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Chapter 1
Introduction
Introduction1.1
Topic1.2
Comparative and Legal Approach1.3
Structure of the Dissertation1.4
Remarks1.5
1.1 Introduction
Policymakers and scientists often say that cartels harm consumer interests and
therefore warrant severe administrative fines.1 However, due to their secrecy, cartels
are often difficult to uncover. To encourage whistle-blowing and disrupt cartels,
the European Commission and Member States of the European Union (“Member
States”) have introduced a “leniency policy”. To ease the cartel discovery and
elimination process, cartel participants have been afforded a few limited opportun-
ities to avoid or reduce administrative fines. This grants full or partial immunity
from fines to a cartel participant that provides information to the European Com-
mission or a national competition authority concerning a cartel. The competition
authorities have been actively using this leniency policy to fight cartels. In fact,
this is how the vast majority of European cartels have been discovered.
Especially at the beginning of this millennium, the European Commission also
started to encourage a second measure called “private enforcement” to target
competition law infringements and protect consumers. According to the European
Commission, cartel victims should be encouraged and assisted to start civil proceed-
ings against cartel participants.2 It is expected that private enforcement will acquire
a more prominent role in competition law in Europe.3
A problem that arises, however, is that private enforcement and the leniency policy
may work against each other.4 A company blowing the whistle on a cartel risks
litigation, liability and financial risk. Legal and other scholars expect the leniency
policy to become less attractive to managers basing their decision-making predom-
inantly on financial risk.5 Even a 100% fine reduction could potentially offer little
incentive for a company if liability were hanging over its head like the sword of
Damocles.
Verstager 2016. See also Appeldoorn & Vedder 2013, para I.I and p. 110.1.
Verstager 2016.2.
Rusu 2017, p. 796.3.
OECD 2015, p. 30; Buccirossi, Marvão & Spagnolo 2015, p. 2; Emmerich 2014, para 3; Vedder 2014,
pp. 1 and 3 et seq.; Silbye 2011, p. 692.
4.
See inter alia Wils 2007, pp. 57-58.5.
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In fact, the European Commission was facing a dilemma. On the one hand, as a
policy-maker it encourages private enforcement in line with European case law.
On the other, as a public enforcer of competition law, the European Commission
obviously tries to safeguard the functionality of public enforcement tools, specifi-
cally the attractiveness of the leniency programme, as a means of discovering car-
tels.6
1.2 Topic
The research question of this study is whether the rise of private enforcement in
Europe would interfere with the effectiveness of the leniency policy. If the answer
is considered in the affirmative, the study further examines whether and how the
leniency policy can remain effective if more private enforcement actions take place.
To answer the first question, several sub-questions will have to be answered first.
The study starts by describing what leniency is, how it works, and what makes a
leniency policy effective. The study also highlights elements in legislation and
practice that could be considered barriers to an effective leniency policy. In addition
the study will answer the questions of whether private enforcement takes place,
what the relevant developments are (on the EU and at national level), and what
the connection and relation between leniency and private enforcement is and how
they are intertwined.
To examine these questions the author will not only examine the systems in the
European Union (“EU”), Germany and the Netherlands but also analyze the practice
in the United States of America (“United States”), where both a leniency policy and
private enforcement have co-existed for many years. By comparing the laws and
practice in the EU, the Member States and the United States, the author will
identify flaws and potential flaws in the European system. The author will make
his own suggestions for a more effective system. He will also analyze the opinions
and expectations of economists and legal scholars regarding the question whether
leniency can remain effective if private enforcement actions increase.
Based on the findings, the author analyzes the solutions of the Antitrust Damages
Directive7 to prevent the emergence of private enforcement from jeopardizing the
leniency policy. The author will also review the solutions provided by the Antitrust
Damages Directive to remove the potential disincentive caused by this situation
and examine whether and how the leniency policy could be even more effective.
Cf. Wilman 2016, pp. 906, 930 and 931 (footnote 242).6.
Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition
law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA relevance.
7.
CHAPTER 114
TOPIC1.2
1.3 Comparative and Legal Approach
Legal scholars often state that one can come to an understanding of a legal system
only by comparing it with another. A comparative approach can help to solve legal
questions.8
This thesis will compare and evaluate the rules relating to leniency and private
enforcement in the EU, the Netherlands, Germany, and the United States. The
American leniency and private enforcement system serves as inspiration, with the
EU, German and Dutch systems being the primary subjects of this research. As part
of this comparative approach, the author will discuss and analyze the legislation,
case law and literature of those countries.
Dutch competition law is a relatively new field. Until 1998, the Netherlands was
considered a “cartel paradise”.9 As the Dutch economy became more open, however,
it was important for businesses to be dynamic and able to respond promptly to
international changes.10 Cooperation between companies to protect market shares
and benefits made the economy rigid and certainly not dynamic, thereby hindering
the country’s competitive position.11 Dutch politicians realized that cartels were
having a negative impact on the economy as a whole.12 Therefore, a new law con-
cerning competition came into force in 1998. Over the last decades, Dutch compe-
tition policy has changed drastically. Because Dutch competition law (as it is known
today) has only applied for two decades, in order to conduct a thorough and more
accurate European-American comparison of the policies of leniency and private
enforcement, the situation in a second country within the EU (Germany) will be
considered and examined.
The author chose Germany and the United States because of their history and de-
velopment of competition law. In Europe Germany was one of the founding fathers
of European competition law.13 According to several German scholars, European
competition policy was initially modeled on German competition policy.14 Currently,
German economists and legal scholars are holding lively discussions about compe-
tition law. They have thoroughly researched the effects of leniency policy and
private enforcement and there are quite a few cartel damages claims pending in
Germany. Furthermore, Germany is especially interesting as it was one of the first
European countries to introduce special private enforcement action provisions into
its legislation. Germany is also particularly interesting for another reason: the
German competition authority, Bundeskartellamt (“BKartA”), has existed for more
than 50 years. In contrast, the Dutch competition authority, Autoriteit Consument &
Markt (“ACM”), has existed for around twenty years. Moreover, when the Dutch
system of competition law and enforcement was created, the Dutch legislature
Cf. Koopmans 2003, pp. 1-14.8.
Van de Gronden 2017, p. 15; Mahler 2017.9.
Amador Sanchez, Dijkman, Lamboo & Smits 2008, p. 22.10.
Ibid.11.
Ibid.12.
Immenga 2008, pp. 3-19.13.
See inter alia Immenga 2008, p. 5.14.
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1.3COMPARATIVE AND LEGAL APPROACH
closely mirrored EU competition law, but also certainly examined the German
system as well.15
The United States influenced German competition policy because of its presence
in Germany after World War II.16 American competition law, or “antitrust law” as
it is referred to in the United States, evolved at the end of the 19th century because
of the necessity of protecting consumers from the rampant expansion, collaboration
and consolidation of companies as a result of industrialization.17 Since then,
American antitrust law has become a model for the rest of the world on how to
maintain a competitive market and protect consumers from anticompetitive behav-
ior. The United States is particularly interesting because of its system of punitive
damages, the assistance of claimants by leniency applicants and its far-reaching
right of discovery.
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation
The aim of the study is to describe the existing systems in the EU, Germany and
the Netherlands, to analyze their strengths and weaknesses and take a similar ap-
proach towards the system that is implemented following the Antitrust Damages
Directive. The goal is to identify the options and opportunities for further improving
the effectiveness of overall competition law enforcement, focusing on both the le-
niency programme and private enforcement.
Chapter 2 provides a broad overview of the leniency policy in the EU, Germany
and the Netherlands. The aim of the research is to investigate whether the increase
in private enforcement will jeopardize the leniency programme and render overall
competition law enforcement less effective. By describing the leniency programmes,
the author encountered several (other) characteristics of the leniency programmes
of the EU and Member States, which potentially impede the effectiveness of the
leniency programmes and overall competition law enforcement. Therefore, he also
evaluates their effectiveness and provides an analysis of the interaction between
the different programmes. Chapter 3 describes and evaluates the development of
private enforcement on an EU level. Chapter 4 provides an overview and compar-
ison of the private enforcement systems in Germany and the Netherlands. In Chapter
5, an overview of the leniency system and the system of private enforcement in
the United States is provided. Chapter 5 also compares the American system with
the private enforcement systems as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 6 brings
the earlier chapters together. The bottlenecks and possible solutions for the bottle-
necks encountered in the previous chapters are discussed; an attempt is made to
solve the bottleneck problems and provide suggestions that would make overall
competition law enforcement more effective. The conclusion of the study is in
Chapter 7.
See inter alia Netherlands, Parliamentary Papers II 1995/96, p. 50. See also Netherlands, Parliamen-
tary Papers II 2004/05, p. 9.
15.
Bunte 2018, pp. 3-4.16.
Gifford & Kudrle 2015, p. 4.17.
CHAPTER 116
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION1.4
1.5 Remarks
Impact on national civil law
The discussions on the Antitrust Damages Directive make clear that civil practition-
ers do not always agree with the pan-European changes influencing their national
laws. The author is fully aware of the fact that the laws of the various Member
States have merit in their own right. Because of the principle of proportionality
and subsidiarity, European legislators must be reticent in introducing new legisla-
tion influencing national laws. However, pan-European rules are sometimes neces-
sary. Differences in the laws and (legal) systems of the various Member States have
led to forum shopping. In some Member States, undertakings are succeeding in
their damages claims; in others, they are not. Some suggestions in Chapter 6 might
not be in line with basic concepts in the civil-law systems in many of the Member
States. However, pan-European legislation and the introduction of a competition
law system with its own characteristics will not always fit perfectly with existing
civil-law provisions that stem from the Napoleonic Code or even from Roman law.
There is a Latin adage saying that changes could be necessary over the course of
time: “Tempora mutantur, nos et mutamur in illis” (“Times change, and we change with
them.”)
Changes within the field of competition law
Competition law is a relatively new field of law, especially in the Netherlands. It
is in constant flux with developments happening in rapid succession.18 This study
is based on the books, case law, articles, etc. that were available on 1 July 2017.
Articles and case law published afterwards are possibly not incorporated into the
study.
Changes in article numbering and terminology
Because of constant changes in the European law and the development of the
European Union itself as an institution, the enumeration of competition law pro-
visions has changed several times. For example, the former Article 81 of the EC
Treaty is now Article 101 of the TFEU. Also, the names of courts and competition
authorities have changed from time to time.
To keep the study readable, especially for those who are not familiar with the
previous article numbers, names and terminology, the author has chosen to use
the terms as they are today, even in references to older articles and institutions.
See inter alia Appeldoorn & Vedder 2013, p. vi.18.
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Chapter 2
Leniency Policy of the European Commission,
Germany and the Netherlands
Introduction2.1
Effective Leniency Policy2.2
Leniency Policy of the European Commission2.3
German Leniency Policy2.4
Dutch Leniency Policy2.5
Interaction Leniency Policies Within the EU2.6
Evaluation Effectiveness Leniency Policy Within EU2.7
Conclusion2.8
2.1 Introduction
In the Antitrust Damages Directive, the leniency programme is described as a pro-
gramme concerning the application of Article 101 TFEU or a corresponding provision
under national law on the basis of which a participant in a secret cartel, indepen-
dently of the other undertakings involved in the cartel, cooperates with an investi-
gation of the competition authority, by voluntarily providing presentations regard-
ing that participant's knowledge of, and role in, the cartel in return for which that
participant receives immunity from, or a reduction in, fines for its involvement in
the cartel.19
Illegal cartels are often difficult to detect without the cooperation of the undertak-
ings or individuals involved in them.20 Therefore, the European Commission con-
sidered it in the EU’s interest to reward undertakings that are willing to put an end
to illegal practices and cooperate in the European Commission’s investigation
independently of the other undertakings involved in the cartel.21
Applying for leniency was, and still is considered as tattling and betraying, and
therefore has a negative connotation. However, there is empirical evidence that
leniency programmes are beneficial because they encourage the disruption of col-
lusive practices and expedite the cartel investigation.22 In fact, leniency programmes
are now the main tool for the discovery and prosecution of cartels.23 To be effective,
it is important for the leniency policy to be effectively set and carried out. In the
United States, for example, the amount of fines collected in 1993 was almost twice
as high as in 1992, a significant increase in whistle-blowing attributable just to the
Antitrust Damages Directive, Article 2(15).19.
Reuter 2016, p. 483. See also Wils 2016, pp. 336-337; Vedder 2014, pp. 1 and 3.20.
European Commission 2006 (Notice on immunity of fines and reduction fines).21.
See e.g. OECD 2002, pp. 10, 13, 26 and 106; Borell, Jiménez & Carcía 2013, p. 111.22.
Bigoni, Fridolfsson, Le Coq & Spagnolo 2012, p. 368 et seq. See also inter alia European Commission
2017 (Proposal Enforcement Directive), pp. 3 and 27.
23.
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modification of the leniency programme.24 Similarly, the modification of the
European Commission’s leniency policy in 2002 (i.e. the introduction of full im-
munity) resulted in more applications for leniency.25
Chapter 2 describes the characteristics and developments of the leniency programme
in the EU, Germany and the Netherlands in order to answer the question whether
the leniency programme will be jeopardized, and overall competition law enforce-
ment becomes less effective, by an upcoming private enforcement. By analyzing
the leniency programmes, the author also encountered several characteristics of
the leniency programmes and the application of the programmes in the EU and
Member States, which potentially have a negative influence on the effectiveness
of the leniency programmes and hence on overall competition law enforcement.
Therefore, this Chapter also discusses the effectiveness of the leniency programmes
and whether potential improvements exist.
2.2 Effective Leniency Policy
2.2.1 Introduction
Consumer welfare will increase if prices reach an equilibrium based on supply and
demand. A cartel prevents this balance from being achieved because a cartel is
formed to provide a surplus for the cartel infringers.26 The underlying reason for
competition law enforcement is that if cartels can be prevented, competition can
be sustained, consumer welfare will be increased and the structure of the market
will be balanced, and, thus, competition as such will be protected.27
As economist Spagnolo describes it, the most important objective of antitrust laws
is avoiding the infringements (e.g. the cartel) from taking place.28 Deterrence acts
on a large number of potential infringements and considerably reduces prosecution
costs.29 He notes that ex ante deterrence is and should be the primary objective of
law enforcement and the foremost criterion for the evaluation of its optimality
and efficiency.30
When used correctly, leniency may appear to be a useful tool for uncovering cartels,
sustaining competition and increasing consumer welfare.31 The cooperation may
consist of providing intelligence and evidence with respect to cartel violations as
Motchenkova 2005, § 1.3 and Chapter 5. See also Motchenkova 2004.24.
See inter alia Wils 2016, pp. 333-334; Hoang, Hüschelrath, Laitenberger & Smuda 2014, pp. 15-23;
Billiet 2009, p. 14.
25.
Bigoni, Fridolfsson, Le Coq & Spagnolo 2012, pp. 369-370; Spagnolo 2008, p. 260. Cf. Verstager
2016.
26.
CJEU 4 June 2009 (T-Mobile v Netherlands and Others), point 38. See also CJEU 6 October 2009 (GlaxoS-
mithKline v European Commission), point 63. Cf. inter alia Bigoni, Fridolfsson, Le Coq & Spagnolo 2012,
pp. 369-370; Motchenkova 2005.
27.
Spagnolo 2008, p. 264. See also Van Lierop & Pijnacker Hordijk 2007, p. 14.28.
Spagnolo 2008, pp. 264-265.29.
Ibid.30.
Cf. Marvão & Spagnolo 2014, pp. 57-58; Bellamy & Child 2013, para 5.022.31.
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well as admission of the violation and acceptance of remedial or compensatory
measures.32
The leniency programme is based on game theory. Game theory relies on an abstract
model to study how rational people make strategic decisions. By providing an in-
centive to the first self-reporting undertaking, the leniency programme in fact
creates a “prisoner’s dilemma”.33 If undertaking A is the first undertaking to report
the cartel, it will not be fined. If undertaking A does not report the cartel, and the
others also do not, it will again not be fined as long as the cartel is not uncovered
by other means.34 However, if competitor B reports the cartel to the competition
authority first – out of fear of the others doing so first – undertaking B will not
pay a fine but undertaking A will.
In 1978, the United States introduced the “Corporate Leniency Programme” to assist
in identifying cartels. It was only in 1996 that the European Commission also in-
troduced a policy of encouraging companies to report illegal cartel practices in
exchange for immunity from or reduction of fines.35 Similar rules have since been
introduced in both Germany and the Netherlands.
To analyze whether the emergence of private enforcement may jeopardize leniency,
it is important to determine what is considered to be an effective leniency policy,
and how effectiveness can be achieved. The effectiveness of the leniency policy
may be assessed by determining whether and to what extent the objectives of the
leniency policy will be achieved with the existing policy. The author distinguishes
between the “direct” and “indirect” objectives of the leniency policy. Direct objec-
tives result directly from the leniency policy whereas indirect objectives are indi-
rectly reached as a result of achieving the direct objectives.
2.2.1.1 Direct Objectives
The following objectives are categorized as direct objectives: uncovering cartels;
collecting information and contributing evidence of the existence of cartels; and
destabilizing cartels.
2.2.1.2 Detecting Cartels
The purpose of a leniency policy is to identify cartels in the first place.36 Without
information provided by at least one of the cartel participants, it is difficult to detect
a cartel.37 Point 8 of the Model Leniency Programme of the European Competition
Cf. Wils 2007, p. 25.32.
Silbye 2011, pp. 691 and 693; Spagnolo 2005, pp. 6 and 13.33.
For example, a cartel could also be revealed via officials that become aware of cartel violations
during criminal investigations or (old) employees blowing the whistle.
34.
Borell, Jiménez, Carcía 2013, p. 108.35.
See inter alia Wils 2016, pp. 336-337; Faull & Nikpay 2014, para 8.106; Marvão & Spagnolo 2014,
p. 57; Bellamy & Child 2013, para 5.022; Bigoni, Fridolfsson, Le Coq & Spagnolo 2012, pp. 368-369;
36.
Spagnolo 2008, pp. 262-263; Amador Sanchez, Dijkman, Lamboo & Smits, 2008, p. 35; Spagnolo
2005, p. 3; European Commission 2004 (Notice on Cooperation within the NCA), para 37.
Wils 2016, p. 336; European Commission 2017 (Proposal Enforcement Directive), p. 3.37.
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Network (“ECN”) states that a cartel constitutes a very serious violation of competi-
tion rules and is often extremely difficult to detect and investigate without the
cooperation of at least one of the participants.38 Mr Hammond of the Department
of Justice of the United States (“DOJ”) — the DOJ being one of the federal competition
authorities in the United States, along with the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
— states that the leniency policy is in fact responsible for the successful detection
of most of the cartels that have been found:39
“While all of these tools are valuable and frequently utilized in our investigations,
the fact is that the U.S. Corporate Leniency Program has directly led to the detection
and successful prosecution of more international cartels than all of these other powers
combined. Unquestionably, leniency programs are the greatest investigative tool ever
designed to fight cartels.”
(…).
“Leniency programs have led to the detection and dismantling of the largest global
cartels ever prosecuted and resulted in record-breaking fines in the United States,
Canada, the EU and other jurisdictions. In the United States alone, companies have
been fined over $2.5 billion dollars for antitrust crimes since 1997, with over 90
percent of this total tied to investigations assisted by leniency applicants. And there
is more to come. Currently, the Division is investigating over 50 suspected interna-
tional cartels operating on six continents. More than half of these investigations were
initiated or are being advanced by information received from a leniency applicant.”
2.2.1.3 Collecting Information and Proving the Existence of Cartels
Proving the existence of a cartel is directly related to the detection of a cartel.40 For
successful prosecution it is necessary to have sufficient evidence of the existence
of a cartel. Without the assistance of at least one of the cartel participants this is
difficult to achieve. J-C Puffer-Mariette states: 41
“Selbst wenn eine Wettbewerbsbehörde einen konkreten Anfangsverdacht gegen ein
Kartell hat, wird sie in der Regel erhebliche Schwierigkeiten bei der Ermittlung und
dem Nachweis eines Kartells haben. (…). Haben sich die Unternehmen im Vorfeld
auf eine Durchsuchung der Wettbewerbsbehörde eingestellt, so ist einschlägiges Be-
weismaterial nur schwer auffindbar. Zudem wird die Wettbewerbsbehörde ohne
einen Insiderhinweis nicht zielgerichtet vorgehen können. Selbst wenn sie bei Durch-
suchungen potentielles Beweismaterial sicherstellt, wird die Auswertung häufig einen
hohen Personalaufwand erfordern.”
Mr. Hammond of the DOJ has also made clear that a leniency application not only
makes the existence of a cartel become apparent, but also assists in proving the
existence of the cartel:42
Cf. Puffer-Mariette 2007, pp. 18-19.38.
Hammond 2004. See also Hammond 2000 (2).39.
See inter alia Faull & Nikpay 2014, para 8.107; Bellamy & Child 2013, para 5.022; Amador Sanchez,
Dijkman, Lamboo & Smits 2008, p. 35; Wils 2007, pp. 41-42.
40.
Puffer-Mariette 2007, p. 19.41.
Hammond 2000 (2). See also Wils 2007, p. 42.42.
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“An effective Leniency Program will lead cartel members, in some cases, to confess
their conduct even before an investigation is opened. In other cases, it will induce
organizations already under investigation to abandon the cartel stonewall, race to
the government, and provide evidence against the other cartel members.”
2.2.1.4 Destabilizing Cartels
Another purpose of leniency policy is to destabilize existing cartels.43 The system
of leniency may create turmoil among the cartel participants. A leniency policy
may cause unrest among cartel participants because it creates a lurking risk that
other cartel participants will apply for leniency. If one of the cartel participants
applies for leniency, it will leave the other cartel participants without the option
to get immunity or a reduced fine. As said above, this can be considered a “prisoner’s
dilemma”.44 The reason why a participant in the cartel is likely to provide evidence
against its partner in crime is because the authorities have the leverage of being
able to offer a reduction in the penalty.45
Mr Hammond of the DOJ stated that the more anxious a company is about being
caught, the more likely it is that it will apply for leniency: 46
“The Race to the Courthouse. The more anxious a company is that its cartel partici-
pation may be discovered by the government, the more likely it is to report its
wrongdoing in exchange for amnesty. Of course, amnesty is only available to the first
one in the door. If you are second, even if only by matter of a few hours, which has
happened on a number of occasions, the second firm and all of its culpable executives
will be subject to full prosecution. This winner-take-all approach sets up a race, and
this dynamic leads to tension and mistrust among cartel members.”
2.2.2 Indirect Objectives
In addition to the direct objectives, the following are indirect objectives: punishing
cartels and returning to society the improperly obtained benefits; terminating
cartels; and the deterrent effect.
2.2.2.1 Punishing Cartels and Returning the Benefit Obtained
As stated above, cartels have deleterious impact on consumers. After detecting and
proving the existence of a cartel, the next step is to punish the cartel participants.47
These days, cartel participants can expect severe punishments.
Wils 2016, p. 338; Amador Sanchez, Dijkman, Lamboo & Smits 2008, p. 35; Wils 2007, p. 42.43.
See Section 2.2.1. See also Faull & Nikpay 2014, para 8.108; McElwee 2004, p. 561.44.
Cf. McElwee 2004, p. 561.45.
Hammond 2000 (2).46.
Bigoni, Fridolfsson, Le Coq & Spagnolo 2012, p. 369; European Competition Network 2006, p. 8;
Spagnolo 2008, pp. 259 and 262-263.
47.
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As policymakers consider cartels bad for consumers, and hazardous for the economy,
policymakers seek to make competition enforcement as effective as possible. The
goal is to prevent a competition law infringer from obtaining a benefit from this
misconduct.
Policymakers use (or consider using) the following three separate legal instruments
to reduce cartel activities.
i. The first is administrative law, which is still the most important instrument
within the European legal framework. Authorities may impose high adminis-
trative fines. Next to the high fines, authorities often inform the public about
investigations and fines, which results in publicly naming and shaming of
infringing undertakings. Developments in recent years include changes to the
leniency policy and fines for the individuals directly involved in the cartel.
ii. The second is criminal law, several politicians believe that competition law
violations are sufficiently serious to justify imprisonment as a sanction.48
iii. The third is private enforcement. The Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”) has
held that any citizen or business suffering harm as a result of a breach of EU
antitrust rules should be entitled to claim reparation from the undertaking
responsible for such damage. The CJEU has pointed out that EU law guarantees
this right. Despite the existence of this right, it is the European Commission’s
opinion that private enforcement is not being relied on sufficiently. The
European Commission has introduced the Antitrust Damages Directive to
promote private enforcement within the Member States.
2.2.2.2 Terminating Cartels
In the detection and destabilization of cartels, an obvious aim is to end the cartel.49
An undertaking that applies for leniency is normally required to immediately end
its participation in the cartel. For example, point 13(1) of the ECN Model Leniency
Programme 2012 makes clear that the applicant must satisfy the condition that its
involvement in the alleged cartel is immediately ended with its application, unless
its continued involvement would, in the competition authority’s view, be reasonably
necessary to preserve the integrity of the competition authority’s inspections.
Also, other cartel infringers have an incentive to end a cartel because otherwise
the cartel could attract additional severe punishments. Moreover, if other under-
takings are no longer joining the cartel, the cartel will be less effective. Normally,
a cartel can only remain functional if the relevant undertakings are joining it.
See inter alia Financieele Dagblad 2010, p. 3.48.
European Competition Network 2006, p. 8.49.
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2.2.2.3 Deterrence
It has been a long-established principle in the science of criminology that the in-
creased possibility of getting caught deters more than the severity of the punish-
ment:50
“Es ist eine kriminologische Binsenweisheit, dass dieWahrscheinlichkeit des Entdeck-
twerdens mehr abschreckt als die Höhe der Strafe. Vor diesem Hintergrund wäre es
wichtiger, mit funktionierenden und aufeinander abgestimmten Kronzeugenregel-
ungen die Aufdeckungsquote zu erhöhen, als die Verstrafrechtlichung des Kartellrechts
voranzutreiben.”
One of the indirect objectives of a leniency policy is for undertakings to fear anti-
competitive behavior with competitors more because the chance of getting caught
and being fined is bigger where a leniency policy is effective (as it discovers and
proves the existence of the cartel). The aim is to prevent undertakings from in-
fringing anti-cartel provisions. In fact, the aim of the leniency programme is to act
as a deterrent to participation in unlawful cartels.51 As economist Spagnolo notes,
deterrence is and should be the primary objective of law enforcement and is the
foremost criterion for the evaluation of its optimality and efficiency.52 Deterrence
acts on a large number of potential infringements and provides large savings in
prosecution costs.53
The chance of getting caught is considerably higher when there is a leniency
policy.54 Because more cartels have been detected and more undertakings have
been punished heavily, undertakings are much more reluctant these days to par-
ticipate in a cartel. Nowadays, often part of an undertaking’s compliance policy is
to safeguard that its employees at all times act in accordance with competition
law. More and more undertakings organize — often with the assistance of external
counsel — compliance training for employees in order to prevent undertakings
from getting involved in anticompetitive behavior.
2.2.3 Becoming Effective
To make a leniency programme effective and reach the objectives referred to above,
the leniency policy must take two main principles into account: (i) it is beneficial
for an undertaking to apply for leniency; and (ii) the leniency policy is set and
carried out in a clear, predictable and transparent way, with undertakings being
treated equally.
Schroeder 2006, p. 453; Bos & Struijlaart 2002, p. 232.50.
European Commission 2004 (Notice on Cooperation within the NCA), para 37. See also Bigoni,
Fridolfsson, Le Coq & Spagnolo 2015, p. 665; Bellamy & Child 2013, para 5.022; Spagnolo 2008,
pp. 262-263.
51.
Spagnolo 2008, pp. 264-265. See also Van Lierop & Pijnacker Hordijk 2007, p. 14.52.
Spagnolo 2008, pp. 264-265.53.
See inter alia Hammond 2004. See also Motchenkova 2005, pp. 7-8.54.
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2.2.3.1 Cost-Benefit Analysis
The most important underlying factor in choosing to apply for leniency is whether
the application would be beneficial for an undertaking from a cost-benefit perspec-
tive. The financial risks, the personal risks and the rewards influence the decision
to apply for leniency or not: 55
”The reason why these concepts are at the heart of a successful leniency programme
is that companies typically conduct a cost/benefit analysis in order to determine
whether it is in their interest to co-operate with the Commission.”
To illustrate the above, the European Commission introduced its first leniency
programme in 1996, with a possible fine reduction by up to 75 percent. In reality,
there was little incentive to report the cartel to the European Commission without
a guarantee of full immunity.56 After the policy was modified, the 2002 leniency
notice provided an applicant with full immunity if certain conditions were met.
The 2002 leniency notice lead to around 167 applications for leniency until 2006.57
In contrast, the 1996 leniency notice, which had been in place for a much longer
period of time, resulted in only 80 leniency applications.58 The cost-benefit analysis
is influenced by a number of aspects, such as the following:
i. the chance of the cartel being detected;
ii. the chance of a cartel participant getting caught;
iii. the expected penalty (higher penalties lead to a more effective leniency policy,
because they can result in larger benefits to leniency applicants);59
iv. the benefit of applying for leniency, e.g. a fine reduction and no imprisonment;
v. the effort required to make an application for leniency, including the hiring
of external counsel and other costs;
vi. the information to be provided, e.g. whether this creates a risk of finding
other infringements;
vii. the expected criminal sanctions or civil claims;60
viii. the expected public response;
ix. the effect of a leniency request on the undertaking’s reputation; and
x. any personal punitive and/or financial implications for decision makers and
other employees of the undertaking.
McElwee 2004, p. 559.55.
Billiet 2009, p. 14.56.
Ibid.57.
Ibid. The same is true for the leniency policy in the United States where the introduction of full
immunity from fines resulted in more undertakings applying for leniency. See also Wils 2016,
p. 334; Van der Meulen & Van Oers 2002, p. 160.
58.
Wils 2007, p. 42; Motchenkova 2005.59.
Buccirossi, Marvão & Spagnolo 2015, p. 5; Guttuso 2014, p. 94; Silbye 2011, p. 692.60.
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2.2.3.2 Equality, Transparency, Predictability and Certainty
For a leniency policy to be effective, and hence for it to achieve its direct and indirect
objectives, it is also essential for the leniency policy to be set and carried out in a
transparent, predictable and non-discriminatory way.
The experiences of various cartel authorities has showed that cartel participants
are more willing to apply for leniency and cooperate with the competition
authority if the latter provides transparency throughout the anti-cartel enforcement
programme.61 For example, the European Commission noted that companies con-
sidering leniency need a sufficient degree of legal certainty to be incentivized to
cooperate.62 The DOJ has acknowledged that transparency in enforcement policies
maximizes cooperation.63 It has taken into consideration several principles for
creating the most effective leniency policy possible:64
– A robust, effective international anti-cartel enforcement program depends on
cooperation from at least some of those who have engaged in the cartel activity.
– Prospective cooperating parties come forward in direct proportion to the pre-
dictability and certainty of their treatment following cooperation.
– Therefore, prospective cooperating parties need to know (1) the rules, (2) how
prosecutorial discretion will be exercised in applying the rules, and (3) that they
will be treated fairly and equitably.
– An anti-cartel enforcement program maximizes the incentives for cooperation
from cartel members if it has transparency in the elements of its enforcement
program discussed in Part II, and it ensures proportional and equitable treat-
ment of offenders as discussed in Part III.
Hence, the DOJ’s experience has been that transparency must include not only
explicitly stated standards and policy, but also clear explanations of prosecutorial
discretion in applying those standards and policies.65 According to the DOJ, pro-
spective amnesty applicants come forward in direct proportion to the predictability
and certainty of whether they will be accepted into the programme. Uncertainty
in the qualification process kills an amnesty programme.66 Likewise, competition
experts are also aware of the fact that the leniency policy should be equal, predict-
able, transparent and clear.67 Competition law practitioner Voet van Vormizeele
makes clear that there is a direct relation between the effectiveness of the leniency
policy and the level of certainty felt by the leniency applicant:68
“Unter der alten Bonusregelung hatte sich das Bundeskartellamt immer noch einen
Ermessenspielraum hinsichtlich der Nichtfestsetzung ein der Geldbuße vorbehalten.
See for example Wils 2016, p. 345; Hoang, Hüschelrath, Laitenberger & Smuda 2014, p. 17 et seq.;
Spratling 1999 (2).
61.
European Commission 2017 (Proposal Enforcement Directive), p. 3.62.
Hammond 2000 (2).63.
Spratling 1999 (2). See also Hammond 2004; Hammond 2000 (1).64.
Hammond 2000 (2).65.
Ibid.66.
McElwee 2004, p. 559.67.
Voet van Vormizeele 2006, p. 293.68.
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Hierdurch [i.e. with the adjusted policy with less discretion] wird natürlich
die Rechtssicherheit für die betroffenen Kartellbeteiligten erheblich erhöht: In der
Vergangenheit hatte sich gezeigt, dass allzu weite Ermessenspielräume in kartellrecht-
lichen Kronzeugenregelungen deren Effektivität erheblich mindern konnten.”
2.2.4 Interim Conclusion
Leniency appears to be an important instrument for fighting cartels. A leniency
policy is more effective if more cartels are destabilized, detected, proved to exist
and punished. Furthermore, a leniency policy can be considered more effective if
penalties for cartel infringements are more of a deterrent and cartel activities are
more often ended.
To ensure that a leniency policy is effective, the undertaking applying for leniency
should have an incentive from a cost-benefit perspective to apply for leniency. The
undertaking needs to benefit from its application. Furthermore, it is essential for
a leniency policy to be set and carried out in a clear, predictable, transparent and
non-discriminatory way.
2.3 Leniency Policy of the European Commission
2.3.1 Introduction
In its notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, the
European Commission states that the interests of consumers and citizens in the
detection and punishment of illegal cartels outweigh the interest in fining those
undertakings that enable the European Commission to discover cartel practices.69
The European Commission considers that an undertaking’s collaboration in the
discovery of the existence of a cartel has intrinsic value.70 A decisive contribution
to the opening of an investigation or to the finding of an infringement justifies
granting the undertaking in question immunity from any fine.71
The European Commission introduced its first leniency policy in 1996, with a
possible fine reduction by up to 75 percent.72 Before 1996, the European Commission
had already been reducing fines or even abstaining from imposing fines in recog-
nition of cooperation received in a number of cases.73
With the introduced leniency programme, the reality was that there was still little
incentive to report the cartel to the European Commission. This was because the
programme lacked a guarantee of full immunity.74 In 2002, the policy was refined
European Commission 2006 (Notice on immunity of fines and reduction of fines), point 3.69.
Ibid, point 4.70.
Ibid.71.
European Commission 1996 (Notice on non-imposition or reduction of fines). See also Billiet 2009,
p. 14.
72.
Wils 2007, p. 35.73.
Billiet 2009, p. 14.74.
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and extended.75 Full immunity from fines became available.76 The European
Commission revised its leniency policy again in 2006 to provide greater guidance
and clarity to immunity applicants in assessing the information and evidence re-
quired to meet the immunity threshold.77 Furthermore, the European Commission
introduced the concept of a “marker”.78 With a marker, the cartel participant who
comes first is able to contact the European Commission to declare its willingness
to cooperate. The timing of the placement of the marker is decisive for the status
of the application.
A more elaborate explanation of European competition law and the leniency pro-
gramme as such will be provided in the sections that follow. This explanation starts
with a brief overview of the main rules of EU competition law in Section 2.3.2.79
Competition law in general will be discussed first. The three pillars are (i) cartel
prohibition, (ii) abuse of a dominant position and (iii) merger control. Similar pillars
also apply in the individual Member States. As the rules are rather similar in the
various Member States, these will not be discussed again when specifically discussing
the German and Dutch leniency policies in the next sections that follow.
In Section 2.3.3, the role and powers of the European Commission as the competi-
tion authority will be discussed. Section 2.3.4 describes and analyzes the leniency
policy rules of the European Commission. Section 2.3.5 describes how the European
Commission’s leniency policy works in daily practice. Section 2.3.6 follows with
an evaluation of the European Commission’s leniency policy.
2.3.2 Rules of Competition Law
To protect and improve competition within the EU, there are three main competition
law pillars.80 These three pillars are (i) cartel prohibition, (ii) abuse of a dominant
position, and (iii) merger control. Undertakings active in the European market are
required to comply with the rules set out as part of the legal framework for each
pillar.81 The Member States have similar legislation to prevent undertakings from
infringing competition law. Below the three pillars will be described briefly. In
fact, for the study of the relationship between leniency and private enforcement,
the cartel prohibition is the most important pillar, as the leniency programme only
applies to this particular infringement.
In addition to the rules under these three pillars, there are also other principles
that affect European competition policy, including procurement law, Article 107
TFEU (State Aid), Article 106 TFEU (former Article 86 EC) and the useful effect or
state action doctrine of Article 4(3) Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) (former Article
European Commission 2002 (Notice on immunity of fines and reduction of fines).75.
Billiet 2009, p. 14.76.
See inter alia Wils 2016, p. 328; ABA 2006.77.
See inter alia Frese 2007, p. 52 et seq. See also Demetriou & Gray 2007, p. 1434.78.
See more comprehensively discussed Van de Gronden & De Vries 2006, pp. 32-66.79.
See inter alia Essers 2009, p. 584.80.
Cf. Van de Gronden & De Vries 2006, p. 33.81.
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10 EC) in conjunction with Article 101 or 102 TFEU.82 Because they are not directly
relevant for this study, they are not further discussed.
2.3.2.1 Cartel Prohibition
The European Commission makes clear that the objective of cartel prohibition is
to protect competition as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and ensuring
an efficient allocation of resources.83
Article 101 of the TFEU prohibits agreements and other collusive behaviour between
undertakings that restrict competition and affect trade between Member States.84
The Antitrust Damages Directive defines a cartel as an agreement or concerted
practice between two or more competitors aimed at coordinating their competitive
behaviour on the market or influencing the relevant parameters of competition
through practices such as, but not limited to, the fixing or coordination of purchase
or selling prices or other trading conditions, including in relation to intellectual
property rights, the allocation of production or sales quotas, the sharing of markets
and purchasers, including bid-rigging, restrictions of imports or exports or anti-
competitive actions against other competitors.85
The purpose of Article 101 TFEU is to preclude restrictive agreements between in-
dependent market operators, whether horizontal (i.e. between parties operating
at the same level of the economy) or vertical (i.e. between parties operating at dif-
ferent levels), thus promoting effective and undistorted competition in the market.
In 1966, the CJEU held that vertical agreements could also breach competition
rules. In the landmark decision in the Consten v Grundig cases, the CJEU stated that:86
“Competitionmay be distorted within the meaning of article 85(1) [now 101 TFEU]
not only by agreements which limit it as between parties, but also by agreements
which prevent or restrict the competition whichmight take place between one of them
and third parties. For this purpose, it is irrelevant whether the parties to the agreement
are or are not on a footing of equality as regards their position and functioning in
the economy.”
Under Article 101(2) of the TFEU, any agreement or decision violating the cartel
prohibition is void.87
If an agreement is considered to restrict trade and competition within the meaning
of Article 101(1) of the TFEU, it may still be exempted from the prohibition, based
on Article 101(3) of the TFEU. This requires fulfilment of the four cumulative con-
ditions referred to in that provision. They are as follows: (i) improvement of pro-
duction, distribution or promotion of technical or economic progress, (ii) fair share
Cf. Van de Gronden & De Vries 2006, p. 33.82.
European Commission 2004 (Communication on Article 81(3)), para 2.2.1.83.
Van Bael & Bellis 2010, p. 15.84.
Antitrust Damages Directive, Article 2 (14).85.
CJEU 13 July 1966 (Établissements Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v European Commission), p. 339.86.
See inter alia Ligteringen 2016, pp. 24-25.87.
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of the resulting benefit for consumers, (iii) indispensability of the restriction of
competition, and (iv) no elimination of competition.
Article 1 of Regulation No 1/2003 makes clear that the European Commission has
no (longer) sole jurisdiction to grant an exemption under Article 101(3) of the TFEU.
Thus, the national competition authorities and national courts are entitled to apply
this TFEU exemption as well. Article 101(3) of the TFEU is now a legal exemption
based on a self-analysis conducted by the parties involved.88 Article 101(3) of the
TFEU does not exclude certain types of agreement from its scope.89 As a matter of
principle, the exemption covers all restrictive agreements fulfilling the four condi-
tions of Article 101(3) of the TFEU. However, agreements that severely restrict
competition are unlikely to fulfil the 101(3) conditions. Such restrictive agreements
are usually blacklisted in block exemption regulations or identified as hard-core
restrictions in European Commission guidelines and notices. Agreements of this
nature generally fail to meet at least the first two conditions of Article 101(3). They
neither create objective economic benefits nor benefit consumers.90
After the introduction of Regulation 1/2003, agreements between undertakings
with possible consequences for competition were no longer subject to the require-
ment to give notice of them to the European Commission. As described, since
Regulation 1/2003 it has been up to the undertakings themselves to assess the le-
gality or illegality of their actions. Although block exemptions already existed prior
to Regulation No 1/2003, the aforementioned procedural change affected the im-
portance of these block exemptions. By granting block exemptions, the European
Commission employs its power to exempt certain agreements for the purpose of
providing transparency and legal certainty for undertakings.
In its guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) of the TFEU, the European
Commission pointed out in which cases the conditions of Article 101(3) of the TFEU
will be met.91 The guidelines are non-binding and without prejudice to the case
law of the CJEU and the EGC concerning the interpretation of Article 101(1) and
(3) of the TFEU or to the interpretation that the courts of the European Union place
on those provisions.92
2.3.2.2 Abuse of a Dominant Position
Insofar as it may affect trade between Member States, the abuse of a dominant
position by one or more undertakings within the EU or a substantial part of it is
prohibited under Article 102 of the TFEU. Such an infringement is comprised of
two elements: (i) there must be a dominant position; and (ii) there must be abuse.93
Cf. Van de Gronden & De Vries 2006, para 2.1.1.88.
European Commission 2004 (Communication on Article 81(3)), point 46.89.
European Commission 2004 (Communication on Article 81(3)).90.
Ibid.91.
Ibid. Cf. CJEU 18 January 2017 (Toshiba Corp. v Commission), points 67 and 72. Cf. Van Lierop & Pijn-
acker Hordijk 2007, p. 21.
92.
Van de Gronden & De Vries 2006, p. 34 et seq.93.
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Article 102 of the TFEU does not define the term “dominant position.” However,
the practices of the European Commission and the case law of the European courts
have clarified the concept.94 In the case of United Brands, the CJEU defined a domin-
ant position as a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking that
enables it to prevent the maintenance of effective competition on the relevant
market by empowering it to behave, to an appreciable extent, independently of its
competitors and ultimately its consumers.95 A dominant position exists when an
undertaking is able to act (relatively) independently because of its economic
strength, without fear that competitors (or new entrants) will effectively compete.
The concept of abuse relates to the behavior (i.e. exploitative, exclusionary, or
structurally abusive behavior) of the undertaking holding the dominant position.96
Through recourse to methods which differ from those conditioning normal compe-
tition, this abuse has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the level of com-
petition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition.97 This abuse
is not only aimed at practices that cause damage to consumers directly, but also
those detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competitive struc-
ture.98 Examples of abuse of a dominant position are inter alia predatory pricing99,
tying,100 refusals to deal,101 and refusals to provide access to essential facilities.102
For undertakings entrusted with tasks of general interest, an infringement of Article
102 of the TFEU may be justified under Article 106(2) of the TFEU. The Article 106(2)
exemption also applies to cartel infringements under Article 101 of the TFEU.103
As mentioned before, the pillar of the abuse of dominant position is not particularly
relevant for the effect of an upcoming private enforcement for the effectiveness of
the leniency programme, as the relationship with the leniency policy is lacking.
However, private enforcement of cartel infringements and the abuse of a dominant
position are narrowly connected. Civil enforcement cases in relation to the abuse
of a dominant position are often also relevant for cartel damages cases.
2.3.2.3 Merger Control
The EU and its Member States are of the opinion that concentrations (i.e. mergers
and acquisitions) should not lead to a significant impediment of effective competi-
Van Bael & Bellis 2010, p. 101.94.
CJEU 14 February 1978 (United Brands v European Commission), point 65. See also Van Bael & Bellis
2010, p. 101. Cf. inter alia cases: CJEU 21 February 1973 (Continental Can v European Commission); CJEU
95.
16 December 1975 (Suiker Unie v European Commission); Commission Decision of 17 December 1975
(Chiquita); Commission Decision of 4 July 2007 (Wanadoo v Telefónica).
CJEU 13 February 1979 (Hoffmann La Roche v European Commission), point 91. See also Van Bael &
Bellis 2010, p. 798.
96.
CJEU 13 February 1979 (Hoffmann La Roche v European Commission), point 91.97.
Van Bael & Bellis 2010, p. 798.98.
Eg. CJEU 3 July 1991 (Akzo v European Commission). See more information Van Bael & Bellis 2010,
p. 806 et seq.
99.
Eg. Commission Decision of 24 May 2004, COMP/C-3/37.792 (Microsoft – Windows Media Player).100.
Eg. CJEU 14 February 1978 (United Brands), point 207.101.
Eg. CJEU 26 November 1998 (Bronner/Mediaprint).102.
Van de Gronden & De Vries 2006, p. 34.103.
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tion in the EU or a substantial part of it.104 Therefore, special rules have been im-
plemented.
Regulation No 139/2004 applies to concentrations with a European dimension.
According to Article 1 of Regulation No 139/2004, an EU-wide dimension exists if
certain turnover thresholds are met.
Whether the European Commission considers a concentration incompatible with
the internal market depends on the question whether effective competition will
be significantly impeded. Furthermore, the efficiency defense is reinforced by the
fact that Merger Regulation No 139/2004 explicitly refers to efficiencies in recital
29, which together with Article 2(1)(b) stipulates that technical and economic pro-
gress may be taken into account in assessing mergers.105
2.3.3 Enforcement by the European Commission
The European Commission is independent of the Member States. Its job is to repre-
sent and uphold the interests of the EU as a whole. It drafts proposals for new
European laws, which it presents to the European Parliament and the Council.106
It is also the EU’s executive arm.107 This means it manages the day-to-day business
of the EU, implementing its policies, running its programmes, and spending its
funds.108 The European Commission also acts as the “guardian of the Treaties”.109
The European Commission, together with the CJEU, is responsible for making sure
EU law is properly applied by and in all Member States.110 If the European Commis-
sion finds that a Member State is not applying EU law, and therefore is not meeting
its legal obligations, the European Commission takes steps to rectify the situation.
In such cases, the European Commission can launch an “infringement procedure”.
In practice, this means sending an official letter stating why the European Commis-
sion considers the country to be infringing EU law and setting a deadline for
sending the European Commission a detailed reply.111 If this procedure has no effect
on the infringement, the European Commission refers the case to the CJEU, which
has the power to impose penalties.112 The CJEU’s decisions are binding on the
Member States and on EU institutions.113
The European Commission is empowered to actively enforce the competition law
rules stated under Article 101 and Article 102 of the TFEU and the rules regarding
Regulation No 139/2004, Article 2. See also Van Bael & Bellis 2010, Chapter 7; Van de Gronden &
De Vries 2006, p. 35 et seq.
104.
Van de Gronden & De Vries 2006, p. 35.105.
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies_en.106.
Ibid.107.
Ibid. See also Bellamy & Child 2013, paras 1.046-1.048.108.
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies_en; Van Bael & Bellis 2010, p. 1 et
seq.
109.
Ibid.110.
See e.g. Regulation No 2015/1589 (successor of Regulation No 659/1999), Article 6 concerning State
Aid. See also Bellamy & Child 2013, para 17.087 et seq.
111.
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies_en.112.
Ibid.113.
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merger control.114 The European Commission has a package of enforcement tools
to effectively enforce competition law. These tools are provided to a large extent
in Regulation No 139/2004 and Regulation No 1/2003.
The European Commission enjoys a number of investigation tools (e.g. inspection
of business and non-business premises and written requests for information).115
The European Commission may also impose fines on undertakings violating EU
antitrust rules. Fines can run up to 10 percent of an undertaking’s turnover.116 It
also examines whether a concentration significantly hinders effective competition
in the EU. If it does not, the concentration is approved unconditionally. If it does
– and no sufficient commitments aimed at removing the impediment are proposed
by the merging firms – the concentration is prohibited by the European Commis-
sion.117
2.3.4 Present Leniency Policy
Regulation No 1/2003 is based on a parallel jurisdiction system in which national
competition authorities are, alongside the European Commission, active enforcers
of Article 101 and Article 102 of the TFEU.118 The European Commission is entitled
to act only if the cartel has an effect on the internal market (between Member
States).
As a consequence of the parallel jurisdiction system, several leniency programmes
may apply simultaneously and the applicant may have to file applications to more
than one authority.119 This means that if a cartel affects the internal market, an
undertaking may wish to request leniency from the European Commission as well
as from an impacted Member State where a leniency programme is effective.
The European Commission’s leniency policy offers undertakings involved in a
cartel either total immunity from or a reduction in the fine that the European
Commission would have otherwise applied under Article 101 of the TFEU.120 It
must be noted that the immunity or reduction of the fine only relates to the admin-
istrative fine. Leniency does not, however, extend to providing protection from
criminal sanctions and only partially removes civil liability.121 The leniency policy
cannot be applied to fines that can be imposed on the basis of other material or
formal infringements (e.g. not cooperating, providing wrong information or not
filing a concentration in due time).
Van Bael & Bellis 2010, p. 1 et seq. and p. 643 et seq.114.
Regulation No 1/2003, inter alia Articles 18, 20, and 21. More info Bellamy & Child 2013, para 13.011
et seq.
115.
Regulation No 1/2003, Article 23 and Regulation No 139/2004, Article 14. See more information
Braat & Van Gelder 2009, para 2.2.
116.
European Commission 2008 (Notice on remedies).117.
Regulation No 1/2003.118.
European Competition Network 2006, point 1 et seq.119.
Wils 2016.120.
Antitrust Damages Directive, Article 11.121.
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The leniency policy is not laid down as hard law in statutory provisions. Policy
rules implement the policy. Although these rules are not statutorily enshrined, a
party acting in compliance with the leniency policy can be assured that the policy
rules will be upheld on the basis of the principle of sound administration.122
To obtain total immunity, a cartel participant must be the first participant to inform
the European Commission of the cartel. Undertakings not qualifying for immunity
may benefit from a reduction in fines if they provide evidence that represents sig-
nificant added value to the information already in the possession of the European
Commission.
2.3.4.1 Immunity from Fines
The European Commission grants immunity to an undertaking if it is the first to
submit information and evidence which in the view of the European Commission
will enable to (i) carry out a target inspection in connection with the alleged cartel
or (ii) find an infringement of Article 101 of the TFEU in connection with the alleged
cartel.123
i. Can the European Commission carry out a targeted inspection in connection
with the alleged cartel?
This assessment is carried out “ex ante”, i.e. without taking into account whether
or not a given inspection has been successful and whether or not an inspection
has been carried out. The assessment is made exclusively on the basis of the type
and quality of the information submitted by the applicant. The undertaking needs
to provide a written or oral corporate statement and other information relating to
the cartel.
The corporate statement includes the following: (i) a detailed description of the
alleged cartel arrangement; (ii) the name and address of the legal entity submitting
the immunity application as well as the names of the other undertakings that have
participated in the alleged cartel; (iii) the names, positions, office locations and,
where necessary, home addresses of all individuals who are or have been involved
in the alleged cartel; (iv) information on which other competition authorities have
been or will be approached in relation to the alleged cartel.124
Immunity is not granted if, at the time of the submission, the European Commission
is already in possession of sufficient evidence to take a decision to carry out an in-
spection or has already carried out such an inspection.
ii. Can the European Commission find an infringement of Article 101 of the
TFEU in connection with the alleged cartel?
E.g. principle of legitimate expectations.122.
European Commission 2006 (Notice on immunity of fines and reduction fines), points 8 and 9.123.
See for more information Section 2.3.4.3.124.
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In the alternative, immunity is granted on the condition that the European Com-
mission does not have, at the time of the submission, sufficient evidence to find
an infringement of Article 101 of the TFEU and that no undertaking has been
granted conditional immunity from fines in connection with the alleged cartel.
In addition, several other conditions must in any case be met to qualify for im-
munity from a fine.125 First, to qualify for immunity, the undertaking must fully
cooperate continuously and expeditiously from the time it submits its application
throughout the European Commission’s administrative procedure. This requires
the applicant to provide accurate, straightforward, and complete information.
Second, the undertaking must end its involvement in the alleged cartel immediately
following its application, except for what would, in the European Commission’s
view, be reasonably necessary to preserve the integrity of the inspections. Third,
the undertaking must not destroy, falsify, or conceal evidence of the alleged cartel.
Nor should the undertaking disclose the content of its contemplated application,
except to other competition authorities.
An undertaking that takes steps to coerce other undertakings to join or to remain
in the cartel is not eligible for immunity from fines, but it may still be eligible for
a reduction in the fines if it fulfills the relevant requirements.126
Once the European Commission has received the information and evidence submit-
ted by the undertaking and all the conditions are met as appropriate, the European
Commission grants the undertaking a written conditional immunity from fines.127
If it becomes apparent that immunity is not available or the undertaking failed to
meet the conditions as appropriate, the European Commission notifies the under-
taking in writing. In this event, the undertaking may withdraw the evidence dis-
closed for the purposes of its immunity application or ask the European Commission
to consider the immunity application as an application for a reduction in the fine.128
If two or more applications are submitted for the same alleged infringement, the
European Commission starts with the first application received. It does not consider
other applications for immunity until it has taken a position on the existing appli-
cation, irrespective of whether the immunity application is presented formally or
as a request for a marker.129
2.3.4.2 Reduction of a Fine
An undertaking disclosing its participation in an alleged cartel but not meeting
the conditions for immunity from a fine may be eligible to a reduction in any fine
that would otherwise have been imposed.130
European Commission 2006 (Notice on immunity of fines and reduction fines), point 9 et seq.125.
Ibid, points 13 and 22.126.
Ibid, point 18.127.
Ibid, point 20.128.
Ibid, point 21.129.
Ibid, point 23.130.
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To qualify, an undertaking must provide the European Commission with evidence
of the alleged infringement. This evidence must add significant value to the evidence
already in the European Commission’s possession. “Significant added value” refers
to the extent to which the evidence provided strengthens, by its very nature, its
level of detail, or both, the European Commission’s ability to prove the alleged
cartel.131 Moreover, the undertaking must meet the following conditions:
i. The undertaking fully, continuously and expeditiously cooperates from the
time it submits its application throughout the European Commission’s admin-
istrative procedure. In particular, the applicant provides accurate, straightfor-
ward, and complete information;
ii. The undertaking ends its involvement in the alleged cartel immediately fol-
lowing its application, except for what would, in the European Commission’s
view, be reasonably necessary to preserve the integrity of the inspections;
iii. The undertaking does not destroy, falsify or conceal evidence of the alleged
cartel. Nor does it disclose the fact or the content of its contemplated applica-
tion, except to other competition authorities.132
At the end of the administrative procedure, the European Commission will deter-
mine the level of reduction in the fine that would otherwise have been imposed
on the undertaking.
i. The first undertaking to provide significant added value is granted a reduction
of 30 – 50 percent (Band 1).
ii. The second undertaking to provide significant added value is granted a reduc-
tion of 20 – 30 percent (Band 2).
iii. Subsequent undertakings providing significant added value are granted a re-
duction of up to 20 percent (Band 3).133
If requested, the Directorate General for Competition will provide an acknowledge-
ment of receipt of the undertaking’s application and any subsequent evidence
submissions, this acknowledgment confirming the date and, if appropriate, the
time of each submission. The European Commission does not take any position
on an application for a fine reduction until it has taken a position on any existing
applications for conditional immunity from fines in relation to the same alleged
cartel.134
If the European Commission comes to the preliminary conclusion that the evidence
submitted by the undertaking constitutes significant added value and that the
undertaking has met the conditions, it will inform the undertaking in writing of
its intention to apply a fine reduction within a specific band. The European Com-
mission also informs the undertaking in writing whether it has come to the prelim-
inary conclusion that the undertaking does not qualify for a fine reduction. The
European Commission 2006 (Notice on immunity of fines and reduction fines), point 25.131.
Ibid, point 24 in conjunction with point 12.132.
Ibid, point 26.133.
Ibid, point 28.134.
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European Commission may disregard any application for a fine reduction if the
application is submitted after the statement of objections is issued.135
At the end of the administrative procedure, the European Commission evaluates
the final position of each undertaking filing an application for a fine reduction.
The European Commission determines the following in any such final decision:136
(i) whether the evidence provided by an undertaking represents significant added
value with respect to the evidence in the European Commission’s possession at the
same time; (ii) whether the conditions shown above are met; and (iii) the exact level
of reduction within the bands.
2.3.4.3 Corporate Statement
A corporate statement / leniency statement made under the “European Commission
Notice on immunity from and reduction of fines in cartel cases” is a voluntary
statement (made to the European Commission by or on behalf of an undertaking)
of the undertaking’s knowledge of a cartel and its role in the cartel, this statement
being prepared especially to be submitted under the European Commission Notice.
Any statement made to the European Commission in the administrative procedure
in relation to this notice forms part of the European Commission’s file and can
thus be used in evidence.137
One of the revisions in the 2006 Leniency Notice was the introduction of a procedure
to protect corporate statements from being made available to claimants in civil
proceedings for damages.138 The European Commission could, at the applicant’s
request, allow corporate statements to be provided orally, unless the applicant has
already disclosed the content of the corporate statement to third parties. Oral cor-
porate statements are recorded and transcribed at the European Commission’s
premises. Undertakings making oral corporate statements are granted the oppor-
tunity to check the technical accuracy and correct the substance of the recording
within a given time limit at the European Commission’s premises. Following the
explicit or implicit approval of the oral statements or the submission of any correc-
tions to it, the undertaking listens to the recordings at the European Commission’s
premises and checks the accuracy of the transcript within a given time limit. Non-
compliance with the last requirement may lead to the loss of any beneficial treat-
ment.139
According to the European Commission notice on immunity from and reduction
of fines in cartel cases, access to corporate statements is only granted to the address-
ees of a statement of objection. Other parties cannot access corporate statements.
The European Commission’s position is that this specific protection of a corporate
European Commission 2006 (Notice on immunity of fines and redaction fines), point 29.135.
Ibid, point 30.136.
Ibid, point 31.137.
Demetriou & Gray 2007, pp. 1434-1435.138.
European Commission 2006 (Notice on immunity of fines and reduction fines), point 32.139.
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statement is no longer justified if the applicant discloses its contents to third
parties.140
Access to the file is granted only on the condition that the information thereby
obtained be used for the purpose of judicial or administrative proceedings for the
application of the EU competition rules at issue in the related administrative pro-
ceedings. The use of such information for a different purpose during the proceedings
could be regarded as lack of cooperation. Furthermore, if any such use is made
after the European Commission has already made a prohibition decision in the
proceeding, the European Commission may, in any legal proceedings before the
European courts, ask the court to increase the fine in respect of the responsible
undertaking. Should the information be used for a different purpose, at any point
in time, with the involvement of outside counsel, the European Commission could
report the incident to that counsel’s bar, with a view to disciplinary action.141
Corporate statements are transmitted to the competition authorities of the Member
States142 only if the conditions set out in the Network Notice143 are met and the
level of protection against disclosure awarded by the receiving competition
authority is equivalent to the one conferred by the European Commission.144
2.3.4.4 Marker Protection
The “marker”, introduced in 2006, as new phenomenon was welcomed by most
people involved in the field of competition law.145 Under the leniency programme
of the European Commission, the marker is only available for the immunity appli-
cant and not for the other cartelists that apply for a reduction of the fine afterwards.
Providing a marker to the other leniency applicants applying for a reduction would
make it too complicated, according to the European Commission.146
The European Commission uses the marker system to “protect” a leniency applicant.
The marker secures the immunity applicant’s place in the queue while it is gathering
the information needed to apply for leniency successfully. The information later
provided is deemed to have been submitted on the date of the marker. A marker
is a brief notice to the competition authority in which the leniency applicant de-
scribes basic information about the illegal cartel, such as the parties and products
involved, the territory, the duration, and the nature. Afterwards, the information
provided is supplemented with additional information about the cartel.
The idea of the marker is to reduce paperwork at the start of the leniency process.
It should be easier for the undertaking to apply for leniency and hence more attrac-
European Commission 2006 (Notice on immunity of fines and reduction fines), point 33.140.
Ibid, point 34.141.
Pursuant to Regulation No 1/2003, Article 12.142.
European Commission 2004 (Notice on Cooperation within the NCA).143.
European Commission 2006 (Notice on immunity of fines and reduction fines), point 35.144.
See inter alia Allen & Overy 2006, p. 1; ABA 2006, pp. 1, 9 et seq.; Ashurts 2006, para 4; Baker &
McKenzie LLP 2006, para 2.4; Clifford Chance 2006, p. 5.
145.
See inter alia Van de Gronden 2017, p. 343.146.
39LENIENCY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS
2.3LENIENCY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
tive for an undertaking to apply for leniency. Accordingly, the purpose of a marker
system is to encourage a race among cartel members to report cartels to the cartel
authority.147
One important point is that the European Commission’s power to grant a marker
is discretionary. In other words, the European Commission may grant a marker.148
This uncertainty might reduce the marker system’s attractiveness to undertakings
that intend disclosing their cartels.149 Be this as it may, the marker system does
offer an undertaking the possibility of winning the race even if it does not have
all the information required when deciding whether to make a dash for im-
munity.150
2.3.4.5 Disclosure of Leniency Information
The confidentiality of information provided by an applicant for leniency is con-
sidered to be important. Whistle blowers often do not like to have too much atten-
tion paid to their deed of informing a competition authority of a cartel. An even
more important reason is that an applicant for leniency does not want the infor-
mation provided to be used against it by other authorities or in civil proceedings.
Uncertainty about whether the information provided by an applicant for leniency
will remain confidential could remove the incentive to apply for leniency.151 Eco-
nomist Motchenkova even states that if a leniency procedure is more confidential,
cartelization is less likely to occur.152 If a leniency request is not treated confiden-
tially, a leniency policy may even lead to prolonging a cartel’s existence.153
Inspection on the file of the European Commission is governed by EU law.
Regulation 1/2003
By virtue of Article 15(3) TFEU and Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union, any citizen of the Union and any natural or legal person
residing or having its registered office in a Member State, is to have a right of access
to the documents of the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, subject
to the principles and conditions to be defined in accordance with Article 15(3)
TFEU.154 Pursuant to Article 27 (2) of Regulation 1/2003 and Article 15 of Regulation
773/2004 the rights of access to the file are reserved to the parties involved in the
case of the European Commission.155 Victims of competition law infringements
are regularly not party to the European Commission's procedure.156 As a third
party, they can not rely on these access to the file provisions.
ABA 2006, p. 2.147.
European Commission 2006 (Notice on immunity of fines and reduction fines), point 15.148.
Incardona 2007, p. I-40.149.
Ibid.150.
European Commission 2017 (Proposal Enforcement Directive), point 45 et seq.; Billiet 2009, p. 21;
ABA 2006, p. 1.
151.
Motchenkova 2005, Chapter 5.152.
Ibid.153.
EGC 28 March 2017 (Deutsche Telekom v Commission), point 22.154.
Ibid, point 32 et seq.155.
Ruster 2017, p. 139.156.
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Regulation 1049/2001
Of greater (but still limited) importance is the right of everyone to access documents
in accordance with Article 2 (1) of the Access to Documents Regulation.157 The
European Commission could be forced to provide documents to third parties under
the Access to Documents Regulation. Under this Access to Documents Regulation,
the European Commission may be obliged to provide information to EU citizens
and every natural person and legal entity with a place of residence or corporate
domicile in one of the Member States.158 However, Article 4 of the Access to Docu-
ments Regulation sets limits for this information policy. Based on Article 4, the
European Commission refuses access to documents where disclosure would inter
alia undermine the commercial interests of a natural or legal person, court proceed-
ings and legal advice, the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits, unless
there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. Haasbeek concluded that it will
be very difficult for plaintiffs in civil proceedings to receive documents from the
European Commission, as the exceptions incorporated in the Access to Documents
Regulation will often bar access to competition files.159
In a 2011 German case on German disclosure rules, the ECJ considered whether
leniency information had to be provided by the German competition authority.
The outcome of this case also influenced the issue of the information that the
European Commission has to disclose, because the discussion was basically about
how Article 101 of the TFEU should be applied.
A purchaser of decor paper and the victim of a decor paper cartel, Pfleiderer AG
(“Pfleiderer”), applied to the German competition authority (the BKartA) for com-
prehensive access to the files relating to the cartel proceedings in order to prepare
for civil proceedings for a damages award. The BKartA partially refused Pfleiderer’s
request. Pfleiderer appealed against the decision to the local civil court in Bonn.
The court made clear that the BKartA was obliged to provide Pfleiderer with the
information requested, including the information concerning the leniency request.
However, as the court was of the opinion that the intended decision possibly con-
flicted with European competition law rules, the court decided to adjourn the
proceedings and refer the question to the ECJ.160
In the case referred by the German court to the ECJ, Advocate General Mazák gave
his opinion on whether leniency information in the possession of the BKartA had
to be disclosed to a third party for the purpose of preparing an action for damages.161
Mazák concluded that, if a national competition authority is operating a leniency
programme, a third party adversely affected by the cartel does not have access to
self-incriminating statements voluntarily provided by leniency applicants. Self-in-
Regulation No 1049/2001. For a number of years, similar national regulations have existed and
may be applicable for (national) cartel authorities.
157.
Regulation No 1049/2001, Article 2(1).158.
Haasbeek 2009, pp. 137-147. Cf. Ruster 2017, p. 141; Amador Sanchez, Dijkman, Lamboo & Smits
2008, p. 38; Eilmansberger 2007, inter alia p. 477.
159.
AG Bonn 4 August 2009, 51 Gs 53/09.160.
See opinion of Advocate General Mazák of 16 December 2010 in Case C-360/09 (Pfleiderer AG v BKartA).161.
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criminating statements are those in which the leniency applicant effectively admits
and describes its participation in the infringement. Allowing access to such state-
ments could substantially reduce the effectiveness of the relevant leniency pro-
gramme and undermine the national authority’s enforcement of Article 101 of the
TFEU. At the same time, Mazák argued that it would infringe the fundamental
rights to an effective remedy and a fair trial for a national competition authority
to deny access to other pre-existing documents submitted by a leniency applicant
that would assist a third party to establish the existence of the cartel, the damage
caused, and a causal link between the breach of competition law and the damage
suffered by the third party.
On 14 June 2011, the ECJ answered the question of the German court.162 It stated
that, in the absence of binding EU law on the subject, it was up to the Member
States to establish and apply national rules on the right of persons adversely affected
by a cartel to have access to documents relating to leniency procedures. However,
the Member States had to ensure that the rules established or applied did not
jeopardize the effective application of Article 101 and Article 102 of the TFEU.
As concluded by the European Commission and the Member States that have sub-
mitted observations, the ECJ has held that leniency programmes are useful tools
for uncovering and bringing an end to infringements of competition rules and,
therefore, serve the objective of the effective application of Article 101 and Article
102 of the TFEU.163 The effectiveness of those programmes could be compromised
if documents relating to a leniency procedure were disclosed to persons wishing
to bring an action for damages, even if the national competition authorities were
to grant to the applicant for leniency exemption, in whole or in part, from the fine
which they could have imposed.164 According to the ECJ, the view can reasonably
be taken that a person involved in an infringement of competition law, faced with
the possibility of such disclosure, would be deterred from taking the opportunity
offered by such leniency programmes, particularly when, under Article 11 and
Article 12 of Regulation No 1/2003, the European Commission and the national
competition authorities might exchange information that the person has voluntarily
provided.165
Nevertheless, the ECJ has made clear that it is settled case-law that any individual
has the right to claim damages for loss caused by conduct liable to restrict or distort
competition.166 The existence of such a right strengthens the working of EU com-
petition rules and discourages agreements or practices (frequently covert) liable to
restrict or distort competition. From that point of view, actions for damages before
national courts can make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective
ECJ 14 June 2011 (Pfleiderer AG v BKartA).162.
Ibid, point 25.163.
Ibid, point 26 et seq.164.
Ibid, point 27.165.
ECJ 20 September 2001 (Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan), points 24 and 26 and ECJ 13 July 2006 (Manfredi
v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others), points 59 and 61.
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competition in the European Union.167 Accordingly, it is necessary to ensure that
the rules do not operate in such a way as to make it practically impossible or exces-
sively difficult to obtain compensation for cartel infringements and to weigh the
respective interests in favor of disclosure of the information and in favor of the
protection of that information provided voluntarily by the applicant for leniency.168
That reasoning may be adopted by the national courts and tribunals only on a case-
by-case basis, according to national law, and taking into account all the relevant
factors in the case.169
In the light of the above, the ECJ answered the question referred to it by the court
in Bonn by stating that the provisions of EU law on cartels must be interpreted as
not precluding a person who has been adversely affected by an infringement of
EU competition law and is seeking to obtain damages from being granted access
to documents relating to a leniency procedure involving the perpetrator of that
infringement.170 It is, however, for the courts and tribunals of the Member States,
on the basis of their national laws and by weighing the interests protected by EU
law, to determine the conditions under which this access is permitted or refused.171
In the later case of Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie et al., the ECJ issued a
reminder that, regarding the detailed procedural rules governing actions for damages
arising from competition infringements, it is for the Member States to establish
and apply national rules on the right of access.172 Nonetheless, Member States must
exercise that competence in accordance with EU law.173 The rules applicable to
actions for safeguarding rights that individuals derive from the direct effect of EU
law must not be less favorable than those governing similar domestic actions and
must, in practice, not make it impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights
conferred by EU law.174
In this case, the issue was whether an absolute ban on victims receiving documents
violates EU legislation if the parties involved in the litigation do not consent to
providing the information. The ECJ, referring to the case of Bundeskartellamt v Pflei-
derer, made clear that the national courts must weigh the interests of disclosing
the information and those of protecting the information.175 The ECJ noted that the
balancing was necessary because, in competition law in particular, a rigid rule –
either because it provides for the absolute refusal to grant access to the documents
in question or because it grants access to those documents as matter of course –
is liable to undermine the effective application, inter alia, of Article 101 of the TFEU
and the rights conferred by that provision on individuals.176 Consequently, the
ECJ 20 September 2001 (Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan), point 24 et seq. ECJ 14 June 2011 (Pfleiderer
AG v BKartA), point 28.
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weighing of interests justifies the disclosure of information or the protection of
that information by the national courts only on a case-by-case basis, according to
national law, and taking into account all the relevant factors in the case.177
In another case the EGC and later on the CJEU were asked to determine whether
the European Commission was allowed to refuse a request for disclosure of docu-
ments from the file to a third party. EnBW Energy Baden-Württemberg (“EnBW”)
claimed to have been affected by the gas insulated switchgear cartel (“GIS cartel”).178
EnBW requested access to documents relating to proceedings in the GIS cartel and
held by the European Commission.179 The European Commission refused to provide
the information referring to exceptions of Article 4 of the Access to Documents
Regulation.180
The CJEU accepted a general presumption that documents relating to a proceeding
under Article 101 of the TFEU fall under the disclosure exception of Article 4 of
the Access to Documents Regulation.181 However, the CJEU also noted that the
general presumption does not rule out the possibility of demonstrating that the
request of a specific document disclosure is not covered by that presumption, or
that there is an overriding public interest in disclosure of the document by virtue
of Article 4 of the Access to Documents Regulation.182
The CJEU reminded that any person is entitled to claim compensation for the loss
caused to that person by a breach of Article 101 of the TFEU.183 Such a right
strengthens the working of the EU competition rules, thereby making a significant
contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the EU.184 To ensure
effective protection of the right to compensation enjoyed by a claimant, the CJEU
however, saw no need for every document relating to a proceeding under Article 101
of the TFEU to be disclosed to the claimant on the ground that that party intends
to bring an action for damages.185 This is because it was highly unlikely that the
action for damages would need to be based on all the evidence in the file relating
to that proceeding.186 In the absence of any such necessity, the interest in obtaining
compensation for the loss suffered as a result of a breach of Article 101 of the TFEU
cannot constitute an overriding public interest, within the meaning of Article 4(2)
of the Access to Documents Regulation.187
The CJEU held that any person seeking compensation for the loss caused by a vio-
lation of Article 101 of the TFEU must demonstrate that it is necessary for that
ECJ 6 June 2013 (Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie et al.), point 34.177.
EGC 22 May 2012 (EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG v European Commission); CJEU 27 February
2014 (Commission v EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG).
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person to be granted access to documents in the European Commission’s file to be
able to weigh, on a case-by-case basis, the respective interests in favor of disclosure
or protection of those documents, taking into account all the relevant factors in
the case. In the absence of any such necessity, the interest in obtaining compensa-
tion for the loss suffered as a result of a breach of Article 101 of the TFEU cannot
constitute an overriding public interest within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the
Access to Documents Regulation.188
In the recent case Evonik Degussa, the CJEU decided on the non-confidential version
of a decision by the European Commission. A cartelist complained about the non-
confidential version of the decision the European Commission wanted to make
public. That decision was comprised of verbatim quotations, and conveyed infor-
mation from the document the undertaking provided to the European Commission
in support of a corporate statement in order to obtain leniency.
The CJEU pointed out that the publication, in the form of verbatim quotations, of
information from the documents provided by an undertaking to the Commission
in support of a statement made in order to obtain leniency differs from the publi-
cation of verbatim quotations from that statement itself.189 Whereas the first type
of publication should be authorized, subject to compliance with the protection
owed, in particular, to business secrets, professional secrecy and other confidential
information, the second type of publication is not permitted under any circum-
stances.190
Intermediate Conclusion
Based on this legal framework, statements and documents submitted to the
European Commission in the context of a leniency application are often protected
against disclosure to third parties, including victims of cartel infringements.191 In
practice, the European Commission regularly rejects requests for access to leniency
documents.192 It could be argued that the Evonik Degussa case suggests that the
statement itself is protected from disclosure per se. That would be in line with the
protection of the disclosure provision provided by the Antitrust Damages Directive.
However, it is questionable whether leniency documents are in each and every
situation protected from disclosure. There might be situations in which the case-
by-case analysis – as stated in the Pfleiderer case, the Donau Chemie case and the
EnBW case – make it necessary to disclose leniency documents, also the corporate
statement.193
It is significant to note that information could also have been obtained via civil
courts based on national disclosure and discovery rules.194 This applies in particular
to the right of discovery in the common-law countries, like the United States (see
CJEU 27 February 2014 (Commission v EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG), point 107 et seq.188.
CJEU 14 March 2017 (Evonik Degussa v Commission), point 87.189.
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Chapter 5), the United Kingdom and Ireland. However, in countries like Germany
and the Netherlands, there are other opportunities to collect information that may
potentially have the consequence that information has to be provided.195 That is
certainly the case with the arrival of the new disclosure provisions in the Antitrust
Damages Directive (see further in Chapter 4).
2.3.5 European Commission’s Leniency Policy Practice
Between 2005 and 2010, the European Commission fined undertakings involved
in approximately 35 different cartel cases.196 In 33 of these cases (approximately
95%), the leniency programme played a role. Furthermore, it has become clear that
full immunity is often granted.197 In 77 percent of the cartel cases, an applicant
was granted a 100 percent reduction of the fine. The cartel case of Hard haberdashery:
fasteners198 was still under the 1996 leniency regime, so a reduction of only 75 per-
cent was provided in that case. In certain other cases, mainly in 2007 and 2008,
leniency apparently played a “less” important role because the European Commis-
sion started some investigations on its own initiative.199
As stated above in Section 2.3.4.1, 100 percent immunity is provided if the applicant
is the first to provide information concerning a cartel that makes it possible for
the European Commission to start an investigation. The other way to get a 100
percent reduction in the fine is for the applicant to make it possible for the
European Commission to find the existence of the cartel.
From the above, it seems that in almost 80 percent of the cartel cases handled by
the European Commission without the help of at least one of the cartel infringers,
the European Commission would not be aware of the cartel’s existence or the
European Commission would not be able to find the existence of the cartel.200 This
is relatively consistent with the conclusions of Mr. Fonteijn, head of the ACM, who
stated that 75 percent of the European Commission’s cartel cases result from a le-
niency application.201 It means that without the leniency applications, most cartels
would not have been uncovered and cartel infringers would not be fined. It proves
the importance of a well-functioning leniency programme for the enforcement of
European competition law.
The European Commission’s leniency policy is not implemented in rules of law
that the administration is always bound to comply with.202 Nevertheless, the admi-
Billiet 2009, pp. 16-17; Immenga & Mestmäcker 2007, nr. 268; European Competition Lawyers
Forum 2006.
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nistration may not depart from rules of practice in an individual case without
giving reasons compatible with the principle of equal treatment.203 In adopting
and publishing these rules of conduct, the European Commission sets a limit on
the exercise of its discretion and cannot depart from those rules without the risk
of being found, where appropriate, to be in breach of general principles of law,
such as the principle of equality and the protection of legitimate expectation.204
However, policy rules lack democratic oversight and are often less clear, less pre-
dictable and less transparent than rules laid down in hard law.205
Nevertheless, both the EGC and the CJEU have accepted that the European Commis-
sion has a discretion to set fines for a breach of competition or, if deemed appro-
priate, to grant leniency.206
More specifically, the CJEU has confirmed that the European Commission has a
wide discretion to impose fines and to determine the level of the fines, taking into
consideration the gravity and duration of the infringement concerned.207 The dis-
cretion of the European Commission is limited by the legal maximum of 10 percent
of the overall turnover of the undertaking concerned as set forth in Article 23 of
Regulation No 1/2003.
In addition, the CJEU has clarified that, with regard to the grant of leniency, the
European Commission enjoys a wide discretion in assessing the quality and useful-
ness of the cooperation provided by an undertaking, in particular by reference to
the contributions made by other undertakings.208 It must be borne in mind that
the reduction of the fines is justified only if the cooperation of undertakings par-
ticipating in the unlawful conduct facilitates the European Commission in estab-
lishing the infringement and, where possible, to end it.209 Taking into consider-
ation the rationale behind the reduction, the European Commission cannot disreg-
ard the usefulness of the information provided, as it is a necessary part of the evi-
dence already in its possession. The CJEU has pointed out that the discretion of the
European Commission should find its limits in a coherent and non-discriminatory
policy.
In the case of Le Carbone-Lorraine the EGC stated that the European Commission
should — in exercising its wide discretionary power to set fines —take numerous
factors into account, including the cooperation of the undertakings concerned
Cf. EGC 8 October 2008 (Le Carbone-Lorraine v European Commission), point 70; EGC of 18 June 2008
(Hoechst GmbH v European Commission), point 510 et seq.
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during the investigation. In this context, the European Commission is required to
make complex assessments of fact, such as the facts relating to the cooperation
provided by the individual undertakings concerned.210
Indeed, the wide discretionary power of the European Commission is not unlimited.
It should take into consideration multiple factors, such as the duration and the
gravity of the infringement and the extent of cooperation provided.211 With regard
to the latter, the European Commission has an additional discretion in assessing
the quality and usefulness of the information and cooperation provided. The degree
of cooperation will be measured in reference to the contribution made by other
undertakings. Furthermore, the discretionary power is restricted by the objectives
set forth in the competition rules, regulating the scope of the penalization of a
cartel.
2.3.6 Evaluation of the European Commission’s Leniency Policy
Over the years, the cost-benefit analysis has become more beneficial for the leniency
applicant. There are greater benefits for a leniency applicant, for example, the in-
troduction of a 100 percent reduction of the fine. The European Commission also
seems aware of the fact that for the leniency policy to be effective it is important
that it should be drawn up and carried out in a clear, transparent, predictable and
equal way.212 This line of thinking and way of acting certainly have a positive in-
fluence on the effectiveness of the European Commission’s leniency policy. This
becomes clear from the fact that amendments to its leniency policy in 2002 led to
many more leniency applications. Another positive aspect of the European Com-
mission’s leniency policy can be found in the structuring of the reduction of fines.
The European Commission set “bands” that make it transparent and obvious to
undertakings what possible reduction in the fines would be provided as the result
of a leniency application.
Despite the positive aspects of setting up a clear, predictable, transparent and non-
discriminatory leniency policy, there appear to be ways to improve the leniency
policy to the next level. Separately from the discussion about the various leniency
policies within Europe and their harmonization (or the lack thereof) (see Sections
2.6 and 2.7), there are some issues concerning the European Commission’s leniency
policy that do need attention.
First of all, the European Commission is structured as an all-in-one system, whereby
almost no formal or physical distinction between investigating and decision-making
services is made. Indirectly, this may have a negative impact on the effectiveness
of the leniency policy. There is a risk of undertakings not believing that the policy
will be applied and carried out in a clear, predictable, transparent and equal way
if there is no separation between the investigators of a cartel and the competition
authority decision-makers.
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Carbon AG v European Commission), point 88.
210.
EGC 15 December 2010 (E.ON Energie AG v European Commission), point 287.211.
Cf. Wils 2016, p. 345.212.
CHAPTER 248
LENIENCY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION2.3
Second, the leniency policy is written down in policy rules. A clear advantage is
that it is easier to change policy rules than legislation. It is a pragmatic approach.
However, policy rules come with disadvantages. Making it possible to change policy
rules rather quickly also implies uncertainty for the stakeholders. Moreover, policy
rules are not subject to democratic oversight.213 Democratic oversight is found only
in the generic legislation setting the level of the fines. Furthermore, the last disad-
vantage with policy rules is that the court is not bound by policy rules if the court
considers that policy rules violate legislation.
Furthermore, although the bands provide more certainty about the reductions in
the fines, within the bands there may still be severe differences in the amount of
the fine reductions. A reduction of 50 percent is quite different from a reduction
of 30 percent, and a reduction of 20 percent is much more than no reduction at
all. This too endangers the clarity, transparency, and predictability of the leniency
programme.
In addition, the information provided by a leniency applicant seems to be largely
protected from disclosure but not completely. Especially self-incriminating state-
ments voluntarily provided by leniency applicants appear protected. However, the
question is whether the leniency applicant itself is really protected. The test set for
providing leniency documents by the ECJ is that there should be a weighing of the
two factors (i.e. the need for a litigation process in which information could be
disclosed if it is necessary for a victim of a cartel to claim for damages v. the protec-
tion of the leniency programme by keeping information confidential), which should
be conducted on a case-by-case bases under national law. This may imply that in-
formation, also in relation to the leniency application, will have to be provided.
As long as this is not completely clear, this can lead to uncertainty. In addition,
practice shows that also from other non-confidential information from the
authority, like the decision to set a fine – often published on the internet – claims
may be expected, also for leniency applicants. Van Bael and Bellis say that regardless
of the measures taken to protect the corporate statement, the final decision of the
European Commission will disclose the identity of the leniency applicant and
contain a detailed description of the participation in the cartel.214 Any protection
granted is thus short term.215 In other words, it appears that protecting the leniency
information, does not prevent proceedings for damages against the immunity re-
cipient. This will be further discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.
2.4 German Leniency Policy
2.4.1 Introduction
The German leniency policy is based on the European leniency policy. The first
German leniency policy dates from 2000.216 To provide greater guidance and clarity
Appeldoorn & Vedder 2013, p. 88.213.
Van Bael & Bellis 2010, p. 1138.214.
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to immunity applicants, the BKartA revised its leniency policy in 2006.217 The leni-
ency programme of the BKartA applies to cartel participants (natural persons, un-
dertakings and associations). To some extent, criminal law also plays a role in
German competition law. A specific criminal offence, punishable with imprison-
ment, exists for bid rigging, an offence for which no leniency programme exists.218
Section 2.4.2 discusses the role and powers of the BKartA as a competition
authority. Section 2.4.3 provides an overview of the German leniency policy rules.
Section 2.4.4 discusses and analyzes how the German leniency policy functions in
daily practice. Section 2.4.5 provides an evaluation of the German leniency policy.
2.4.2 Enforcement by the BKartA
The BKartA is the competent authority at the German federal level for competition
law. According to Article 50(1) of the Act Against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz
gegenWettbewerbsbeschränkungen) (“ARC”), the BKartA is also the competent authority
to apply Article 101 and Article 102 of the TFEU, provided that the case at issue
does not concern the competence of a non-federal competition authority.219 The
enforcers at a non-federal level will not be discussed here, as their role in the field
of competition law is rather limited.
Under Article 51(1) of the ARC, the BKartA is an “independent federal authority”
(selbständige Bundesoberbehörde) which falls under the authority of the federal Ministry
for Economic Affairs and Technology.220 The independent status of the BKartA
implies that the German legislature has defined a policy field (competition) within
which the BKartA exercises its own powers. The Minister is not allowed to remove
these powers.221
One of the tasks of the BKartA and the competition authorities of the German states
(Länder) is to enforce the ban on cartels. It has been an integral element of Article
1 of the ARC since the ARC came into force in 1958.222
Article 1 of the ARC concerns the prohibition of agreements restricting competition.
Agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition are prohibited.
The BKartA is entitled to conduct an investigation and to collect evidence.223 It has
jurisdiction to issue prohibition decisions,224 interim measures,225 decisions in
Voet van Vormizeele 2006, p. 292.217.
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which commitments of undertakings are made binding,226 and decisions in which
the inapplicability of competition rules to certain behavior is established.227 Fur-
thermore, under Article 81 of the ARC, the BKartA has the power to impose fines
on undertakings that have violated German and European competition law. These
sanctions fall within the scope of administrative law. At present, the amount of
the fine for a severe infringement can be up to 10 percent of the undertaking’s
turnover (Article 82 (4) of the ARC). This is similar to the amount that the European
Commission can impose. Moreover, under Article 34 of the ARC, the BKartA is able
to order the disgorgement of the economic benefit and require the undertaking to
pay a corresponding sum resulting from the violations of German and European
competition law.228 An individual can receive a fine of as much as a million euros.
An essential feature of the BKartA is its decision-making structure.229 The so-called
“Decision divisions” (Beschlussabteilungen) are at the heart of the decision-making
process in the BKartA.230 Under Article 51(2) of the ARC, these divisions take com-
petition law decisions on behalf of the BKartA:231
“Die entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes werden von den Beschlussabteilungen
getroffen, die nach Bestimmung des Bundesministeriums fürWirtschaft und Techno-
logie gebildet werden. Im überigen regelt der Präsident die Verteilung und den Gang
der Geschäfte des Bundeskartellamtes durch eine Geschäftsordnung; sie bedarf der
Bestätigung durch das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie.”
Even the president of the BKartA cannot influence the decisions taken by
Beschlussabteilungen.232 The Chairman of a Beschlussabteilung is a civil servant appointed
for life and is required to be a qualified judge.233 It can be concluded from this that
a significant characteristic of the decision-making process in German competition
law is that it has a quasi-judicial structure.234 It is likely that this system with a
guaranteed internal independence contributes to legal certainty and to a leniency
policy that could be carried out in a clearer, more predictable, more transparent
and more non-discriminatory way.235
2.4.3 Present German Leniency Policy
As described, the German leniency provisions draw on those of the European
Commission.236 As with the European Commission’s policy, the German leniency
policy is set out in policy rules.237 Although these rules are not enshrined by law,
Article 32b ARC.226.
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as also discussed above under Sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5, the BKartA’s compliance
with the leniency policy can be invoked on the basis of the principles of sound
administration by the parties concerned.
Generally speaking, “soft law” is considered more ambiguous. To some extent, the
authorities have discretion in interpreting these policy rules and in general there
is no democratic oversight. Furthermore, the authorities are not prohibited from
changing the rules. There are uncertainties that might influence a party’s interest
in applying for leniency, as described above in Sections 2.3.4, 2.3.5 and 2.3.6.
As in other European countries, more undertakings in Germany may receive a fine
reduction. There is only one undertaking that could receive full immunity.
2.4.3.1 Immunity from Fines
The BKartA grants a cartel participant immunity from a fine if the applicant provides
the BKartA with the evidence necessary to obtain a search warrant and it is the
first participant in a cartel to contact the BKartA before the latter has sufficient
evidence to obtain a search warrant. In addition, it provides the BKartA with verbal
and written information and, if available, evidence enabling the BKartA to obtain
a search warrant. It is important that the applicant was not the only ringleader in
the cartel, that it did not coerce others to participate in the cartel238 and that it
cooperates fully and on a continuous basis with the BKartA. 239
When the BKartA is in a position to obtain a search warrant, it will as a rule grant
a participant immunity from a fine if the participant is the first participant in the
cartel to contact the BKartA before it has sufficient evidence to prove the offence.
It provides the BKartA with verbal and written information and, if available, evi-
dence enabling it to prove the offence. It is important that it was not the only
ringleader in the cartel, that it did not coerce others to participate in the cartel,
that it cooperates fully and on a continuous basis with the BKartA and that there
is no cartel participant that enabled the BKartA to obtain a search warrant already.240
2.4.3.2 Reduction in the Fines
For the benefit of a cartel participant who does not meet the conditions for im-
munity, the BKartA can reduce the fine by up to 50 percent if it provides the BKartA
with verbal or written information and, if available, evidence making a significant
contribution to proving the offence. In addition, the applicant cooperates fully and
on a continuous basis with the BKartA.241
The amount of the reduction is based on the value of the contribution to uncovering
the illegal agreement and the sequence of the applications.
Schroeder 2006, pp. 441-442.238.
Bundeskartellamt 2006, point 3.239.
Ibid, point 4.240.
Ibid, point 5.241.
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2.4.3.3 Marker Protection
A cartel participant may contact the head of the Special Unit for Combating Cartels
or the chairman of the competent Decision Division to declare the cartel partici-
pant’s willingness to cooperate. The timing of the placement of this marker is de-
cisive in determining the status of the application.242
The marker is not only reserved for the first immunity applicant. The German
system also allows markers for subsequent applicants for fine reductions (so called
"type 2 markers").
The BKartA immediately confirms to the applicant in writing that a marker has
been placed and/or that the application has been received, stating the date and
time of receipt.243
A marker may be placed orally or in writing. If placed orally in English, a German
translation must be provided in writing. It must contain details about the type and
duration of the infringement, the product and geographic markets affected, the
identity of those involved and at which other competition authorities the applica-
tions have been or are intended to be filed.244
After the marker has been placed, the BKartA sets a time limit of a maximum of
eight weeks for the drafting of an application for leniency.245
In its application, an applicant must submit information necessary for obtaining
a search warrant or for proving the offence.246 If the applicant does not fulfill its
obligations, its priority status lapses, and the subsequent applicants move up in
rank.247
2.4.3.4 Disclosure of Leniency Information
Within the scope of its statutory limits and the regulations on the exchange of in-
formation with foreign competition authorities, the BKartA treats the identity of
an applicant as confidential and protects all trade and business secrets during the
course of the proceedings up to the point at which a statement of objections is issued
to a cartel participant.248
Access to file requests that national authority receive, must be assessed on the na-
tional rules that are applicable.249
Bundeskartellamt 2006, point 11.242.
Ibid, point 18.243.
Ibid, point 11.244.
Ibid, point 12.245.
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Prior to the implementation of the Antitrust Damages Directive, the files and infor-
mation claims of potential victims of competition law infringements against inter
alia the BKartA, consisted primarily of Article 406e of the German Code of Criminal
Procedure (Strafprozessordnung, “StPO").250According Article 46(3) of the German
Administrative Offences Act (Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten, “OWiG”) the criminal
procedural rule was applicable to administrative procedures for competition law
infringements.251
If an application for fine immunity or fine reduction has been filed, the BKartA
refuses applications by third parties to inspect the file or to supply information to
the extent allowed, insofar as the leniency application and the evidence provided
by the applicant are concerned.252
Concerning information requests to the BKartA, the case of Pfleiderer v Bundeskartelamt
at the regional court of Bonn, already discussed briefly in subsection 2.4.3.4, has
been particularly relevant.253
In a decision dated January 2008, the BKartA imposed fines totaling EUR 62,000,000
on the three largest European producers of decor paper and on five individuals
personally responsible for price-fixing agreements and agreements on capacity
closure. Those decisions were based, inter alia, on information and documents that
the BKartA had received in the context of its leniency programme.
Pfleiderer is a purchaser of decor paper and one of the world’s three leading man-
ufacturers of engineered wood, surface finished products and laminate flooring.
It stated that over the previous three years it had purchased goods with a value in
excess of EUR 60,000,000 from the decor paper producers against which the BKartA
proceedings had been brought. In preparation for civil proceedings for damages,
Pfleiderer applied to the BKartA for comprehensive access to the files relating to
the decor paper cartel proceedings. Pfleiderer received a version of the three de-
cisions imposing fines, from which identifying information had been removed,
and a list indicating the evidence collected in a search. Pfleiderer then also expressly
requested, by means of a second application, access to the leniency applications,
the documents voluntarily transmitted by the immunity recipients, and the evidence
collected. The BKartA informed Pfleiderer that it intended to comply with Pfleiderer’s
request only in part.
The BKartA removed confidential business information, internal documents and
documents covered by point 22 of the BKartA’s Leniency Programme. Point 22
makes clear that where an application for fine immunity or a fine reduction has
been filed, the BKartA must refuse applications by third parties to inspect the file
or to supply information to the extent allowed, insofar as the leniency application
and the evidence provided by the applicant are concerned.
Ruster 2017, p. 144.250.
Ibid.251.
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Pfleiderer’s appeal against that decision went to the regional court in Bonn.
The court stated that, in accordance with paragraph 406 e) of the German Code of
Criminal Procedure, which governs access to files for victims in criminal proceedings
and which applies by analogy to cartel proceedings concerning administrative of-
fences pursuant to paragraph 46 (1) and the last part of the fourth sentence of
paragraph 46(3) of the German Administrative Offences Act,254 a lawyer acting for
the aggrieved party may be granted access to the files and the evidence held by the
authorities insofar as it can demonstrate a legitimate interest in that regard. How-
ever, the court also realizes that if the BKartA was obliged to reduce this level of
protection in order to grant third parties access to leniency applications, which
would be contrary to point 22 of its leniency programme, this would possibly have
two serious consequences. First, the European Commission would no longer provide
the BKartA with information based on leniency applications. The other members
of the ECN would also not provide the BKartA any such information, insofar as the
national competition authorities of the other Member States have made provision
for protection against discovery, within the meaning of the ECN Model Leniency
Programme, in their respective national leniency programmes. This would not only
have a significant adverse effect on cooperation within the ECN but would also
mean that an efficient case allocation within the ECN would no longer be possible.
This would call into question the entire operating capacity of the ECN.255 Second,
undertakings might potentially be dissuaded from cooperating within the frame-
work of the leniency programme and cartels would not be reported and would re-
main undetected because leniency applicants would fear that the documents and
information that they had voluntarily transmitted might be used directly against
them in civil claims for damages. In that way the applicant for leniency would
even be placed in a worse position than those cartel members who do not cooperate
with the competition authorities.256
In light of these doubts, the court decided to stay the proceedings and raise a
question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.257 The CJEU decided that, in the
consideration of an application for the access to documents relating to a leniency
programme submitted by a person who is seeking to obtain damages from another
person who has taken advantage of such a leniency programme, it is necessary to
ensure that the applicable national rules are not less favorable than those governing
similar domestic claims and that they do not operate in such a way as to make it
practically impossible or excessively difficult to obtain such compensation and to
weigh the respective interests in favor of disclosure of the information and in favor
of the protection of that information provided voluntarily by the applicant for le-
niency.258 That assessment can be made by the national courts and tribunals only
on a case-by-case basis, according to national law, and taking into account all the
relevant factors in the case. As an answer to the judgment of the CJEU, the court
Amtsgericht Bonn 4 August 2009, 51 GS 53/09.254.
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in Bonn withdrew its originally intended decision to grant Pfleiderer full access to
the files.
Intermediate Conclusion
Based on the above, victims of cartel infringements seem to have great difficulties
receiving leniency documents. Practice shows that regarding the leniency applica-
tion, the BKartA rejected requests for leniency application information regularly.259
However, the application of the grounds for refusal may not make it practically
impossible to enforce the antitrust damages claims (effectiveness principle).260 It
appears necessary to balance the interests in individual cases.261 The test set by the
ECJ is that there should be a weighing of the two factors (i.e. the need for a litigation
process in which information could be disclosed if necessary for a victim of a cartel
to claim for damages v. the protection of the leniency programme by keeping in-
formation confidential), which should be conducted on a case-by-case bases under
national law.
It is significant to note that information could also have been obtained via civil
courts based on national disclosure and discovery rules.262 This applies in particular
to the right of discovery in common-law countries, like the United States (see
Chapter 5), the United Kingdom and Ireland. However, in countries like Germany
and the Netherlands, there are other opportunities to collect information that may
also have the consequence that information has to be provided.263 That is certainly
the case with the arrival of the new disclosure provisions in the Antitrust Damages
Directive (see further in Chapter 4).
2.4.4 BKartA’s Leniency Policy Practice
In Germany, the leniency policy plays an important role in the fight against cartels.
In its submissions to the Bonn court, the BKartA argued that, at the national level,
its leniency programme, which was introduced in 2000 (Notice No 68/2000), has
proved to be a highly effective tool in the fight against cartels.264
From 2001 to 2008, the BKartA received a total of 210 leniency applications in 69
different cases. In the first quarter of 2009, there were already 12 applications in
nine cases. In 2013, the BKartA received 66 leniency applications in 41 different
cases.265 In 2014, the BKartA received 72 leniency applications in relation to 41
different cases. There appears to be a trend towards more leniency applications.
The court of appeal in Düsseldorf has comprehensively examined the German Le-
niency Programme. In its judgment of 27 March 2006, it held that the German le-
Ruster 2017, pp. 145-146.259.
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Ibid.261.
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niency programme was within the limits of the BKartA’s reasonable discretion and
was not violating any administrative rules.266
i. Immunity from the Fine
The court of appeal examined whether the leniency programme was in accordance
with the Administrative Offences Act, as according to Article 81 (2) (1) of the Ad-
ministrative Offences Act the creation of a cartel is an administrative offence. The
court of appeal issued a reminder that according to Article 47 of the Administrative
Offences Act, the prosecution of offences is within the reasonable discretion of the
prosecution authority.267 The existing discretion is wide.268 The authority must
consider all circumstances of the case, especially the relevance and the impact of
the infringement, the seriousness of the misconduct, the attitude of the infringer
towards the offence, its conduct after the crime and the risk of recurrence. The
BKartA would exceed its policy freedom only if it chose to refrain from prosecuting
the offender arbitrarily or on the basis of improper consideration.269
The court of appeal emphasized that in completely relieving the infringer from
any obligation to pay a fine, the leniency programme remained within the limits
of its reasonable discretion.270 It held that a cartel can be detected and stopped only
from the inside. Therefore, effective incentives have to be created for those cartel
members, which contributes substantially to the detection of the cartel.271 Further-
more, the BKartA gave assurances that 100 percent leniency was only granted under
strict conditions in its leniency programme.272 Cartel members playing a decisive
role in establishing the cartel or extraordinarily benefiting from it, for example,
are explicitly barred from 100 percent leniency.273
In its assessment of the leniency programme, the court of appeal referred to the
legislative explanatory memorandum.274 In 2005, legislators introduced a new
statutory provision (Article 81(7) of the ARC) stating that the BKartA had discretion-
ary power to set the fine:
“The Bundeskartellamtmay lay down general administrative principles on the exercise
of its discretionary powers in assessing the fine, in particular in setting the amount
of the fine, and also with regard to its cooperation with foreign competition author-
ities.”
Concerning the new provision, the Explanatory Memorandum (BT-Drucks. 15/3640)
stated that the new paragraph 7 made clear that the BKartA was authorized to es-
tablish general management principles for the exercise of discretion in determining
OLG Düsseldorf 27 March 2006, VI-Kart 3/05 (OWi).266.
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the amount of the fine.275 This included in particular principles for the full or
partial reduction of a fine that takes into account the willingness of individual
cartel members to uncover the cartel.276 Such administrative principles concretize
the prosecution discretion of the BKartA in a permissible manner.277
ii. Reduction of the Fine
In a second step, the court of appeal stated that the way in which the Bonus Scheme
determined a reduction of a fine was also in accordance with the criteria in Article
17(3) of the Administrative Offences Act.278
According to Article 17(3) of the Administrative Offences Act, a fine must be assessed
on the basis of the importance of the offence and accusations against the offender.
Furthermore, the economic circumstances of the offender must also be taken into
account.279
According to the court of appeal, the special circumstances of the offender, such
as its contribution in detecting the cartel are to be taken into account. This is par-
ticularly important in complicated settings in which the cooperation of the offender
in discovering the offence is necessary. In such a circumstance, cooperation shows
the offender’s understanding of the offence committed.280 The court of appeal
states that the leniency programme uses criteria in determining several fine grada-
tions and held that reduction of the fine (like immunity from a fine) was also in
accordance with the law.281
The claimants appealed, but in the appeal the legitimacy of the leniency policy
was no longer at issue.282
In a later decision of the court of appeal in Düsseldorf, the German leniency pro-
gramme was again a point of discussion.283 The court of appeal referred to the
outcome of the 2006 case as far as it concerned the leniency programmes’ compli-
ance with Article 47 and Article 17(3) of the Administrative Offences Act. Further-
more, the court of appeal held that information provided by an infringer who had
been granted leniency may legitimately be used as evidence in the cartel procedure.
One point of discussion was Article 136(a)(1) of the German Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, which states inter alia that holding out the prospect of an advantage not
statutorily intended is prohibited. Article 136 of the German Code of Criminal
Procedure is applicable here, as the Administrative Offences Act does not contain
any specific rule and Article 46 of the Administrative Offences Act states that
therefore the rules of the German Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable in
OLG Düsseldorf 27 March 2006, VI-Kart 3/05 (OWi), point 201 et seq.275.
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cartel procedures. Pursuant to German criminal case law, it is indisputable that
statements obtained in violation of this prohibition may not be used in German
criminal procedures.284
The court of appeal stated that a leniency policy holding out the prospect of a fine
reduction in exchange for the cooperation of the leniency applicant does not con-
stitute a prohibited method of examination within the meaning of Article 136(a)(1)
of the German Code of Criminal Procedure. The court’s reasoning was that the le-
niency programme was in accordance with the law and therefore holding out its
benefits was intended by the legislator and therefore does not infringe the German
Code of Criminal Procedure.285
It follows from those cases that under German law the leniency programme is a
result of the proper exercise of the discretion granted to the BKartA by Article 47
and Article 17(3) of the Administrative Offences Act. The German policy appears
to place more importance on destroying cartels than on prosecuting individual
cartel members.
2.4.5 Evaluation of the German Leniency Policy
Over the years, the cost-benefit analysis has been becoming more beneficial for a
leniency applicant. Fines (including personal fines) for other infringers are more
severe, so there are greater benefits for a leniency applicant, especially when a
100% reduction of the fine is granted.
Like the European Commission, the competition authority in Germany is also aware
of the fact that a leniency policy should, to be effective, be set and carried out in
a clear, predictable, transparent and non-discriminatory way. German policymakers
have changed the leniency policy accordingly. These changes have certainly had a
positive influence on the effectiveness of the policy.
The existence of separate “decision divisions” (Beschlussabteilungen) may mean that
undertakings consider the German system and particularly its decision-making to
be more equal, more predictable, more transparent and clearer than they would
for authorities where the departmental separation is less obvious. With the legal
framework, the independence from the Decision divisions is properly safeguarded.
This could have a positive influence on the effectiveness of the German leniency
policy.
Another positive element for the effectiveness of the leniency policy is that the
BKartA is not required to publish its decision to impose a fine. It could be important
for undertakings – when it comes to potential civil actions for example – that
information concerning the cartel is not necessarily made public.
BGH 10 May 2011, NStZ 2001, 551. See also Meyer, Goßner & Schmitt 2017, § 136 a, para 29.284.
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There seems to be room for further improvement of the German leniency policy.
Apart from the discussion about the various leniency policies in Europe and their
harmonization (see Sections 2.6 and 2.7), there are some issues concerning the
German leniency policy that do need attention.
First of all, the leniency policy is set out in policy rules. As already described, a
clear advantage is that it is pragmatic in that it is easier to change policy rules than
legislation. However, there are also disadvantages to relying on policy rules. Policy
rules can be changed rather quickly, which makes them prone to uncertainty.
Moreover, policy rules are not subject to democratic oversight.286 Democratic
oversight is found only in generic legislation setting the maximum level of the
fines. Furthermore, a final disadvantage of policy rules is that a court is not bound
by policy rules if the court considers the policy rules to violate legislation.
More uncertainty stems from the fact that the exact reduction of the fine is often
unclear to leniency applicants. The BKartA has discretion in deciding the level of
fine reduction, of up to 50 percent. This creates uncertainty about what the fine
for the undertaking will actually be.287
Another point of criticism relates to the fact that the leniency policy does not cover
potential criminal enforcement. Although criminal enforcement in Germany is
only secondary in the fight against cartels, this could influence the decision-making
of an undertaking and its employees in applying for leniency.288 When a company
conducts its cost-benefit analysis, any criminal enforcement will likely play a role
in its decision-making. This could affect the effectiveness of the German leniency
policy.
Fourth, the information provided by leniency applicants seems to be protected to
a large extent. It is difficult to receive information from the BKartA. Moreover, the
Antitrust Damages Directive provides that the leniency statement cannot be used
in civil proceedings. Having said that, the test set for providing leniency documents
is that two factors should be weighed: the need for a litigation process in which
information could be disclosed if necessary for a victim of a cartel to claim for
damages versus the protection of the leniency programme by keeping information
confidential. This exercise should be conducted on a case-by-case bases under na-
tional law. This may imply that information, also in relation to the leniency appli-
cation, will have to be provided. As long as it is not completely clear what informa-
tion potentially has to be provided, this can lead to uncertainty. In addition, practice
shows that also from other non-confidential information from the authority claims
may be expected, also for leniency applicants. In other words, it appears that the
protection of the leniency information does not prevent proceedings for damages
against the immunity recipient. This will be further discussed in Chapters 4 and 6.
Appeldoorn & Vedder 2013, p. 88.286.
Henry 2005, p. 21.287.
Schroeder 2006, pp. 452-453.288.
CHAPTER 260
GERMAN LENIENCY POLICY2.4
2.5 Dutch Leniency Policy
2.5.1 Introduction
Like the German leniency policy, the Dutch policy is also based on the European
leniency policy.289 The first Dutch leniency policy was established in 2002. However,
before 2002, the ACM had provided reductions of fines to undertakings providing
information concerning cartels. The first reduction of a fine in the Netherlands
related to the case of FEM/De Week in 1999.290
The latest alignment of the Dutch leniency policy was made in 2014. The official
name of the 2014 Leniency Policy Rule is the “Policy Rule of the Minister of Eco-
nomic Affairs of 4 July 2014, No. WJZ/14112586, on the reduction of fines in con-
nection with cartels”. The main modification in the latest version comes from the
Minister of Economic Affairs who prepared and issued this leniency policy. The
ACM drew up earlier versions in 2002, 2007 and 2009. The Minister received this
power from Article 21 of the independent governing body framework act (Kaderwet
zelfstandige bestuursorganen). The reason for this change was that the Minister of
Economic Affairs thought that it was desirable to strictly separate those who set
the policy from those who carry it out.291 In doing so, the Minister determines the
general policy without being allowed to specifically address individual cases.292
As is the case for the European Commission’s and the German leniency policies,
the Dutch leniency policy is set out in policy rules. Although these rules are not
enshrined in law (described above in Sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5), the compliance of
the parties concerned with the leniency policy can be invoked by the ACM on the
basis of the principles of sound administration.
The ACM is charged with ensuring that undertakings and associations of undertak-
ings do not violate the anti-cartel provisions of Article 101 of the TFEU293 and Article
6 of the Dutch Competition Act (“DCA”).
Article 6 (1) of the DCA states that agreements between undertakings, decisions by
associations of undertakings and concerted practices of undertakings that are in-
tended to, or will, result in hindrance, impediment or distortion of competition
on the Dutch market or on a part thereof are prohibited.
Section 2.5.2 below describes the role and powers of the ACM as a competition
authority. Section 2.5.3 provides an overview of the current Dutch leniency policy
and looks at the special leniency treatment given to construction cartels in the
Netherlands. Section 2.5.4 discusses and analyses how the Dutch leniency policy
functions in practice. Section 2.5.5 evaluates the Dutch leniency policy as it is
known today.
Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs 2014 (Policy rule on the reduction of fines), p. 14.289.
Van der Meulen & Van Oers 2002, p. 163.290.
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2.5.2 Enforcement by ACM
The ACM is an autonomous administrative authority. For the exercise of its powers,
the ACM is subdivided into several departments, such as the Antitrust Department,
Concentration Department, and the Legal Department.294
As an enforcer of competition law, the ACM has several instruments at its disposal
to effectively act against infringements of competition law. The ACM has the task
of supervising and investigating whether competition infringements take place.295
Under Chapter 10 of the DCA, the ACM is also the competent authority for the
enforcement of Article 101 and Article 102 of the TFEU.
Pursuant to Chapter 7 of the DCA, the ACM can impose an administrative fine,
order incremental penalty payments, and issue binding instructions for violations
of cartel infringements and for the abuse of a dominant position.296 The ACM can
impose administrative fines to infringers of cartels under Article 57 of the DCA.
Since 2016, these maximum fines can amount to EUR 900,000 or 10 percent of the
undertaking’s turnover, whichever is more. Article 57 (2) provides that the fine can
be multiplied by the number of years the cartel was active (with a maximum of
four). This fine can be doubled if the infringer is a recidivist. An individual can
also be fined up to EUR 900,000.297 The potentially high fines deviate from the
maximum fines in the other Member States, like Germany, and of the European
Commission. It was a political wish of the Dutch politicians to introduce higher
fines. It should be noted that the ACM is not bound to impose higher fines and it
is even unlikely that the ACM will change its policy.298 It is more likely that it will
keep pace with the fine regimes of the other competition authorities within Europe.
The new legislation could create uncertainty however, as there is a basis for increas-
ing fines drastically in the (near) future.
Although the leniency policy is set by the Minister, a characteristic of the ACM or-
ganization is that it is considered an all-in-one system, whereby almost no formal
or physical distinction between investigating and decision-making services is
made.299 The reasoning behind this system is that it would make the competition
policy more effective and efficient if all powers are within the same organization.300
The Board gives instructions to the Antitrust division responsible for the investiga-
tion and to the Legal Department, which is inter alia responsible for imposing
sanctions.301 This system has been criticized, but because of the presumed ef-
fectiveness and efficiency of this system, there are no plans to change it.302
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2.5.3 Present Dutch Leniency Policy
2.5.3.1 Immunity from Fines
The ACM grants a leniency applicant immunity from fines if the applicant is the
first to submit a request for immunity, if it concerns a cartel into which the ACM
has not launched an investigation (which means that the ACM has not yet internally
laid down in writing its first suspicion of a cartel) and if the applicant provides the
ACM with information that enables the ACM to perform a target inspection.303
The ACM grants immunity to the first applicant that submits a request for immunity
if the application concerns a cartel into which the ACM has already launched an
investigation, but this only applies if the ACM has not yet sent a statement of ob-
jections to any of the parties involved and the application provides the ACM with
documents that stem from the period of the practice in question and that had not
already been in the ACM’s possession and on the basis of which the ACM is able
to prove the existence of the cartel.304
An important factor in whether the applicant is granted immunity is whether the
applicant has not coerced another undertaking into participating in the cartel and
the applicant cooperates fully and continuously right up until the point that the
decision to impose an administrative fine becomes final.305
2.5.3.2 Reduction of Fines
Under Article 5 of the 2014 Leniency Policy Rule, the ACM grants a leniency appli-
cant a fine reduction of at least 30 percent and no higher than 50 percent, provided
that immunity from fines is not available, the ACM has not sent a statement of
objections to any of the parties involved in the cartel and the applicant is the first
to submit a fine-reduction application that contains information with significant
added value and the applicant fully and continuously cooperates right up until
the decision to impose an administrative fine becomes final.
Article 6 of the 2014 Leniency Policy Rule makes clear that the ACM grants a leni-
ency applicant a fine reduction of at least 20 percent and no higher than 30 percent,
provided that the ACM has not sent a statement of objections to any of the parties
involved in the cartel and the applicant is the second to submit a fine-reduction
application containing information with significant added value and the applicant
fully and continuously cooperates right up until the decision to impose an admin-
istrative fine becomes final.
According to Article 7 of the 2014 Leniency Policy Rule, the ACM grants a leniency
applicant a reduction of a fine of no higher than 20 percent, provided that the
ACM has not sent a statement of objections to any of the parties involved in the
Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs 2014 (Policy rule on the reduction of fines), Article 4.303.
Ibid.304.
Ibid.305.
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cartel, the applicant is not the first or second to submit an application for a reduc-
tion of a fine, the application contains information with significant added value
and the applicant fully and continuously cooperates right up until the decision to
impose an administrative fine becomes final.
According to Article 18 of the 2014 Leniency Policy Rule, the ACM considers the
date, time and the added value of the information to determine the reduction of
the fine.
A leniency applicant applying for a fine reduction should provide information
with significant added value. The ACM uses this information for finding and
proving additional facts leading to an increase in the seriousness or the duration
of the violation. The ACM does not take these additional facts into account when
determining the level of the fine to be imposed on the leniency applicant providing
that evidence.
For leniency applicants, there is an obligation to cooperate, which means that until
the decision to impose an administrative fine becomes final with respect to all
practices involved in the cartel, a leniency applicant must fully and continuously
cooperate as required in the interest of the investigation or the proceedings. This
implies that, once the leniency application is submitted, the leniency applicant
must, at least, refrain from taking any action that impedes the investigation or the
proceedings. In addition, the leniency applicant — of the applicant’s own accord
or at the ACM’s request — must provide the ACM with all information regarding
the cartel that the applicant has or may reasonably obtain and ceases its involvement
in the cartel, unless and insofar as the ACM considers continued involvement in
the cartel to be reasonable in order to preserve the effectiveness of inspections and
to ensure that, insofar as reasonably possible, individuals who are working, and
have worked, for the applicant are available for making statements.
Article 22 makes clear that a leniency applicant’s failure to fulfill the obligations
of the grant of leniency renders the grant of leniency null and void. If the grant of
leniency is rendered null and void, the ACM may use the information received
from the leniency applicant as evidence, and the ACM may impose a fine on the
leniency applicant.
2.5.3.3 Construction Fraud
There has been a special leniency regime that falls outside the scope of this study.
It concerned special rules introduced as a result of the discovery at the beginning
of this millennium of widespread bid rigging in the construction industry in the
Netherlands. This scandal was named “the Construction Fraud” (de Bouwfraude).
Almost all construction companies in the Netherlands were agreeing among each
other which construction company would win which tender.
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Both national politicians and the ACM wanted to end this practice, prompting a
process called “Make a Clean Sweep”.306 However, carrying out the normal guidelines
for the setting of fines would have major implications for the market as a whole.307
Therefore, the ACM set a special policy for the setting of fines for this market. The
result was that the fines were substantially lower than they would have been with
the standard procedure.308 This policy had a few distinguishing features in compar-
ison with the ACM’s standard policy. Actually, this special policy entailed not just
a kind of leniency policy, but also a kind of settlement agreement.
For example, a fast track was introduced. Undertakings engaging in bid rigging
could get a lower fine if they agreed that they would relinquish the right to submit
objections or lodge an appeal against a decision. In addition, these undertakings
had to reach a consensus with the ACM about civil claims before 15 February 2005.
For disclosing a specific project where bid rigging took place, another percentage
discount was to be provided. Another fine reduction was granted for cooperating
further than required by law. In total, 473 bid-rigging construction companies ap-
plied for the special procedure. In total, 379 of these companies were considered
leniency applicants.309
Some people in the field of competition law are of the opinion that this special
policy was a violation of the general principles of proper administration, more
specifically, a violation of the principle of equal treatment.310 According to the
district court in several cases, such a defense failed, mainly because the situations
and circumstances under consideration were not comparable or equal.311
2.5.3.4 Marker Protection
Placing a marker allows a leniency applicant to supplement the leniency application
for a time period determined by the ACM and protects the applicant’s position.312
The leniency programme is not only reserved for the first immunity applicant.
Markers for the subsequent reduction of fines applicants exist under the Dutch
system as well (so called "type 2 markers").
The ACM may allow an applicant to place a marker for an incomplete leniency
application if the ACM considers it offers a concrete basis for a reasonable suspicion
Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs 2005. Process “Make a Clean Sweep” – “het proces schoon
schip maken”, as how it is known in the Netherlands – was the result of the finding of a massive
306.
cartel in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, more than 400 construction companies used to meet
regularly to set prices in their bids and to allocate markets. Although this was a public secret, a
whistle blower that handed over parallel accounts of a construction company was needed to bring
the topic on the agenda of the Dutch State. This was the start for politicians to hold a parliamentary
inquiry. The ACM started its investigations.
ACM 2004, p. 33. See also Kuipers 2005, p. 171.307.
Kuipers 2005, p. 169.308.
See inter alia Kuipers 2005, p, 164.309.
Ibid, pp. 171-172.310.
See inter alia Rechtbank Rotterdam 22 January 2010; Rechtbank Rotterdam 24 July 2007.311.
Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs 2014 (Policy rule on the reduction of fines), Article 15
and p. 17 et seq.
312.
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of the applicant’s involvement in the cartel. To this end, a leniency applicant must
at least provide information about its address, the parties in the alleged cartel, af-
fected products and/or services, affected territory, duration of the cartel, nature of
the cartel conduct and the other competition authorities inside or outside the EU
that have been approached by the leniency applicant in relation to the alleged
cartel.313
2.5.3.5 Disclosure of Leniency Information
Access to file requests that national authority receive, must be assessed on the na-
tional rules that are applicable.314
The 2014 Leniency Policy Rule makes clear that the ACM will protect the informa-
tion of the leniency applicant until the statement of objections is issued, except if
the ACM is bound by an overriding legal duty or if the leniency applicant has given
its consent to disclosure.315 According to the 2014 Leniency Policy Rule, the ACM
does not use evidence received from a prospective leniency applicant or information
received as a result of leniency applications submitted in good faith, but which are
rejected by the ACM prior to granting leniency to the applicant in question, unless
the person or undertaking providing the information consents to the information
being used or unless it has already come into the ACM’s possession from other
sources.316 The ACM discloses a statement made orally to an addressee of the
statement of objections only if the addressee (together with its legal representative
seeking disclosure on its behalf) commits not to make any copy by mechanical or
electronic means and also commits to use the statement solely for the purposes
relating to the administrative proceedings in question.
Parties involved in the administrative procedure of the ACM itself could have access
to the leniency applications and information. According to the Tribunal, the success
of ACM's leniency programme weighs less heavily than the defense interest of the
other parties. 317
According to Article 3 of the Government Information Public Access Act (“GIPAA”),
any person may request access to documents which contain information about
governmental matters and which are located with a government body.318 Hence,
also third parties. Identifying an interest in the documents or a reason for the re-
quest is not necessary. Once access has been granted to one person, it is made
available to everyone at all times.319
Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs 2014 (Policy rule on the reduction of fines), Article 15
and p. 17 et seq.
313.
Ruster 2017, p. 143.314.
Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs 2014 (Policy rule on the reduction of fines), Article 26.315.
Ibid, Article 25.316.
See inter alia CBb 2 December 2015 (Meelkartel), point 6.317.
Fierstra et al. 2009.318.
See inter alia Spaans & Mensink 2010; Spaans & Mensink 2008.319.
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The grounds for denying access to documents are stated in Articles 10 and 11 of
the GIPAA. Article 10(1) of the GIPAA provides the absolute grounds for refusal.320
Article 10(2) of the GIPAA lists the relative grounds for refusal.321 A document does
not have to be disclosed if the importance of providing the information does not
outweigh the interests enumerated in Article 10(2) of the GIPAA.322 Some grounds
for refusing access could be particularly relevant in competition law cases, as the
competition authority often relied on these. These grounds include the following:
business and manufacturing data; the relations of the Netherlands with other
countries and international organizations; the detection and prosecution of criminal
offences; the inspection, verification and supervision by administrative bodies; the
disproportionate advantaging or disadvantaging of natural or legal persons involved
in the matter or of third persons; and, in accordance with Article 11(1) of the GIPAA,
policy opinions contained in documents drafted for the purposes of internal con-
sultation.323
Under Article 10(2d) of the GIPAA, the ACM may refuse access to information if
the information is needed for investigation purposes.324
Article 10(2g) of the GIPAA refers to the disproportionate advantaging or disad-
vantaging of natural or legal persons involved in the matter or of third persons.325
This ground for refusal could be specifically relevant to litigation. It could be argued
that documents from the administrative file should not be disclosed because it
would discourage cartel participants from applying for leniency and thus disadvan-
tage those who would therefore never realize that they are the victims of a cartel.
This would jeopardize competition law enforcement in general, including public
enforcement and the private litigation process. Other leniency applicants and
other private enforcement claimants in other cartels could be negatively affected
by such a decision as their cartel may not be discovered.
Under Article 11(1) of the GIPAA, internal ACM documents are not accessible. Article
11 ensures the free exchange of thoughts and opinions within the ACM or between
the ACM and other administrative bodies or advisory bodies.326 Documents drafted
for the purpose of internal consultation may originate from third parties.327 Access
to internal documents may be refused only if and insofar as they contain personal
policy opinions.328 To fulfil this condition, it is not enough for personal opinions
to have some effect on the content of the documents.329 Documents containing
factual information could not be considered personal policy opinions.330 Whether
Daalder 2011, p. 281.320.
Fierstra et al. 2009.321.
Ibid.322.
Ibid.323.
Daalder 2011, p. 340.324.
Ibid, p. 372 et seq.325.
Fierstra et al. 2009.326.
Ibid. See also Daalder 2011, pp. 248 and 265.327.
Fierstra et al. 2009. See also Daalder 2011, p. 246.328.
Fierstra et al. 2009.329.
Daalder 2011, p. 267.330.
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the authors of the documents conducted assessments is decisive.331 As a general
rule, access cannot be denied categorically. If partial publication is possible, access
to that part will have to be granted. Categorical refusal is allowed only if the objec-
tive facts and the personal policy opinions cannot be distinguished from each
other.332
Next to the exceptions of the GIPAA, there is another important rule concerning
disclosure by the ACM which is set in Article 7 of the ACM Act (Instellingswet ACM).
A case from the Rotterdam district court shows that Article 7 of the ACM Act pro-
vides a special disclosure regime that has priority over the rules of the GIPAA.333
Information received by the ACM on the basis of its statutory duty may be used
only to execute the duties provided in Article 2 of the ACM Act. According to the
district court, the ACM has an obligation to keep the information confidential. 334
It has become clear as a result of several ACM decisions that it is difficult for parties
that would like to claim for damages, to obtain the relevant documents from the
ACM. The exceptions incorporated into the GIPAA and the ACM Act prevent access
to competition files.335
Intermediate Conclusion
Based on the above, it appears very difficult for victims of cartels to obtain leniency
documents from the ACM. The author is not aware of any case in which leniency
information has been provided to a party that would like to obtain damages. Based
on EU law however, an absolute ban appears not allowed. The test set by the ECJ
is that there should be a weighing of the two factors (i.e. the need for a litigation
process in which information could be disclosed if necessary for a victim of a cartel
to claim for damages v. the protection of the leniency programme by keeping in-
formation confidential), which should be conducted on a case-by-case bases.
It is significant to note that information could also have been obtained in civil
courts via the national disclosure and discovery rules.336 This applies in particular
to the right of discovery in the common-law countries, like the United States (see
Chapter 5), the United Kingdom and Ireland. However, in countries like Germany
and the Netherlands (see further in Chapter 4), there are other opportunities to
collect information that may also have the consequence that information has to
be provided.337
Daalder 2011, p. 268.331.
Fierstra et al. 2009.332.
Rechtbank Rotterdam 13 May 2015 (Sandd v ACM), point 5.4 et seq.333.
Ibid.334.
From the Decision ACM 25 June 2007, Case 6112 (Martens & Van Oord Aannemingsbedrijf B.V. en T.G.
van Oord Holding B.V.) it becomes clear that the ACM is reluctant to provide information related to
335.
a leniency application. Bringing the leniency applications into the public domain would harm the
operations of the ACM in an unacceptable manner. Cf. Decision ACM 18 May 2010, Case 6881/33
(Wob-verzoek xCAT.nl Publishing); Decision ACM 8 June 2010, Case 6924 (Wob-verzoek Automark); Decision
ACM 5 March 2009, Case 6566 (Wob-verzoek J. Zwaga). See also Haasbeek 2009, pp. 137-147.
See inter alia Ruster 2017, pp. 143-184.336.
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2.5.4 Dutch Leniency Policy Practice
An appeal from an ACM decision goes to a district court Rotterdam. From there,
an appeal goes to the Trade and industry appeals tribunal (College van Beroep voor
het bedrijfsleven or “Tribunal”), an administrative court that is the highest court of
appeal in competition law matters.
In a 2009 case, the district court of Rotterdam stated that the ACM had discretion
in setting fines as long as it remained within the statutory boundaries.338 In this
case, the district court also accepted the ACM’s leniency policy.
In a later case, a decision of the district court was appealed to the Tribunal. In the
Tribunal’s decision, the Tribunal answered several questions regarding the leniency
policy applied by the ACM.339 The plaintiff’s first objection was that it was of the
opinion that the district court was required, in reviewing the amount of the fine,
to fully assess the fine reduction provided under the leniency policy.
The Tribunal held that the district court had correctly stated that the ACM had
some discretionary power under Article 56 of the DCA in relation to setting a fine.340
The discretionary power is limited by generally binding legal provisions, fundamen-
tal legal principles, and the principles of sound administration.341 This implied
that the court would take a reticent approach in assessing whether the ACM had
used its power correctly.
In a 2011 case, the Tribunal pointed out that the fine stated in Article 57(1) of the
DCA could not go beyond a maximum amount corresponding to the turnover of
the undertaking involved.342 Article 57(2) of the DCA makes clear that in setting
the fine, the gravity and duration of the offence are taken into consideration. The
Tribunal held that the ACM had, having regard to Article 57(1) and (2), some discre-
tion in determining the criteria for the fine and the fine itself.
In the cases, the Tribunal pays a good deal of attention to the setting of fines and
to the leniency policy. It makes clear that, under the settled case law, including
that of the European Court of Human Rights and the CJEU, a court should fully
review the level of the fine. That implies that a court assesses whether, having regard
to all the relevant facts and circumstances, there is any disproportionality between
the infringement and fine. If the court considers that the standard has been misap-
plied, a court is allowed to reduce the fine.
With the imposition of a fine, the ACM is, first of all, bound by Article 57(1) of the
DCA, which states that a fine cannot go beyond the maximum amount often relative
to the turnover of the undertaking involved. Furthermore, under Article 57(2) of
the DCA, in setting the fine, the gravity and duration of the offence should be taken
Rechtbank Rotterdam 22 January 2010 (Geelen Beton Posterholt B.V. and Others v ACM).338.
CBb 18 March 2010 (Imtech N.V. v ACM).339.
Ibid.340.
Ibid.341.
CBb 8 February 2011 (ACM v Aannemersbedrijf A and Others).342.
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into consideration. Moreover, according to the court, a large number of circum-
stances that differ from one case to the other should be taken into account. Circum-
stances that can be relevant in setting the fine can include possible repetition of
the offence, the willingness to cooperate in ending the infringement and the amount
of the infringer’s improper advantage. Within the above quoted boundaries, and
in compliance with the statutory maximum, the ACM is given some discretion in
the assessment of the fine.
The cases indicate that the leniency policy is accepted in the Netherlands and that
the ACM has some discretion in setting the fine. The courts acknowledge the dis-
cretionary power of the ACM, except if ACM oversteps the boundaries set out in
generally binding legal provisions, or if it violates fundamental legal principles or
principles of sound administration. Dutch courts adopt a reticent approach in their
review of ACM fine-setting.
According to the ACM, leniency played a role in 40 percent of the cartel cases
between 2005 and 2009.343 In its 2009 Annual Report, the ACM acknowledges the
importance of leniency as an instrument of enforcement. The construction fraud
(Bouwfraude) cases are not incorporated into these calculations. Regardless, even
bearing in mind that the construction fraud cases are not included, the 40 percent
seems very low.
It is likely that the ACM meant to say that in 40 percent of the cases a leniency
application was the reason for starting the investigation. For example, this was the
situation in the 2006 case concerning the market for surface coating for preserving
and decorating metal (Verzinkerijen), in which the first applicant was provided full
immunity, and most of the others were granted a reduction of the fine of between
15 to 35 percent.344 In another 2007 cartel case concerning metal grates (Metalen
Roosters), the first applicant was provided full immunity from fines. The second and
third applicants were granted 15 percent and 10 percent reductions respectively.345
There have been also several other cartels, however, where leniency did not lead
to detecting cartels but provided additional information for the ACM to prove the
cartel’s existence. For example, this was the situation in a tree nurseries cartel
(Boomkwekerijen). It was the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service and Eco-
nomic Investigation Service (FIOD-ECD) that provided the ACM with information
concerning the cartel in the first place. Later on, however, two of the nine tree
nurseries were granted a reduction of 65 percent and 15 percent of the fine.346 In
2009, in a painting business cartel (schildersbedrijven), one of the painting businesses
applied for leniency and granted a reduction of 60 percent.347
Although exact facts and figures are not provided by the ACM, Chris Fonteijn,
Chairman of the Board of the ACM has noticed that lately more companies and
ACM 2009.343.
Decision ACM 4253, 28 December 2006 (Verzinkerijen).344.
Decision ACM 5210, 10 December 2007 (Roosters).345.
Decisions ACM 5211, 13 November 2007 and 08 May 2008 (Boomkwekerijen).346.
Decisions ACM 6601, 6429, December 2009 (Schilderwerken).347.
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individuals, even from outside the Netherlands, are applying for leniency at the
ACM.348
It is also interesting that sometimes the ACM does not reduce the fines because the
companies involved provided no information. The first group of these cases, in
2008, involved the domestic services market.349 The second group of cases, in 2009,
involved the market for paintwork.350 As no fine reductions were provided, it seems
that none of the infringers applied for leniency. This has probably something to
do with the fact that the fines in these cases were relatively low. The market taken
into account by the competition authority for setting the fine related to the value
of the contract only. As discussed above in Section 2.2.3.1, if there is not a severe
punishment, leniency is not an interesting instrument in uncovering cartels.351
The cost-benefit analysis is possibly not interesting enough. In this kind of cartel
in particular (i.e. bid rigging), the solution may be to impose fines on the individuals
involved.
In July 2010, the ACM imposed its first fines on individuals. In this case, they were
found to have been the de facto leaders of an infringement.352
2.5.5 Evaluation of the Dutch Leniency Policy
It is obvious that the lawmakers and the ACM are increasingly aware of how impor-
tant it is for the leniency policy, if it is to be effective, to be set and carried out in
a clear, transparent, predictable and non-discriminatory way. The changes made
to the previous leniency policies certainly had a positive influence on the ef-
fectiveness of Dutch leniency policy. Also, the imposition of higher fines and indi-
vidual fines, in combination with the possibility of full immunity made it more
interesting to actually apply for leniency.
Despite the above, parts of the Dutch leniency policy could still be changed in order
to provide an even clearer, more transparent, more predictable and more equal
leniency policy. This would lead to an even more effective leniency policy and,
hence, even more effective competition law enforcement.
Apart from the discussion about the various leniency policies within Europe and
their harmonization (or lack thereof), which is specifically dealt with in Sections
2.6 and 2.7, there are a few other issues concerning the leniency policy that do
need attention.
First of all, Dutch leniency policy is set out in policy rules, prepared by the Minister.
As said before, one clear advantage of this is that it is easier to change policy rules
Fonteijn 2014, p. 8.348.
Decision ACM 5851, 19 September 2008 (Thuiszorg ’t Gooi); Decision ACM 6108, 19 September 2008
(Thuiszorg Kennemerland).
349.
Decision ACM 6492, 21 August 2009 6492 (Schilderwerken Tongelreep); Decision ACM 6430, 21 August
2009 (Schilderwerken Meiveld); Decision ACM 6431, 5 June 2009 (Schilderwerken Kazerne II).
350.
Cf. Motchenkova 2005, p. 34.351.
Decision ACM 1528, 14 July 2010 (Koninklijke Wegener N.V.).352.
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than legislation. However, policy rules can be changed rather too easily, which
implies uncertainty for leniency applicants and other stakeholders. Another diffi-
culty is that policy rules are not subject to democratic approval.353 Democratic ap-
proval is found only in general legislation setting the maximum level of the fine.
Finally, the court is not bound by policy rules if the court considers the policy rules
not to be in compliance with the legislation.
Second, the actual amount of the fine reduction is often unclear and uncertain for
leniency applicants. The ACM has a significant amount of discretion as to how
much the fine will be.
Third, the choice of an all-in-one system within the ACM may have a negative in-
fluence on the effectiveness of the leniency policy because although there is a
formal distinction between the investigators and the decision-makers, in practice,
Chinese walls do not always appear to function properly. There is a risk of under-
takings not believing that the policy will be applied in a clear, predictable, trans-
parent and equal way. The case of ETB Vos B.V. v ACM makes clear that this fear is
justified.354 In this particular case, although it is prohibited by Article 54a of the
DCA, the same ACM officials investigating the cartel were active during the fine-
determination stage. It could be argued that the organization and hence the leniency
policy are considered as less reliable, resulting in a lack of sense of trust. This is
the risk and disadvantage of having an all-in-one system.355 Obviously, this situation
creates the appearance of partiality favoring the ACM’s investigating officers, re-
sulting in undertakings becoming possibly even more suspicious than they already
are about whether they are being treated fairly. Lack of trust of potential leniency
applicants in the cartel authority might have a negative effect on the effectiveness
of leniency. That is even more the case if the authority’s effectiveness is evaluated
by the government on the basis of the fines it imposes as has happened in the
Netherlands.356 This potentially creates an incentive for the competition authority
to set high fines and provide low fine reductions. It cannot be ruled out that those
circumstances have an influence on whether and the extent to which parties con-
sider the competition authority trustworthy.
Fourth, the information provided by leniency applicants seems to be protected to
a large extent. It is difficult to receive information from the ACM. Having said that,
the test set for providing leniency documents is that there should be a weighing
of the two factors (i.e. the need for a litigation process in which information could
be disclosed if necessary for a victim of a cartel to claim for damages v. the protec-
tion of the leniency programme by keeping information confidential), which should
be conducted on a case-by-case bases under national law. This may imply that in-
formation, also in relation to the leniency application, will have to be provided.
As long as this is not completely clear, this can lead to uncertainty. In addition, it
should be realized that practice shows that also from other non-confidential infor-
mation from the authority, like the decision to set a fine – often published on the
Appeldoorn & Vedder 2013, p. 88.353.
Rechtbank Rotterdam 28 April 2009 (ETB Vos B.V. v ACM); Molin 2009, p. 196 et seq.354.
See also De Pree 2006, pp. 175 and 176.355.
Cf. VVD & PvdA 2012, p. 71. Cf. Geursen 2017.356.
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internet – claims may be expected, also for leniency applicants. In other words,
it appears that protecting the leniency information, does not prevent proceedings
for damages against the immunity recipient. This will be further discussed in
Chapters 4 and 6.
2.6 Interaction of Leniency Policies Within the EU
2.6.1 Introduction
Within the EU, there is a system of parallel competences in which national compe-
tition authorities are active enforcers of Article 101 of the TFEU (ban of cartels) and
Article 102 of the TFEU (abuse of a dominant position) alongside the European
Commission.357 In such a system of parallel competences, an application for leniency
to one authority is not considered an application for leniency to another author-
ity.358 In the absence of an EU-wide system of fully harmonized leniency pro-
grammes, a logical consequence of such a system is that leniency programmes may
apply in parallel, and the applicant may need to file an application to more than
one authority.359
A parallel competence system is subject to criticism, especially with regard to leni-
ency applications for companies involved in a cartel in more than one Member
State. Because of the parallel competence system, it is possible for a leniency appli-
cant to file leniency applications with several individual Member States as well as
with the European Commission. This can be a burden in itself. The different re-
quirements to fulfill the individual leniency policies and the different leniency
regimes could make it less interesting to give up cartel membership and apply for
leniency.360
The competition authorities have noticed that the parallel competence system
within the EU reduces the effectiveness of the leniency policy. The parallel compe-
tence system does have an effect on the clarity, transparency, certainty and equality
of leniency within Europe. Therefore, the European Competition Network (“ECN”)
has researched how to improve the EU’s various leniency policies.
2.6.2 Alignment of Leniency Policies
Multiple parallel applications of policy across the EU is a complex exercise and
cumbersome process. Possibly dozens of different leniency applications would have
to be filed with the different competition authorities. This filing of complete appli-
cations to all the various competition authorities could discourage applicants from
applying for leniency under any programme.
See Regulation No 1/2003.357.
European Competition Network 2012 (2) (ECN Model Leniency Programme), point 1. See also CJEU
20 January 2016 (DHL v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato), point 58 et seq.; opinion of
Advocat General Wathelet of 10 September 2015, point 64.
358.
European Commission 2004 (Notice on Cooperation within the NCA), point 38. See also CJEU
20 January 2016 (DHL v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato), point 58 et seq.; opinion of
Advocat General Wathelet of 10 September 2015, point 65.
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It was thought that discrepancies in the individual leniency programmes could
have adverse effects on the effectiveness of leniency as it influenced the clarity,
transparency, certainty and equality of leniency policies.
To ensure that the EU competition rules are applied effectively and consistently
and to solve problems relating to the differences between the leniency policies,
the European Commission and the national competition authorities have together
formed a network of competition authorities for the application in close cooperation
of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU. This ECN consists of the European Commission
and the competition authorities of the Member States. The ECN developed the ECN
Model Programme (“ECN model”) as a standard.
While it is considered desirable to ensure that all competition authorities operate
a leniency programme, the variety of legislative frameworks, procedures and
sanctions across the EU makes it difficult to adopt a single uniform system. The
ECN model therefore sets out the principal elements which, after the soft harmo-
nization process has occurred, should be common to all leniency programmes
across the EU. The European Commission and the national competition authorities
are committed to seeking the alignment of the programmes in their jurisdictions
within the framework specified by the ECN model.361
The ECN model is based on the common leniency programme experience of the
competition authorities over a number of years and has two principal objectives.
Firstly, the ECN model is meant to trigger the soft harmonization of the existing
leniency programmes and to facilitate the adoption of such programmes by the
few competition authorities that do not operate one. Secondly, it sets out the fea-
tures of a uniform short form application designed to alleviate the burden on both
undertakings and competition authorities of multiple filings in large, cross-border
cartel cases.
The aim of the ECN model is – especially when it comes to cross-border cartels –
to make leniency more attractive to undertakings and, by doing so, to make the
leniency policy more effective.
2.6.3 The ECN Leniency Policy Model
The 2006 ECN model set forth a framework to reward the cooperation of parties
to agreements and practices falling within the ECN model’s scope. ECN members
have committed to using their best efforts, within the limits of their competence,
to align their respective leniency programmes with the ECN model. The ECN
model does not prevent a competition authority from adopting a more favorable
approach towards applicants within its programme.
European Competition Network 2012 (2) (ECN Model Leniency Programme), Explanatory Notes,
p. 10 et seq.
361.
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In November 2012, the ECN clarified and simplified the information that undertak-
ings must provide when applying for leniency to several different authorities. With
the 2012 ECN model, all leniency applicants applying to the European Commission
in cases involving more than three Member States will be able to submit a summary
application to national competition authorities. With the prior ECN model 2006,
only the immunity applicant was entitled to use summary applications. In addition,
the ECN has agreed on a standard template for summary applications, which un-
dertakings will be able to use in the Member States.
The purpose of the ECN model is to ensure that potential leniency applicants are
not discouraged from applying as a result of the discrepancies between the existing
leniency programmes within the ECN. It sets out the treatment that an applicant
can use in any ECN jurisdiction once all the programmes have been aligned. In
addition, the ECN model aims to alleviate the burden associated with multiple fil-
ings. The European Commission is particularly well placed for this by being able
to introduce a model for a uniform summary application system.362
It is significant that the ECN leniency policy model does not have the effect of
changing the individual leniency programmes. By endorsing the revised ECN
model, the heads of the European competition authorities agreed to use their best
efforts to align their current and future leniency programmes and practices. In
each jurisdiction, the ECN model becomes operational only when it has been intro-
duced into the programme or applied in practice.363
To qualify for leniency according to the 2012 ECN model, the applicant must satisfy
the following cumulative conditions: (i) The applicant ends its involvement in the
alleged cartel immediately following its application, save to the extent that its
continued involvement would, in the competition authority’s view, be reasonably
necessary to preserve the integrity of the competition authority’s inspections. (ii) It
cooperates genuinely, fully and on a continuous basis from the time of its applica-
tion to the competition authority until the conclusion of the case. This includes
the following: (a) providing the competition authority promptly with all relevant
information and evidence that comes into the applicant’s possession or under its
control; (b) remaining at the disposal of the competition authority to reply promptly
to any requests that, in the competition authority’s view, may contribute to the
establishment of relevant facts; (c) making current and, to the extent possible,
former employees and directors available for interviews with the competition
authority; (d) not destroying, falsifying or concealing relevant information or evi-
dence; and (e) not disclosing the fact or any of the content of the leniency application
before the competition authority has notified its objections to the parties (unless
otherwise agreed with the competition authority). (iii) When contemplating making
an application to the competition authority but prior to doing so, the applicant
has not (a) destroyed evidence falling within the scope of the application; or (b)
disclosed, directly or indirectly, the application it is contemplating (either the
contents of the application or even the fact that an application is being contem-
European Competition Network 2012 (2) (ECN Model Leniency Programme), point 2.362.
European Commission 2012.363.
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plated) except to other EU competition authorities or any competition authority
outside the EU.364
2.6.3.1 Immunity from Fines
Under the ECN model, the competition authority grants an undertaking immunity
from any fine that would otherwise have been imposed if: a) the undertaking is
the first to submit evidence that, in the competition authority’s view, will enable
the competition authority to carry out targeted inspections in connection with an
alleged cartel; b) the competition authority does not, at the time of the application,
already have sufficient evidence for an inspection and the competition authority
had not already carried out an inspection in connection with the alleged cartel
arrangement; and c) the conditions attached to leniency are met (Type 1A).365
With a view to enabling the competition authority to carry out targeted inspections,
the undertaking should be in a position to provide the competition authority with
the following: (i) the name and address of the legal entity submitting the immunity
application; (ii) the other parties to the alleged cartel; (iii) a detailed description of
the alleged cartel, including: (iv) the affected products; (v) the affected territory or
territories; (vi) the duration; and (vii) the nature of the alleged cartel conduct; (viii)
the evidence of the alleged cartel in its possession or under its control (in particular
any contemporaneous evidence); (ix) information on any past or possible future
leniency applications to any other competition authority and competition author-
ities outside the EU in relation to the alleged cartel.366
In cases where no undertaking had been granted conditional immunity from fines
before the competition authority carried out an inspection or before it had sufficient
evidence for an inspection, the competition authority grants an undertaking im-
munity from a fine which would otherwise have been imposed if all of the following
conditions are met: a) The undertaking is the first to submit evidence that, in the
competition authority’s view, enables the finding of an infringement of Article
101 of the TFEU in respect of an alleged cartel; b) at the time of the submission,
the competition authority did not have sufficient evidence to find an infringement
of Article 101 of the TFEU in connection with the alleged cartel; c) the conditions
attached to leniency are met (Type 1B).367
An undertaking that took steps to coerce another undertaking to participate in the
cartel is not to be eligible for immunity from fines under the model programme.368
2.6.3.2 Reduction of Fines
Undertakings not qualifying for immunity may benefit from a reduction of any
fine that would otherwise have been imposed.
European Competition Network 2012 (2) (ECN Model Leniency Programme).364.
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To qualify for a fine reduction, an undertaking must provide the competition
authority with evidence of the alleged cartel which, in the competition authority’s
view, represents significant added value relative to the evidence already in the
competition authority’s possession at the time of the application. The concept of
“significant added value” refers to the extent to which the evidence provided
strengthens, by its very nature and/or its level of detail, the competition authority’s
ability to prove the alleged cartel.
To determine the appropriate level of the fine reduction, the competition authority
takes into account the time at which the evidence was submitted (including
whether the applicant was the first, second, third, etc. undertaking to apply) and
the competition authority’s assessment of the overall value added to its case by
that evidence. Reductions granted to an applicant following a fine-reduction appli-
cation must not exceed 50 percent of the fine that would otherwise have been
imposed.
2.6.3.3 Marker Protection
An undertaking wishing to make an application for immunity may initially apply
for a “marker”.369 The competition authority has discretion as to whether or not it
grants a marker. Where a marker is granted, the competition authority determines
the period within which the applicant has to complete the leniency application by
submitting the information required to meet the relevant evidential threshold for
immunity. If the applicant completes the application within the set period, the
information and evidence provided are deemed to have been submitted on the
date when the marker was granted.
To be eligible to secure a marker, the applicant must provide the competition
authority with its name and address as well as information concerning the following:
(i) the basis for the concern leading to the approach for leniency; (ii) the parties to
the alleged cartel; (iii) the affected product(s); (iv) the affected territory or territories;
(v) the duration of the alleged cartel; (vi) the nature of the alleged cartel conduct;
and (vii) information on any past or possible future leniency applications to any
other competition authorities and competition authorities outside the EU in relation
to the alleged cartel.370
2.6.3.4 Oral Procedure
The competition authority may allow oral applications at the applicant’s request.
In such cases, the statements may be provided orally and recorded in any form
deemed appropriate by the competition authority. The applicant must also provide
the competition authority with copies of all pre-existing documentary evidence of
the cartel.371
European Competition Network 2012 (2) (ECN Model Leniency Programme), point 16 et seq.369.
Ibid, point 18.370.
Ibid, point 28.371.
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No access to any record of the applicant’s oral statements is granted before the
competition authority has issued its statement of objections to the parties. Oral
statements made under the present programme are only exchanged between
competition authorities under Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003 if the conditions set
out in the European Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of
Competition Authorities are met and if the protection against disclosure granted
by the receiving competition authority is equivalent to the one conferred by the
transmitting competition authority.372
2.6.3.5 Summary Applications
In cases where the European Commission is particularly well placed to deal with
a case, the applicant that has filed or is in the process of filing a leniency application
with the European Commission, either for immunity or for a fine reduction, may
file summary applications with any national competition authority which the ap-
plicant considers (possibly) well placed to act. These summary applications needs
to contain a substantively identical scope to the respective application submitted
to the European Commission and should include a short description of the name
and address of the applicant, the other parties in the cartel, the affected products,
the affected territory or territories, the duration, the nature of the alleged cartel
conduct, the Member States where the evidence is likely to be located; and infor-
mation on its other past or possible future leniency applications in relation to the
alleged cartel.373
Once it receives the summary application, a national competition authority grants
the applicant a summary application marker based on the date and the time when
the information was provided to the national cartel authority. If the summary ap-
plicant is the first applicant in respect of the alleged cartel at the national compe-
tition authority concerned, the national competition authority informs the summary
applicant accordingly.374 If the national competition authorities request specific
further information, the applicant has to provide such information promptly.375
If the national competition authority decides to act in a case, it determines a period
of time within which the applicant must make a full submission of all relevant
evidence and information required to meet the applicable thresholds. If a national
competition authority requests the applicant to make a full submission, the appli-
cant must submit to the national competition authority all information and evi-
dence relating to the alleged cartel, subject to the requirements under the relevant
leniency programme.376
European Competition Network 2012 (2) (ECN Model Leniency Programme), points 28-30.372.
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2.6.4 Principles of Allocation – Particularly Well Placed
As stated earlier, Regulation No 1/2003 is based on a system of parallel competences
in which all competition authorities have the power to apply Article 101 and Article
102 of the TFEU and are responsible for an efficient allocation of work with respect
to those cases where an investigation is deemed to be necessary.377 At the same
time, each network member retains full discretion in deciding whether or not to
investigate a case.378 Under this system of parallel competences, cases will be dealt
with by the following: 379
i. a single national competition authority, possibly with the assistance of other
Member States’ competition authorities; or
ii. several national competition authorities acting in parallel; or
iii. the European Commission.
In most instances, the authority receiving a complaint or starting an ex-officio
procedure will remain in charge of the case.380 Reallocation of a case would be
envisaged only at the outset of a procedure where either that authority considered
that it was not well placed to act or where other authorities also considered them-
selves well placed to act.381 Where reallocation is found to be necessary for the ef-
fective protection of competition and in the European Union’s interest, network
members endeavor to reallocate cases to a single well-placed competition authority
as often as possible.382 In any event, reallocation should be a quick and efficient
process and not hold up on-going investigations.383 An authority is considered to
be well placed to deal with a case if the following three cumulative conditions are
met.384
i. the agreement or practice has substantial direct actual or foreseeable effects
on competition within its territory, is implemented within or originates from
its territory;
ii. the authority is able to effectively bring to an end the entire infringement,
i.e. it can adopt a cease-and-desist order from which the effect will be sufficient
to bring an end to the infringement and it can, where appropriate, sanction
the infringement adequately;
iii. it can gather, possibly with the assistance of other authorities, the evidence
required to prove the infringement.
The European Commission is particularly well placed if one or several agreements
or practices, including networks of similar agreements or practices, have effects
on competition in more than three Member States (cross-border markets covering
European Commission 2004 (Notice on Cooperation within the NCA), point 5.377.
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Ibid.379.
Ibid, point 6.380.
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more than three Member States or several national markets).385 Furthermore, the
European Commission is particularly well placed to deal with a case if it is closely
linked to other EU provisions that may be exclusively or more effectively applied
by the European Commission. The European Commission is also well placed if it
is in the interest of the European Union for a European Commission decision to
be taken as part of the process of developing EU competition policy when a new
competition issue arises or to ensure effective enforcement.386
These criteria indicate that there must be a material link between the infringement
and the territory of a Member State for that Member State's competition authority
to be considered well placed.387 Presumably, in most cases the authorities of those
Member States where competition is substantially affected by an infringement are
well placed if they are capable of effectively bringing the infringement to an end
through either single or parallel action unless the European Commission is better
placed to act.388 The authorities dealing with a case in parallel action endeavor to
coordinate their actions to the extent possible.389
Regarding the allocation of cases and the broad freedom of the competition author-
ities to allocate cases, the cases Si.mobil v Commission and easyjet v Commission are
relevant.
In Si.mobil v Commission the EGC ruled on the rejection of the European Commission
of an abuse of dominance complaint, based on the fact that a national competition
authority was already handling the case.
On 14 August 2009, the applicant lodged a complaint with the European Commis-
sion concerning an alleged infringement by Mobitel of Article 102 TFEU on the
wholesale and retail mobile telephone markets in Slovenia.390 The Slovenian
competition authority had instigated proceedings already on 19 March 2009 and
was dealing with the same practices as those which the applicant had referred to
in its complaint to the European Commission.391
The European Commission refused to act as there was an insufficient degree of
European Union interests in conducting a further investigation into the alleged
infringements on the wholesale market.392 Moreover, the European Commission
concluded that that Slovenian competition authority was already dealing with the
retail market complaints.393
The EGC agreed with the European Commission in its rejection to handle the
complaints. Regarding the complaints about the retail market, the EGC reminds
that it is apparent from the wording of Article 13(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 that
European Commission 2004 (Notice on Cooperation within the NCA), point 14.385.
Ibid, point 15.386.
Ibid, point 9.387.
Ibid.388.
Ibid, point 13.389.
EGC 17 December 2014 (Si.mobil v Commission), point 3.390.
Ibid, point 5.391.
Ibid, point 7.392.
Ibid.393.
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the European Commission is entitled to reject a complaint on the basis of that
provision if it is satisfied that, first, a competition authority of a Member State “is
dealing with” the case that has been referred to the Commission and, second, the
case relates to ‘the same agreement, decision of an association or practice’.394 As
these conditions were fulfilled, it was a valid reason not to handle the case.
Moreover, the EGC reminds that the Notice on cooperation within the Network of
Competition Authorities does not create individual rights for the companies involved
to have the case dealt with by a particular authority. More generally, neither Reg-
ulation No 1/2003 nor the Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition
Authorities create rights or expectations for an undertaking to have its case dealt
with by a specific competition authority.395 Hence, even on the assumption that
the European Commission had been particularly well placed to deal with the case
and the Slovenian competition authority had not been well placed to do so, the
applicant did not have a right to have the case dealt with by the Commission.396
The EGC further reminds that the competition authorities have a broad discretion
in deciding which national authorities handles a case in order to ensure that cases
are dealt with by the most appropriate authorities within the network.397
In the case easyJet v Commission, the EGC ruled that the European Commission is al-
lowed to reject a complaint that has previously been rejected by a national compe-
tition authority (on priority grounds). In 2008, easyJet lodged several complaints
with the ACM against Schiphol Airport based on the law of aviation and the abuse
of a dominant position.398 In 2009 the ACM rejected the complaints.399 In 2011
easyJet lodged a complaint with the European Commission.400 easyJet submitted
that the charges set by Schiphol were discriminatory and excessive and amounted
to an infringement of Article 102 TFEU. The applicant mentioned, moreover, that
it had lodged a number of complaints with the ACM but that that authority had
not taken any final decision on the merits of a complaint relating to competition.
In 2013 the European Commission rejected the complaints of easyJet, based on
Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1/2003. Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 states
that where a competition authority of a Member State or the Commission has re-
ceived a complaint against an agreement, decision of an association or practice
which has already been dealt with by another competition authority, it may reject
it. In addition, the European Commission found that, in any event, the complaint
could also be rejected because the European Union lacked a legal interest, given
that, in the light of the ACM’s findings, there was very little likelihood of being
able to establish an infringement of Article 102 TFEU.
EGC 17 December 2014 (Si.mobil v Commission), point 33.394.
Ibid, point 39.395.
Ibid, point 40.396.
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EGC 21 January 2015 (easyJet v Commission), points 2-3.398.
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81LENIENCY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS
2.6INTERACTION OF LENIENCY POLICIES WITHIN THE EU
The EGC holds that the European Commission did not err in law in rejecting the
applicant’s complaint on the basis of Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, since
the European Commission found that the competition authority of a Member State
had dealt with that complaint on the basis of Article 102 TFEU.401
From the case law, it can be concluded that the authorities have a broad discretion
to decide who handles which cases. Regulation 1/2003 and the Notice on cooperation
within the Network of Competition Authorities do not create rights or expectations
for an undertaking to have its case dealt with by a specific competition authority.402
Even on the assumption that a competition authority is particularly well placed
to deal with a case and another is not well placed to do so, the applicant does not
have a right to have the case dealt with by the former.
2.6.5 Evaluation of the Interaction of Leniency Policies
In the 2006 and 2012 ECN models, important steps have been taken to achieve a
more unified system of making a leniency application. The EU, German and Dutch
leniency programmes are in line with the ECN leniency policy model. As such, it
is expected that a more unified system will provide more equality, transparency,
clarity and certainty. Also, it can be concluded that leniency as such will become
more effective and competition law enforcement more successful.
However, improvements to the system are still possible. This becomes clear, for
example, in the European Commission’s lift cartel case.403 Several of the undertak-
ings applied for leniency in the Member States but were disadvantaged because
the European Commission encroached on the case, which rendered the submission
of the leniency application to the Member States’ authorities useless. The under-
takings had to apply for leniency with the European Commission but were too late.
With regard to the Dutch lift cartel situation, TKL argued that the company had
made a leniency application to the national competition authority since everything
indicated that the Dutch regulator was the most appropriate authority for dealing
with this case. TKL stressed that, after an internal check, it was obvious to the
company that it was just about “a local agreement on incidental projects” and on
28 April 2004 the application was made to the Dutch regulator, with a copy sent
to the European Commission. It also drew parallels with the Dutch authority’s
well-published antitrust investigation of tenders and bid rigging in the construction
industry, which gave TKL an even greater indication that Dutch officials would be
the appropriate regulator. Despite TKL having received leniency from the ACM in
the summer of 2004, the European Commission later took over the case. TKL accused
the European Commission of “ignoring the basis of its own co-operation notice”.
“The enforcement of decentralized competition law has become a lottery” TKL
added. “You don’t know who is going to deal with the case.”404
EGC 21 January 2015 (easyJet v Commission), point 62.401.
EGC 17 December 2014 (Si.mobil v Commission), point 39.402.
See inter alia EGC 13 July 2011 (Kone and Others v Commission). Cf. CJEU 20 January 2016 (DHL v Autorità
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From the above, it becomes clear that also the European Commission Notice on
cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities and the ECN model
do not provide sufficient clarity, particularly for cartel infringers that would like
to apply for leniency.
The fact that it is still often unclear to parties which authority will handle a case
is a lingering hurdle. As shown in the cases above, the consequences can be
enormous for infringers. The risk of punishment by other authorities, even if im-
munity by one of the authorities is provided, lies in wait. As discussed in Section
2.2.3.2, this ambiguity and legal uncertainty could make the leniency system less
interesting to infringers, and hence less effective.
In addition to the specific problem of uncertainty in knowing which authority is
best placed, in it remains generally quite a hurdle for an undertaking to apply for
leniency, especially when it comes to large, cross-border cartel cases. First of all,
the rules of the various leniency programmes are still not 100 percent the same.
For example, the fine reduction in Germany is different from that provided by the
European Commission. Moreover, to the extent that the rules are the same, that
does not mean that the application of these rules is automatically the same in each
and every Member State. The differences can lead to different treatment for leniency
applicants, depending on the authority handling a case. Additionally, with the
existing system, in some cases leniency applications have to be filed with more
than twenty-five national competition authorities as well as with the European
Commission. This could be considered a heavy burden for undertakings.
Enforcement Directive Proposal
In March 2017 the European Commission shared a proposal for a directive of the
European Parliament and the Council to empower the competition authorities of
the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper func-
tioning of the internal market.405 The first aim of the proposed Directive is to boost
effective enforcement of European competition law by empowering national
competition authorities to be more effective enforcers of the EU competition rules
and to ensure that national competition authorities have the necessary guarantees
of independence, resources, enforcement and fining powers.406 The second aim of
the proposal is to provide companies considering leniency a sufficient degree of
legal certainty in order to be incentivized to cooperate with authorities.407 Also
the European Commission notes that the divergences in leniency programmes
across Europe discourages companies from coming clean and providing evidence
of these anticompetitive practices.408
The European Commission notes that differences in leniency programmes still lead
to different outcomes for leniency applicants in terms of whether they benefit from
European Commission 2017 (Proposal Enforcement Directive).405.
Ibid, p. 3.406.
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immunity from fines or even from fine reductions at all.409 Companies which are
considering reporting cartel behavior to a number of jurisdictions in return for
more lenient treatment lack the certainty they need about whether and to what
extent they will benefit from this.410 According to the European Commission, EU
action is needed to ensure that a leniency system is available and applied in a
similar way in all Member states.411 From a public consultation regarding the leni-
ency programme it became clear that 61% of the stakeholders found the lack of
implementation of the ECN Model Leniency Programme by Member States to be
problematic.412 With the proposed Directive the European Commission suggests
to make the provisions of the ECN Model Leniency Programme part of binding
legislation by which the Member States are bound.
It should be noted that the proposed Directive only remains a proposal. It is not
certain whether it will be adopted in whole or in part. If it is implemented, not
much change to the leniency rules in Germany and the Netherlands is to be expec-
ted. In both countries, the ECN Model Leniency Programme is already implemented
in their national policy rules regarding leniency.
2.7 Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Leniency Policy Within
the EU
2.7.1 Introduction
Section 2.2 analyzed when a leniency policy can be considered effective. Analyzing
the effectiveness of leniency programmes within the EU needs a two-step approach
because this is how the European system of parallel competence works.
The effectiveness of the individual leniency programme is one issue. However,
within the EU, there is the additional issue of cooperation between the Member
States and cooperation between Member States and the European Commission.
First, the similarities and differences of the various leniency policies will be ana-
lyzed. Second, the process of parallel competence and parallel leniency applications
will be discussed. Finally, it will be discussed whether there are ways to make the
leniency policies even more effective.
2.7.2 Comparison of the EU, German and Dutch Leniency Policy
The leniency policies of the different cartel authorities are similar to each other to
a large extent. All three have adopted the ECN model in one way or another. The
main similarities between the leniency policies of the European Commission, the
BKartA and the ACM are as follows: each of them is acting on the basis of adminis-
trative legislation and use similar administrative fines to enforce the rules of
competition; the leniency policies are embodied in policy rules; administrative
European Commission 2017 (Proposal Enforcement Directive), pp. 5 and 8.409.
Ibid, p. 8.410.
Ibid.411.
Ibid, p. 17.412.
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fines will be reduced by up to 100 percent; until the introduction of the new rules
of the Antitrust Damages Directive, the leniency policy had no effect on possible
private and criminal enforcement of competition law; participants that apply for
leniency have to cooperate fully and have to end their involvement in the cartel
immediately in principle; marker protection has been introduced; and the legislators
and competition authorities have devoted specific attention to the confidentiality
and inspection of files of the leniency applicant.
The different leniency policies still do contain relevant differences, however.
Full immunity and fine reduction should be guaranteed from the outset in clear
and achievable circumstances. With regard to the fine reduction categories, the
leniency programme of the European Commission and the Netherlands specify in
more detail the reduction that the applicant may expect than is done in the German
leniency system.
The fine reductions in the policy rules of the different cartel authorities are not
the same. The Dutch leniency policy changed in 2014 so that it was in accordance
with the leniency policy of the European Commission. In 2014, the Dutch Ministry
of Economic Affairs changed its opinion about the 60 to 100 percent band and
aligned with the leniency policy of the European Commission. Regarding the fine
reduction, the ACM has aligned its bands with those of the European Commission.
If a leniency applicant does not receive immunity, it could still get a reduction of
30 to 50 percent for the first leniency applicant, 20 to 30 percent for the second
leniency applicant, and up to 20 percent for other leniency applicants. In Germany,
the reduction for leniency applicants not receiving immunity is simply 50 percent
or less. The amount of the reduction shall be based on the value of the contributions
to uncovering the illegal agreement and the sequence of the applications.413
The marker systems differ on important aspects. Only the immunity applicant
could receive a marker from the European Commission. The German and Dutch
competition authorities also provide a marker to the other leniency applicants that
are applying for a fine reduction. It implies that securing the level of fine reduction,
without being obliged to hand in a leniency application immediately, is not possible
with the European Commission, but is possible in Germany and the Netherlands.
A leniency application made to the ACM or the BKartA may be submitted not just
by the undertakings involved in the cartel but also by the individuals that have
given the orders to participate in the cartel or factually directed participation in
the cartel.414 The difference between Dutch and German leniency is that the Dutch
policy states that for individuals no longer working with the undertaking involved
in the cartel at the time of the leniency application, it will be decided on a case-by-
case basis whether the they will be granted the same fine reduction as the under-
taking. The German policy makes clear that it incorporates former employees under
Bundeskartellamt 2006, point 5.413.
Schroeder 2006, p. 452.414.
85LENIENCY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS
2.7EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LENIENCY POLICY WITHIN THE EU
the “leniency veil”.415 Concerning this matter, the Dutch leniency policy appears
to be less transparent, less predictable and less clear than the German policy.
According to the European Commission’s leniency policy, a cartel participant that
took steps to coerce other undertakings to join the cartel is not granted immunity.
The wording of the text could imply that the mere attempt to coerce appears suffi-
cient to satisfy this test. A fine reduction is the maximum feasible incentive available
to such a cartel participant under the EU system. The Dutch and German leniency
policies appear to be less strict in providing immunity.416 No immunity is granted
to participants that coerced others to participate in the cartel.
The existence of the “decision divisions” (Beschlussabteilungen) in Germany may lead
undertakings to consider the German system, particularly its decision-making
process, more equal, predictable, transparent and clear. Such a decision division
provides more legal certainty and is seen as being more likely to deal with the case
only on the facts and on the merits. If ambiguities are removed, cartel infringers
can make a more rational decision about whether or not to apply for leniency.
Removal of the ambiguities could strengthen the game theory effect of the leniency
policy, because a more rational decision can be made if the rules of the game are
clearer. As discussed in Section 2.2.3.2, this could have a positive influence on the
effectiveness of leniency. When applying for leniency to the European Commission
or the ACM, this possible positive influence is lacking.
In contrast to the leniency policy of the European Commission and Germany, it is
in principle the Ministry of Economic Affairs that makes the policy rules for the
ACM. It could be argued that the Ministry – with its distance to the cartel investi-
gations – is in a better position to decide whether rules are to be set in the interest
of the public instead of the interest of the authority. This could be considered as
a positive aspect of the Dutch system.
Another difference is that “naming and shaming” appears to be more important
to the European Commission and to the ACM. In the German system, the BKartA
is not obliged to publish its decision to impose a fine, unlike the EU and Dutch
systems, in which the (non-confidential version of the) decision to impose a fine is
always made public.417 Although not directly related to leniency, public release of
this information might affect whether cartel cases and cartel participants remain
confidential or become public. In the conduct of a cost-benefit analysis, this could
negatively influence the effectiveness of leniency.
2.7.3 Interaction of Leniency Policies
Especially for cross-border cartels, a leniency applicant expects transparent, clear,
certain and equal treatment in each and every Member State. The introduction of
the ECN model is an important step to create a more unified system of leniency
Bundeskartellamt 2006, point 17.415.
Cf. Wils 2007, p. 33.416.
Regulation No 1/2003, Article 30; ACM Act (Instellingswet), Chapter 3, para 3; Jüntgen 2007, pp. 128-
137, under III.3.
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application. It is expected that a more unified system will lead to more equality,
transparency, clarity and certainty and this will lead to the leniency policy becoming
more effective and competition law enforcement more successful.418
To a large extent, the leniency policies of the various cartel authorities within the
European Union are aligned. The cooperation between Member States, mainly via
the ECN, has certainly contributed to that. For undertakings, this means greater
equality, transparency, clarity and certainty. It also makes it easier to apply for le-
niency if a single application standard applies.
A more comprehensive comparison, however, shows that there are differences
between the different policies.419 For example, the amount of the fine reduction
is not the same in every Member State. Also, the marker systems differ on important
aspects. The main challenge for the competition authorities is to change the fact
that leniency policies still differ within the EU. Moreover, the hurdle of having
different leniency applications for the same cartel should be solved one way or the
other. Most likely, a centrally led pan-European system would contribute to further
improvement of the effectiveness of the leniency policy and competition law en-
forcement in Europe. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
2.8 Conclusion
A basic premise is that applying for leniency should be beneficial to an undertaking.
To be made more effective, a leniency policy should be set and carried out in a
clear, transparent, predictable and equal way. Uncertainty, lack of clarity, lack of
transparency and inequality jeopardize the effectiveness of the leniency policy.420
The competition authorities seem to be aware of this as well because they have
been adjusting their leniency policies accordingly.
In the last few decades, the three European authorities examined above have made
a great effort to optimize their leniency programmes.421 Overall, the individual le-
niency policies are becoming more and more comprehensible and provide good
guidance and certainty. Looking at the amount of leniency applications, this effort
has proven to be fruitful. Many more cartels have been detected. However, there
still appear to be ways to further improve the clarity of the leniency programmes.
The wide margin in setting the fines and determining the reduction in the fines
and the fact that rules are laid down in soft law provisions are factors that may
result in a leniency programme that is less effective than it could be. The protection
of leniency documents doesn’t appear absolute and may differ from case to case.
This may lead to uncertainty. Moreover, practice shows that also from other non-
confidential information from the authority, like the decision to set a fine – often
published on the internet – claims may be expected, also for leniency applicants.
In other words, it appears that protecting the leniency information, does not prevent
proceedings for damages against the immunity recipient.
European Commission 2017 (Proposal Enforcement Directive), pp. 9, 17, 22 and 27.418.
See also European Commission 2017 (Proposal Enforcement Directive), pp. 3, 5 and 8.419.
Jephcott 2002, p. 384. See also Voet van Vormizeele 2006, p. 293.420.
Cf. Riley 2010, pp. 191-207.421.
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2.8CONCLUSION
To a large extent, the leniency policies of the various cartel authorities within the
EU have been made to correspond. It is believed that it also have a positive impact
on the effectiveness of the leniency policy. The cooperation between Member States,
mainly via the ECN, has certainly contributed to that. For undertakings, this means
greater equality, transparency, clarity and certainty. However, after a more com-
prehensive comparison, some differences between the different policies have become
apparent (see Section 2.7). The main challenge for the competition authorities in
relation to the leniency policy is to change the fact that leniency policies within
the EU still contain differences. It would be preferable to have a 100 percent uniform
leniency policy for all the Member States and the European Commission. If the
policies are made equal, predicable, transparent and clear, it is more likely that
cartel infringers will be able to make a more rational decision about whether or
not to apply for leniency. It could strengthen the game-theory effect because a
more rational decision can be made. As discussed in Section 2.2.3.2, this could
have a positive influence on the effectiveness of leniency. In connection with this,
a single pan-European leniency system could potentially contribute to an improve-
ment in the effectiveness of the leniency policy and competition law enforcement
in Europe. Especially for cross-border cartels, this would take away the hurdle of
multiple leniency applications.
These items and possible solutions will be described in more detail in Chapter 6.
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Development of Private Enforcement at the
EU level
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Towards European Antitrust Damages Legislation3.3
Comparison and Analysis of the Directive and the Papers3.4
Conclusions3.5
3.1 Introduction
In order to analyze the relation between leniency and upcoming private enforce-
ment, it is – next to describing the leniency policy in Europe – relevant to describe
the development of private enforcement and the way it is interpreted in Europe.
This chapter will start with the history, evolution and maturation of private en-
forcement within the EU. As Sagan once said, “You have to know the past to under-
stand the present”.422 In the second part of Chapter 3, the existing EU legal frame-
work, as formulated in the Antitrust Damages Directive will be discussed briefly.
It also includes some observations on the legislative process of the EU legislator.
3.2 History
3.2.1 Introduction
In some of the Member States, private enforcement of competition law has already
existed for quite a while now. But in others it is a relatively new phenomenon. In
2001, private enforcement was placed on the EU agenda when the CJEU made clear
that victims of competition law infringements should be compensated for their
losses. Since then, the European Commission has set to work on making a policy
developing private enforcement as a valuable tool in the fight against competition
law infringement, a tool that would supplement the already known, and feared,
public law enforcement instruments of the competition authorities.
This Section describes and analyzes the history of private enforcement in the EU.
First, the important case law of the CJEU is considered. Then the actions taken by
the European Commission are discussed. This starts with a description of the for-
mulated Green Paper, after which the White Paper is discussed. As a result of these
Papers and the market consultation process, the European Commission prepared
a draft directive in 2009. Several Member States have criticized the 2009 draft, as
have a few European institutions including the European Parliament. Because of
Quote: Carl Sagan (1934-1996).422.
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this criticism, the plans were shelved. In contrast to Kroes, it appeared that her
successor Commissioner Almunia, was not interested in pursuing this matter as
vigorously; however, appearances can often deceive. The European Commission
was working on a new directive, which was first published in 2013, later amended
and accepted in 2014, and had to be implemented into national legislation by the
end of 2016.
3.2.2 EU case law
The doctrine of civil liability based on EU law provisions has not been created
suddenly. Step by step, the CJEU has made clear whether, who, and relative to
whom, someone may be liable for an infringement of EU law. Such developments
might even be expected to go further.423
One of the first important cases regarding EU law is the case Van Gend & Loos v the
Netherlands. The case shows that individuals do not only derive obligations but also
rights, directly from the EU Treaties. Van Gend & Loos imported goods from Ger-
many to the Netherlands. The Dutch customs authorities charged a tariff on the
import. Van Gend & Loos objected, submitting that the tariff was contrary to EU
law.424
Van Gend & Loos paid the tariff but sought to recover the money in the national
court afterwards. The national court made a request for a preliminary ruling to
the CJEU, submitting the question whether (the predecessor of) Article 30 of the
TFEU conferred rights on the nationals of a Member State. Rights that could be
enforced in national courts.
According to the CJEU, Article 30 TFEU created personal rights for Van Gend &
Loos, even though this was not expressly stated in the Article. According to the
CJEU, based on Article 30, it was not allowed to impose a higher tariff.425 The CJEU
makes clear that the European Union constitutes a new legal order of international
law for the benefit of which the Member States have limited their sovereign rights,
albeit within limited fields and the subjects of which comprise not only Member
States but also their nationals.426 Independently of the legislation of Member States,
Union law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended
to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage.427 These
rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the EU treaties, but also
by reason of obligations which the EU treaties impose in a clearly defined way
upon individuals as well as upon the member states and upon the institutions of
the Union.428
Cf. Wilman 2016, p. 935.423.
CJEU 5 February 1963 (Van Gend & Loos v Netherlands).424.
Ibid.425.
Ibid.426.
Ibid.427.
Ibid.428.
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In fact, with this landmark case, the CJEU decided that the fact that the failure of
Member States to comply with EU law could be supervised by individuals that act
as enforcers in national courts.429
Liability under EU law originated with the case of Francovich v Italy.430 The state of
affairs before Francovich v Italy was that there was (arguably) authority for the position
that the Member States were non-contractually liable under EU law.431 However,
the conditions of liability were to be provided by national law.432
In this case, Francovich alleged that Italy had not fulfilled its obligation to imple-
ment a directive before 23 October 1983 (i.e. to set up or designate a guarantee in-
stitution to ensure the payment of outstanding employee claims in the event of
employer insolvency).433 Francovich sought to rely on the rights provided by the
directive and claimed that Italy was obliged to honour the guarantees provided for
in the directive or alternatively pay compensation.434
Briefly stated, the CJEU held that the full effect of EU law would be impaired and
the protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals
were unable to obtain redress when their rights are infringed by a breach of EU
law for which a Member State can be held responsible.
One principle in the EU legal system is that a Member State is liable for damage
caused to an individual as a result of breaches of EU law for which the Member
State is responsible. A basis for a Member State’s obligation to make good such
damage is found in Article 4(3) of the TEU, under which Member States are required
to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment
of their obligations under EU law.435 Among these obligations is the obligation to
eliminate the consequences of a breach of EU law.436
In the case of Francovich v Italy, the CJEU limited the discussion to the situation of
a Member State failing to fulfill its obligation to take all measures necessary to
achieve the result prescribed by a directive. In this situation, according to the CJEU,
three conditions must be fulfilled to ensure the effectiveness of the rights to be
protected: (i) the result prescribed by the directive entails the granting of rights to
individuals; (ii) the right is identifiable; and (iii) there must be a causal link between
the breach of the Member State's obligation and the loss and damage suffered by
the injured parties.437
CJEU 5 February 1963 (Van Gend & Loos v Netherlands).429.
CJEU 19 November 1991 (Francovich and Others v Italian Republic).430.
Bondi & Farley 2009, p. 11.431.
Ibid.432.
Ibid, pp. 13-14.433.
Ibid.434.
Wilman 2016, p. 891.435.
CJEU 19 November 1991 (Francovich and Others v Italian Republic), point 31; Wilman 2016, p. 897.436.
CJEU 19 November 1991 (Francovich and Others v Italian Republic), points 39-40; Beu 2012, p. 13; Bondi
& Farley 2009, p. 16.
437.
91DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT AT THE EU LEVEL
3.2HISTORY
Although the action for damages would be dealt with in the context of national
law, the conditions set have to be not less favorable than those relating to similar
domestic claims and must not be framed so as to make it virtually impossible or
excessively difficult to obtain reparation.438 National law would then designate the
competent courts and lay down the detailed procedural rules for legal proceedings.
In Francovich v Italy, the CJEU found that the conditions relating to the breach of
individual rights had been met, and the case was sent back to the Italian court to
determine causality and the level of damages.439 The case of Francovich v Italy and
the conditions set for a civil claim against a Member State could be considered as
providing guidelines for later civil litigation against a Member State.
The case of Brasserie du Pêcheur v Germany made clear that the application of this
principle (i.e. that Member States are required to compensate individuals for loss
and damage caused to the individuals as a result of breaches of EU law for which
they can be held responsible) cannot be discarded if the breach relates to a provision
of directly applicable EU law.440 The principle is also applicable in this situation.
Brasserie du Pêcheur was a French company that claimed that it had been forced to
discontinue exports of beer to Germany in late 1981 because the competent German
authorities considered that the beer produced by the French company did not
comply with the purity requirement (Reinheitsgebot) laid down in the Biersteuergesetz
of 14 March 1952, in the version dated 14 December 1976.441
The European Commission took the view that those provisions were contrary to
Article 34 of the TFEU and brought infringement proceedings against Germany
because of two laws, namely, the prohibition on marketing beers bearing the des-
ignation “Bier” lawfully manufactured by different methods in other Member States
and the prohibition on importing beers containing additives. By judgment of 12
March 1987 in the case of Commission v Germany, the CJEU held that the prohibition
on marketing beers imported from other Member States did not comply with the
provisions in question, as it was incompatible with Article 34 of the TFEU.442 Bras-
serie du Pêcheur consequently brought an action against Germany for reparation of
the loss suffered by it as a result of that import restriction between 1981 and 1987,
seeking damages in the sum of DM 1,800,000, representing a fraction of the loss
actually incurred.443
In this case, the CJEU relied on the three conditions stated in Francovich v Italy.444
However, the CJEU amended the conditions to some extent. The CJEU added that
the breach had to be sufficiently serious. In its decision, the CJEU provided a framework
for determining whether a breach is “sufficiently serious”. The decisive test for
determining whether a breach of EU law is sufficiently serious is whether the Member
CJEU 19 November 1991 (Francovich and Others v Italian Republic), point 43; Bondi & Farley 2009, p. 17.438.
Bondi & Farley 2009, p. 17.439.
CJEU 5 March 1996 (Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Germany).440.
Ibid.441.
CJEU 12 March 1987 (Commission v Germany).442.
CJEU 5 March 1996 (Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Germany).443.
Cf. Beu 2012, p. 13.444.
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State concerned manifestly and gravely disregard the limits of its discretion. The
factors that the court takes into consideration include the clarity and precision of
the rule breached, the measure of discretion left by that rule to the national or EU
authorities, whether the infringement and the damage caused was intentional or
involuntary, whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable, the fact that
the position taken by an EU institution may have contributed towards the omission,
and the adoption or retention of national measures or practices contrary to EU law.
The CJEU held that a breach of EU law is sufficiently serious if it has persisted despite
a judgment finding the infringement in question to be established, or if there is a
preliminary ruling or settled case law of the court on the matter in which it is clear
that the conduct in question constituted an infringement.
The case of Dillenkofer v Germany was decided shortly after the case of Brasserie du
Pêcheur v Germany.445 Dellinkofer (and others) were purchasers of package travel
holidays who, following the insolvency in 1993 of the two operators from whom
they had bought their packages, either never left for their destination or had to
return from their holiday location at their own expense. They had not succeeded
in obtaining reimbursement of the money paid to the operators or the expenses
incurred to go back home. Dillenkofer claimed compensation and brought actions
against Germany for the loss and damage suffered because the Directive had not
been transposed within the prescribed period.446 Dillenkofer based the claim on
the ground that if Article 7 of the Directive had been transposed into German law
within the prescribed period, i.e. by 31 December 1992, he would have been pro-
tected against the insolvency of the operators from whom they had purchased their
package travel.
Germany and other Member States argued in particular that a Member State can
incur liability for late transposition of a directive only if there is a serious (i.e. a
manifest and grave) breach of EU law for which it is responsible. According to the
Member States, this depends on the circumstances causing the failure to transpose
the law within the period for transposition.
It appears that by using the condition mentioned in the case of Brasserie du Pêcheur
v Germany (i.e. “sufficiently serious” breach), the Member States tried to find an
exception to, and an escape from, liability for the late transposition of a directive.
The CJEU rejected this point of view and made clear that, in substance, the condi-
tions laid down in the two judgments of Francovich v Italy and Brasserie du Pêcheur v
Germany were the same, since the condition that there should be a sufficiently seri-
ous breach, although not expressly stated in Francovich v Italy, was nevertheless
evident from the circumstances of that case.
The CJEU ruled that the failure to take any measures to transpose a directive
within the period laid down for that purpose constituted a serious breach of EU law
per se and consequently gave rise to a right of reparation for individuals suffering
injury if the result prescribed by the directive entails the grant to individuals of
CJEU 8 October 1996 (Dillenkofer and Others v Germany).445.
Directive on package travel, package holiday and package tours.446.
93DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT AT THE EU LEVEL
3.2HISTORY
rights whose content is identifiable and a causal link exists between the breach of
the Member State's obligation and the loss and damage suffered.
According to the above cases, individuals who have suffered damage have a right
to reparation from a Member State if:447
i. the rule of law infringed must have been intended to confer rights on indi-
viduals;
ii. the breach must be sufficiently serious;
iii. the individual suffered damage; and
iv. there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting
on the Member State and the damage sustained by the injured parties.
After these cases, one of the further implications that had to be examined was
whether the principle of state liability, as accepted in these cases, could be extended
to situations where the malefactor was an individual.448
Whether an individual can claim compensation for a breach of European compe-
tition law has been long discussed, and a right to damages has actually been recog-
nized in some of the Member States.449
Banks v British Coal Corporation was the first CJEU case where this issue arose.450 The
British Coal Corporation controlled coal reserves in the United Kingdom and had
the power to authorize other companies to extract coal and to sell it to third parties,
subject to a fixed amount payable to the British Coal Corporation.451 Banks claimed
that such a licensing agreement was in breach of competition provisions, and that
it was entitled to compensation from the British Coal Corporation for excessive li-
cense fees and for the unreasonable low prices paid by the British Coal Corporation
under the license/purchase agreement. The Advocate General strongly argued in
favor of conferring on the claimant the right to bring an action for compensation
before the national court.452 The CJEU did not address the issue, as it held that the
competition rules stated in Articles 65 and 66 of the European Coal and Steel
Community Treaty were not directly applicable.453
A decade later the CJEU addressed the issue again in Courage v Crehan.454
Ambtenbrink & Vedder 2006, p. 263. Cf. Klinke 2005, p. 309; Ruhle & Lattenmeyer 2003, pp. 733-
737. See for more information also Eijsbouts, Jans, Senden & Prechal 2010.
447.
Bondi & Farley 2009, p. 72.448.
Ibid.449.
Ibid.450.
CJEU 13 April 1994 (Banks & Co. Ltd v British Coal Corporation).451.
Opinion Advocat General Van Gerven, 27 October 1993 in case: CJEU 13 April 1994 (Banks & Co. Ltd
v British Coal Corporation).
452.
CJEU 13 April 1994 (Banks & Co. Ltd v British Coal Corporation), points 15-19. See also Bondi & Farley
2009, p. 72.
453.
Bondi & Farley 2009, p. 73.454.
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3.2.3 Courage v Crehan
In Courage v Crehan, the core problem the EU judges had to address was not the ex-
istence in EU law of a right to bring antitrust damages actions, but to establish
whether a party to a contract which violates competition law can be excluded from
such actions related to that contract.455 The legal problem the CJEU had to solve
concerned essentially the limits to be imposed to the application of national proce-
dural rules.456
However, in Courage v Crehan the CJEU acknowledged that private enforcement does
exist under EU law, deriving it from the effet utile principle.457 The CJEU recognized
an action for damages under Article 101(1) of the TFEU to ensure the full ef-
fectiveness of the Article.458 The CJEU made clear that a party to an anticompetitive
agreement or practice, as well as a third party, may seek compensation for losses
resulting from such agreement or practice.459
The case originated in an action brought by an English brewery, Courage, against
Mr. Crehan, a publican, for the recovery of unpaid sums for deliveries of beer.460
As a defense, Mr. Crehan raised the incompatibility of the contractual provisions
relied upon by Courage with Article 101(1) of the TFEU. Furthermore, he counter-
claimed for damages resulting from the excessive prices charged by Courage.461
However, the difficulty for Mr Crehan was that his defense ran against to the English
premise providing that a party to an illegal contract could not claim damages.462
Citing the cases of Van Gend & Loos,463 Costa Enel464 and Frankovich,465 the CJEU held
that EU law had created its own legal order, which was integrated into the legal
systems of the Member States and which their courts were bound to apply. Just as
it imposed burdens on individuals, EU law had also given rise to rights that had
become part of their legal assets.466 According to the CJEU, these rights arose not
only where EU law expressly granted them, but also by virtue of obligations imposed
by EU law in a clearly defined manner on all three: individuals, Member States and
EU institutions.467 The CJEU reminds that in the earlier case of Eco Swiss, it held
that Article 101 of the TFEU constitutes a fundamental provision essential for the
accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the European Union and, in particular,
for the functioning of the internal market.468
Cisotta 2014, p. 85.455.
Ibid, p. 85.456.
Ibid, p. 88.457.
Ibid, p. 85.458.
See inter alia also Cisotta 2014, p. 84 et seq; Sieburgh 2014, p. 520 et seq.; Beu 2012, pp. 14 and 35
et seq.; Komninos 2002, p. 449 et seq; De Jong 2002; Harinxma 2002.
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CJEU 20 September 2001 (Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan), point 6.460.
Ibid.461.
Ibid, point 11.462.
CJEU 5 February 1963 (Van Gend & Loos v Netherlands).463.
CJEU 15 July 1964 (Costa v E.N.E.L.).464.
CJEU 19 November 1991 (Francovich and Others v Italian Republic), point 31.465.
CJEU 20 September 2001 (Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan), point 19.466.
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Ibid, point 20. See CJEU 1 June 1999 (Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV), point 36.468.
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The CJEU holds that, Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU provide direct effects in the
relations between individuals and created rights for the individuals concerned,
which the national courts have to safeguard.469 According to the CJEU, this means
that any individual could rely on a breach of Article 101 of the TFEU before a na-
tional court even if that individual was a party to a contract that restricted or dis-
torted competition within the meaning of the provision.470
The CJEU points out that, with regard to the possibility of seeking damages caused
by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition, it is settled case
law471 that the national courts whose task it is to apply EU legal provisions in areas
within their jurisdiction have to ensure that those rules take full effect and have
to protect the rights conferred on individuals.472
According to the CJEU, the full effectiveness of Article 101 of the TFEU and the
practical effect of the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) of the TFEU would
be put at risk if it is not open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused
by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition.473 The CJEU
states that damages actions before the national courts could make a significant
contribution to the maintenance of effective competition within the EU.474 Despite
the lack of a legal right for compensation under Article 101 TFEU, the CJEU explains
that a right to damages does exist under EU law, deriving it from the effet utile
principle.475 To protect the maintenance of effective competition, the CJEU therefore
concludes that there should not be any absolute bar to such an action being brought
by a contractual party violating competition rules.476
The CJEU held that it was up to the domestic legal system of each Member State to
designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the proce-
dural rules governing actions for safeguarding the rights individuals derived directly
from EU law, provided that such rules are not less favorable than those governing
similar domestic actions and that they do not render practically impossible or ex-
cessively difficult to exercise of rights conferred by EU law.477 The CJEU precluded
an absolute bar of claiming damages, but also stated that EU law did not preclude
national law from denying a party who was found to bear significant responsibility
for the distortion of competition the right to obtain damages from another contrac-
ting party.478
CJEU 20 September 2001 (Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan), point 23; CJEU 27 March 1974 (BRT v SV
SABAM and NV Fonior), point 16; and CJEU 18 March 1997 (Guérin automobiles v European Commission),
point 39.
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CJEU 20 September 2001 (Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan), point 24.470.
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Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others), point 19.
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The CJEU reminds that EU law does not prevent national courts from taking steps
to ensure that the protection of the rights guaranteed by Union law does not entail
the unjust enrichment of those who enjoy them.479 In line with the earlier case of
Commission v Italy,480 EU law also does not prevent national law from denying a
party who is found to bear significant responsibility for the distortion of competition
the right to obtain damages from the other contracting party, where this is proven.481
Hence, EU law does not preclude a rule of national law from barring a party to a
contract (restricting or distorting competition) from relying on that party’s own
unlawful actions to obtain damages if it was established that that party bore signi-
ficant responsibility for the distortion of competition.482
To assess if an undertaking bears such a ‘significant responsibility’ for the distortion
of competition – and can therefore be barred from bringing an action for damages
– the matters to be taken into account by the national court have to include the
economic context and the respective bargaining power and conduct of the two
parties to the contract.483 The markedly weaker position could, for example, exist
because there is only a reduced or absent freedom to negotiate the terms of the
contract and capacity to avoid the loss or reduce its extent, in particular by availing
himself in good time of all the real remedies available to the markedly weaker
party.484 Van Bael and Bellis indicated that difficulty may arise in determining
whether a party bears such “significant responsibility”.485 Van Bael and Bellis, for
instance, mention that it would be inappropriate for a party to a price-fixing cartel
to be entitled to damages for the loss of clients suffered as a result of the excessive
sale price it had to charge on the basis of the anti-competitive agreement reached
within the cartel.486 Monti is even more critical about the decision. He argues that
Article 101 of the TFEU should protect third parties, not the parties to the contract.487
Providing such a right of damages to parties to the anticompetitive agreement does
not make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition
in the Union.488 Placing private enforcement in the hands of parties to an anticom-
petitive agreement is not the way of increasing private enforcement in the public
interest.489 He even concludes that the possibility to claim for damages for parties
to the anticompetitive agreement could lead to further anticompetitive effects and
be at the cost of consumer welfare.490 In addition it could give an extra responsibi-
lity for the stronger party to the contract which could be used by the other party.
CJEU 20 September 2001 (Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan), point 30.479.
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According to Monti, parties to such agreements should ideally be barred from
seeking damages and the Courage case should be overruled.491
The judgment shows that any individual can claim damages suffered as a result of
a competition law infringement. There was a long legal road, including a standard
appeal of the effet utile principle needed to come to this outcome. First, it had to be
clear that individuals were entitled to rely on EU law directly. Moreover, it was
necessary that liability can result from infringements of EU law. This was already
obvious for Member States. It also became clear that national courts are responsible
to test this. With this, every individual should be able to claim damages caused by
EU competition law infringements. The CJEU makes clear that Member States are
not allowed to have rules that prevent damages claims per se. It is however allowed
that Member States apply rules by which contracting parties cannot claim for
damages if they bear a significant responsibility for the distortion of competition.
The critical observations of Monti are interesting to read. At the same time, the
question is whether the critique is not overstrained. Most importantly, the CJEU is
critical about English law, because it systematically denies a party to an agreement
the possibility of relying on (invalidity and) claiming damages, as it is not in accor-
dance with Article 101 TFEU.492 The CJEU does not prohibit Member States to apply
rules that prevent parties to claim for damages if they have significant responsibi-
lity for the distortion of competition. As the CJEU reminds, it is even common in
the Member States to have rules preventing litigants profiting from their own un-
lawful conduct. Indeed, the CJEU has applied such a rule in the past.493
According to the author, all parties to the contract have often a significant respon-
sibility to prevent the distortion of competition. Therefore, the author assumes
that in practice, parties to the anticompetitive contract will often not be successful
in claiming for damages. It is only for those specific cases, where the other party
is in such a weak position, given the examples by the CJEU – almost comparable
with a third party not involved in the creation of the anticompetitive agreement
at all – that it should be allowed to claim for damages. Cissota notes that the de-
cision in Crehan has been inspired by the need to establish in contractual relation-
ships a kind of fairness.494 It is likely that some kind of fairness is indeed involved,
which is no stranger in the midst of civil law systems. More importantly however
is that providing an extra incentive for preventing parties from entering into
agreements with anticompetitive provisions, provides in my opinion a better pro-
tecting of the maintenance of effective competition. It is likely that the risk of
damages claims as such have a deterrent effect. It strengthens the functioning of
the Union competition rules and discourages acting contrary to them.495
Monti 2002, p. 301.491.
Sieburgh 2014, p. 522.492.
CJEU 20 September 2001 (Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan), point 31.493.
Cissota 2014, p. 87.494.
Sieburgh 2014, p. 520.495.
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3.2.4 Manfredi
The next case interpreting Article 101 of the TFEU and private enforcement in the
EU legal framework originates in an action brought by Vincenzo Manfredi et al.
against some insurance companies.496 Manfredi’s aim was to obtain an order against
cartel infringing insurance companies for the repayment of the increase in the cost
of premiums for compulsory civil liability insurance relating to accidents caused
by motor vehicles, vessels and mopeds paid under an agreement between the in-
surance companies that had been declared unlawful by the national competition
authority.
In the Manfredi case, the applicants brought their respective actions before the court
(Giudice di pace di Bitonto) to obtain damages against several insurance companies
for the increase in the cost of premiums paid by reason of a cartel declared unlawful
by the Italian national competition authority.497 The insurance companies pleaded,
inter alia, that the court did not have jurisdiction and that the right to restitution
and/or compensation was barred because the limitation period had expired. In
addition, it was questioned whether Article 101 of the TFEU was applicable in a
case in which the cartel only pertained to the Italian insurance market.
The CJEU stated that an agreement of concerted practice between insurance com-
panies consisting of a mutual exchange of information that made an increase in
premiums possible, which was not justified by market conditions, and which in-
fringed national rules on the protection of competition, also constituted an infringe-
ment of Article 101 of the TFEU if, in the light of the characteristics of the national
market at issue, there was a sufficient degree of probability that the agreement or
concerted practice would possibly have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or
potential, on the sale of those insurance policies in the relevant Member State by
operators established in other Member States, and that that influence was not in-
significant.498
The second issue was whether Article 101 of the TFEU was to be interpreted as en-
titling any individual to rely on the invalidity of an agreement or practice under
that article and, if there is a causal relationship between that agreement or practice
and the harm suffered, to claim damages for that harm.
The CJEU stated that it was settled case law that the principle of invalidity could
be relied on by anyone, and that courts were bound by it once the conditions for
the application of Article 101 of the TFEU were met and as long as the agreement
concerned did not justify the grant of an exception under Article 101(3) of the TFEU.
The invalidity of Article 101(2) of the TFEU was absolute. An agreement void by
virtue of this provision had no effect between the contracting parties and could
not be invoked against third parties.499 In addition, Article 101(1) of the TFEU pro-
duces direct effects between individuals and creates rights for the individuals
CJEU 13 July 2006 (Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others).496.
Ibid, point 13.497.
Ibid, point 52.498.
Ibid, point 57.499.
99DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT AT THE EU LEVEL
3.2HISTORY
concerned, which the national courts have to safeguard.500 According to the CJEU,
it means that any individual could rely on a breach of Article 101 of the TFEU before
a national court and therefore could rely on the invalidity of an agreement or
practice prohibited under that article.501
The CJEU further recalled that the full effectiveness of Article 101(1) of the TFEU
and, in particular, the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1)
of the TFEU would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to claim
damages caused to him by a contract or by conduct that restricted or distorted
competition.502 From this standpoint, it is obvious that if there is a causal relation-
ship between the harm and the infringement under Article 101 of the TFEU, any
individual can claim compensation for the harm suffered.
The CJEU held that in the absence of EU rules governing compensation for harm
caused by an agreement practice prohibited under Article 101 of the TFEU, it is up
to the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and
tribunals with jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing
actions for safeguarding rights that individuals derive directly from EU law, provided
that such rules are not less favorable than those governing similar domestic actions
and that they do not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise
of rights conferred by EU law (the principle of effectiveness).503 Hence, in the absence
of EU law governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member
State to prescribe the details governing the exercise of that right, including those
on the application of the concept of “causal relationship”, provided that the prin-
ciples of equivalence and effectiveness are observed.504
The next question of the Italian court was whether Article 101 of the TFEU precluded
a national provision under which third parties had to bring their damages actions
for infringement of EU and national competition rules before a court different
from the one that usually has standing in actions for damages or similar value.
The national provision involves a considerable increase in cost and time. The CJEU
made clear that, in the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it is up to the
domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals
having jurisdiction in relation to private enforcement in competition law, provided
that the provisions concerned are not less favorable than the national competition
rules and in addition, that national provisions do not render practically impossible
the exercise of the right to seek compensation under Article 101(1) of the TFEU.505
Another question was whether Article 101 of the TFEU precluded a national rule
providing that the limitation period for seeking compensation under Article 101
of the TFEU starts running on the same day on which that prohibited agreement
CJEU 13 July 2006 (Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others), point 58.500.
Ibid, point 24.501.
Ibid, point 39 et seq.502.
Ibid, point 62.503.
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or practice was adopted.506 As the CJEU pointed out, in the absence of EU rules
governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to
lay down the detailed civil procedural rules for safeguarding EU legal rights,
provided that such rules observe the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.507
A national rule providing that the limitation period starts running on the same
day as the infringement could make it practically impossible to exercise the right
to seek compensation for the harm caused by that infringement. This problem
becomes even greater when the national rule also imposes a short limitation period
that cannot be suspended.508 With such a rule, it is possible for the limitation
period to expire even before the infringement is brought to an end. That would
make it impossible for any individual who has suffered harm after the expiry of
the limitation period to bring an action.509 According to the CJEU, it is up to the
national court to determine whether a national rule on a limitation period for
compensation claims makes it practically impossible to exercise the right to seek
compensation for the harm caused by the infringement.
The last question of the Italian court was whether Article 101 of the TFEU required
national courts to award punitive damages greater than the advantage obtained
by the offending operator. Those punitive damages would be an instrument in
deterring infringements of Article 101 of the TFEU.510
The CJEU stated that the EU rules take full effect and protect the rights conferred
on individuals.511 According to the CJEU, the full effectiveness of Article 101 of the
TFEU and, in particular, the practical effect of Article 101(1) of the TFEU would be
at risk if it was not open to every individual to claim damages for loss caused by
an infringement of competition law.512 The CJEU stated that actions for damages
before the national courts can make a significant contribution to the maintenance
of effective competition in the EU.513 It ruled that the Member States had to set the
criteria for determining the extent of the damages, whether punitive or not,
provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness were observed.514 In
accordance with the principle of equivalence, it had to be possible to award partic-
ular damages, such as exemplary or punitive damages, pursuant to actions founded
on EU competition rules if it was possible for such damages to be awarded pursuant
to similar actions founded on domestic law.515 However, as already stated in Courage
v Crehan, EU law does not prevent national courts from taking steps to ensure that
the protection of the rights guaranteed by EU law does not entail the unjust enrich-
ment of those who enjoy them.516 In general, the CJEU holds that in accordance
CJEU 13 July 2006 (Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others), point 73.506.
Ibid, point 77.507.
Ibid, point 78.508.
Ibid, point 79.509.
Ibid, point 83.510.
Ibid, point 89.511.
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with the principle of effectiveness, persons affected by infringements must be able
to seek compensation for the actual loss (demnum emergens) and for loss of profit
(lucrum cessans) plus interest.517
3.2.5 EU v Otis NV
As stated in Chapter 2, the administrative competition procedure in which the
European Commission is investigator, prosecutor and decision-maker, is frequently
exposed to criticism.518 In the Otis case it was objected that the European Commis-
sion was representing the EU in a civil action for damages as well against members
of an elevator cartel (as private enforcer). That is, against cartel members that the
European Commission had itself previously fined.
In 2007, the European Commission fined producers of elevators and escalators for
a cartel infringement. The European Commission imposed nearly EUR 1 billion
worth of fines. In the same year, the European Commission also lodged a follow-
on damages action on behalf of the EU in the Belgian courts alleging to have lost
around EUR 7 million resulting from the cartel.519 These losses had allegedly oc-
curred as a result of the EU having awarded contracts for the supply and installation
of elevators and escalators for their buildings to some of the cartel members, in-
cluding Otis.520
Otis argued that the European Commission acting as private enforcer should be
considered as a violation of due process rights.521 First of all, the fact that the
European Commission’s public enforcement fining decision itself enjoyed "binding
legal effects"522 on the domestic court as regards the finding of an infringement,
allowed the European Commission to act as "judge in its own cause".523 The referring
court wishes to ascertain whether, in the context of such an action, the European
Commission is not both judge and party in its own cause in breach of the nemo judex
in sua causa principle.524 Moreover, the fact that the European Commission was
also involved in the public procedure should prevent the European Commission
from being allowed to act as the private enforcer as well. Otis argued that the
European Commission already acted in the public procedure, received (confidential
information) and made all kind of decisions about prosecuting the parties to the
investigation. The European Commission, as private enforcer, should therefore be
considered in violation of the principle of "equality of arms".
The CJEU reminds that any person can claim compensation for the harm suffered
where there is a causal relationship between that harm and an agreement or
CJEU 13 July 2006 (Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others), point 95.517.
See inter alia Beumer 2013 (1), p. 7. See also Section 2.3.6.518.
Andreangeli 2014, p. 717.519.
Ibid.520.
Cisotta 2014, p. 91.521.
According to Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003.522.
Andreangeli 2014, p. 717.523.
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practice prohibited under Article 101(1) TFEU.525 It means that the EU also enjoys
that right.526
However, the CJEU also makes clear that when that right is exercised the funda-
mental rights of the defendants, as safeguarded, inter alia, by the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union must be observed.527
The CJEU concludes that there is no violation of the nemo judex in sua causa principle.
EU law provides for a system of judicial review of European Commission decisions
related to proceedings under Article 101 TFEU, which affords all the safeguards
required by Article 47 of the Charter.528 The CJEU notes that the defendants in the
main proceedings, to whom the decision had been addressed, did bring actions for
the annulment of that decision (in the administrative procedure).529 The review
provided for by the Treaties thus involves review by the EU Courts of both the law
and the facts, and means that they have the power to assess the evidence, to annul
the contested decision and to alter the amount of a fine. The review of legality,
supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction in respect of the amount of the fine,
therefore meets the requirements of the principle of effective judicial protection.530
Moreover, the CJEU notes that it is still up to the national court to determine indi-
vidually the loss caused to each of the persons to have brought an action for dam-
ages. Such an assessment is not contrary to Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003.531 In
addition, the CJEU concludes that there is no violation of the principle of equality
of arms. When preparing the action in the main proceedings, the European Com-
mission only used information in the public version of the decision of 27 February
2007. For that reason, the Commission is on an equal footing with every other lit-
igant.532 In addition, the CJEU notes that EU law contains a sufficient number of
safeguards to ensure observance of the principle of equality of arms.533
This judgment has been criticized by several legal scholars.534 Doubts were expressed
whether the CJEU decision does justice to the rights of due process. It is questioned
why the CJEU does not explicitly consider Article 6 ECHR and the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights in its assessment.535 Attention is paid to the
limited review of European judges of the European Commission decisions. Beumer
holds that it is unclear whether such an assessment of the decision is the same as
a “thorough appreciation of the facts”. If this is not the case, the ‘legal control’ by
CJEU 6 November 2012 (EU v Otis NV and Others), point 43.525.
Ibid, point 44.526.
Ibid, point 45.527.
Ibid, point 56.528.
Ibid, point 57.529.
Ibid, point 63.530.
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Ibid, point 73.532.
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See inter alia Beumer 2013 (1); Andreangeli (Andreangeli 2014) and Cisotta (Cisotta 2014) appear
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the European judges of the European Commission decisions may not meet the re-
quirements of the ECHR.536
In addition, the question is raised whether, by only using a non-confidential version
of the European Commission’s decision in the civil proceedings, the principle of
equality of arms is respected sufficiently. Beumer notes in this context that also if
the European Commission only uses a non-confidential version of its own decision
in the civil procedure, the principle of equality of arms can be violated.537 On the
basis of the theory of "doctrine of appearance” an objective and abstract imbalance
may be sufficient to establish a violation of the principle of equality of arms.538
Even for those who are not convinced by these doubts, the question could be raised
(from a policy perspective) whether it is desirable that the institution that already
is the investigator, prosecutor and decision-maker on behalf of the EU also acts as
private enforcer. Parties involved could have more doubts about the motives and
conduct of the European Commission. It is not ruled out that this potentially affects
the attractiveness and effectiveness of the leniency policy, and hence the ef-
fectiveness of competition law as a whole.539 Because of the role of the European
Commission in the public enforcement case, handling the follow-on damages case
as well, is at least unfortunate. Of course, it should be noted that the case is eccen-
tric. The discussion only arose because the cartel also had an (alleged) impact on
the EU itself. To avoid indistinctness, confusion and distrust, it would make sense
to entrust another institution of the EU with the important task of private enforcer,
when such specific circumstances occur.
3.2.6 Kone AG and Others v ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG
In Kone AG and Others v ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG, ÖBB-Infrastruktur claims that part of
its loss was caused by the cartel at issue, which made it possible to maintain a
market price at such a high level that even competitors not party to the cartel were
able to benefit from a market price that was higher than without the existence of
that cartel, whether in terms of profit margin, or simply of survival, if their cost
structure was such that normal conditions of competition resulted in their removal
from the market.540 Under Austrian law it is difficult to receive compensation under
such circumstances if a contractual link with the cartel infringers is missing.541
The CJEU notes that the market price is one of the main factors taken into consid-
eration by an undertaking when it determines the price at which it will offer its
goods or services.542 When a cartel manages to maintain artificially high prices for
particular goods and certain conditions are met, e.g. the nature of the goods or the
size of the market covered by that cartel, it cannot be ruled out that a competing
Beumer 2013 (1), pp. 11-12.536.
Ibid, p. 12. Cf. Andreangeli 2014, p. 732.537.
Beumer 2013 (1), p. 12.538.
Cf. Section 2.3.6.539.
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undertaking, outside the cartel in question, might choose to set the price of its offer
at an amount higher than it would have chosen under normal conditions of com-
petition, i.e. in the absence of that cartel.543 In such a situation, even if the deter-
mination of an offer price is regarded as a purely autonomous decision, taken by
the undertaking not party to a cartel, it must nonetheless be stated that such a
decision has been able to be taken by reference to a market price distorted by that
cartel.544
The CJEU reminds that the Member States must ensure that European Union
competition law is fully effective and therefore national legislation must specifically
take into account the objective pursued by Article 101 TFEU, which aims to guar-
antee effective and undistorted competition in the internal market, and, accordingly,
prices set on the basis of free competition.545 In those circumstances, the CJEU
holds that national legislation must recognize the right of any individual to claim
compensation for loss sustained.546
Consequently, the victim of umbrella pricing may obtain compensation for the
loss caused by the members of a cartel, even if it did not have contractual links
with them, where it is established that the cartel at issue was, in the circumstances
of the case and, in particular, the specific aspects of the relevant market, liable to
have the effect of umbrella pricing being applied by third parties acting indepen-
dently, and that those circumstances and specific aspects could not be ignored by
the members of that cartel.547 It is for the referring court to determine whether
those conditions are satisfied.548
The cartel infringers run the defense that such damages are likely to dissuade the
undertakings concerned from assisting the competition authorities to investigate
cases, which would run contrary to the principle of effectiveness.549 The CJEU re-
minds that the leniency programme is a programme developed by the European
Commission, through its Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in
cartel cases, which has no legislative force and is not binding on Member States.
Consequently, that leniency programme can also not deprive individuals of the
right to obtain compensation before the national courts for loss sustained as a
result of an infringement of Article 101 TFEU.550
The CJEU elaborates that Article 101 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that it
precludes legislation which categorically excludes, for legal reasons, any civil lia-
bility of undertakings belonging to a cartel for loss resulting from the fact that an
undertaking not party to the cartel, set its prices higher than would otherwise have
been expected under competitive conditions.551
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In line with the earlier cases Courage v Crehan and Manfredi, the CJEU indicated that
specific provisions of national law that implicate an absolute ban on EU competition
law damages actions affect the effective functioning of EU competition law and
are therefore not allowed.
The Kone case gives substance to what is meant by “everyone should be able to
claim for damages”. The umbrella effect doctrine shows that the pool of subjects
that may recover damages from cartelists is very wide and shows that the potential
liability could be very comprehensive.
3.2.7 Interim Conclusion
The case law shows that EU competition law intervenes directly in the national
civil law of the Member States. Hence, specifically with respect to a particular type
of violation (competition law infringements), there is a special regime that affects
domestic civil law and the relation between individuals in the Member States. That
is a far-reaching consequence, bearing in mind that a right to compensation is not
explicitly included in the Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU. At the same time,
competition law is one of the special areas where EU law is aimed at specifically,
with direct consequences between individuals. Already from the fact that also the
nullity of the contract results from an EU competition law infringement, shows
that EU competition law goes beyond the public side of enforcement only.
With Courage v Crehan, the CJEU made clear that Article of the 101 TFEU has direct
horizontal effect and that other private law consequences (others than nullity) are
also possible.552 Prior case law already showed that Member states could be held
liable, but – as a logical next step – it became clear that other subjects (individuals)
could also be held liable. It is clear that if a direct horizontal effect is recognized
under EU law, the “non-compliant-individual” could be held responsible for the
harm resulting from the non-compliance.553
It became clear from the cases of Courage v Crehan and Manfredi, as well as later cases
like Bkart v Pfleiderer,554 Bundeswettbewerbsbehorde v Donau Chemie,555 European Union v
Otis and others556 and Kone v ÖBB-Infrastruktur557 that the CJEU has established a legal
basis for private enforcement in Article 101 and Article 102 of the TFEU. According
to the CJEU this is based on the principle of effectiveness, even though a damages
provision is not explicitly stated in the TFEU itself. The CJEU has clarified that if
rights holders were not able to claim compensation for competition law infringe-
ments, Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU would not have full effect. According to
the CJEU, it is up to the Member States to secure this right in order to be used ef-
fectively by the victims. Member States should prevent it from being practically
Hartkamp, Sieburgh & Devroe 2017, pp. 4-5.552.
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impossible to exercise the right to seek compensation for the harm caused by that
infringement.
The case Courage v Crehan made it clear that everyone who suffered harm caused
by an EU competition law infringement can claim for damages, even parties to the
anticompetitive contract. It is up to the national courts to safeguard this right.558
There could be an exclusion for the right on compensation if the claiming party
would be unjustifiably enriched. In circumstances in which the party was one of
the EU competition law infringing parties, claiming for damages could be prevented
under certain conditions. In the cases that followed, the CJEU explicitly held that
third parties are able to claim for damages if a causal link between the damage
and the infringement exists.559 Necessary conditions to claim for damages are that
an EU law infringement is established, damages can be showed and that there is
a causal relationship between the infringement and the damages. From the Manfredi
case, it also became clear what the harm consists of. The CJEU considers harm to
be the actual loss, loss of profit and the interest. It does not matter whether the
victim is a direct victim in the supply chain, an indirect victim in the supply chain,
the EU itself, or a victim that suffered harm in another way, for example, via um-
brella sales.560
3.2.8 Ashurst Comparative Report
Pursuant to a tender carried out by the European Commission, law firm Ashurst
compared the conditions for bringing claims for infringements of EU competition
rules in 2004.
The aim of this study (called the “Ashurst Comparative Report”)561 was to provide
a comparative analysis of the national rules and case law regarding the enforcement
of European competition rules and, in the absence thereof, the national competition
rules in the courts of Member States.562 The goal was (i) to take stock and gather
information on the status quo of claims for damages for breach of competition law
in the Member States, (ii) to conduct a comparative analysis of that data; and (iii)
to find ways for more effective enforcement at the level of the individual Member
States and at the European level.563
In summary, the Ashurst Comparative Report concluded that there was only a very
small amount of such litigation. The study found that not only was there a lack of
development of actions for damages for breach of European competition law, but
there was also “astonishing diversity” in the approaches taken by the Member
States.564 The study concluded inter alia that the rules of the various Member States
Sieburgh 2014, p. 520.558.
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differ to a large extent, including on the statutory basis, the standing of victims,
the rules of evidence, the rules on discovery, proving damage, limitation periods,
procedural costs, and proving causation.
3.2.9 The Green Paper and Commission Staff Working Paper
3.2.9.1 Introduction
The European Commission assumes that hardcore cartels cost consumers and
other victims in the EU between 25 billion and 69 billion euros per year.565 Based
on these observations, the European Commission concluded that, where hardcore
cartels are concerned, much harm is left uncompensated.566 According to the
European Commission, this is attributable to shortcomings in the laws relating to
antitrust damages in the various Member States – referring to the Ashurst Com-
parative Report that also made clear that the rules in the various Member States
differ vastly.567
After the Ashurst Comparative Report, the European Commission published a green
paper as a discussion document, which was intended to stimulate debate and
launch a consultation process at the European level regarding private enforcement.
As consultation paper a green paper presents a range of ideas and invites interested
individuals or organizations to contribute with their views and information. A
green paper is often followed by a white paper, an official set of proposals that is
used as a vehicle for their development into law.
In the green paper called “Damages actions for breach of the EC Antitrust rules” (“Green
Paper”) and the Commission staff working paper attached to it, the European
Commission addressed the conditions for bringing damages claims for infringements
of European competition law. The two papers identify several obstacles to a more
successful and efficient system.568 The European Commission wants to facilitate
damages claims in order to make it easier for consumers and undertakings to obtain
compensation for their loss and damage.569 In addition, the European Commission
aimed to strengthen the enforcement of competition law as such.570
3.2.9.2 Background and Objectives of the Green Paper
The competition rules in Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU are enforced by both
public and private instruments.571 Under Regulation 1/2003, the European Commis-
sion and national competition authorities are responsible for public enforcement
of the applicable EU competition law. With regard to public enforcement, both
See inter alia Kortmann & Swaak 2009, p. 341.565.
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the European Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States
apply European competition law in individual cases.
According to the European Commission, it is fundamental to the idea of private
damages actions that the victim of a legal violation must be entitled to compensation
for the loss suffered as a result of the violation in question.572 Private enforcement
in this context means application of competition law in civil disputes before na-
tional courts.573 Such an application can take different forms. Pursuant to Article
101(2) of the TFEU, agreements or decisions prohibited by Article 101 of the TFEU
are void. European competition law could also be used in actions for injunctive
relief.574 Moreover, damages awards can be awarded to those who have suffered a
loss caused by an infringement of the competition rules.575 The Green Paper focuses
solely on damages actions.
According to the European Commission, damages actions serve two purposes. First,
they compensate those who have suffered a loss as a consequence of anti-compet-
itive behavior. Second, they ensure the full effectiveness of the competition rules
by discouraging anti-competitive behavior, hence contributing to the maintenance
of effective competition in the EU (deterrence).576 For these objectives, EU law de-
mands an effective system for claiming damages for infringements of competition
rules.
The purpose of the Green Paper and Commission Staff Working Paper is to identify
the main obstacles to a more efficient system for bringing damages claims and to
set out different options for further reflection and possible action to improve
damages actions both for follow-on actions (i.e. cases in which the civil action is
brought after a competition authority has found an infringement) and for stand-
alone actions (i.e. cases not following on from a prior finding by a competition
authority about a competition law infringement).577
In the Green Paper, the main issues are summed up. These issues are dealt with in
greater detail in the Staff Working Paper. All interested parties were invited to
study the considerations put forward in the papers. The European Commission
invited all interested parties to comment on the issues discussed, and the options
provided regarding, amongst others: (i) access to evidence; (ii) fault requirement;
(iii) damages; (iv) the passing-on defense; (v) defending consumer interests; (vi) liti-
gation costs; (vii) coordination of public and private enforcement; (viii) jurisdiction
and applicable law; and (ix) other issues.
The comments should assist the European Commission in deciding whether
measures should be taken at the EU level to improve the conditions for competition
damages claims, and if so, which measures. The European Commission wanted to
European Commission 2005 (Annex to the Green Paper on Damages Actions), p. 6.572.
European Commission 2005 (Green Paper on Damages Actions), p. 3.573.
See for more information Wilman 2016, pp. 909-913.574.
Wilman 2016, pp. 909-913.575.
See inter alia Kroes 2005 (1); Kroes 2005 (2); Kroes 2006 (1), pp. 2-4; and Kroes 2006 (2), p. 4.576.
European Commission 2005 (Green Paper on Damages Actions), p. 4.577.
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use the debate to find ways to better compensate for antitrust injuries and increase
deterrence.578 It noted that the ultimate objective of the European Commission
was to foster competition, not a litigation culture.579
3.2.9.3 Coordination of Public and Private Enforcement
One of the issues the European Commission paid attention to in the Green Paper
is that public and private enforcement should complement each other and that
they should therefore be coordinated in an optimal way.580 Decisions by competition
authorities could have a significant impact on the actual possibilities of claimants
to prove their case.581 According to the European Commission, optimal coordination
between private and public enforcement is especially important for the coordination
between leniency applications in public enforcement and damages claims.582 Both
leniency programmes and civil liability contribute by their effects to the same aim:
more effective deterrence from entering into cartels.583 In the European Commis-
sion’s opinion, consideration should therefore be given to the impact of damages
claims on the operation of leniency programmes so as to preserve the effectiveness
of the programmes.584 In this respect, it should be taken into account that the
successful operation of leniency programmes is generally helpful for private litigants
in damages actions, as leniency programmes uncover secret cartels.585
In its Staff Working Paper, the European Commission also pays attention to the
potential negative signals. It has been argued that the prospect of damages claims
could constitute a disincentive for leniency applicants and thus exercise a negative
effect on public enforcement in the field of cartel fighting.586 Although some neg-
ative effect is certainly not to be excluded,587 the existence of a negative effect is
by no means certain according to the European Commission.588 Today, a cartel
participant is already exposed to civil liability and would not want to forgo the
opportunity to at least reduce its liability to pay fines (especially when some other
cartel participant may at any time choose to apply for leniency). In this situation,
the potential applicant would be exposed to both fines and civil damages.589 In her
speech in New York on 22 September 2005, just before the final Green Paper was
published, Kroes stated:590
“First on the interaction between public and private enforcement. Being a public
enforcer of competition rules myself, you will not be surprised to hear that I would
European Commission 2005 (Annex to the Green Paper on Damages Actions), p. 8.578.
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not like the key role played by public antitrust enforcement to be weakened by private
actions.
I am convinced though, that more private enforcement does not equal less public
enforcement.
Rather on the contrary: my spontaneous feeling is that private enforcement is by
nature complementary to, and even strengthens the enforcement actions taken by
competition authorities.
Somemaywonder whether my plea for more private antitrust enforcement in Europe
can be reconciled with my desire to uphold or even strengthen the efficiency of the
European leniency programmes.
Well, I frankly do not see how the obligation to compensate the victims of an antitrust
infringement could have a chilling effect on the leniency programmes of the European
competition authorities.
Quite the opposite! A balanced private antitrust enforcement system should become
a real incentive for leniency applications.”
It seems from the above that at that time the European Commission did not fear
the negative side effects of private enforcement and felt that an upcoming private
enforcement would not outweigh the effectiveness of the leniency programme.
However, the Staff Working Paper pays attention to this possible negative side effect.
According to the Staff Working Paper, any measure optimizing the combined de-
terrent effect of both leniency programmes and private enforcement should be
considered.591 In its Green Paper the European Commission provides three options
to ensure that leniency programmes and the rules on damages claims are coordi-
nated in a way that ensures the underlying aims are optimally achieved:592
i. exclude the discoverability of the leniency application;
ii. provide a leniency applicant with a rebate on a damages claim; and
iii. remove joint liability for the leniency applicant.
In its comments on the Green Paper, Member State Austria makes clear that its
legal system meets the standards as provided in Courage v Crehan by the CJEU
already.593 Its legislation regarding civil damages and its civil procedural rules are
already compliant with the standards.594 Moreover, the Austrian federal government
notes that the EU has no competence for the harmonization of legislation regarding
civil damages and civil procedural rules.595 The Austrian federal government warns
European Commission 2005 (Annex to the Green Paper on Damages Actions), p. 64 et seq.591.
Ibid, pp. 65-66.592.
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that all Member States feature a mature system regarding civil damages in which
the EU should not carelessly intervene.596
With respect to balancing public enforcement and private enforcement, the Aus-
trian Government states that an incentive for applying for leniency will be reduced
if more private enforcement takes place. Therefore, information that the authorities
received due to a voluntary cooperation of a cartel member should be protected
from disclosure.597
Germany also holds that there is no need for a new pan-European framework.598
According to the German federal government, the starting point for all consideration
should be the principle of subsidiarity.599 While uniform substantive standards for
competition law are necessary in the internal market, the enforcement of damages
claims is to a large extent governed by the general legal provisions of the Member
States.600 According to the German federal government these differ from one an-
other fundamentally in many respects.601 The German federal government reminds
that even the case law of the CJEU assumes that the modalities of private damages
claims are governed by the domestic law of the Member States.602 There should
only be deviation from this when a specific need is shown, for example, to avoid
serious differences in the internal market.603 However, national efforts of the
Member States have first priority.604 In the opinion of the German federal govern-
ment only specific antitrust law rules should be enacted to the extent absolutely
necessary in regard to relevant characteristics.605 In so doing, contradictory valu-
ations in relation to the general rules for civil law disputes should be avoided.606
For example, the German federal government mentions that it would not be justified
to deviate from generally applicable rules regarding access to evidence and to es-
tablish special rules for the disclosure of documentary evidence particularly in the
area of antitrust law.607 Moreover, the German federal government notes that the
necessary rules for the disclosure of evidence – which under German law above
all encompasses the production of documents – should remain reserved to national
law.608
In terms of finding the right balance between public and private enforcement, the
German government holds that public and private enforcement of competition
law should be coordinated in such a way that the functionality and attractiveness
of leniency applications should be affected to the least extent possible.609 This in-
Austrian Federal Ministry of Justice and Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour 2006.596.
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cludes protecting the confidentiality of such applications and the information
connected thereto.610 Through the disclosure of the antitrust violation the leniency
applicant should not be additionally burdened and subject to a larger risk of
damage compensation than other participants in the anti-competitive behavior.611
The German government believes that the suggested instruments could significantly
reduce the attractiveness of leniency applications if potential applicants saw
themselves as being subject to the danger of multiple damage compensation claims
or far-reaching civil procedure law obligations to produce evidence.612 According
to the German federal government, the suggestion to reduce or limit the obligation
to pay damages compensation and remove the joint and several liability of the le-
niency applicant would create several problems.613 The extent to which preferential
treatment of the leniency applicant is justified as compared to other infringing
parties, and how this can be carried out when necessary, can only be sensibly de-
cided within the framework of the applicable national law.614
The Danish government appears more positive about the pan-European approach
to assist competition law victims that claim for damages.615 At the same time, the
Danish Government finds that such initiatives should be well-balanced to avoid
creating new rules of procedure and compensation rules within the scope of com-
petition law differing substantially from what applies to the general law of torts
and law of procedure.616
The government of the United Kingdom notes that public enforcement is the
primary means of enforcing competition law and holds that it is important not to
compromise that, or divert resources from it.617 According to the government of
the United Kingdom, private actions are however also a very important comple-
mentary limb of an effective competition regime.618 The government of the United
Kingdom reminds that private actions allow those who have suffered loss to be
compensated and, alongside other means, can in practice provide an important
additional deterrent to those who may cause loss.619
The government of the United Kingdom concludes that the implementation of
some of the options suggested by the European Commission would either affect
the whole domestic civil law system or create special rules for competition issues
only.620 There would need to be a very clear justification for making domestic rules
applicable to competition law distinct from other areas of law.621 In order to safe-
German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and the Federal Cartel Office 2006.610.
Ibid.611.
Ibid.612.
Ibid.613.
Ibid.614.
Danish Ministry for Economic and Business Affairs 2006.615.
Ibid.616.
United Kingdom Government 2006.617.
Ibid.618.
Ibid.619.
Ibid.620.
Ibid.621.
113DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT AT THE EU LEVEL
3.2HISTORY
guard consistency with national laws and national competition law generally, the
government of the United Kingdom notes that there are strong arguments for action
being taken at Member State level rather than at Union level, particularly where
these arguments relate to areas of substantive law such as damages and liability
or to procedural law dealing with disclosure, costs and access to evidence.622 In
each system, there are different sets of checks and balances in place, in order to
retain a balance between claimants and defendants.623
Regarding finding the right balance between public and private enforcement, the
United Kingdom government makes clear that leniency is an essential tool in the
investigation of cartels.624 The United Kingdom believes that in making it easier to
bring private actions, undertakings must not be discouraged from applying for le-
niency.625 The United Kingdom believes that material created to support an under-
taking’s leniency application should be protected from disclosure.626 In the United
Kingdom such material could include transcripts of interviews and witness state-
ments.627 An exclusion of this type would ensure that leniency applicants do not
place themselves in a position worse than that of the other members of the cartel.628
As it comes to limiting the liability for the leniency applicant, the government of
the United Kingdom states that this should not be at the expense of claimants.629
The Finnish government concludes that the implementation of nearly all of the
options proposed by the European Commission would require changes in the
substance of the Finnish Act on Competition Restrictions, Damage Compensation
Act, Act on the Openness of Government Activities, and the Code of Procedure.630
The Finnish government reminds that the CJEU has ruled that, in the absence of
Union rules on the issue, it is for the legal systems of Member States to provide
detailed rules for bringing damages actions.631 Proceedings in damages claims thus
fall under the jurisdiction of national courts of law.632
The Finish government observes that the European Commission holds that Union
law demands an efficient system for damages claims for the infringement of antirust
rules and that this legislation in the Member States is underdeveloped.633 According
to the Finnish government it is not clarified, at least not sufficiently, by what, ac-
cording to the European Commission, would constitute the legal basis or other
United Kingdom Government 2006.622.
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means by which the European Commission could take further measures on Union
level.634
Regarding the leniency policy, the Finnish government concludes that providing
benefits to the immunity recipient by reducing the liability of the immunity recip-
ient may prove problematic since it increases the liability of the other cartel
members.635 The suggested option that the leniency applicant will be exempted
from the joint and several liability relating to the injury, and that liability be de-
limited to the portion of the damages corresponding to the applicant’s share of the
cartel’s operational market could be taken into consideration, according to the
Finnish government.636
The Irish competition authority notes that given the importance of EU and national
competition laws, it supports action by the European Commission to ensure that
the right to bring a damages action for breach of EU competition laws (and national
competition laws) is a reality in all Member States.637 Since there are great differ-
ences in national legal and court systems, the competition authority is concerned
to ensure that any specific rules concerning antitrust damages action will not have
unintended and potentially harmful effects on the conduct of other damages actions
in Member States.638 For this reason, the competition authority asked the European
Commission to adopt a minimalist approach, namely, to adopt only those rules
deemed necessary to ensure that the right of damages action for EU competition
laws (and national competition laws) is viable in all Member States.639
With respect to protecting the leniency policy and providing additional benefits
to the immunity recipient, the Irish competition authority appears to have a disap-
proving attitude. The competition authority believes that, weighing up the pros
and cons of applying for leniency, it will always be to an undertaking’s, or individu-
al’s advantage to come forward for leniency.640 If it does, and leniency is granted,
then, although it may subsequently be exposed to damages, its risk will be less
than if it did not apply for leniency, in which case it would risk both substantial
penalties and damages.641 Also, the competition authority does not believe that a
leniency applicant should be “rewarded” for coming forward by having his exposure
to damages limited or excluded.642 He is already benefiting from either immunity
from prosecution or some other form of leniency.643 Moreover, it is very difficult
to see in an Irish context how it would be possible to exclude the discoverability
of the immunity applicant’s information (application).644
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The Netherlands has commented that it deplores the fragmented approach of the
European Commission.645 The European Commission interferes in several fields of
law, like competition law, contract law, intellectual property and consumer law
and provides specific measures that affect the national civil legal framework. It is
important to recognize that civil procedural law in each Member State is an inter-
nally consistent system. If the EU adds measures and remedies or changes existing
measures, it will probably mean that the national system becomes unbalanced.646
At the same time, the Netherlands notes that a European approach to civil enforce-
ment is important to ensure a level playing field.647 Differences in legal possibilities
for damages claims could lead to forum shopping or adverse effects on the business
climate in the Member States.648 Therefore, a European approach to this issue is
desirable to avoid excessive differences arising between the various Member States.
However, as said, the Netherlands is of the opinion that this issue must be addressed
in a broader context than just competition law.649 Regarding the leniency policy,
the Dutch comments are in line with the comments from Finland.
From the above, the following can be concluded. The responses show that many
Member States are anxious about harmonizing civil law. Primarily, many Member
States consider civil law legislation as a national matter where the EU does not
necessarily have to interfere. It is questioned by several Member States whether
the interference is not in conflict with the principle of subsidiarity.
Remarkably, with regard to the relation between public enforcement and private
enforcement, many Member States considering protecting the leniency programme
of the utmost importance. Public enforcement is the “sacred cow” where a punitive
character and deterrence comes from. Private enforcement, aiming at compensation
for victims clearly plays second fiddle only.
Most Member States believe that the effectiveness of the leniency policy is best
protected if the information of the applicant's request is protected from disclosure.
At the same time, none of the Member States advocate an additional discount for
the leniency applicant regarding the damage to compensate. For some Member
States, excluding the leniency applicant from joint liability is worth discussing.
Other Member States argue that public enforcement, including the leniency pro-
gramme, should be considered completely separate from the civil law system. A
leniency application should not affect the claims of victims against the cartel of-
fenders in one way or the other. Moreover, a limitation of liability for a leniency
applicant is undesirable as it could be seen as an undesirable bonus for a cartel
offender.
Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs 2006.645.
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3.2.10 White Paper, Commission StaffWorking Paper andAssessment Report
3.2.10.1 Introduction
The European Parliament concurred with the findings of the Green Paper, as did
other stakeholders, and called on the European Commission to prepare a White
Paper with detailed proposals to address the obstacles to effective antitrust damages
actions.650
The White Paper is to be read in connection with two Commission staff working
documents: (a) the Commission staff working paper on EU antitrust damages actions,
which explains in greater detail the considerations underlying the White Paper
and also provides an overview of the already existing EU law; and (b) an Impact
Assessment Report which analyses the potential benefits and costs of various policy
options and gives an executive summary of the report.651
3.2.10.2 Objectives of the White Paper
The White Paper considers and puts forward proposals for policy choices and spe-
cific measures that would ensure that all victims of infringements of European
competition law have access to effective redress mechanisms so that they can be
fully compensated for the harm suffered.652
The primary objective of the White Paper is to improve legal conditions for victims
to exercise their Treaty rights to reparation for all damage suffered as a result of a
breach of the European competition rules.653
It is interesting to note that despite the criticism of the Member States, the European
Commission continued to draw up proposals for the adaptation of civil law legisla-
tion in the Member States.
According to the European Commission, effective remedies for private parties also
increase the likelihood of a greater number of illegal restrictions on competition
being detected and of the infringers being held liable.654 Inherently, improving
compensatory justice also produces beneficial effects in terms of deterrence, i.e.
reducing future infringements and increasing compliance with EU competition
rules.
The European Commission makes clear that part of its policy is to preserve strong
public enforcement of Article 101 and Article 102 of the TFEU by the European
Commission itself and by the competition authorities of the Member States. The
European Commission states that the measures put forward in the White Paper
European Commission 2008 (White Paper on Damages Actions), p. 2.650.
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are designed to create an effective private enforcement system that complements,
but does not replace or jeopardize, public enforcement.
In the Green Paper, the European Commission provided several options for address-
ing the various difficulties with private enforcement in the EU. In the White Paper,
the European Commission proposes policy choices in relation to most of these issues.
3.2.10.3 Interaction Between Public and Private Enforcement
Regarding the interaction between public and private enforcement, the European
Commission notes in its Commission Staff Working Paper that given the inevitable
interaction between an increased level of damages claims and the operation of an
efficient leniency programme, the attractiveness of leniency programmes in Europe
should be maintained, on the one hand, by ensuring an adequate level of protection
for leniency applications in later litigation and, on the other hand, by trying to
further incentivize potential immunity applicants to apply for leniency.655
The European Commission emphasizes that adequately protecting corporate
statements submitted by a leniency applicant from disclosure in private actions
must be ensured in order to avoid placing the applicant in a less favorable situation
than the co-infringers.656 Otherwise, according to the European Commission, the
threat of disclosure of the confession submitted by a leniency applicant can have
a negative influence on the quality of its submissions, or even dissuade an infringer
from applying for leniency altogether.657 Therefore, the European Commission
suggests that protection should apply as follows:
i. whenever disclosure is ordered by a court, be it before or after adoption of a
decision by the competition authority;
ii. to all corporate statements submitted by all applicants for leniency in relation
to a breach of Article 101 of the TFEU (and also where national law is applied
in parallel); and
iii. regardless of whether the application for leniency is accepted or rejected, and
even if it does not lead to any decision by the competition authority.658
Furthermore, the European Commission proposes limiting the civil liability of the
immunity recipient to claims by its direct and indirect contractual partners.659 This
mechanism suggests that the immunity recipient only maintains civil liability to-
wards its direct and indirect contractual partners.660 As a result, the only persons
entitled to compensation from the immunity recipient would be the victims who
directly purchased or sold the cartelized products or services from the immunity
recipient (i.e. direct contractual partners) or those further down the supply chain
European Commission 2008 (Working Paper Accompanying White Paper on Damages Actions),
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who purchased or sold these products or services (directly or through intermediaries)
from the direct contractual partners.661 According to the European Commission,
this would help to make the scope of damages paid by immunity recipients more
predictable and more limited without unduly sheltering them from civil liability
for their participation in an infringement.662 The immunity recipient would have
to bear the burden of proving the extent to which its liability would be limited.663
In response to the European Commission’s invitation, more than a hundred parties
commented on the White Paper. In its comments, German ministries and the
BKartA allege that leniency programmes are of paramount importance for the entire
system of antitrust enforcement. For this reason, care should be taken that the
design of private antitrust enforcement affects the effectiveness of the leniency
programmes of the Member States as little as possible. Accordingly, the protection
of confidential data of principle witnesses must be guaranteed.664 The government
of the Netherlands states that it supports the proposal to protect all corporate
statements made by leniency applicants. The Netherlands firmly believes that
strong public enforcement of antitrust rules must be preserved. To this end, it
considers it essential that the leniency programmes are and remain attractive.665
Concerning the interaction between litigation and leniency programmes, several
parties agree with the European Commission’s suggestions and are of the opinion
that the proposals would secure the functioning of the leniency policy.666 Some
parties believe that the leniency applicants should also assist the private plaintiffs
in the civil proceedings by providing the claimants with information.667 Others are
of the opinion that taking away joint and several liability from the applicant with
immunity is difficult to apply under domestic law668 and overly mild and blurs the
line between private enforcement and public enforcement.669 Moreover, many
commentators allege that the limitation of liability of immunity recipients should
not have adverse consequences for victims seeking compensation for damages.670
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Almost all parties agree that private enforcement could negatively influence the
leniency programme, a programme that most parties considered highly effective
and worthy of protection.
3.3 Towards European Antitrust Damages Legislation
3.3.1 Introduction
After receiving the comments on the White paper, the European Commission
started drafting a directive. By the end of 2009, the European Commission had
drafted a directive to give effect to Article 101 and Article 102 of the TFEU by
strengthening the compensation rights of victims of competition law infringements.
Through the introduction of a set of rules designed to address the most important
obstacles for effective compensation the proposed directive aimed to ensure that
all victims are in a position to obtain full compensation for the harm caused by
an infringement of the European competition rules. Furthermore, the proposed
directive introduced additional safeguards concerning representative actions and
access to evidence, as suggested by stakeholders in the course of the public consulta-
tion process.
The proposed directive would have obliged Member States to amend, if necessary,
their laws so that they were in accordance with directive provisions, including on
proposals for representative actions.671 In the proposed directive, non-profit organ-
izations would be able to bring claims on behalf of groups of consumers who do
not need to be individually identified.672 This provision generated fears of opt-out
class actions and claims being brought on behalf of consumers at large.673 Aside
from this specific concern, the very idea of the European Commission interfering
with Member States’ internal legal systems was itself controversial and many
questioned whether the European Commission was entitled to do so.674 In March
2009 the European Parliament adopted a resolution in which it insisted on being
involved in “the co-decision procedure” in any legislative initiative in the area of
collective redress.675 The European Commission chose to ignore the Parliament’s
wishes and struck out alone.676 The Parliament’s reaction, coupled with the criticism
from legal practitioners and business commentators across the EU, assisted in
building the pressure which led to the rumored personal intervention of former
President Barroso and the ultimate withdrawal of the proposed directive.677
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3.3.2 The Antitrust Damages Directive
3.3.2.1 Introduction
In 2013, former Commissioner Almunia presented an amended version of the
proposed directive. The most important differences from the earlier draft directive
are that a co-decision procedure has been used by the European Commission and
that provisions for collective redress are no longer included. In 2014, the Antitrust
Damages Directive was accepted.678
3.3.2.2 The Antitrust Damages Directive
The name of the Antitrust Damages Directive is somewhat confusing because the
name does not make clear that the Antitrust Damages Directive is actually meant
to deal with two main issues. As the name indicates, the first issue dealt with by
the Antitrust Damages Directive relates to damages actions as such. But the second
issue, not described in the name, relates to the protection of the leniency policy.679
Lawmakers have tried to protect the competition authority (as a public law enforcer)
by attempting to ensure that the leniency policy is not jeopardized by an increase
in private enforcement.680
According to the European Commission, the objectives could be best pursued
through a directive. This was believed to be the most appropriate legal instrument
to make the measures effective and to ensure smooth adoption into the legal systems
of the Member States.681
The reason is that a directive requires Member States to achieve objectives and
implement the measures into their national substantive and procedural legal sys-
tems.682 This approach gives Member States more freedom to implement a measure
than a regulation would. The choice of the most appropriate tools to implement
measures in the directive is left up to the Member States.683 This allows Member
States to ensure consistency of these rules with their national substantive and
procedural laws. Furthermore, according to the European Commission, a directive
is a flexible tool for the introduction of common rules in areas of national law that
are crucial for the functioning of damages actions. It ensures adequate guarantees
across the European Union, while leaving room to the individual Member States
for additional measures if they choose to adopt them.684 Moreover, the European
Commission has made clear that a directive avoids intervention in any situation
Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition
law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA relevance.
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where the domestic legal provisions of a Member State are already in line with the
proposed measures.685
As the European Commission notes correctly, a directive at the EU level is only
possible as long as it is in accordance with the basic principles of the European
Union, specifically the subsidiarity and proportionality principles.686
With their comments on the Green Paper and White Paper, the Member States
have tried to reduce to impact of the European Commission’s idea to provide a
specific pan-European private enforcement system for competition law infringe-
ments.687 That was only successful to a limited extent. With the Antitrust Damages
Directive, a pan-European private enforcement system has been introduced.
The question whether the regulation could not be regulated nationally, is answered
in the negative. The EU legislator holds that it has competence regarding the subject
matter. It concludes that the principle of subsidiarity is ensured.
In the proposed directive of 11 June 2013, the European Commission states that
the suggested legislation is fully in line with the subsidiarity principle since its
objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, and there is a
clear need for, and value in, EU action.688 A legally binding act at EU level will en-
sure more easily that full effect is given to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU through
common standards allowing for effective damages actions across the EU, and that
a more level playing field is established in the internal market.689
More specifically, the proposed directive is deemed to comply with the principle
of subsidiarity for several reasons, according to the European Commission. First of
all, there is a significant risk that effective public enforcement by the European
Commission and national competition authorities would be jeopardized in the
absence of EU-wide regulation of the interaction between public and private en-
forcement, and in particular of a common European rule on information from the
file of a competition authority being available for the purposes of a damages action.
Moreover, the European Commission notes that experience shows that, in the ab-
sence of EU legislation, most Member States do not provide, on their own initiative
for an effective framework for compensation for victims of infringements of Articles
101 and 102 TFEU, as repeatedly required by the CJEU. In addition, the European
Commission concludes that there is currently a marked inequality between Member
States in the level of judicial protection of individual rights guaranteed by the
Treaty; this may cause distortions of competition and impede the proper functioning
of the internal market.690 The result is an evident disparity in even the content of
the entitlement to damages guaranteed by EU law.
European Commission 2013 (Proposal Directive on Damages Actions), para 3.685.
Ibid.686.
See inter alia German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, Federal Ministry of Food, Ag-
riculture and Consumer Protection and the Federal Cartel Office 2008.
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European Commission 2013 (Proposal Directive on Damages Actions), para. 3.2.688.
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See also Rusu 2017, pp. 802-803.690.
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The Antitrust Damages Directive is based on Articles 103 and 114 of the TFEU. The
Directive’s provisions should be incorporated into the Member States’ national
legislation completely. Only if it can be inferred from the wording of a directive
may a Member State implement rules stricter than the provisions set out in the
directive.691 This means that the provisions of the Antitrust Damages Directive
should be implemented in national jurisdictions completely and countries are not
allowed to have other rules unless explicitly stated in the specific provision of the
Antitrust Damages Directive. For example, regarding the disclosure provisions,
Article 5 of the Directive allows Member States to have rules leading to wider dis-
closure of evidence than that provided in the Directive.692
The Antitrust Damages Directive is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter
(Articles 1–4) pertains to the subject matter, the scope and the definitions used in
the Antitrust Damages Directive. Chapter Two (Articles 4–8) refers to disclosure
of evidence. Chapter Three relates to decisions of competition authorities, limitation
periods and joint and several liability (Articles 9–11). Chapter Four (Articles 12–15)
deals with the passing-on of overcharges. Chapter Five (Articles 16–17) contains
some provisions on estimating the damages and Chapter Six (Articles 18–19) pro-
vides a few special rules on alternative dispute resolution in relation to antitrust
damages. Chapter Seven (Articles 20–23) provides a few final provisions. Article
21(1) of the Antitrust Damages Directive provides that Member States must imple-
ment the Antitrust Damages Directive into their legal systems by 27 December
2016. Practice showed however, that – at least in the Netherlands – even prior
to implementation, national courts were treating the Antitrust Damages Directive
as rules of law and referred to it in their decisions.693
As already discussed, the European Commission believes that an upcoming private
enforcement could jeopardize the leniency programme. Therefore, it provided
legal instruments to protect the leniency programme in its Green Paper, White
Paper, the Draft Antitrust Damages Directive and in the Antitrust Damages Directive.
Although it is not written down by the European Commission, it appears that the
Pfleiderer case694– which made clear that information, also related to leniency,
could be open for disclosure, and potentially brings a risk for leniency applicants
– accelerated the Antitrust Damages Directive legislation process, in order to
protect the leniency programme.695
The fear of competition authorities – not least the European Commission – that
the effectiveness of the leniency may be jeopardized by an upcoming private en-
forcement appears well founded. From research and models of several economists
Cf. Lenaerts & Van Nuffel 2011, p. 296.691.
Antitrust Damages Directive, Article 5 (8).692.
See e.g. Hoge Raad 8 July 2016 (TenneT v ABB), point 4.3.4; Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden
2 September 2014 (TenneT v ABB), point 3.27; Rechtbank Gelderland 10 June 2015 (TenneT v Alstom);
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it is clear that the upcoming increase in private enforcement, resulting in claims
for the immunity recipient, will jeopardize the effectiveness of the leniency pro-
gramme indeed as long as no additional measurements are taken to prevent that.696
Also, the CJEU and several (legal) practitioners and scholars already mentioned that
an upcoming private enforcement (including the disclosure of leniency information)
could jeopardize the effectiveness of leniency.697 For example, Rusu notes that due
to the enormous potential group of victims that can claim for damages, the incen-
tives of cartel infringers to apply for leniency alter, since doing so renders them
‘sitting ducks’ for private damages suits initiated by the cartelists’ and non-cartelists’
customers and consumers alike.698
The Hungarian legislator was also of the opinion that supporting private damages
claims could affect the effectiveness of the leniency programme. The Hungarian
legislator already took legal measurements prior to the creation and implementation
of the Antitrust Damages Directive. The Hungarian system provided several instru-
ments to protect the effectiveness of the leniency policy. The (old) system in Hungary
will be discussed briefly in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, the relation between public
and private enforcement in the United States is analyzed. From the comparison
with the US system it becomes clear that the American legislator is also of the
opinion that the leniency programme could be jeopardized by private enforcement
claims.
It should be noted that if the fine of the competition authority is extremely high
– as is common practice in Europe – it appears logical that private enforcement
has only limited meaning in determining whether or not to apply for leniency, as
long as the exposure of damages claims is relatively little, not to say tiny. The risk
that another infringer takes the enormous benefits of the “leniency carrot”, by
submitting a leniency application, will often be too big, especially if there is on-
going cartel activity and it is uncertain what competitors will do. In such a situation,
the management will still often decide to apply for leniency. That analysis could
very well change if everyone who suffered damages would be fully compensated
for the competition law infringement, as set forth by the CJEU and stipulated in
the Antitrust Damages Directive.
The starting point for the fine is a percentage of the company’s annual sales of the
product concerned by the infringement.699 Empirical studies of past cartels show
that overcharges of 20% or more during the cartel are common.700 It is likely that
even without any other loss (besides the overcharge) for the victims of the cartel
infringement, even without interest to be compensated and even without the risk
Buccirossi, Marvão & Spagnolo 2015, p. 2; Bigoni, Fridolfsson, Le Coq & Spagnolo 2012, inter alia
p. 387; Silbye 2011, p. 692; Harrington 2008, p. 237; Renda et al. 2007, Chapter 6.
696.
CJEU 14 June 2011 (Pfleiderer AG v BkartA), points 25-27; Emmerich 2014, point 3; Kersting 2014;
Ortega Gonzáles 2014; Braat 2013, p. 325. Cf. also OECD 2015, p. 37.
697.
Rusu 2017, p. 802.698.
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that other infringers are unable to pay (and the infringer has to pay a part of that
damages as well), a well-functioning private enforcement system could collect a
total damages sum in compensation that exceeds that which competition authorities
collect through infringement fines.701 Based on the doctrine of the cost-benefit
analysis, this expanding exposure will become an (even more) relevant factor in
deciding whether or not to apply for leniency.
In the following sections the Antitrust Damages Directive will be discussed in more
detail. Not all aspects will be discussed as they are not all directly relevant for an-
swering the question whether the effectiveness of the leniency policy may be
jeopardized by an upcoming private enforcement and how this could be prevented.
With regard to the relation between private enforcement and leniency, the following
elements of private enforcement are identified as most relevant by the author. In
fact, they all relate to the cost-benefit analysis, as described in Section 2.2.4.
– Whether infringers are liable for harm caused. If they are not liable, the risk
of civil liability is non-existent and negative effects in civil procedures can be
ruled out (See Section 3.3.2.3).
– Whether leniency from the public authorities also protect infringers from
civil liability (See Section 3.3.2.7);
– What the (potential) damages the infringer has to compensate are. Only loss?
Also lost profit and interest? And is the infringer jointly and severally liable?
(See Sections 3.3.2.3 and 3.3.2.7);
– Whether infringers are jointly and severally liable for the damages. If so, it
significantly increases the potential liability of individual infringers (See
3.3.2.7). It also implies that claimants could choose their favorite infringer(s)
to claim the damages from, as all infringers are liable for the complete damage;
– How damages have to be proven and whether damages may be estimated. If
it is difficult to prove damage, and estimations are not accepted by the courts,
it is likely that it is rather difficult, not to say impossible, to successfully claim
for damages, which could be considered advantageous for the infringers (See
Section 3.3.2.3).
– What the group of potential claimants is. If the group of potential claimers
is limited, for example, to claimants with a direct connection to the infringer,
or difficult because it is practically impossible to claim damages for claimants
with little loss, this might have consequences for the total exposure. The impact
of a leniency application in the private enforcement atmosphere could be
more limited (See Section 3.3.2.3).
– Whether and which information from the public enforcement case will become
available for potential claimants (See 3.3.2.4)
– Whether public enforcement decisions can be, and are, used in private en-
forcement procedures and whether they are of assistance for claimants in
private enforcement procedures (See 3.3.2.5);
E.g. according to the European Commission the estimated loss of hardcore cartels is EUR 25 and
69 billion per year (See Section 3.2.9.1). That is far more than the accumulated fines per year of
the European competition authorities combined.
701.
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– Whether there are limitation periods that claimants have to take into account
(See 3.3.2.6). If there would be no limitation period, or an extremely long
period, it implies that claimants have a lot of time to claim for damages. It
brings uncertainty for infringers for a long time about which claims may be
expected.
– Whether the limitation period depends on the (final) public enforcement de-
cisions (See 3.3.2.6). If so, a final decision for one does not have to be final
towards the other. It could be interesting to claim damages from the infringers
to whom the decision is already final.
3.3.2.3 Damages and Estimating the Damages
The Antitrust Damages Directive sets out rules necessary for all victims of competi-
tion law infringements to recover full compensation for the damage suffered.
Furthermore, the Antitrust Damages Directive sets out rules concerning the coor-
dination of public enforcement by competition authorities and private enforcement
by national courts.702 The premise of the Antitrust Damages Directive is that full
compensation of damages is available to anyone who has suffered damage as a
result of the competition law infringement. The explanation of “damage” is in line
with CJEU case law.703 Damage consists of the loss suffered, lost profits and interest.
The Antitrust Damages Directive relates to cartel infringements as well as abuse
of a dominant position based on Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU and similar na-
tional provisions in the Member States if applied in parallel.704 By extending the
scope of the Antitrust Damages Directive to national provisions used in parallel,
the Antitrust Damages Directive aims to prevent the application of different private
enforcement rules to one and the same cartel infringement, which could hinder
the proper functioning of the internal market.705 Eliminating this problem should
help prevent legal uncertainty.
The Antitrust Damages Directive does not have consequences for competition law
infringements that do not affect trade between EU Member States, as intended in
Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU.706 The compensation to be paid may not lead to
overcompensation.707 This is to prevent “American-style situations”.708 Article 17(2)
of the Antitrust Damages Directive makes clear that there is a presumption that a
cartel infringement causes damage. It is for the cartel infringer to rebut this pre-
sumption, which eases the burden of proof on claimants. Article 17(1) of the Anti-
trust Damages Directive provides that neither the burden nor the standard of proof
required for the quantification of harm renders the exercise of the right to damages
practically impossible or excessively difficult. The Antitrust Damages Directive
states that Member States must ensure that the national courts are empowered, in
Antitrust Damages Directive, Article 1.702.
Oude Elferink & Braat 2014, p. 222.703.
Antitrust Damages Directive, Article 2 (1).704.
Ibid.705.
Ibid, Preamble under 10.706.
Ibid, Article 3 (3) and Preamble under 13.707.
Oude Elferink & Braat 2014, p. 223.708.
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accordance with national procedures, to estimate the amount of harm if it is estab-
lished that a claimant suffered harm but it is practically impossible or excessively
difficult to precisely quantify the harm suffered on the basis of the evidence
available. On its website, the European Commission provides several documents,
including a Communication and a Practical Guide, to assist both national courts
and the parties involved in litigation in quantifying the damages resulting from
antitrust infringements.709
Chapter IV of the Antitrust Damages Directive contains special provisions relating
to passing-on the overcharge. Article 12 of the Antitrust Damages Directive was
implemented after the European Parliament suggested it. It contains an umbrella
clause. It should be possible to be compensated for all damage, and overcompensa-
tion should be prevented.710 Pursuant to Article 13 of the Antitrust Damages Direc-
tive, infringers must be able to invoke the passing-on defense.711 It implies that
competition law infringers could allege that the claimants have passed-on the
higher price completely, or partly, which potentially results in no damage or lower
damage for the (direct) claimants.712 The burden of proving that the overcharge
was passed-on rests with the defendant. The defendant may reasonably require
disclosure from the claimant, or from third parties, in order to receive evidence
that the overcharge was passed-on.713 Article 14 of the Antitrust Damages Directive
contains a special provision for indirect purchasers. Indirect purchasers have the
onus of proving that the loss or damage was passed-on and should be able to request
evidence from the defendant and third parties. Unless the defendant can demon-
strate credibly to the satisfaction of the court that the overcharge was not, or was
not entirely, passed on to the indirect purchaser, the indirect purchaser proves that
the higher price was passed on if it shows the following: (i) the defendant committed
an infringement of competition law; (ii) the infringement of competition law re-
sulted in an overcharge for the direct purchaser of the defendant; and (iii) the indi-
rect purchaser purchased the goods or services that were the object of the infringe-
ment of competition law, or has purchased goods or services derived from them
or containing them.714
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Antitrust Damages Directive, it must be avoided that
litigation brought from different levels in the supply chain produces multiple lia-
bility or the absence of liability on the part of the infringer. A court should be able
to take into account damages claims originating from other levels in the supply
chain, other judgments that are issued in that respect, and relevant information
in the public domain resulting from the public enforcement of competition law.715
As the calculation of the overcharge is complex, under Article 16 of the Antitrust
Damages Directive, the European Commission has the obligation to issue guidelines
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification_en.html.709.
Oude Elferink & Braat 2014, p. 228.710.
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for national courts on how to estimate the share of the overcharge passed-on to
the indirect purchaser.716
3.3.2.4 Collection of Information
The mitigation of evidence asymmetry is the basis of Chapter II of the Antitrust
Damages Directive.
Article 5 of the Antitrust Damages Directive states the standard rule concerning
access to evidence. A court must be able to order defendants and third parties to
provide relevant evidence if a claimant makes a reasoned request containing the
available facts and relevant evidence, which should be sufficient to make it plausible
that the party has a claim.717 The access to the evidence must be limited to what
is proportionate.718 In doing so, the court should take into account the legitimate
interests of the parties involved, as well as the interests of third parties.719 In par-
ticular, the court should consider the following: (i) whether the request for infor-
mation is justified based on the facts and the evidence provided; (ii) whether the
information request is justified based on the scope of the information request and
the costs of the publication of the information; and (iii) whether the information
requested contains confidential information, including from third parties.720 Article
5 makes clear that the risk of becoming involved in litigation is not a legitimate
reason for not providing information.721
According to Article 5(4) of the Antitrust Damages Directive, the national courts
should have the power to order the disclosure of evidence containing confidential
information where it is relevant to the action for damages. When a court orders
the disclosure of such information, it should have at its disposal effective measures
to protect the confidential part of the information.722 Applicable legal professional
privileges under EU or national law should be respected when ordering the disclo-
sure of evidence.723 The party from which information is sought should have an
opportunity to be heard before a national court orders disclosure under Article 5
of the Antitrust Damages Directive.
Pursuant to Article 5(8) of the Antitrust Damages Directive, the Member States are
allowed to enforce and introduce rules concerning the disclosure of evidence
leading to a broader disclosure of evidence. Article 6 contains an additional provi-
sion regarding information in the possession of the competition authority. National
courts could request a competition authority to divulge evidence included in its
file only where no party or third party is reasonably able to provide that evidence.724
Member States must ensure that evidence obtained by a natural or legal person
Antitrust Damages Directive, Article 16.716.
Ibid, Article 5 (1).717.
Ibid, Article 5 (3).718.
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solely through access to the file of a competition authority can be used in an action
for damages only by that person or by a natural or legal person that succeeded to
that person’s rights, including a person that acquired that person’s claim.725 The
national court must decide whether it is proportionate to order a competition
authority to provide information. The court should consider whether: (i) it concerns
a specific request for specific information (to prevent fishing expeditions); (ii) the
request for information relates to a legal private enforcement action; and (iii) there
is a need to safeguard the effectiveness of the public enforcement of competition
law.726
Courts cannot order a party or a third party to disclose the leniency statement and
a settlement submission.727 This is called Chapter II’s “black list”.728 There is also
a “grey list”, which includes documents that may only be disclosed after the com-
petition authority by adopting a decision or otherwise, has closed its proceedings.729
This relates to documents: (i) prepared by a natural or legal person specifically for
the proceedings of a competition authority; (ii) information drawn and sent by the
competition authority to parties in the course of its proceedings; and (iii) settlement
submissions that have been withdrawn.730 Information not mentioned on the black
list or the grey list may be ordered in actions for damages at any time, without
prejudice to Article 6 of the Antitrust Damages Directive.731
To the extent that a competition authority is willing to state its views on the pro-
portionality of disclosure requests, it may, acting on its own initiative, submit ob-
servations to the national court before which a disclosure order is sought.732
Article 7 of the Antitrust Damages Directive contains obligations to ensure the
confidentiality of documents as stated on the black and the grey lists. If this infor-
mation is obtained by a natural or legal person solely through access to the file of
a competition authority, despite the fact that Articles 6(5) and 6(6) of the Antitrust
Damages Directive prevent that, the information is either deemed to be inadmissible
in actions for damages or is otherwise protected under the applicable national
rules. This is to ensure the full effect of the limits on the disclosure of evidence set
out in Article 6 of the Antitrust Damages Directive. Pursuant to Article 8 of the
Antitrust Damages Directive, national courts should be able to effectively impose
sanctions on parties, third parties and their legal representatives if: (i) they acted
contrary to a court order to provide information; (ii) they destroyed evidence; (iii)
they ignored a court order to protect confidential information; or (iv) they ignored
the limits on the use of evidence provided for in the Antitrust Damages Directive.733
The sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.734 According to the
Antitrust Damages Directive, Article 7 (3).725.
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Antitrust Damages Directive, the sanctions which the national courts can invoke
include, with regard to the behavior of a party to proceedings for an action for
damages, the possibility of drawing adverse inferences, such as presuming the
relevant issue to be proven or dismissing claims and defenses in whole or in part,
and the possibility of ordering the payment of costs.735
3.3.2.5 Decisions of Competition Authorities
When national courts rule on agreements, decisions or practices under Article 101
or 102 of the TFEU that are already the subject of a European Commission decision,
Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 makes clear that they cannot take decisions running
counter to the decision adopted by the European Commission. They must also
avoid giving decisions that would conflict with a decision contemplated by the
European Commission in proceedings it has initiated. To that effect, the national
court may assess whether it is necessary to stay its proceedings.
Article 9 of the Antitrust Damages Directive has similarities to Article 16 of Regu-
lation 1/2003. It makes clear that the infringement of competition law as determined
in a final decision of a national competition authority, or by a review court, is
deemed to be irrefutably established for the purposes of an action for damages
brought before the national courts under Article 101 or 102 of the TFEU, or under
national competition law.
This article is included to enhance legal certainty, to avoid inconsistency in the
application of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU, to increase the effectiveness and
procedural efficiency of actions for damages, and to foster the functioning of the
internal market for undertakings and consumers. The idea is that the findings of
infringement of Article 101 or 102 of the TFEU in a final decision by a national
competition authority, or a review court, should not be re-litigated in subsequent
actions for damages.736
If the final decision is made in another Member State, that final decision may be
presented before their national courts as at least prima facie evidence assessed along
with any other evidence adduced by the parties.737
The effect of the national decisions by competition authorities is without prejudice
to the rights and obligations of national courts under Article 267 of the TFEU. The
national court may request the CJEU to give preliminary rulings concerning: (i) the
interpretation of the Treaties; and (ii) the validity and interpretation of acts of the
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union.738
Antitrust Damages Directive, Article 8 (2).735.
Ibid, Preamble point 34.736.
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3.3.2.6 Limitation Period
Pursuant to Article 10, the limitation period is at least five years and does not begin
to run before the competition law infringement has ceased and the claimant knows,
or can reasonably be expected to know: (i) of the behavior and the fact that it con-
stitutes an infringement of competition law; (ii) of the fact that the infringement
of competition law caused harm to it; and (iii) the identity of the infringer.739
The limitation period is suspended or, depending on national law, interrupted if
a competition authority takes action for the purpose of the investigation or its
proceedings with respect to an infringement of competition law to which the action
for damages relates. The suspension ends, at the earliest, one year after the infringe-
ment decision has become final, or after the proceedings are otherwise terminated.
3.3.2.7 Joint and Several Liability
Undertakings infringing competition law collectively are jointly and severally liable
for the harm caused by the collective infringement of competition law. Each of
those undertakings is bound to compensate for the harm in full, and the injured
party has the right to require full compensation from any of them until it has been
fully compensated.740
An infringer may recover a contribution from any other infringer, the amount of
which is determined in light of their relative responsibility for the harm caused
by the infringement of competition law.741
The Antitrust Damages Directive provides for two exceptions to the general rule
of joint and several liability. There is an exception for a small-to-medium-sized
enterprise (“SME”) if the viability of the undertaking is at risk. This exception does
not apply if: (i) the SME has led the infringement of competition law or has coerced
other undertakings to participate in it; or (ii) the SME has previously been found
to infringe competition law.742
In the Antitrust Damages Directive, the immunity recipient is jointly and severally
liable towards its direct and indirect purchasers and providers. The immunity re-
cipients are exempted from the general joint and several liability rule.743 They are
jointly and severally liable only to their direct and indirect purchasers or providers,
unless full compensation cannot be obtained from the other infringers.744 Moreover,
for those other than (direct or indirect) purchasers and providers – for example
victims of umbrella pricing as discussed in the Kone case745– the leniency applicant
with immunity is only obliged to contribute to other infringers for its relative part
Antitrust Damages Directive, Article 10 (2)(3).739.
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of the damages.746 It means that in principle the immunity recipient is relieved
from joint and several liability for the entire harm and any contribution it must
make vis-à-vis co-infringers does not exceed the amount of harm caused to its own
direct or indirect purchasers or, in the case of a buying cartel, its direct or indirect
providers.747 To the extent that a cartel has caused harm to those other than the
customers or providers of the infringers, the contribution of the immunity recipient
should not exceed its relative responsibility for the harm caused by the cartel.748
The immunity recipient remains fully liable to the injured parties other than its
direct or indirect purchasers or providers only where they are unable to obtain full
compensation from the other infringers.749
3.4 Comparison and Analysis of the Directive and the Papers
3.4.1 Introduction
The development and adoption of the Antitrust Damages Directive was an interest-
ing process. Although several Member States were critical about a specific pan-
European private enforcement system, it was introduced and is part of European
legislation. Claimants have several instruments to make it possible to claim for
damages. With respect to the protection of the leniency policy, a completely new
system has been introduced.
3.4.2 Instruments for Claimants
The Antitrust Damages Directive includes several provisions in order to make sure
that claimants receive compensation. If civil law provisions in the Member States
are not in line with these, they had to be adjusted accordingly.
The Antitrust Damages Directive provides that everyone who suffered harm as a
result of a competition law infringement should be able to claim for damages. In
line with European case law, the damage consists of loss suffered, lost profit and
interest. The amount of harm may be estimated. The Antitrust Damages Directive
also provides that infringers are jointly and severally liable, with some exceptions
for small and medium enterprises and the immunity recipient. Parties are able to
request the disclosure of specific information that could be helpful in the civil
procedure. The Antitrust Damages Directive provides a system that helps indirect
claimants to receive compensation and provides a limitation period that takes the
outcome of a public enforcement procedure into account. Concerning the latter,
the decision of the public enforcement procedure can be used as important evidence
in the civil procedure.
The accepted instruments in the Antitrust Damages Directive ensure that claimants
could successfully claim for damages. At the same time, the consequence of the
provisions is that the damages claims for cartel infringers are still to be expected,
Antitrust Damages Directive, Article 11 (6).746.
Ibid, Preamble point 38.747.
Ibid.748.
Ibid.749.
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including for leniency applicants. As addressed by several Member States, this can
have a negative impact on the success of the leniency programme. If the potential
damages to be compensated are so severe for the immunity recipient, the applicant
could well be less interested in applying for leniency in the first place. Taking that
into account, to protect the leniency policy and to coordinate public and private
enforcement, the European legislator did introduce a special regime for leniency
information and the potential liability of the immunity recipient. This will be dis-
cussed in Section 3.4.3.
It is interesting to note that the Antitrust Damages Directive does not include a
provision concerning collective redress and representative actions.750 In the draft
2009 directive, collective redress and representation actions were part of the pro-
posal still. The European Commission considered the availability of collective
damages actions particularly important for consumers harmed by antitrust viola-
tions.751 There was clear critique from the Member States that the European Com-
mission wanted to interfere. Several Member States considered this was a national
affair. Moreover, Member States also argued that the topic should not be arranged
only in relation to competition law but should be considered as a more general
topic on the European agenda for consumers.752
In 2013, the European Commission published its initiative on Collective Redress.753
This is not part of European legislation. It is an invitation for Member States to
introduce a collective actions system, including actions for damages by July 2015.
It is up to the Member States to make it easier for consumers to act as a group to
receive compensation. The Member States can use the document of the European
Commission in establishing a system. In January 2018, the European Commission
published a report that shows that the availability of collective redress mechanisms
as well as the implementation of safeguards against the potential abuse of such
mechanisms is still not consistent across the EU.754 It appears that the European
Commission will usurp the topic and provide more guidance or even legislation.755
3.4.3 Coordination of Public and Private Enforcement
In the various documents, attention was paid to the relationship between private
enforcement and leniency. In the Green Paper and the accompanying Staff Working
Paper, the European Commission signaled that an increase in private enforcement
could have an impact on the effectiveness of leniency policy, at least to some extent.
Already in its Green Paper, the European Commission provided some suggestions
to prevent such negative consequences. It provided three options to ensure that
leniency programmes and the rules on damages claims are coordinated so that the
underlying aims would be optimally achieved: (i) exclusion of discoverability of
Cf. Rusu 2017, p. 808.750.
European Commission 2014 (Press Release).751.
Oude Elferink & Braat 2014, p. 218.752.
European Commission 2013 (Recommendation on collective redress mechanisms).753.
European Commission 2018.754.
Ibid.755.
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information of the leniency applicant; (ii) rebate on damages claims; and (iii) re-
moval of joint liability for the leniency applicant. 756
The European Commission emphasized that it is important for a claimant to get
access to evidence if it is to prove anti-competitive behavior. According to the
European Commission, it must therefore be considered whether an obligation to
hand over documents or otherwise provide access to evidence should be intro-
duced.757
In its White Paper, the European Commission held that adequate protection against
disclosure in private actions for damages should, in order to avoid placing the ap-
plicant in a less favorable situation than the co-infringers, be ensured for corporate
statements submitted by a leniency applicant.758 Otherwise, according to the
European Commission, the threat of disclosure of the confession submitted by a
leniency applicant could have a negative influence on the quality of its submissions,
or even completely dissuade the cartel infringer from applying for leniency.759
Therefore, the European Commission suggested that protection should apply:760
(i) to all corporate statements submitted by all applicants for leniency in relation
to a breach of Article 101 of the TFEU (even if national law is applied in parallel);
and (ii) regardless of whether the application for leniency is accepted, rejected, or
leads to no decision by the competition authority. The Antitrust Damages Directive
provides such protection.
The European Commission also considered the possibility of limiting the joint and
several civil liability of the immunity recipient to claims by the undertakings’ direct
and indirect contractual partners.761 The mechanism implies that the immunity
recipient retains civil liability for an infringement for which it received immunity,
but only towards its direct and indirect contractual partners.762 As a result, the only
persons entitled to receive compensation from the immunity recipient would be
the victims who directly bought the cartelized products or services from the im-
munity recipient (i.e. direct contractual partners), or those further down the supply
chain that bought these products or services (directly or through intermediaries)
from the direct contractual partners (i.e. indirect contractual partners).763 The im-
munity recipient would then not be held liable for the damage suffered by a pur-
chaser or provider that did not directly or indirectly purchase or provide cartelized
products from/to it.764 According to the European Commission, this would help to
make the scope of damages paid by immunity recipients more predictable and
European Commission 2005 (Annex to the Green Paper on Damages Actions), pp. 65-66.756.
European Commission 2005 (Green Paper on Damages Actions), p. 5.757.
European Commission 2008 (White Paper on Damages Actions), p. 10.758.
Ibid.759.
Ibid.760.
Ibid.761.
European Commission 2008 (Working Paper Accompanying White Paper on Damages Actions),
p. 88.
762.
Ibid.763.
Ibid.764.
CHAPTER 3134
COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF THE DIRECTIVE AND THE PAPERS3.4
more limited, without unduly sheltering them from civil liability for their partici-
pation in an infringement.765
The Antitrust Damages Directive does provide an exception for an undertaking
receiving immunity under the leniency programme. For such an undertaking, joint
and several liability is limited to compensating its direct or indirect purchasers and
providers and, is limited to compensating for its relative part, to third parties, to
the extent that other damages can be recovered from other infringers.766 In principle
the immunity recipient is relieved from joint and several liability for the entire
harm and any contribution it must make vis-à-vis co-infringers does not exceed
the amount of harm caused to its own direct or indirect purchasers or, in the case
of a buying cartel, its direct or indirect providers. To the extent that a cartel has
caused harm to those other than the customers or providers of the infringers, the
contribution of the immunity recipient should not exceed its relative responsibility
for the harm caused by the cartel. The immunity recipient remains fully liable to
the injured parties other than its direct or indirect purchasers or providers only
where they are unable to obtain full compensation from the other infringers. The
additional solution provided by the Green Paper, i.e. the leniency applicant would
also receive a rebate on damages claim in the civil case, has not reached the final
text of the Antitrust Damages Directive.
3.5 Conclusions
The two CJEU decisions of Courage v Crehan and Manfredi are the start and the heart
of European private enforcement, together with Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU.
Everyone who has suffered damage (actual loss, lost profit and interest) from a
competition law infringement should be able to receive compensation.
A problem arose because the rules were only explained to a limited extent by the
CJEU. A possible consequence of the lack of clarity on private enforcement rules
and regulations is that private enforcement potentially became an unpredictable
enforcement tool from which it was not clear what cartel infringers and claimants
should expect. Until recently, because of the lack of pan-European legislation, the
further elaboration of private enforcement rules has had to come from the national
courts and from national legislation. As long as there was no specific national
legislation, the courts have had to define provisions in accordance with the case
law of the CJEU.
Private enforcement has been in flux over the last decade. In addition to the various
cases decided by the CJEU and national courts, the European Commission has been
working on this topic extensively, with the result being the Antitrust Damages Di-
rective, which had to be implemented by the Member States no later than 27
December 2016.
European Commission 2008 (White Paper on Damages Actions), p. 10.765.
Antitrust Damages Directive, Article 11 (4).766.
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The Antitrust Damages Directive should ensure the possibility to claim for damages
successfully. It provides several instruments that assist claimants in successfully
claiming for damages. The Antitrust Damages Directive codifies much of the CJEU
case law. Moreover, many of the solutions provided in the European Commission’s
Green Paper and White Paper are now, despite critique from Member States, EU
law and part of national legislation.
New elements are integrated into national legislation and include the following:
(i) the presumption that damages arise from cartel infringements; (ii) a set of rules
concerning disclosure, including the disclosure of information from the competition
authorities; (iii) specific limitation periods for antitrust damages actions; (iv) a
special regime for leniency applicants as far as it concerns the disclosure of infor-
mation and related to joint and several liability; (v) a special regime for SMEs; and
(vi) a regime to make consensual dispute resolution more attractive.
As stated in the Green Paper, one of the main incentives for drafting the Antitrust
Damages Directive was the protection of consumers.767 The Green Paper and White
Paper make explicitly clear that, especially for consumers, receiving compensation
can be difficult, as the damage they have suffered is often limited (scattered dam-
ages), and starting individual proceedings is unlikely in such an event. For political
reasons, some of the issues mentioned are not addressed. For example, no solutions
have been provided for collective redress and representative actions. It should be
noted however that the Member States without a collective action system with the
option of claiming damages will likely acquire such a system in the near future.
The European Commission has put collective actions on the European agenda and
is pushing for such a regime in the Member States.
If there is an optimum of private enforcement, and all – or at least a significant
part of damages – is compensated in future, it is even likely that the impact of
the damages to be paid will often outweigh the financial implications of the admin-
istrative fines to be paid. It implies that considering ‘damages as risk’ becomes
more apparent when considering to apply for leniency on the basis of the cost-be-
nefit analysis. Because of this effect of an upcoming private enforcement, the
(other) main incentive for drafting the Antitrust Damages Directive was to coordi-
nate public and private enforcement. The European Commission’s fear that an
upcoming private enforcement (and disclosure of leniency information) could
jeopardize the leniency policy was shared by the CJEU, the Member States, (legal)
practitioners and scholars. Several economists demonstrated with their research
and models that private antitrust damages claims jeopardize the effectiveness of
the leniency programme and that the European Commission’s fear is justified.
They conclude that the private enforcement claims jeopardize the leniency policy
if no measurements are taken to protect the leniency policy.
The Antitrust Damages Directive includes provisions that should protect the leniency
policy. Of the proposals to protect the leniency programme, the following have
European Commission 2005 (Green Paper on Damages Actions), pp. 3 and 7-8; European Commission
2008 (White Paper on Damages Actions), p. 4.
767.
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been partly incorporated into the Antitrust Damages Directive: the exclusion of
discoverability of the leniency statement and the partial removal of joint liability
for the leniency applicant with immunity. An additional solution (i.e. the leniency
applicant would also receive a rebate on the damages awarded in the civil case),
which was widely criticized by several Member States, was not included in the final
text of the Antitrust Damages Directive.
In Chapter 6, the creation of the provisions of the Antitrust Damages Directive,
especially with regard to the provisions that potentially affect the effectiveness of
the leniency policy, will be evaluated and compared with the previous legal struc-
tures in Germany and the Netherlands. Moreover, the system set out in the Antitrust
Damages Directive will be compared with the American system. Comments on the
expected effect of the Antitrust Damages Directive and some critique on the sug-
gested solutions will also follow in that Chapter.
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4.1 Introduction
As described in Chapter 3, the Antitrust Damages Directive is designed to ensure
that private enforcement becomes a usable tool in Member States for victims of
competition law infringements and to protect the effectiveness of the overall leni-
ency programme. The Antitrust Damages Directive is the European Commission’s
attempt to ensure that victims are able to claim damages. In addition, the European
Commission is seeking to create a uniform basis for private enforcement rules and
principles in all Member States.
The objective of this chapter is to describe private enforcement as known in Ger-
many and the Netherlands until recently. First, it describes the legal frameworks
in Germany and the Netherlands and how these systems functioned before the
Antitrust Damages Directive was implemented. Also, an overview of the (old) systems
of other European countries is described briefly. Afterwards the changes in Germany
and the Netherlands, as a result of the adaption of the Antitrust Damages Directive
will be discussed, to the extent relevant for this study.
Whether private enforcement (potentially) jeopardizes the effect of the leniency
policy depends inter alia on the extent to which private enforcement plays a role
in daily practice and whether damages have to be paid.768 If private enforcement
turns out to be merely a paper tiger, it is not expected that leniency applicants will
incorporate the risk of civil litigation into their assessment of whether or not to
apply for leniency. If private enforcement is considered effective in claiming
damages, it is likely that cartel infringers will take the risk of damages claims into
account in the cost-benefit analysis conducted in order to decide whether or not
to apply for leniency.769
See Section 3.3.2.2.768.
See Section 2.2.3.1 and 3.3.2.2.769.
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The main element of the study is the relationship between the leniency programme
and private enforcement. Although the abuse of dominance by undertakings is
also relevant to private enforcement, it is less relevant to this study as the leniency
programme only applies to cartel infringements, and not to infringements regarding
abuse of dominance. For that reason, in this study there is a strong focus on cartel
infringements and only modest attention is given to private enforcement in relation
to abuse of dominance.
4.2 Private Enforcement in Germany Prior to the Antitrust Damages
Directive
4.2.1 Introduction
The German competition act is called the Act against Restraints of Competition
(ARC).770 In Germany, private enforcement actions can commence in the civil courts.
Claims can be brought under either German or EU competition law.771 Cartel in-
fringement can be based on Article 1 of the ARC and Article 101 of the TFEU. Re-
garding abusive behavior by dominant undertakings, claims can be based on Articles
19 and 20 of the ARC and Article 102 of the TFEU.
On 1 July 2005, the seventh amendment to the ARC became effective. The main
objective of amending the law was to bring German law more in line with European
competition law, and more specifically in line with Regulation No 1/2003.772 The
amendments to the ARC also related to civil claims for damages, for which the
legal basis was provided in an amended Article 33 of the ARC.773 The German legis-
lature introduced the new provision to enforce private enforcement actions, espe-
cially in cartel cases, to protect competition on the markets and as additional means
of compensating losses instead of the standard provision found in Article 823(2) of
the German Civil Code (GCC).774 The German legislature has thereby taken into
consideration the main principles stated in the case of Courage v Crehan and what
was discussed in the Green Paper. The amended Article 33 of the ARC deals with
many of the aspects discussed, and difficulties signaled in, the Green Paper.775
In 2013, German lawmakers amended the ARC to some degree, which strengthened
the position of consumer protection associations in terms of their participation in
antitrust enforcement actions. Certain institutions were allowed to bring actions
for injunctive relief or the skimming off of economic benefits in the case of mass
and dispersed damages. As was the case in the past, only the affected parties can
claim damages. A system for collective redress remained outside the system of the
German antitrust damages claims regime.776
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (“GWB”).770.
Dietrich, Gruber & Hartmann-Rüppel 2009, p. 74.771.
Wurmnest 2005, p. 1173.772.
Ibid, p. 1180; Dietrich, Gruber & Hartmann-Rüppel 2009, p. 74.773.
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (“BGB”); Dietrich, Gruber & Hartmann-Rüppel 2009, p. 73.774.
Cf. Müller 2010, p. 131. Cf. Dietrich, Gruber & Hartmann-Rüppel 2009, pp. 74-75.775.
Besen, Schützte, Von Graevenitz 2013, p. 4.776.
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In 2016, the German government provided a draft of a new, adjusted ARC, inter
alia to implement the provisions of the Antitrust Damages Directive.777 Although
the Antitrust Damages Directive had to be implemented by the end of 2016, it was
not part of German legislation until June 2017. It did not mean that the Antitrust
Damages Directive was irrelevant in Germany. National courts were already obliged
to apply the harmonious interpretation, whenever they were able to do so.778 It
meant that national courts should interpreted national law provisions in conformity
with the Antitrust Damages Directive.779 In June 2017, the new ARC, including the
Antitrust Damages Directive provisions, became part of German legislation.
This section starts with a description of the status of private enforcement in Germany
prior to the implementation of the Antitrust Damages Directive. Subsequently,
attention is given to the subjects that the European Commission discussed compre-
hensively in its Green Paper and White Paper, together with the elements described
in the Antitrust Damages Directive from a German perspective. Specifically, the
following items are discussed as they could be relevant for the effectiveness of the
leniency programme: (i) the right to damages and collective redress; (ii) disclosure
of evidence; (iii) the passing-on of overcharges; (iv) the effect of (national) decisions;
(v) the limitation period, and (vi) the Masterfoods defense. The section ends with
an interim conclusion regarding the effectiveness of German private enforcement.
4.2.2 The State of Private Enforcement in Germany prior to the Antitrust
Damages Directive
4.2.2.1 Introduction
Article 33 of the ARC empowered victims of cartel infringers to claim damages
under the ARC and Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU.780
At the start of 2018, most pending cases in Germany were so-called follow-on cases.
Examples of large damages cases pending in Germany are cartel cases relating to
air cargo, car glass, cement, coffee, elevators, hydrogen peroxide, paper, railway
tracks and refrigeration compressors. In most of these cases, the competition
authority was assisted in detecting or proving the cartel infringement by at least
one of the cartel infringers.781 The 100 percent fine reduction that was often granted
shows that in most cases the competition authority was previously not aware of
Zuehlke 2017, p. 165.777.
Hartkamp, Sieburgh & Devroe 2017, pp. 6-7.778.
Ibid.779.
Immenga & Mestäcker 2014, § 33, para 8.780.
Air Cargo: Lufthansa was granted a 100 percent reduction of the fine; Car Glass: the Commission
started the cartel investigation following a tip-off from an anonymous source; Asahi / AGC Flatt
781.
Glass was granted a 50 percent reduction of the fine; Cement: Readymix AG disclosed the cartel to
the BKartA; Elevators: Kone was granted a 100 percent reduction of the fines for the Belgian and
Luxembourgish cartel and Otis received a 100 percent fine reduction for the Dutch cartel; Hydrogen
Peroxyde: Degussa AG received a 100 percent fine reduction; Railway track: Voestalpine AG applied
for leniency and was granted a reduction of the fine; Refrigeration compressors: Tecumseh was
granted a 100 percent reduction of the fine.
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the cartel or not able to prove the cartel infringement without the help of a leniency
applicant.
It can easily be concluded that the public enforcement cases in Germany depend
heavily on the leniency programme, and the civil damages actions follow afterwards.
That shows the importance of leniency applications for the public prosecution
process and also for the compensation of cartel victims.
4.2.2.2 Statutory Context
Article 33(1) of the ARC provided that whoever violates (inter alia) the cartel or
abuse-of-dominance prohibitions in the ARC and Article 101 or 102 of the TFEU
has an obligation to the person affected to remediate and, in the case of a danger
of recurrence, to refrain from committing the violation. Injunctive relief is already
available when an infringement is foreseeable. The affected persons are competitors
or other market participants impaired by the infringement.
Article 33(2) of the ARC stated that claims made pursuant to Article 33(1) of the
ARC may (if they have legal capacity) also be asserted by associations for the pro-
motion of commercial or independent professional interests, if they have a signifi-
cant number of member undertakings selling goods or services of a similar or re-
lated type on the same market, and if they are able, in particular with regard to
their human, material and financial resources, to actually exercise their statutory
functions of pursuing commercial or independent professional interests, and the
infringement affects the interests of their members. The amendment of the ARC
in 2013 allowed certain institutions to bring actions for injunctive relief or for the
skimming-off of economic benefits in the case of mass and dispersed damages. As
was the case in the past, only the affected parties may claim damages, and collective
redress remained inadmissible.782
Article 33(3) of the ARC provided that whoever intentionally or negligently commits
an infringement pursuant to Article 33(1) of the ARC is liable for the damage arising
from it.
Interest is payable on the compensation owed, starting from the time the damage
occurred.
The fourth prong of Article 33 of the ARC provided that, if damages are claimed
for an infringement, the court is bound by the finding that an infringement has
occurred, to the extent such a finding was made in a final decision by the cartel
authority, the European Commission or the competition authority (or court acting
as such) in another Member State of the European Union. The same applied to such
findings in final judgments resulting from appeals against these decisions.
German lawmakers also implemented a special limitation period provision. Article
33(5) of the ARC stated that the limitation period for commencing a claim under
Article 33(3) of the ARC is suspended if proceedings are initiated either by the cartel
Besen, Schützte & Von Graevenitz 2013, p. 4.782.
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authority for infringement within the meaning of Article 33(1) of the ARC, by the
European Commission, or by the competition authority of another Member State.
Article 33 of the ARC appeared to be successful. With the introduction of the revised
paragraph, the legal framework conditions have been substantially improved for
claimants, and significantly more claims for damages have been brought to court.783
The surveys of the German competition authority (called Bundeskartellamt or
“BkartA”) show that more and more victims of antitrust infringements started legal
actions against the companies involved in cartel cases and are enforcing their rights
by means of civil litigation.784
4.2.2.3 Practice
The introduction of Article 33 of the ARC was an attempt to resolve potential diffi-
culties for plaintiffs in civil litigation and to make the rules concerning the matter
more transparent. The aim of German lawmakers was to ensure effective compen-
sation and deterrence. For example, with the adjusted Article 33(4) of the ARC, it
became clear that the court is bound by a finding that an infringement has occurred,
to the extent such a finding was made in a final decision by the BKartA, the Euro-
pean Commission, or a competition authority or court acting as such in a Member
State of the EU. The same applied to such findings in final judgments resulting
from appeals against decisions pursuant to these decisions. Article 33(5) of the ARC
suspended the limitation period of a claim for damages if proceedings are initiated
by the BKartA, the Commission, or a competition authority in one of the other
Member States of the EU for possible cartel infringements. Additionally, German
lawmakers tried to provide a solution for the passing on defense. Under Article
33(3) of the ARC, it was not sufficient for a defendant in a damages proceeding to
state that there is no harm because the good or service purchased at the excessive
price was resold, which should not be interpreted to mean that the passing on de-
fense is precluded.785 It implied that it is up to the defendant to prove that the
damages are lower because the plaintiff fully or partly passed them on to its pur-
chasers. The differing decisions concerning this defense will be analyzed later.
Within German academic circles, Article 33 of the ARC and private enforcement
are discussed extensively in the context of the decided cartel cases. Many published
cases concerning Article 33 of the ARC relate to the abuse of dominant positions
and regulatory issues, most of which concern energy regulation. For this study,
these are of limited relevance, so the discussion below focuses on the cartel cases.786
One of the cases regarding cartel damages claims that has often been discussed in
the recent past is one involving cement manufacturers.787 The aim of CDC, the
Cf. Müller 2010, p. 234; Bundesregierung 2009, p. IX; Dietrich, Gruber & Hartmann-Rüppel 2009,
p. 73; Bundeskartellamt 2008, p. 33; International Competition Network 2007, p. 2.
783.
Bundeskartellamt 2008, p. 33.784.
BGH 28 June 2011, KZR 75/10, point 29 et seq, especially point 44 et seq.785.
See also Section 4.1.786.
LG Düsseldorf 21 February 2007, 34 O (Kart) 147/05; OLG Düsseldorf 14 May 2008, VI-U (Kart) 14/07;
BGH 7 April 2009, KZR 42/08.
787.
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plaintiff, was to enforce claims by commercial consumers against parties because
of antitrust law violations. CDC pooled these claims by acquiring the debt assign-
ments and accepted the risk and cost of the claims.
Briefly, the defendants were six cement manufacturers that had set up and main-
tained a nationwide cement cartel. As the assignee of the claims, CDC claimed
damages for antitrust violations in the amount of more than EUR 100 million. The
case is important for several reasons. First of all, the district court made clear that
CDC was, after a valid assignment, entitled to claim damages on its own behalf
and at its own expense and risk because of the antitrust violations. Hence, the
claim vehicle/funder was able to collect the claims by buying them from the victims
of the cartel and starting antitrust violation proceedings in Germany on its own
behalf.788 Furthermore, the court dealt with the issue of jurisdiction. It made clear
that every district court in Germany had jurisdiction in the case of accused offenders
being suspected of participating in a nationwide cartel.789 In this case, it was also
decided that the lack of clarity about the exact amount of damages attributable to
the complexity of the computation was no reason to dismiss the case. An estimation
of the amount of the damages was sufficient to pursue the proceedings.790
The court of appeal confirmed the decision of the lower court, holding that the
procedural objections of the defendants (i.e. lack of jurisdiction, the inability of
the court to assess the amount of damages definitively, and the lack of entitlement
of CDC to take legal action) were unfounded.791
4.2.3 German Private Enforcement System Prior to the Antitrust Damages
Directive
4.2.3.1 Introduction
The European Commission concluded in its Green Paper792 and White Paper793 that
some legal bottlenecks within the Member States still had to be eliminated in order
to achieve a more effective private enforcement system in Europe. The German
private enforcement legislation and practice that was until recently applicable are
analyzed below, including a review of these bottlenecks identified by the European
Commission. These are then compared with the Antitrust Damages Directive, which
seeks to provide several solutions for the identified bottlenecks.
4.2.3.2 Right to Damages and Collective Redress
Under Article 33 of the ARC, standing was exclusively provided to affected parties
of the competition infringements and associations for the promotion of commercial
LG Düsseldorf 21 February 2007, 34 O (Kart) 147/05, point 77.788.
Ibid, points 55, 59-61.789.
Ibid, point 73 et seq.790.
OLG Düsseldorf 14 May 2008, VI-U (Kart) 14/07.791.
European Commission 2005 (Green Paper on Damage Actions).792.
European Commission 2008 (White Paper on Damage Actions).793.
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interests.794 Article 33(1) of the ARC defines affected parties as competitors or other
market participants impaired by the competition law infringement. Article 33(1)
of the ARC stated that any affected party may demand removal or injunctive relief
from a party that has infringed provisions of the ARC, Article 101 or 102 of the
TFEU, or an injunction issued by the cartel authority. Furthermore, Article 33(3)
of the ARC provided a remedy for damages in the case of the tortfeasor acting in-
tentionally or negligently.
Under Articles 830 and 840 of the GCC, cartel infringers are jointly and severally
liable for the damages caused by the cartel infringement.
German law does provide for the transfer of damages claims to third parties who
may then enforce the claims collectively.795 In the aforementioned cartel case
concerning the cement sector, this was accepted for the first time.796
Regarding acquiring claims from cartel victims, an important decision was made
on this issue by the district court of Düsseldorf in a matter between CDC and the
cement producers that followed the abovementioned decision of the court of appeal
over an interlocutory judgment of the first instance.797 It is an example of the
general problem that the validity of the assignment is often the center of discussion
and can also be decisive. CDC bought the claims for EUR 100 plus a variable com-
ponent in return. The variable component was dependent on the outcome of the
proceeding. The court rejected the claim by CDC. It held that the assignments of
the claims to CDC were legally void under Article 134 of the GCC read in conjunc-
tion with Article 1, para. 1, sentence 1, of the German Legal Advice Act (Rechtsbera-
tungsgesetz old version) and Article 138 of the GCC respectively.798 The district court
regarded the former assignments invalid pursuant to Article 134 of the GCC because
CDC had no license for debt collection, which would have been necessary under
Article 1, paragraph 1, sentence 1, of the German Legal Advice Act, which was in
force until end of June 2008.799 Regarding the renewed assignments afterwards,
CDC did not have sufficient financial means according to the court. The district
court explained that a party violates public policy (thus triggering the application
of Article 138 of the GCC) when it deprives the defendants of their rights to recover
statutory attorney’s fees from the claimant if the claim is rejected.800 On appeal,
the Düsseldorf court of appeal confirmed the decision of the district court.801
Under Article 33(2) of the ARC, associations were also able to bring actions for in-
junctive relief or for the skimming-off of economic benefits in the case of mass
and dispersed damage. Damages can only be claimed by the affected parties. As
said, class actions for damages remain inadmissible.802 Legal scholar Wurmnest
Wurmnest 2005, p. 1187.794.
Zuehlke 2017, pp. 171-172.795.
OLG Düsseldorf 14 May 2008, VI-U (Kart) 14/07, WuW/E DE-R 2311-2317.796.
LG Düsseldorf 17 December 2013, 37 O 200/09 (Kart) (CDC v Cement producers).797.
Ibid, point 57 et seq.798.
Ibid, point 67 et seq.799.
Ibid, point 96 et seq. See also Kuijpers et al. 2015, p. 8.800.
OLG Düsseldorf 18 February 2015, Az. VI U 3/14 (CDC v Cement producers).801.
Besen, Schützte & Von Graevenitz 2013, p. 4.802.
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questions whether private associations will step in, as they are under an obligation
to transfer the collected profits to the Federal Treasury, and thus do not have a
proper economic incentive to sue.803
Under Regulation No. 2015/2421, victims can claim rather easily for damages up
to EUR 5,000.804 It is also possible to combine claims of different victims. The
European small-claims procedure only applies to cross-border cases. These are cases
in which at least one of the parties is domiciled or habitual resident in a Member
State other than the Member State of the court where the action is brought under
this Regulation. It is not possible to claim damages if there is no cross-border ele-
ment. The practical relevance of this Regulation for cartel claims seems to be lim-
ited. Consumers and small and medium-sized enterprises often buy products from
undertakings incorporated in the same Member State. It is likely that a cross-border
element is not necessarily present and thus a proceeding under the Regulation is
not possible. Moreover, the maximum value of the dispute as a threshold (EUR
5,000) is limited.805 It is likely that victims of cartels, often entailing continuous
infringements for many years, suffer a much higher amount of damages.
4.2.3.3 Disclosure of Information
As discussed in Section 2.4.3.4 there are several methods of obtaining information
about a cartel. Via civil procedural provisions a private party could successfully
request for information. Moreover, in Germany civil courts could receive informa-
tion from other authorities directly. In the German Code of Civil Procedure
(“CCP”),806 the five categories of evidence used to establish the relevant basis for
deciding a case are as follows: (i) legal inspection; (ii) witness testimony; (iii) expert
testimony; (iv) the hearing of the parties; and (v) documentary evidence.
Prior to the implementation of the Antitrust Damages Detective, German private
competition law did not provide specific tools to force a defendant to disclose in-
formation to the claimant.807 In particular, there was no basis for a claimant to
invoke far-reaching pre-trial discovery rights.808 The system did not provide for
discovery of facts that are not already known to the claimant and thus need to be
investigated. Actually, in Germany there were only limited circumstances where
one can require an opposing or third party to produce documents or give statements.
In practice, the options did not play a significant role in the German legal process.809
Article 242 of the GCC could provide a general accessory claim, which could be
helpful, especially in follow-on lawsuits in determining the level of causal harm.810
Wurmnest 2005, p. 1187.803.
Regulation No 2015/2421 (successor of Regulation No 861/2007).804.
Cf. Kramer 2014, p. 100.805.
Zivilprozessordnung.806.
Zuehlke 2017, p. 170. See also Dietrich, Gruber & Hartmann-Rüppel 2009, p. 86.807.
Dietrich, Gruber & Hartmann-Rüppel 2009, p. 86.808.
Ibid, pp. 77-78.809.
Ruster 2017, p. 153.810.
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The conversion of this material right to procedural law is described in Articles 422
and further CCP.811
Pursuant to Article 142 ff of the CCP, German courts may order a party or a third
party to submit documents in its possession ex officio.812 Article 142 of the CCP does
not authorize a party to conduct a fishing expedition for the purpose of gaining
access to documents that may lead to further evidence.813 The precondition for the
order was a conclusive presentation based on concrete facts. In practice, courts
imposed high demands on the concretization.814 The requesting party’s interest in
providing the documents must be balanced against the interests of the other party
in not providing them.815 If a party disobeys the order to provide a document, the
court can draw its own inferences and take the refusal into consideration when
assessing the facts of the case.816
In practice, the provisions provided only limited instruments for collecting evidence.
The methods of obtaining information are limited because of the relatively strict
conditions under which information has to be disclosed. In practice, it remained
difficult to receive information and documents. Particularly in stand-alone actions,
obtaining the information needed for civil proceedings was a hurdle.
Prior to the implementation of the Antitrust Damages Directive, civil courts were
able to obtain the files of the BKartA and the public prosecutor's office pursuant
to Article 273 (2) 2 CCP Article 474 (1) Code of Criminal Procedure, § 46 (1) Code of
Administrative Offences and for the transmission of the Commission files.817 The
transfer could only take place after the civil action was brought. It implies that it
was not suitable for the preparation of the claim for damages.818 The injured party
is not entitled to the use of the official files. It is at the discretion of the court,
whether or not information could be used. In practice, courts made little use of
this possibility.819 There is an interesting case about the provision however.
The court of appeal in Hamm held that public prosecutors have to refer their files
to the civil courts requesting them.820 The defendants argued that the public pro-
secutor was not allowed to provide the information to the court. The court of appeal
held that the prosecutor did not have discretion in this matter and concluded that
there were no grounds to reject a request to refer the files to the civil courts. It is
up to the civil court to decide whether and to what extent the claimants receive
access to the file and which information can be used.821 According to the court of
appeal, it is up to the civil court, and not the public prosecutor, to balance the in-
Ruster 2017, p. 157.811.
Ibid.812.
Ibid.813.
Ibid.814.
Dietrich, Gruber & Hartmann-Rüppel 2009, p. 78.815.
Ibid. See also Ruster 2017, p. 157.816.
Ruster 2017, pp. 148-149.817.
Ibid.818.
Topel 2016, § 50, nr 155. See also Ruster 2017, p. 149.819.
OLG Hamm 26 November 2013, III-1 Vas 116-120/13.820.
Kuijpers et al. 2015, p. 7.821.
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terests of protecting public enforcement and providing effective damages claims
as stated in the case of Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie.822 In 2014, the Ger-
man federal court of justice rejected the objections against the decision of the court
of appeal.823 The federal court of justice noted that the civil court must ensure that
all relevant aspects and interests are accordingly taken into account and balanced
in a transparent manner.824
4.2.3.4 Passing-on Defense
Compensation for more than the actual loss is normally precluded in Germany.825
Some experts have strongly argued in favor of incorporating a clear-cut prohibition
of the passing-on defense in the amended Article 33 of the ARC, as they regard this
as necessary for the proper functioning of private enforcement.826 According to
most of these scholars, victims should be prevented from being able to claim
damages in the amount of their actual loss because the passing-on defense could
make it rather difficult to successfully claim damages.827
In 2003, the Mannheim district court ruled that cartel infringers are not liable to-
wards direct purchasers in the event of plaintiffs passing-on the higher prices to
downstream purchasers.828 The Karlsruhe court of appeal adopted these conclusions
and further presumed that direct purchasers will regularly be able to pass-on the
inflated prices to the downstream purchasers.829
After being amended in 2005, Article 33(3) of the ARC states that if a good or service
was purchased at an inflated price, the existence of damage is not precluded because
the good or service was resold. Legal scholar Wurmnest stated that the new law
does not categorically exclude the possibility of offsetting benefits resulting from
the resale in cases in which direct purchasers managed to pass-on the higher prices
to indirect purchasers.830
With the amendment, the legislators tried to find a balance between a realistic
path for victims of cartel infringers to claim for damages without being deterred
by a possible passing-on defense of the defendant on the one hand, and on the
other hand the legal principle of limitation of damages for plaintiffs to the full
compensation of a victim’s damages for financial loss and lost profits.
In a decision related to the Ready-mix concrete cartel, the Berlin court of appeal
decided on the issues of how to compute the amount of damages and the passing-
OLG Hamm 26 November 2013, III-1 Vas 116-120/13. See also Kuijpers et al. 2015, p. 7.822.
BGH 6 March 2014, BvR 3541/13.823.
Kuijpers et al. 2015, p. 8.824.
Cf. Glöckner 2007, pp. 492-493.825.
Wurmnest 2005, p. 1184.826.
Dietrich, Gruber & Hartmann-Rüppel 2009, p. 83, under b.827.
LG Mannheim 11 July 2003, 7 O 326/02, GRUR 2004, 182, 184. See more Wurmnest 2005, p. 1183.828.
OLG Karlsruhe 28 January 2004, 6 U 183/03, NJW 2004, 2243, 2244. See more Wurmnest 2005,
p. 1183.
829.
Wurmnest 2005, p. 1184.830.
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on defense.831 The court describes the way in which damages are to be calculated.
The general principle is that the price actually paid is to be compared with the
price that would apply in absence of a cartel. The difference constitutes the damages
for the plaintiff.832 If there is not enough factual evidence for a precise calculation
of the damages, pursuant to Article 287 of the CCP, the court must estimate the
price that would apply if there was no cartel.833
Prior to the amendments of Article 33 of the ARC, the Mannheim district court and
the Karlsruhe court of appeal had decided that the passing-on defense was admis-
sible and the plaintiffs had the burden of proof with regard to the level of dam-
ages.834 However, according to the Dortmund district court, which categorizes the
passing-on defense as a case of setting-off of benefits, it was up to the defendant
to prove that the plaintiff was able to pass-on the overcharge, as the defense would
benefit the defendant.835
The Berlin court of appeal decided otherwise. The court set out that the passing-on
defense is not permissible under German law and also does not work under Article
33(3) of the ARC.836 The Berlin court of appeal creatively solved problems with the
passing-on defense for defendants and claimants by allowing direct and indirect
purchasers to be joint and several creditors, with the effect that a single creditor
(e.g. the direct purchasers) can claim the entire loss (i.e. the damage suffered by
the direct and indirect purchasers) from the cartelist, and is then obliged to com-
pensate the other victims.837 As a result, the amount of damages claimed by the
plaintiff will not be reduced by the overcharges charged to its own purchasers.838
Several legal scholars have analyzed the passing-on and joint-and-several liability
creditor solutions of the Berlin court of appeal. Kamann and Ohlhoff, for example,
hold that the joint creditor solution of the court is not an ideal solution. According
to them, its weakness lies in its doctrinal inconsistency and complexity.839 It is
questionable, for example, how indirect purchasers will receive their damages from
the plaintiff, especially in cases where the direct plaintiff reaches a settlement.
Realistically, the direct result could well be that the plaintiff is overcompensated.
Other people in the field are of the opinion that the passing-on defense should be
allowed as they emphasize that it is a basic legal principle that one should be
obliged to pay damages only to compensate for the harm actually suffered (the so-
called compensatory principle).840
KG Berlin 1 October 2009, 2 U 10/03 (Kart). The Federal Court of Justice (BGH) found that there was
no reason to admit an appeal on points of law (BGH 08 June 2010, KZR 45/09).
831.
KG Berlin 1 October 2009, 2 U 10/03 Kart, point 31.832.
Ibid, point 37.833.
LG Mannheim 11 July 2003, 7 O 326/02, GRUR 2004, 182, 184 and OLG Karlsruhe 28 January 2004,
6 U 183/03, NJW 2004, 2243, 2244.
834.
LG Dortmund 1 April 2004, 12 O 55/02 Kart.835.
KG Berlin 1 October 2009, 2 U 10/03 Kart, WuW/E DE-R 2773 – 2788, point 95 et seq.836.
KG Berlin 1 October 2009, 2 U 10/03 Kart, WuW/E DE-R 2773 – 2788.837.
Ibid, points 95 and 103.838.
Kamann & Ohlhoff 2010, pp. 303-320.839.
See for example Bechtold 2010, pp. 296-297.840.
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As stated, in Germany the general rule in assessing damages is to provide full
compensation. The decisions of the CJEU also make clear that full compensation
should be provided to the victims of a cartel.841 It can also be concluded that there
is no ground for an overcompensation of direct victims. The passing-on defense
should therefore be available for defendants.
In 2010, the Düsseldorf court of appeal ruled that the passing-on defense was
available in a case relating to regulatory markets where Article 33 of the ARC did
not apply.842 The court of appeal stated that anyone affected by antitrust violations
should, in principle, on the basis of decisions of the CJEU, be able to claim dam-
ages.843 If the overcharges have been fully or partly passed-on to indirect purchasers,
the claims made by direct purchasers for this part of the harm should realistically
not be successful.844 The Düsseldorf court of appeal regarded it as established from
the proven facts that the claimant had taken the overcharges into account in its
own price calculations. The court of appeal accepted the passing-on defense. The
court held that the claimant’s general denial of having passed on the overcharges
was not sufficient for a substantive denial.845
In the ORWI case in 2011, the German federal court of justice clarified the rule on
the passing-on defense. The federal court of justice held that to assign the burden
of proof to the defendant was consistent with the general rule that the party bene-
fitting from a fact has to prove it.846 The federal court of justice stressed the neces-
sity of an adequate causal link between the cartel infringement and the harm, and
made clear that regarding this the passing-on defense was possible as a defense
and had to be seen as a situation of setting-off the benefits.847 According to the
federal court of justice, the defendant had the onus of proving that the damage
was reduced as the plaintiff had (fully or partly) passed the damage on to its own
purchasers.848 That the federal court of justice assigned the burden of proof to the
defendant was consistent with the general rule that the party benefitting from a
fact has to prove it.849 Whereas the indirect purchaser had to prove that the direct
purchasers passed-on the overcharges to it, the seller bore the burden of proof
where it argued as a defendant that the claimant had passed-on the price increases
to its buyers.850
In a later decision, the Berlin district court followed the German federal court of
justice, pointing out that the passing-on defense is generally permissible as a defense
and is a situation of setting-off the benefits and that the burden of proof was on
CJEU 20 September 2001 (Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan); CJEU 13 July 2006 (Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico
Assicurazioni SpA and Others).
841.
OLG Düsseldorf 22 December 2010, VI-2 U (Kart) 34/09.842.
Ibid, point 58.843.
Ibid, point 58 et seq.844.
Ibid.845.
BGH 28 June 2011-KZR 75/10.846.
Ibid, points 44, 57 et seq.847.
Ibid, point 41 et seq. especially point 44 et seq.848.
See inter alia Prütting 2016, § 286, point 111.849.
Kuijpers et al. 2015, p. 10.850.
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the defendants.851 It ruled though that in that specific case the passing-on defense
had to be rejected. According to the court, the claimant had no downstream market
to pass on the overcharge to.852 The claimant was the owner of a subway station
and had paid too much for the escalators. It leased the station to the subway oper-
ator. The court considered that as the escalators were only a small part of the cost,
it was unlikely that there was a causal link between the overcharge for the escalators
and the rent agreed with the subway operator.853
4.2.3.5 Effect of (National) Decisions
The first sentence of Article 33(4) of the ARC stated that if damages are claimed for
an infringement of the ARC or of Article 101 or Article 102 of the TFEU, German
courts are bound by a finding that an infringement has occurred to the extent that
such a finding was made in a final decision by German cartel authorities, the
Commission, or the competition authorities (or courts acting as such) of other
Member States. A decision is thus binding only if it is established that an infringe-
ment of the ARC or Article 101 or 102 of the TFEU has occurred.854 If a decision is
appealed, the second sentence of Article 33(4) of the ARC provides for the resulting
final judgement to have binding effect.855 The Munich court of appeal stated that
the legally binding effect under Article 33(4) of the ARC is limited to the finding
of an infringement.856 According to the court of appeal, there is no legally binding
effect regarding other legal requirements in a damages claim. Hence, only the
operative provisions of a decision are binding, and not the reasons given for the
decision.857 Hence, Article 33(4) of the ARC only relieved the claimant of proving
the infringement of competition law as such.858 All additional requirements for
bringing a successful damages claim, e.g. causation of harm, and the size of harm,
still have to be alleged and proven by the claimant.859 Article 33(4) of the ARC was
criticized by several scholars as being too broad. They assumed that the provision
does not limit the binding effect of administrative decisions to claims that are
brought against those parties who are the addressees of the infringement decision.860
If the article is understood this way, a problem exists for example if the competition
authority does not direct its procedure against all parties who are infringers, includ-
ing possible infringers.861 If A, B, and C are mentioned as infringers in the body of
the decision, but the decision is directed only against A and B, it contradicts the
principle of procedural fairness if a claimant in litigation can rely on Article 33(4)
of the ARC against C as well. C was not involved in the cartel proceedings and thus
was not able to defend itself.
LG Berlin 6 August 2013, 16 O 193/11 (Kart), point 65.851.
Ibid.852.
Ibid. See also Kuijpers et al. 2015, p. 10.853.
Dietrich, Gruber & Hartmann-Rüppel 2009, p. 84.854.
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OLG München 21 February 2013, U 5006/11 Kart and Az U 711/12 Kart.856.
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Those concerns are unfounded if Article 33(4) of the ARC is correctly understood
so that its binding effect can be used only against those undertakings that were
involved in the administrative proceedings and with regard to whom the authority
established the existence of an infringement. An example of the correct application
of Article 33(4) of the ARC is found in the decision of the Munich court of appeal.862
The court set aside a binding finding of a cartel infringement against a party that
was not addressed by the decision of the competition authority:
“Da der Bußgeldbescheid nur die Beklagte zu 1) betrifft, fehlt es hinsichtlich der Beklagten zu
2) bis 5) bereits an einer bindenden Feststellung eines Kartellverstoßes.”
4.2.3.6 Limitation Period
According to Article 195 of the GCC, the regular limitation period is three years.
According to Article 199(1) of the GCC, the period starts running on expiry of the
year in which the claim has arisen and the victim knew, or could have known, of
the harmful event. Article 33(5) of the ARC provided for a suspension of running
the limitation period if a German cartel authority, the European Commission or
competition authority of another Member State initiates an infringement pro-
ceeding.
According to Article 204(2) of the GCC (to which Article 33(5) of the ARC referred),
the suspension ends six months after the competition authority has made a final
decision or has ended the investigation by other means. This suspension allows
potential plaintiffs to await the final outcome of public investigations before filing
their actions for damages in court.863
4.2.3.7 Masterfoods Defense
Pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation No 1/2003, it is prohibited for national courts
to take decisions that conflict with a decision of the European Commission.864 This
Article codifies the Masterfoods judgement of the CJEU.865
As long as a case is pending at the European Commission or its decision has not
yet become final, the national court has to examine whether to stay the proceedings
in accordance with Article 148 of the CCP.866 Article 148 CCP provides a suspension
if a decision in another matter is anticipated. Where the decision on a legal dispute
depends either wholly or in part on the question of whether a legal relationship
does or does not exist, and this relationship forms the subject matter of another
legal dispute that is pending, or that is to be determined by an administrative
agency, the court may direct that the hearing be suspended until the other legal
OLG München 21 February 2013, U 5006/11 (Kart) and Az U 711/12 Kart.862.
Wurmnest 2005, p. 1187.863.
Emmerich 2014, para 87.864.
CJEU 14 December 2000 (Masterfoods v HB Ice Cream), point 52.865.
Schmidt 2012, para 28. See also Hoffmann 2014, para 142; Emmerich 2014, para 88.866.
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dispute has been dealt with and terminated, or until the administrative agency has
issued its decision.
Bornkamm notes that the national court is obliged to stay the proceedings.867 In
German case law, using the Masterfoods as a defense to delay national court pro-
ceedings does not seem to play an important role. Publicly available decisions of
the courts do not show lively discussions between claimants and defendants on
how to proceed in the proceedings in cases in which the decision is not final yet.
4.2.4 Conclusions
Article 33 of the ARC, with the elements also mentioned by the European Commis-
sion in the Green Paper and White Paper, appeared to a large extent to be in line
with the Antitrust Damages Directive. In line with the Green Paper, White Paper
and the Antitrust Damages Directive, German courts were bound by the determi-
nation of competition law infringements by authorities, the passing-on defense
was acknowledged and the burden of proof lied on the defendant. Article 33 of the
ARC also provided a special suspension of the limitation period if there was also
an administrative proceeding underway.
In fact, German lawmakers anticipated the adoption of a directive. The special
provisions appeared to make it easier for claimants to claim compensation and
appeared to make the German private enforcement system attractive and popular
for claimants, although it remained difficult to collect information. Several follow-
on cases have been filed using the new private enforcement system.868 After 2005,
the number of civil claims increased substantially. If these indications are not de-
ceiving us, this is a good portent for the Member States where the policy of the
Antitrust Damages Directive had to be incorporated into the national legal system
by the end of 2016. Because of the Antitrust Damages Directive, German lawmakers
had to amend Article 33 of the ARC to some extent. For example, the suspension
of the limitation period had to be expanded. Also, special liability rules for leniency
applicants and SMEs were missing. Furthermore, additional disclosure provisions
had to be implemented. The amendments necessary, will be discussed in more
detail in Section 4.6.
Collective redress in Germany, especially for small claims, appears hardly feasible.
Germany lacks the option of collective redress for cartel victims. Associations may
claim damages, but only in a financially unattractive way. There are ways to assign
claims, although the validity of the assignment could be problematic.
Concerning the position of the leniency applicant in German civil proceedings, the
following can be concluded. In Germany, public enforcement cartel cases are almost
always uncovered by the leniency application(s). The public enforcement case ap-
pears in almost every case the start of the civil proceedings. Hence, private enforce-
ment cartel cases are standard so called ‘follow-on’ cases. It implies, in fact, that
Bornkamm 2003, p. 85. Cf. Bartels 2002, pp. 83-94.867.
See Section 4.2.2.1. See also Kuijpers et al. 2015, pp. 1 and 14.868.
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applying for leniency could very well lead to antitrust damages claims in Germany.
These damage claims could have been substantial, also for the leniency applicants
as infringers are jointly and severally liable for the cartel damage, including leni-
ency applicants.
Under the (old) German provisions prior to the implementation of the Antitrust
Damages Directive, the leniency applicant was an interesting party to sue because
it is jointly and severally liable and it already confessed its participation in the
cartel to the competition authority. Moreover, other characteristics probably made
the leniency applicant an even more useful first target for claimants. The limitation
period towards the leniency applicant could end earlier (the extra limitation period
of Article 33(5) could end earlier for the leniency applicant), which could result in
claimants starting to claim from the leniency applicant at an earlier stage. The
Masterfoods defense could have a similar negative effect. The leniency applicant
who does not appeal the decision will have a final and irrevocable decision of the
competition authority prior to the infringers that do appeal the decision. It poten-
tially has the effect that claimants focus on the leniency applicants from which
the decision is final and irrevocable.
4.3 Private Enforcement in the Netherlands Prior to the Antitrust
Damages Directive
4.3.1 Introduction
As in Germany, in the Netherlands it was possible to bring proceedings in the civil
courts because of competition law infringements, also prior to the implementation
of the provisions of the Antitrust Damages Directive.
In the Netherlands, however, the number of cases in which private enforcement
has come into play has been smaller, and competition law actions were often used
only as a side-path; plaintiffs did not intend to claim damages in the first place.869
In the case law, for example, it has often been the case that the plaintiff was seeking
to absolve itself of its contractual obligations with the help of competition law
legislation. This is possible with Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 6 of the Dutch
Competition Act (“DCA”),870 as the second prong of these articles stipulates that a
contract infringing competition law is void.
Until recently, there were only a couple of Dutch cases in which plaintiffs claimed
damages from cartel infringers.871 However, the number of damages claims has
grown substantially.872
Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 discuss the legal framework of private enforcement in the
Netherlands as how it was prior to the implementation of the Antitrust Damages
Directive. Section 4.3.3 considers the points of particular interest in greater detail,
Cf. Kuijpers et al. 2015, p. 10.869.
Mededingingswet.870.
Zippro 2009, pp. 163-164. See also Hettema 2004, p. 110.871.
Cornelissen et al. 2017, p. 264. See also Van Lierop & Pijnacker Hordijk 2007, p. 6.872.
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often points that have also been considered by the European Commission in the
Green Paper, White Paper and the Antitrust Damages Directive. Specifically, the
following items are discussed because they have some kind of relation with the
leniency programme: the right to damages and collective redress, disclosure of ev-
idence, the passing-on of overcharges, effect of (national) decisions, and the limita-
tion period. Also, the Masterfoods defense will be discussed and analyzed. At the
end, an interim conclusion follows in Section 4.3.4.
4.3.2 The State of Private Enforcement in the Netherlands Prior to the
Antitrust Damages Directive
4.3.2.1 Introduction
Competition law has played a role in the Dutch civil courts for decades.873 However,
there were only a few cases that concerned damages. Often plaintiffs intend to
“void” their agreement or to prevent the exclusion of parties. It should not be
concluded too quickly that civil damages claims were scarce in the Netherlands.
Several cases concerning civil damages claims regarding competition law infringe-
ments have been brought to court.874
Over the last decade, there is a trend of more private enforcement claims being
brought to court after the competition authorities have issued their first fines.875
At the start of 2018, several of these so-called follow-on actions are still in the
preliminary phase. Defendants challenge the jurisdiction of the Dutch courts and
try to stay proceedings awaiting the outcomes of the appeals before the EU courts.876
Large-scale cases of antitrust damages actions in the Netherlands relate to the fol-
lowing cartels: air cargo, bitumen, flat screens, gas insulated swift gear, elevators
and escalators, candle waxes and sodium chlorate.877 All these cases are follow-on
cases and in all these cases the competition authority was assisted in detecting or
proving the cartel infringement by the assistance of at least one of the cartel infrin-
gers.878 It clearly shows the direct link between leniency applications and the pos-
See also Maton, Poopalasingam, Kuijper & Angerbauer 2011, p. 503.873.
E.g. Rechtbank Amsterdam 30 March 1977 (J.D. Wilkes v Theal B.V. et al.); Gerechtshof Amsterdam
11 January 1979 (J.D. Wilkes v Theal B.V. et al.); Rechtbank Rotterdam 23 October 1992 (Multi Veste B.V.
874.
Boender & Maasdam B.V. et al.); Rechtbank Middelburg 3 July 2002 (In re N.L. Praet en Zonen B.V. v Coop-
eratieve Producentenorganisatie van de NederlandseMosselcultuur UA); Rechtbank Rotterdam 28 November
2002 (In re Van Ommeren Agencies v Gemeente Rotterdam (Gemeentelijk havenbedrijf Rotterdam)); Rechtbank
Rotterdam 7 March 2007 (CEF CITY Electrical factors B.V.); Gerechtshof ’s-Gravenhage 24 April 2008
(In re N.L. Praet en Zonen B.V. v Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Mosselcultuur UA)
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administration the case has been withdrawn).
Mahler 2017; Cornelissen et al. 2017, p. 264; Kortmann 2014, pp. 664 and 669.875.
Cf. Kuijpers et al. 2015, p. 2.876.
Kuijpers et al. 2015, p. 2. See also Cornelissen et al. 2017, p. 242 and p. 264.877.
Air cargo: Lufthansa received 100 percent reduction of the fine; Bitumen: BP received 100 percent
reduction of the fine; Flat screens: Samsung received 100 percent reduction of the fine; Gas insulated
878.
switch gear: ABB received 100 percent reduction of the fine; Elevator and escalator: Otis received
100 percent reduction of the fine in the Netherlands; Candle waxes: Shell received 100 percent re-
duction of the fine; and Sodium chlorate: AKZO Nobel / EKA Chemicals received 100 percent reduc-
tion of the fine.
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sibility of claiming damages. Without leniency applications, it would appear difficult
to claim damages in the Netherlands.
4.3.2.2 Statutory Context
Contrary to the situation in Germany, prior to the Antitrust Damages Directive
there was no special regulatory framework for private enforcement of competition
law in the Netherlands. The doctrine of private competition enforcement in the
Netherlands apparently had to come from legal scholars, affected parties and
courtrooms.
Claims that resulted from cartel infringements were often based on the legal concept
of an unlawful act. Although it appears rarely, under certain conditions, claims
could also be based on other legal concepts, like breach of contract, unjustified
enrichment and undue payment.879
Wrongful Act
In most cases, Dutch damages actions were (primarily) based on a wrongful act.
Article 6:162(1) of the DCC makes clear that a person who commits a wrongful act
against another, with that wrong act being attributable to that person, is obliged
to repair the damage suffered by the other in consequence thereof.
Article 6:162(2) of the DCC qualifies a wrongful act as a violation of a right and an
act or omission in breach of a duty imposed by law or a rule of unwritten law
pertaining to proper social conduct, except where there are grounds for justification.
Pursuant to Article 6:162(3) of the DCC, a wrongful act must be attributable to the
person committing the act. That is the case if it is his fault or if the cause was one
for which he is accountable by law or generally accepted principles. The final re-
quirement for a wrongful act is the requirement of relativity as set out in Article
6:163 of the DCC. It states that the violated standard of behavior must be intended
to offer protection against damage. There is no obligation to repair the damage if
the violated standard of behavior is not intended to offer protection against damage
as suffered by the injured person.
In Van Ommeren Agencies v Gemeente Rotterdam, for example, the Rotterdam district
court held that if it becomes evident that the defendant is abusing its dominant
position, there is an abuse of circumstances that can be considered as a wrongful
act.880
First, the unlawful conduct lies in the acting (against the victims) in breach with
a legal obligation, being the obligation under Articles 101 TFEU and 6 DCA to refrain
from concluding agreements and entering into concerted practices and which have
See inter alia Ligteringen 2016, pp. 158-165.879.
District Court (Rechtbank) Rotterdam 28 November 2002 (In re Van Ommeren Agencies v Gemeente Rot-
terdam (Gemeentelijk havenbedrijf Rotterdam)). See also Rechtbank Amsterdam (interlocutory proceedings)
880.
16 October 2009 (Plaintiffs/KIAMotors Nederland B.V.); Rechtbank Amsterdam (interlocutory proceedings)
3 December 2009 (Plaintiffs /KIA Motors Nederland B.V.). See furthermore Zippro 2009, p. 338 et seq.;
Maton, Poopalasingam, Kuijper & Angerbauer 2011, p. 504.
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as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.881
Several courts have held that an infringement of competition law should be con-
sidered as a wrongful act. A breach of competition law is considered to be unlawful.
It constitutes an infringement of a duty imposed by law.882 Secondly, the unlawful
conduct follows from the fact that the infringers inter alia fix and align prices, and
as a whole do not compete with each other and the infringers act contrary to their
duty of care according to generally accepted standards of behavior.883
With regard to the requirement of attribution, in most cases a violation of compe-
tition law will imply fault and as such be attributable to the violator.884 Concerning
the causal link between the wrongful act and the damage suffered, it is sufficient
to establish the existence of a condicio sine qua non relationship between the infringe-
ment and the damage suffered.885 The issue is this: what would have happened if
the wrongful act had not occurred.886
In cartel cases, Article 6:166 of the DCC is often used in combination with Article
6:162 of the DCC. Article 6:166 of the DCC relates to collective behavior. Pursuant
to Article 6:166(1) of the DCC, each of the members of a group is joint and severally
liable as far as this collective behavior can be attributed to it individually.887 Article
6:166 DCC will be further discussed in Section 4.3.3.2.
4.3.2.3 Practice
At the start of writing this study, private enforcement damages actions were excep-
tions rather than the rule in the Netherlands. However, even then the limited
number of court decisions could partly be elucidated by out-of-court settlements,
the terms and outcome of which remain sealed and unavailable to the public.
Zippro, for example, referred to the out-of-court settlement agreed on by the con-
struction industry and the Dutch government, the out-of-court settlement of Equens
(the legal successor of Interpay) as well as the organizations representing companies
that have accepted switch cards payments with “PIN”.888
The Netherlands appears to have become one of the three favorite countries to
collectively claim damages, along with Germany and the United Kingdom.889 The
Zippro 2009, p. 339.881.
Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-IV* 2015, nr. 44. See for example the cases Rechtbank Oost-Nederland
16 January 2013 (TenneT v ABB), point 4.7; Rechtbank Amsterdam 16 October 2009 (Plaintiffs/KIA
882.
Motors Nederland B.V.); Rechtbank Amsterdam (interlocutory proceedings) 3 December 2009 (Plaintiffs
/KIA Motors Nederland B.V.). See also Braat 2013, p. 319-321; Maton, Poopalasingam, Kuijper & Anger-
bauer 2011, p. 504.
Zippro 2009, p. 340.883.
Fierstra et al. 2009. See also Braat 2013 p. 324; Zippro 2009, p. 343.884.
Fierstra et al. 2009.885.
Ibid.886.
Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-IV* 2015, nr. 127.887.
Zippro 2009, p. 163.888.
Stancke 2017, p. 4. Cf. European Commission 2013 (Impact Assessment for Directive proposal),
point 52.
889.
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European Commission has counted 52 actions for damages in the period from 2006
to 2012, the vast majority being brought to court in one of these three countries.890
One of the first cases in the Netherlands that made clear that private enforcement
can lead to compensation for a competition law infringement was the case Theal
B.V. vWilkes.891 Distributor Wilkes had been excluded from the sale of record cleaners
in the Netherlands as a result of export prohibitions and the assignment of trade-
mark rights precluding parallel trade. Wilkes filed a complaint with the European
Commission and sued for damages. Prior to the adoption by the European Commis-
sion of a decision, the Amsterdam district court held that Theal and Watts’s practice
of precluding parallel imports breached Article 101 of the TFEU. The court decided
that Theal and Watts had breached Article 101 of the TFEU and awarded damages
to Wilkes, which had to be calculated in a separate damages assessment pro-
ceeding.892 Theal appealed but the court of appeal confirmed the judgement.893
Theal appealed to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, but on 28 August 1979
it went into bankruptcy, before the Supreme Court made a decision. No final deci-
sion by the Supreme Court followed.
The case of Multi Veste v Boender & Maasdam was another case concerning a competi-
tion law infringement.894 At issue was whether there was an obligation to pay a
contractor the costs for calculation. Multi Veste was of the opinion that it was not
obliged to pay these costs as these were the result of an agreement by the contractors
among themselves and had to be considered a cartel infringement. Together the
contractors had agreed to coordinate and raise their tender offers to include costs
for calculation and organization costs. The court held that the payment of the costs
for calculation had to be considered a cartel infringement and the clause in the
contract in which payment of the costs for calculation was stated had to be consid-
ered void. The court held that Boender & Maasdam was unjustly enriched at the
expense of Multi Veste and had to pay back the amount of the costs for calculation.
A more recent case is the case of Praet v Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse
Mosselcultuur U.A.895 Praet was a mussel farmer and one of the members of the
Dutch Cooperative Mussel Farmers Organisation, a private association of mussel
farmers (the “Association”). The Association’s articles and bylaws included a regu-
lation on the assignment of quotas for mussel seed mussels to each mussel farmer.
Praet argued that this regulation was a market-sharing agreement that infringed
Article 101(1) of the TFEU and Article 6 of the DCA and is therefore void. Praet
claimed damages in the amount of his loss of profit, estimated at EUR 250,000 for
each year he was bound by the regulation. The district court decided that there
was a horizontal agreement limiting and fixing the production of the individual
European Commission 2013 (Impact Assessment for Directive proposal), point 52.890.
Rechtbank Amsterdam 30 March 1977 (J.D. Wilkes v Theal et al.); Gerechtshof Amsterdam 11 January
1979 (J.D. Wilkes v Theal et al.); Hoge Raad 16 January 1981 (J.D. Wilkes v Theal et al.).
891.
Rechtbank Amsterdam 30 March 1977 (J.D. Wilkes v Theal et al.).892.
Gerechtshof Amsterdam 11 January 1979 (J.D. Wilkes v Theal et al.).893.
Rechtbank Rotterdam 23 October 1992 (Multi Veste v Boender & Maasdam et al.).894.
Rechtbank Middelburg 3 July 2002 (In re N.L. Praet en Zonen v Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie van
de Nederlandse Mosselcultuur UA); Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 1 July 2004 and 24 April 2008 (In re N.L.
Praet en Zonen v Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Mosselcultuur UA).
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mussel farmers. The Association had applied to the European Commission for
exemption, but did not apply for exemption with the director-general of the ACM.
Therefore, the regulation infringed Article 6 of the DCA and was void. The Associa-
tion was held liable for Praet’s damage, to be calculated in a later proceeding for
the determination of damages. The Association appealed successfully. The ’s-Gra-
venhage court of appeal decided to pose questions to the European Commission
about a possible exception under Regulation 26, Article 2(1) to Article 101(1) of the
TFEU based on two CJEU cases: Delimitis v Henninger Bräu896 and Dijkstra and Others v
Zuivelcoöperaties.897 The court of appeal held that the articles of association and bylaws
did fall under the exception to the Regulation and reversed the judgment. The
court ruled that Article 12 of the DCA makes clear that an exception stated in a
regulation means that not only does Article 101 of the TFEU not apply, but Article
6 of the DCA does not apply either.898
As discussed in Section 4.3.2.1, at the moment there are several cases pending.
More and more claimants are aiming to obtain monetary relief for the harm suffered
from the cartel infringement. It is also increasingly common for claims to be assig-
ned to specialist companies,899 who are often suing on their own behalf.
The most important cases regarding follow-on antitrust damages actions are the
cases of TenneT v ABB and TenneT v Alstom. These cases should be considered landmark
cases as they provide answers to several questions that arise in private enforcement
actions. They provide clarity on points such as how to calculate the damages, the
jurisdiction of the court, the value of a decision of the European Commission as
evidence, the passing-on defense, the liability of subsidiaries of an infringing un-
dertaking and the limitation period. All these elements will be further discussed
in Section 4.3.3.
4.3.3 Dutch Private Enforcement System Prior to the Antitrust Damages
Directive
4.3.3.1 Introduction
The European Commission concluded in its Green Paper and White Paper that
several bottlenecks had to be eliminated in the Member States to achieve a more
effective private enforcement system in Europe. In the following sections, the
Dutch private enforcement practice – as known prior to the introduction of the
new Antitrust Damages Directive legislation – will be analyzed on the basis of
these bottlenecks identified by the European Commission.
CJEU 28 February 1991 (Delimitis v Henninger Bräu).896.
CJEU 12 December 1995 (Dijkstra and Others v Zuivelcoöperaties).897.
Gerechtshof ’s-Gravenhage 1 July 2004 and 24 April 2008 (In re N.L. Praet en Zonen v Cooperatieve Pro-
ducentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Mosselcultuur UA).
898.
Kuijpers et al. 2015, p. 2. For example, the Irish company Claim Funding International claimed
damages from the air carriers for transporting goods at excessive prices because of an alleged cartel.
899.
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4.3.3.2 Right to Damages and Collective Redress
Unlike the system in Germany and the United States, there were no special rules
on standing for private enforcement purposes in the Netherlands. As stated earlier,
damages resulting from cartel infringements were claimed in accordance with the
standard damages provisions in the Dutch Civil Code. The most useful provisions
are those relating to wrongful act in Articles 6:162 and 6:166 of the DCC and un-
justified enrichment in Article 6:212 of the DCC.
To claim for damages, there must be a sufficient interest. Article 3:303 of the DCC,
which also applies to claims based on breach of competition law, makes clear that
there is no right of action without a sufficient interest.900 There are no national
statutory provisions nor is there case-law that relates to standing requirements
which preclude indirect purchasers from claiming redress for an infringement of
competition law.901 This is in line with the cases of Courage v Crehan and Manfredi
of the CJEU, as the CJEU has made clear that every victim of a competition infringe-
ment is entitled to redress.902
As a practical matter, however, there may still be one practical obstacle for vic-
tims.903 A causal link between the unlawful act and the harm suffered had to be
proved. This could turn out to be difficult, as the cartel victim had the onus of de-
monstrating that the competition infringement resulted in higher prices for the
victim than it would have paid in the absence of the alleged violation.904
Some legal scholars mention the relativity requirement in Article 6:163 of the DCC
as another hurdle for indirect victims of competition infringements as the compe-
tition rules violated are not intended to protect these specific groups of operators.905
Since the decision of Manfredi, it has been clear that national rules on relativity are
not capable of restricting individuals from claiming damages for loss caused to
them by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition.906 Accord-
ing to the decision, every victim of a cartel, including indirect victims, should be
able to claim damages.907
If two or more persons are individually liable for the same damage, then they are
joint and severally liable, pursuant to Article 6:102 of the DCC. Infringers cause
the damage resulting from the infringement together, for example, by price fixing.
Pursuant to Article 6:102 of the DCC, they are, therefore, jointly and severally lia-
ble.908 In order to assess what each of them will have to contribute, by virtue of
Article of the 6:10 DCC and on account of their internal relationship with one an-
Fierstra et al. 2009.900.
Ibid.901.
CJEU 13 July 2006 (Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others), point 60 et seq.902.
Cf. Fierstra et al. 2009.903.
Ibid.904.
Ibid.905.
Ibid.906.
CJEU 13 July 2006 (Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others), point 60. See also CJEU 20
September 2001 (Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan), point 26.
907.
Netherlands, Parliamentary Papers II 2016/17, p. 4.908.
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other, the damage is then imputed to them in accordance with Article 6:101 DCC,
unless a different imputation results from law or juridical act.
In addition to a company being held joint and severally liable for damages because
of an unlawful attributable act, a (private) person can also be held jointly and se-
verally liable for participating in a group, where another participant has committed
the actual culpable tort, such as that referred to in Article 6:161 of the DCC. Article
6:166 of the DCC is a special provision. It sets out that in a case where damage has
been inflicted, a person or persons should have restricted the group from this be-
haviour, and thus, are jointly and severally liable. The provision seeks to prevent
an individual, who has not carried out the actual harmful conduct themselves,
from defending themselves on the grounds that the damage would still have oc-
curred, even if they hadn’t conducted themselves as part of the group.909 The par-
ticipation itself constitutes an unlawful act against the victim, the definition of
which establishes the existence of a sufficient causal link to the harm.910
When acting in a group, it is relevant that a contribution was made to the conduct
which gave rise to the risk of injury and the existence of a conscious act together.
The chance of inflicting injury should restrict a person’s participation in the joint
conduct. Hartkamp and Sieburgh note, with regard to this, that this would only
be the case if there was a chance that the infliction of damage could be foreseen.911
In October 2015, the Supreme Court ruled on the application of Article 6:166 of
the DCC.912 An insurer had demanded compensation for damage, which had been
caused by a series of cargo thefts. Reference was made to a criminal conviction,
which showed that the defendant had been convicted of participating in an organ-
ization that had been committing crimes with intent. The Supreme Court noted
that a criminal conviction for participation in a criminal organization was not
sufficient to assert the group conduct referred to in Article 6:166 of the DCC. The
group conduct set out in Article 6:166 paragraph 1 of the DCC, relates not to the
participation in such an organization as such, but to the concrete unlawful group
actions that caused the damage.913 The Supreme Court noted that participation in
the organization and member’s involvement in the wrongful acts committed by
the organization, were not sufficient grounds to assert group conduct, with respect
to the other organization’s grounds for tort.914 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
observed that the court had rightly concluded that the various cargo thefts could
not be regarded as a single group practice. This was based on the fact that the
grounds for liability in Article 6:166 paragraph 1 of the DCC require that an indi-
vidual knew or should have known that the group’s action had, in this case, the
chance of causing actual damage.915
Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-IV* 2015, nr. 127.909.
Ibid.910.
Ibid.911.
Hoge Raad 2 October 2015 (TVM et al. v XYZ).912.
Ibid.913.
Ibid, point 3.5.3.914.
Ibid.915.
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The judgment made it clear that actual personal involvement in specific illegal
acts is required for the affirmation of liability under Article 6:166 of the DCC.
The question will, in many cases, be a point of order concerning Article 6:166 of
the DCC, as it is necessary to redress the damage resulting from cartel infringements.
As Zippro notes, an appeal from the victim to Article 6:166 of the DCC will not be
needed quickly, because all the cartel participants have independently committed
a wrongful act against the victim and there is a sufficient causal link between the
unlawful act of the cartel participants and the victim who has suffered the cartel
damages.916 In most cases it will be sufficient to rely on the main joint and several
liability provision as set out in Article 6:102 of the DCC.
A special situation arose in the case of TenneT v ABB, where the Commission estab-
lished that the parent company had participated in a cartel and the subsidiary
company concluded an agreement with the complainant TenneT (a victim of the
cartel). In this case, the Eastern Netherlands court ruled that, together with the
parent, the subsidiary must also have been aware of the unlawful act. The subsid-
iary was, therefore, together with the parent company jointly and severally liable
under Article 6:166 of the DCC. According to the court, Article 6:166 paragraph 1
of the DCC was met because: (i) there was a conscious combined action amongst
the various participants, with each contributing to the behaviours that created the
risk of harm; (ii) both participants had the chance to foresee that the infliction of
damage could arise and this should have prevented them from participating; (iii)
the parts of the participants could be attributed; and (iv) there was unlawful conduct
towards the victim and the damage, therefore, arose.917 Through this, the subsidiary,
even though it had not committed the cartel offence itself, was deemed jointly and
severally liable for the damage.
Collective Redress
In the Netherlands, there are several legal methods and, hence, several possibilities
for collective redress.
Article 3:305a of the DCC
The first set of rules is laid down in Articles 3:305a-c of the DCC and is applicable
to public interest and group interest collective actions.918 These rules provide repre-
sentative organizations the possibility of representing a group in proceedings. A
representative organization that starts a collective action does so on its own behalf.
A declaratory judgment on liability for sustained damages can be obtained.919
However, not all causes of action and forms of relief can be claimed in a collective
action. According to Article 3:305a(3) of the DCC, an action for damages is not
possible via this procedure.920 Lawmakers were of the opinion that to award damages
all kinds of questions had to be answered regarding the specific circumstances of
Zippro 2009, p. 359.916.
Rechtbank Oost-Nederland 16 January 2013 (TenneT v ABB), point 4.16.917.
Fierstra et al. 2009.918.
Ibid. See also Ligteringen 2016, p. 165.919.
See inter alia Ligteringen 2016, p. 165: Oranje 2005, pp. 289-297.920.
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the individual claimant.921 The court decision binds the representative organization
and the defendant, not the individual victims. As there is no possibility of claiming
damages under Article 3:305a of the DCC, Meijer stated that if the White Paper
provision concerning collective redress were introduced in a directive, collective
redress as referred to in Article 3:305a of the DCC should be amended to be in line
with it.922 Because the final version of the directive does not incorporate a process
for a collective action, an amendment was not needed. As stated in Chapter 3
however, the European Commission set forth some provisions attempting to get
the Member States to implement a system of collective damages actions.
Some legal scholars state that relying on other legal concepts, a compensation claim
could be based on the system set out in Article 3:305a of the DCC, without claiming
damages.923 For example, a claim could arise from undue payment, or as a result
of (partial) termination. This probably makes the discussion about amending Article
3:305a of the DCC, including the possibility of claiming damages less relevant.
However, a claim arising from undue payment is possibly interesting for claims
against a party with a dominant position, but less interesting in cartel cases as
claimants often do not have a contractual relationship with several of the cartel
infringers. Having said this, the Dutch government is of the opinion that compen-
sation under Article 3:305a of the DCC is not possible. The government bases this
on the assumption referred to earlier that standard compensation cannot be calcu-
lated and that every victim should be provided with compensation only for the
loss it actually suffers.
Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages
The limited scope of Article 3:305a has been given substance with the introduction
of a second set of rules called the Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages
that makes a collective settlement generally binding (Wet collectieve afwikkeling mas-
saschade (“WCAM”).924 This second set of rules is laid down in Articles 7:907-910 of
the DCC and Articles 1013-1018 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”). With
these rules, parties to a collective settlement agreement are able to ask the
Amsterdam court of appeal for a declaration. It is not a judgment in which the
courts decide on an issue, but it does make a settlement binding. Pursuant to these
rules, the court of appeal is able to issue an order declaring the collective settlement
binding on all eligible injured parties. Individual injured parties may, by exercising
the right to opt out, withdraw from the settlement before the deadline set by the
Amsterdam court of appeal.
The conditions for obtaining court approval are, inter alia, as follows: (i) the amount
of the compensation may not be unreasonable; (ii) the fulfillment of the agreement
must be sufficiently guaranteed; (iii) the representative organization that negotiated
the settlement must sufficiently represent the collective; and (iv) the number of
class members must be sufficient to warrant certification.925 An important difference
Fierstra et al. 2009.921.
Meijer 2008, p. 137.922.
See Frenk 1994. See also Bloembergen 1996, p. 92; Stolker 1996, p. 130.923.
Ligteringen 2016, p. 166.924.
Fierstra et al. 2009.925.
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from the concept set out in Article 3:305a of the DCC is that the figure of the WCAM
applies to and binds anyone who can be considered a part of the collective unless
the party opted out within the specified time. Another crucial difference is that a
WCAM settlement may and does relate to damages.
The Amsterdam court of appeal considered itself to have jurisdiction in the Conve-
rium case to bind the parties to the settlement (between a defendant causing loss
because of misleading information and multiple victims in Europe).926 This was a
remarkable case because neither the injurious party nor most of the victims came
from the Netherlands. Most of the victims came from other Member States and
Switzerland. Prior to the case, a settlement had been arranged in the United States
between the defendant and the victims there. A district court in the United States
did not consider it had jurisdiction over the natural persons outside the United
States. Applying European legislation (i.e. Regulation on the Jurisdiction and En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and the Lugano Conven-
tion), which has also been endorsed by Switzerland and others, the Amsterdam
court of appeal concluded that the Dutch courts had jurisdiction to order that a
settlement was generally binding not only on Dutch citizens, but also on other
victims in other countries that had endorsed the Treaties.927 This case could very
well also influence the attractiveness of the Netherlands as a choice of forum for
victims of competition infringements. One result could be that victims from all
over Europe could benefit from a single proceeding in the Netherlands.
Despite these special provisions it remains difficult for claimants with little loss to
claim for damages.928 It should be noted that the Dutch parliament is therefore
currently considering proposals to amend the law so that it is possible to claim
damages collectively under Article 3:305a of the DCC.929 In July 2014, the Dutch
government launched consultations on a bill for a new act called Redress of Mass
Damages in a Collective Action Act.930 Also, compensation for individual victims
should be arranged in one way or another. From Europe as well there is pressure
to introduce a system of collective actions, including the option of claiming com-
pensation.931 The Dutch government seems to comply with the wishes of the
European Commission.
There is a third set of rules relating to organized (legal) persons that create a
method of achieving some kind of “collective redress” via proxy, mandate and the
cession of claims. For example, with regard to damages for infringements of com-
petition law in the construction sector, a foundation (a type of legal entity) was
formed. It was called “Foundation for Recourse and Recovery of Damages and Costs
resulting from Construction Fraud” (Stichting Regres en Verhaalschade en Kosten Bouw-
Gerechtshof Amsterdam 12 November 2010 (Converium et al.); Gerechtshof Amsterdam 17 January
2012 (Converium et al.).
926.
Cf. Poot 2006, pp. 169-202.927.
Braat & Rosenboom 2018, pp. 10-19.928.
See inter alia motion Dijksma, Netherlands, Parliamentary Papers II 2011/12. See also Meijer 2011,
p. 327.
929.
Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs 2014 (Public consultation on mass damages). See more
info Braat & Rosenboom 2018, pp. 10-19.
930.
European Commission 2013 (Recommendation on collective redress mechanisms).931.
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fraude).932 In the elevator cartel, a special foundation was established on behalf of
housing corporations claiming damages from the elevator manufacturers.933
Pursuant to Article 3:83 of the DCC, rights of ownership, rights of limited property
and obligatory claims are transferable, unless contrary to their nature or not allowed
by law. There are companies specializing in private enforcement that purchase
claims from victims of cartel infringers via assignment of the debt.934 It is important
to assign the claims in accordance with the requirements stated in Article 3:83 of
the DCC and other provisions, otherwise the claimant could lose the case on forma-
lities.935 The advantage for the assignor is that it will be provided with a sum of
money in case of success and will often not bear any of the financial and other
risks of litigating.936 If the claim turns out to be successful, some kind of success
fee will often be paid by the claim vehicle. Furthermore, with the assignment of
the debt, a dispute between the victim of the cartel and the infringer comes to an
end for the victim. Less energy and financial investment on the part of the victim
(assignor) is needed. The assignee will often be a specialist company that expects
to receive more money from the litigation than it paid to the assignors. It is common
for the assignee to provide the assignors with 70-80 percent of the collected damages
and keep 20-30 percent for itself as a success fee. The advantage for the assignee
is that it will receive the money upfront and will provide a percentage of the money
to the assignors. In practice, it is common to commence joint actions, either by
instructing and authorizing the same lawyer or some other person or legal entity.937
In a collective action based on Article 3:305a of the DCC, individual victims will
retain their rights and the legal entity will act on its own behalf. A different situation
exists where victims assign their claims to a claim collector. The assignment means
that the claim collector receives the rights. The advantage of assigning claims to a
special legal entity is that, unlike in an Article 3:305a proceeding, the legal person
can claim damages directly. With an action based on Article 3:305a of the DCC,
the individual victims still have to claim damages afterwards. As said, another ad-
vantage of assigning the claim is that the victim’s risk is limited. The victim does
not have to bear costs of proceedings, and the energy and efforts put in the pro-
ceedings by the victim will be more limited.
The negative side effect of introducing a claim funder/collector into the process
might be that the claim funder/ collector has a clear interest of its own in going
forward in the proceedings, to stop the proceedings or to settle a case. The interest
of the victim of the competition law infringement is not the most relevant factor
per se. In principle, by assigning a claim to a claim collector, a victim of a compe-
tition law infringement is dependent on the strategy of the claim collector and has
lost its freedom to decide how to handle the case. Moreover, in most cases, the
claim vehicle receives a part of the damages. In fact, it means that the victims of
Fierstra et al. 2009.932.
http://www.deglazenlift.nl.933.
E.g. www.carteldamageclaims.com, http://omnibridgeway.com, http://www.claimsfunding.eu/.934.
Hoge Raad 4 March 2005.935.
Zippro 2009, p. 505.936.
Fierstra et al. 2009.937.
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the cartel are not fully compensated. In theory it could be argued that this is not
in line with CJEU decisions and the Antitrust Damages Directive: the goal of full
compensation for the victims of the cartel.938
Under Regulation No 2015/2421, victims of small claims can claim damages of up
to EUR 5,000 rather easily.939 As discussed in Section 4.2.3.2, it is also possible for
different victims to combine claims. The European small-claims procedure only
applies to cross-border cases. These are cases in which at least one of the parties is
domiciled or habitually resident in a Member State other than the Member State
of the court where the action has been brought under this Regulation. It is not
possible to claim damages if there is no cross-border element. Consumers and small
and medium-sized enterprises often buy products from undertakings incorporated
in the same Member State. It is likely that a cross-border element is not necessarily
present. If not, proceedings under the Regulation are not possible. Moreover, the
amount of EUR 5,000 is very limited.940 It is likely that cartel victims, which often
suffer the harm from continuous infringements for many years, will receive much
higher damages. The practical relevance of this Regulation for cartel claims seems
to be limited.
4.3.3.3 Disclosure of Information
As discussed in Section 2.5.3.5 there are several ways to obtain information related
to a cartel. Via civil law provisions, a party could successfully request for informa-
tion. Under Dutch civil law, litigants may use any and all means to prove their
statements unless otherwise provided. The courts have discretion in their assessment
of the evidence.941
There are several possible ways to receive information from the opposing party.
Under Article 22 of the CCP, the parties are able to ask the court to order that in-
formation be provided by the opposing party. The court could (also on its own be-
half) request a party to clarify something that is unclear or to provide the docu-
ment(s). If the party has compelling reasons to do so, it may refuse to provide the
information or document(s). The court has discretion to decide whether the refusal
is justified. If the court is of the opinion that the refusal is unjustified, it can draw
the conclusion that the court considers legitimate.
Pursuant to Article 186 of the CCP, it is possible to obtain evidence by hearing the
testimony of witnesses before a judge in the pre-trial stage. This procedure can be
used to determine whether sufficient evidence is available to substantiate the
claim.942 Requests for provisional examination of witnesses are, in principle,
granted, except if these requests are used to go on a “fishing expedition” or when
Cf. CJEU 13 July 2006 (Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others); Antitrust Damages
Directive, Preamble point 44 et seq. and Article 3.
938.
Regulation No 2015/2421 (Successor of Regulation No 861/2007).939.
Cf. Kramer 2014, p. 100.940.
Article 152 CCP.941.
Fierstra et al. 2009.942.
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the applicant has not sufficiently indicated which facts need to be proved.943 Dutch
civil procedure also gives litigants the right to prove their arguments through wit-
ness testimony.944 If a witness refuses to answer, the court may draw the conclusion
it deems appropriate.
Pursuant to Article 202 of the CCP, it is possible to hear an expert in the pre-trial
stage. If there are sufficient indications of an infringement, the request is relevant
and sufficiently concrete and concerns facts that can be proved by the expert
opinion, the request for a pre-trial provisional expert opinion will normally be
granted.945 According to Article 198(3) of the CCP, the parties are obliged to cooperate
with the investigation of the expert. If a party does not cooperate, the court can
draw the conclusions it deems advisable.
Pursuant to Article 150 of the Dutch CCP, the burden of proof is normally on the
plaintiff. As a result of the application of the requirements of reasonableness and
fairness, a shift in the burden of proof may follow. Hence, the requirements of
reasonableness and fairness may, as an exception, require the defendant to refute
the assertions raised by the plaintiff. This exception may only be applied in special
circumstances.946
Pursuant to Article 843a of the CCP, a party may request access to documents
needed to substantiate its claim. The Antitrust Damages Directive has ensured that
an amended provision is now part of the Dutch legislation. This new arrangement
will be discussed in Section 4.6.
For a successful request based on Article 843a, several requirements have to be
fulfilled.947 First of all, the applicant requires a legitimate interest in obtaining access
to information. This condition is essentially fulfilled if a party enjoys an unreason-
able advantage or the opposing party enjoys an unreasonable disadvantage because
of the fact that certain evidence does not become part of the record.948 Secondly,
the documents must concern a legal relationship in which the applicant is involved.
In 2010, the Amsterdam court of appeal decided that a legal relationship also exists
in the event of a wrongful act.949 The issue is significant for private enforcement,
because a legal action based on a wrongful act is the most likely option to obtain
damages. On 10 July 2015, the Dutch Supreme Court held that a legal relationship
is no longer necessary to successfully request documents. According to the Supreme
Court, the statutory amendments have resulted in both the other party and third
parties possibly having to provide copies of documents.950 As a third requirement,
the requested documents must be specified as precisely as possible. In order to
Fierstra et al. 2009.943.
Article 163 CCP et seq.944.
Fierstra et al. 2009.945.
See e.g. Hoge Raad 9 September 2005.946.
Fierstra et al. 2009. See for more information Ekelmans 2010; Ekelmans 2007; Sijmonsma 2007.947.
Fierstra et al. 2009.948.
Gerechtshof Amsterdam 9 February 2010 (DB Schenker Rail v ProRail). See also Cornelissen et al. 2017,
p. 250.
949.
Hoge Raad 10 July 2015.950.
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fulfill this criterion, the applicant should have knowledge of the existence and
content of the documents requested.
Furthermore, as a fourth requirement, there is a requirement for the documents
to be at the disposal of, or collocated with, the individual or legal entity to whom
the request is addressed.
Under Article 843a (4) of the CCP, the requested access may be refused if this is
justified by overriding reasons or if the fair administration of justice is served
without granting access. According to Fierstra et al. refusal to grant access will not
be easily granted on the grounds of overriding reasons.951 Pursuant to Article 843b
of the CCP, a claimant who has lost evidence may be given access to copies of the
evidence.
The case of CDC v Shell et al. was interesting because the defendants, the cartel infrin-
gers, requested information from the claimants under Article 843a of the CCP.952
They requested information regarding the claim assignments and the possible
overcharge to their own purchasers.953 The court considered Article 843a of the
CCP to be a special disclosure provision. It served to require certain evidence to be
provided in the legal proceedings. It reminded that in Dutch civil procedure there
is no general disclosure provision requiring parties to provide all possible informa-
tion and documentation. Taking that into account, and to prevent fishing expedi-
tions, a successful request for disclosure under Article 843a of the CCP was subject
to several conditions. First of all, the party requires an evidentiary interest in recei-
ving the information. The information must be needed. Moreover, the requesting
party should request “certain” documents that the other party has in its possession
or is able to receive. Also, the party requesting information must have a legal rela-
tionship to the requested documents. A wrongful act is considered to create such
a legal relationship. If all these conditions are fulfilled, a party is still not obliged
to disclose the documents if there are weighty reasons for not doing so or if it can
be assumed that even without the disclosure of the documents the proper admini-
stration of justice is guaranteed.954 The court emphasized in CDC v Shell et al. that
Article 843a of the CCP is not a general provision requiring parties to produce
documents.955 The court noted that it is also possible to disclose parts of documents
if there is no legitimate interest in the requesting party having unlimited access
to (copies of) the documents requested.956 Interestingly, the court held that a reques-
ting party did not have an interest in the disclosure of documents regarding the
calculation of damages, as the determination of damages was not an issue in the
main proceedings. The court concluded that the requesting party did not (or at
least did not yet) have a legitimate interest in having access to (copies of) the docu-
ments.957 In this case, the defendants also requested information regarding the
purchases of the cartel victims. This was requested in order to assess whether or
Fierstra et al. 2009.951.
Rechtbank Den Haag 1 May 2013 (CDC v Shell et al.).952.
Kuijper & Leeflang 2015, p. 32.953.
Rechtbank Den Haag 1 May 2013 (CDC v Shell et al.), point 4.38.954.
Ibid, point 4.39.955.
Ibid, point 4.41.956.
Ibid, point 4.42.957.
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not the damage was passed-on in the chain. The claimant had already made clear
that it would provide the documents about the purchases. Although the court did
not explicitly state that the claimants were obliged to disclose the information
pursuant to Article 843a of the CCP, the court appears to agree that the claimant
provides this information.958 The case shows that Dutch courts are reluctant to allow
fishing expeditions, but if a document is really needed for a civil action, disclosure
is possible.959
Although Dutch civil procedure provides several instruments for fact-finding and
collecting evidence, the methods of obtaining information are limited because of
the relatively strict conditions under which information has to be disclosed. It
remains difficult and a hurdle to receive the information and documents needed
to prove a tortious act, the causal link and the amount of harm.960 Particularly in
standalone actions, obtaining the information needed to conduct litigation appears
to be difficult. In fact, in follow-on cases press releases and decisions of the compe-
tition authority serve important assistance for the private enforcement action. This
analysis matches Kortmann’s observations. He reports that few claimants in private
enforcement actions for damages feel the need to ask for discovery. He notes that
virtually all the litigation consists of follow-on cases in which the claimants rely
on the extensive description of the facts in the infringement decision of the com-
petition authorities.961
4.3.3.4 Passing-on Defense
The basic principle in the Netherlands is that a party is entitled to be compensated
for the actual harm.962 The passing-on defense is legally admissible and can be used
to deflect claims.963 Damages claimed on the basis of an unlawful act will be un-
successful if it cannot be established that the infringement caused damage to the
claimant in the end.964
Some legal scholars are of the opinion that the passing-on defense is not reasonable
as it makes it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to prove the harm suffered and the
amount.965 Only in special cases, like that of the elevator cartel, does it turn out to
be relatively easy to show the loss suffered by the plaintiff. In the elevator-cartel
situation, because the rents for social housing are fixed in the Netherlands, it is
difficult to argue that the overcharge has been passed-on to the tenants (i.e. the
housing corporations have not been able to pass-on the higher prices).966
Rechtbank Den Haag 1 May 2013 (CDC v Shell et al.), point 4.44.958.
See e.g. Gerechtshof Den Haag 18 December 2015 (Milieudefensie et al. v Shell et al.); Rechtbank Den
Haag 21 September 2016 (CDC v Total et al.).
959.
Rechtbank Den Haag 1 May 2013 (CDC v Shell et al.), point 4.44.960.
Kortmann 2014, p. 669. See also Kuijper & Leeflang 2015, pp. 32-33.961.
See also Ligteringen 2016, para 5.4.3.3.962.
Cf. Hoge Raad 8 July 2016 (TenneT v ABB), points 4.3.2 and 4.3.2. See also Fierstra et al. 2009.963.
Fierstra et al. 2009.964.
See e.g. Maton, Poopalasingam, Kuijper & Angerbauer 2011, p. 506; Van der Wiel 2009, pp. 724-
731.
965.
See for more information Stichting De Glazen Lift, http://www.deglazenlift.nl.966.
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The case of TenneT v ABB makes clear that the passing-on defense may indeed be
used in Dutch proceedings.967
The Arnhem-Leeuwarden court of appeal held in that case that the damage should
be calculated from the time the harm suffered actually started. That does not mean,
however, that later events should not be involved in the damages calculation. Re-
ferring to a case of the Supreme Court, the court of appeal held that circumstances
of the case could result in later events being taken into account.968 Reasonably, the
amount claimable consists of the overcharge minus the damage the victim passed-
on to its own purchasers, plus any lost profits and interest.969
The court of appeal reiterated that passing-on the damages results in shifting the
damages to another party. As every harmed party has the right to get compensated,
the indirect purchasers should also have this right. Although it is less likely that
the indirect purchasers will claim damages for all the harm, and hence less likely
that the cartel infringer will have to compensate for all the harm caused, that is
not a ground for rejecting the passing-on defense, according to the court of appeal.
Identifying all the overcharges caused by the cartel infringers is not the starting
point of the damage assessment process, which is meant to compensate the claiming
victim for the loss actually suffered.970
In a later decision of the Gelderland district court, this district court rejected the
passing-on defense in a specific situation. Offsetting the benefits pursuant to Article
6:100 of the DCC was excluded, according to the court.971 The court held that the
injured person suffered harm but possibly also benefitted from the event. It con-
cluded that any benefits did not have to be subtracted in this case because it would
not be reasonable. The defendant (Alstom) did not argue which facts and circum-
stances made it reasonable to subtract the benefits the claimant (TenneT) received.
Moreover, the court considered it very unlikely that the indirect purchasers would
claim damages, as formal procedural difficulties and the very limited damages for
the individual purchaser created hurdles that were such that it was unlikely that
they would claim damages. Moreover, the court found that it was likely that TenneT
would give the compensation it had received back to the end users, for example,
via lower prices for electricity in the future.972
The Supreme Court made clear that the passing-on defense can be used by defen-
dants. According to the Supreme Court it does not make much of a difference
whether the basis is deducting the passing-on as deduction on the overall damage
or by calculating the damage first and offsetting the benefits afterwards.973 The
Cf. Hoge Raad 8 July 2016 (TenneT v ABB), points 4.3.2 and 4.3.2.967.
Hoge Raad 11 January 2013.968.
Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 2 September 2014 (TenneT v ABB), point 3.32 et seq.969.
Ibid.970.
Rechtbank Gelderland 10 June 2015 (TenneT v Alstom), point 2.20 et seq.971.
Ibid.972.
Hoge Raad 8 July 2016 (TenneT v ABB), point 4.4.2.973.
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Supreme Court accepts both ways and it is up to the court to decide which one it
uses.974
A solution for plaintiffs seeking to circumvent the passing-on defense might be to
avoid basing an action on Article 6:162 of the DCC in the first place, but instead
to base the action on the principle of undue payment. The discussion should then
focus merely on the recovery of the overpayment. However, this legal principle is
primarily interesting to those claiming abuse of dominance. In cartel cases, this
article appears to be less favorable as there is often not a contractual relationship
with all or some of the infringers. Furthermore, in the literature several authors
have concluded that the amount to be paid back (i.e. the undoing commitment)
could be limited if allocating the payment were unjustifiably to enrich the claim-
ant.975
Concerning the passing-on defense, another solution for plaintiffs might be the
“illegal profit rule” as stated in Article 6:104 of the DCC, which provides that if
someone liable towards another person on the basis of tort or failure to comply
with an obligation has gained a profit because of this tort or non-performance, the
court may, at the request of the injured person, estimate the harm in line with the
amount of this profit or a part of it. Two decisions of the Supreme Court concerning
Article 6:104 of the DCC could be interesting. In the case between Ymere (a housing
corporation) and a tenant, the Supreme Court held that the tenant had to provide
the housing corporation with the illegal profit made by the tenant (i.e. income
from illegally renting the apartment minus the costs of conducting the illegal acti-
vity).976 A similar decision was reached by the Supreme Court in a dispute between
Setel N.V. and AVR Holding N.V.977 In that case, AVR claimed compensation because
Setel’s tariff differentiation constituted a wrongful act. In violation of ministerial
provisions concerning interconnection, Setel raised prices for phone calls made
from its network to CT’s network. The illegal profit had to be compensated. Al-
though these cases did not concern competition law, it becomes clear that, for
determining the damages, they could be relevant in determining what the profit
of the wrongfully acting party has been. This is different than determining the ac-
tual loss of the injured party. Under Article 6:104 of the DCC, the court has a dis-
cretion to assess the damages. These cases may provide a solution for the discussion
about the passing-on defense. Applying Article 6:104 of the DCC, a court may decide
that the loss the victim of the cartel offence really suffered is irrelevant, and that
only the advantage of the cartel offender is relevant.
By requesting the court to assess the damages on the basis of Article 6:104 of the
DCC, it may be possible to avoid a discussion concerning the passing-on defense.
It is important for the injured party making the request to the court to rely on Ar-
ticle 6:104 of the DCC. However, this solution could easily lead to overcompensation,
so a defendant could defend itself by arguing that the plaintiff should not be
Hoge Raad 8 July 2016 (TenneT v ABB), point 4.4.5.974.
Hartkamp 2001, pp. 311-318 and 327-334. See also: Zippro 2009, Section 7.9.1.5; Van Leuken 2007,
p. 1051.
975.
Hoge Raad 18 June 2010 (Huurster v Ymere).976.
Hoge Raad 18 June 2010 (Setel v AVR).977.
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overcompensated. The effect might well be that the court decides that the illegal
profit rule with overcompensation of the claimant is not justified.978 The defendant
could possibly convince the court not to accept Article 6:104 of the DCC in
determining the damages by demonstrating that such an outcome would be unfair.
A court is not obliged to apply Article 6:104 of the DCC if it believes that the out-
come would be unfair.979 Moreover, it could also assign only a part of the profit as
damages to prevent overcompensation.980
4.3.3.5 Decisions of Competition Authorities
Under Article 16 of Regulation No 1/2003, no national court may render a judgment
inconsistent with a decision of the European Commission. If the European Com-
mission concludes that there has been a certain cartel infringement, then a national
court is not allowed to decide otherwise.981 If a national court has doubts about
the lawfulness of a decision of the European Commission, it can make a preliminary
request to the CJEU.982 According to the European Commission, the same is true
for national competition authority decisions, which implies that a final decision
of a national competition authority will be fully binding in every Member State,
unless it violates the public order.983 In practice, a decision by the ACM establishing
an infringement of competition law will at least be an important indication to a
civil court that an infringement has taken place.984
According to the Dutch Supreme Court, decisions of administrative authorities that
can no longer be contested do have the force of law.985 The doctrine of force of law
precludes a separate assessment by a civil court of the lawfulness or unlawfulness
of a decision if the lawfulness could have been submitted during the proceedings
in the administrative court. A civil court will assume that the decision is substan-
tively and formally lawful. There are several exemptions, including the following:
(i) the lack of administrative legal protection; (ii) acknowledgment of wrongfulness
by the administrative authority; and (iii) a violation of higher law or higher legal
principles.986 Looking at the case law, it is apparent that the Dutch civil courts are
generally prone to following the ACM’s practice.987
See e.g. Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 2 September 2014 (TenneT v ABB), point 3.27; Rechtbank
Gelderland 10 June 2015 (TenneT v Alstom); Rechtbank Gelderland 24 September 2014, (TenneT v
Alstom), point 4.10. See also Kuijper & Leeflang 2015, p. 31.
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Parl. Gesch. Boek 6 (Inv. 3, 5 en 6), p. 1267. Cf. Parl. Gesch. Boek 6 (Inv. 3, 5 en 6), p. 1269.979.
See Hoge Raad 18 June 2010 (Setel v AVR), point 3.3.2; Hoge Raad 18 June 2010 (Huurster v Ymere),
point 3.6. See also Asser/Sieburgh 6-II* 2017, nr. 105.
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4.3.3.6 Limitation Period
Before the implementation of the Antitrust Damages Directive, according to the
general limitation provision of Article 3:310 of the DCC, a five-year limitation pe-
riod applies to actions for damages. The limitation period starts on the day after
the victim has become aware of the damage and the party liable is known. According
to the district court in Rotterdam, a victim that filed a complaint with the European
Commission must be considered to be aware of the putative infringement for the
purpose of the limitation period.988
If the limitation period has not expired, it can be interrupted by a written reminder
or written notice sent by the creditor explicitly reserving its rights.989 Recognition
of the claim by the debtor also interrupts the running of the limitation period.990
A new limitation period of five years begins on the day after the interruption.991
In any case, the limitation period expires twenty years after the day the wrongful
act was committed.992 Finding out whether the limitation period has expired could
be a hurdle. Cartel infringements often entail ongoing damage that can be hidden
for a long time and will, in addition, be difficult to prove.993 The 2007 Rotterdam
district court case makes clear that due consideration should be given to the limi-
tation period. In that particular case, the court held that plaintiffs were too late
with their claims and therefore the plaintiffs had no cause of action.994 Briefly
stated, the court held that, pursuant to Article 3:310 of the DCC, a time limitation
for an action for damages expires five years after the day on which the injured
person becomes familiar with (i) the damage and (ii) the person responsible for the
damage. In this specific case, the plaintiff (CEF) was too late. The court assumed
that the company had not breached Article 101 of the TFEU after 1994. CEF informed
the defendants of their liability for the first time in a letter dated 19 May 2000. CEF
denied that it was aware of the damage before 1995, but it did not sufficiently
substantiate this point of view, according to the court. In 1991, CEF had already
submitted a complaint to the European Commission concerning the alleged in-
fringement and in 1991 CEF was already familiar with a letter from the European
Commission that its allegations generally appeared to be well founded. The court
considered that CEF was already familiar with the damage and the persons involved
before 19 May 1995, and therefore CEF’s claim was time barred.
In its decision, the court explicitly stated that the requirement was not that CEF
be aware of the exact extent of the damage. Nor was there requirement that CEF
knew that the abusive nature of the actions of the company had already been de-
cided by the European Commission.995 The result of the decision is that a victim
that has complained to the competition authority is not able to defend itself against
Rechtbank Rotterdam 7 March 2007 (CEF CITY Electrical factors B.V.).988.
Article 3:317 DCC.989.
Article 3:318 DCC. See also: Fierstra et al. 2009.990.
Article 3:319 DCC.991.
Article 3:310 (1). Fierstra et al. 2009.992.
Meijer 2008, pp. 135-136.993.
Rechtbank Rotterdam 7 March 2007 (CEF CITY Electrical factors B.V.)994.
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failing to meet the limitation period with the argument that it was not yet aware
of the exact damages. Nor can it argue that the competition authority had not yet
made a decision.
In the case of TenneT v ABB, the Eastern Netherlands Court also considered whether
a limitation period had expired and whether the claims of the claimants should
be rejected. The cartel infringer (ABB) argued that the limitation period started on
13 May 2004, at the time the European Commission published the press release in
which it mentioned the investigations regarding the swift gear cartel and ABB
published a press release on its website. TenneT formally held ABB liable on 24
June 2010. The court rejected ABB’s defense.996 First of all, ABB did not prove that
TenneT was aware of the existence of the press releases. Moreover, the press releases
only announced an investigation. According to the court, the announcement of
an investigation does not imply that the claimants knew, or should have known,
that they had been the victims of a cartel infringement and had suffered harm.
Nor does it imply that the claimants should have started an very thorough investi-
gation.997
On appeal, the Arnhem-Leeuwarden court of appeal provided even more guidance
regarding the limitation period. Referring to a decision of the Supreme Court, the
court of appeal held that the five-year limitation period starts to run the day after
the victim is able to start a legal action for damages, which is the time the victim
obtained sufficient certainty (not absolute certainty) that the damage was caused
by the inadequate conduct or wrongdoing of the involved parties.998 The court of
appeal considered that in this specific case, the limitation period did not start to
run prior to the decision of the European Commission of 24 January 2007.999 The
five-year limitation period was interrupted on 24 October 2010, which meant that
the claims were not time-barred.1000
4.3.3.7 Masterfoods Defense
One of the difficulties that has arisen in Dutch courtrooms relates to the “Master-
foods defense”. Several defendants argued that civil damages proceedings should
be stayed pending the outcome of the appeals before the EU courts against the re-
levant decision of the European Commission.1001
The Amsterdam district court in 2013 decided that a civil damages claim against
several airlines following the air cargo decision of the European Commission should
be stayed awaiting the outcome of the appeals by the airlines against the air cargo
decision of the European Commission.1002 The court’s decision was based on the
Rechtbank Oost-Nederland 16 January 2013 (TenneT v ABB), point 4.22 et seq.996.
Ibid, point 4.24; Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 2 September 2014 (TenneT v ABB), point 3.19 et
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case of Masterfoods v HB Ice Cream, codified in Article 16 of Regulation No 1/2003.1003
On appeal, the Amsterdam court of appeal decided that if a party is relying on a
decision of the European Commission and is requesting to stay the proceedings, it
is required to demonstrate the following: (i) the party appealed the decision of the
European Commission in a timely manner; (ii) it has substantiated that its opposi-
tion to the decision of the European Commission is reasonable; and (iii) it has
specified which defenses it wishes to raise before the European courts to challenge
the decision of the European Commission. This should enable the national courts
to assess whether the defense indeed depends on the validity of the decision of the
European Commission.1004 According to the Amsterdam court of appeal, the airlines
had not sufficiently substantiated their request to stay the civil proceedings.
Therefore, the court of appeal annulled the decision of the district court.1005 The
case was referred back to the district court to be further litigated between the parties
and for a new decision as to whether and to what extent the civil damages pro-
ceeding should be stayed.1006 The Amsterdam court of appeal requires the defendants
to substantiate the defense and specify which defenses it is raising before the
European courts to challenge the decision of the European Commission. This should
be sufficient to enable the national court to assess whether the defenses in the civil
proceedings relate to the decision of the European Commission.
In the wax cartel case, the Hague district court decided somewhat differently. The
district court noted that it was not allowed to take any decision that contravened
a decision of the European Commission. The court held that the obligation under
EU law to cooperate means that the court should stay the proceedings if the decision
were contrary to the decision of the European Commission.1007 The court held that
at that stage of the proceeding – the defendants had yet to provide the statement
of defense so the court had not yet taken judicial notice of the decision of the
European Commission taking all factors into account – the court considered that
it would not (yet) take a decision that contravened the decision of the European
Commission. It made clear that it is likely that decisions also had to be taken by
the court that did not relate to the decision of the European Commission and that
are not expected to create a danger of contradicting a decision of the European
Commission. One can think of formal discussions like the validity of the assignment,
the applicable law and joint and several liability.1008 The court held that the reso-
lution of the dispute between the parties does not entirely depend on the validity
of the decision of the CJEU. Because of this, the court concluded that there was no
reason to stay the proceedings.1009 Staying the proceedings just because the decision
of the European Commission is being appealed would be contrary to the principle
CJEU 14 December 2000 (Masterfoods v HB Ice Cream).1003.
Gerechtshof Amsterdam 24 September 2013 (Equilib v KLM et al.). See also Kuijpers et al. 2015, p. 4.1004.
Gerechtshof Amsterdam 24 September 2013 (Equilib v KLM et al.). See also Gerechtshof Amsterdam
7 January 2014 (EWD v KLM et al.); Gerechtshof Amsterdam 4 February 2014 (KLM et al. v Lufthansa et
al.).
1005.
Kuijpers et al. 2015, p. 4.1006.
Rechtbank Den Haag 1 May 2013 (CDC v Shell et al.), point 4.25.1007.
Ibid, point 4.26.1008.
Ibid, point 4.27. See also Rechtbank Gelderland 26 October 2011 (TenneT v Alstom), point 4.11;
Rechtbank Rotterdam 9 February 2011 (MNO Vervat v Shell), point 3.6.
1009.
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of effectiveness, as mentioned in the case of Courage v Crehan.1010 The court makes
clear that at a later stage, it is possible that it will stay the proceedings.1011
It appears that the different courts do not exactly have the same approach to the
Masterfoods defense. The Amsterdam court of appeal assesses the substances of
the appeal against the decision of the European Union, but this additional test
appears not to be part of the other courts’ assessment.
4.3.4 Conclusions
Most of the cartel private enforcement actions for damages, if not all, are follow-
on cases, also in the Netherlands. It has become clear that in almost all cases the
cartels were detected and their existence proven because one or more of the cartel
infringers applied for leniency.
In the last couple of years, the Netherlands has become one of the most favorite
countries in which to claim damages for competition law infringements. This was
not due to the introduction of a special private enforcement regime in the
Netherlands, but is attributable to a number of factors: an effective judiciary, the
low cost of litigation, the possibility of assigning claims and bundling claims,1012
the possibility of estimating damages, and the active involvement of legal practiti-
oners and claim vehicles that entered and embraced the market enthusiastically
after Courage v Crehan and the publication of the Green Paper and the White Paper.
Where Dutch statute law left room for discussions about the interpretation of some
specific private enforcement elements, the case law brought clarity to a large extent.
Especially the cases of TenneT v ABB and TenneT v Alstom have answered several legal
questions and have been of enormous value to private enforcement in the
Netherlands. The courts have made a number of points clear: how damages must
be calculated; if and how the passing-on defense should apply; which entities within
a group can be held liable on the basis of a decision of a competition authority;
the role of the Masterfoods defense and the limitation period.
There were also still some elements of the Dutch private enforcement system that
could be improved to make it easier for claimants to claim damages.
First of all, it remained a hurdle (and it is often apparently impossible) for claimants
to obtain information regarding competition law infringements from other parties.
As seen, this is of particular importance for standalone actions as more than a
suspicion and some kind of proof must exist to successfully request information.
Especially in standalone cases, it is difficult for claimants to collect evidence for a
strong case and this potentially prevents victims from starting proceedings. Accord-
ing to the available case law, the decisions of the competition authorities prove to
be very important. With that information, the existence of the cartel is disclosed
Rechtbank Den Haag 1 May 2013 (CDC v Shell et al.), point 4.27.1010.
Ibid, point 4.28.1011.
Kortmann 2014, p. 662.1012.
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and information becomes available. For follow-on cases, the disclosure of additional
information appears less relevant.
Second, the limitation period of five years is independent of the administrative
process. Awaiting the final outcome of the public process without starting pro-
ceedings or at least without interrupting the limitation period appears dangerous.
It created an incentive for defendants to delay the proceedings. Possibly other victims
of the cartel would not be able to claim damages because of the expiration of the
limitation period.
Third, it remains difficult to claim damages on behalf of a group. If the damage is
small, victims are often reluctant to claim damages because the cost of litigation
is too high in relation to the potential compensation.1013 Without a system of col-
lective redress, it is likely that these victims in particular will remain uncompensated
and the competition law infringers will remain unduly enriched. Concerning the
Masterfoods defense, it appears that the Amsterdam courts have a different approach
than the other courts in the Netherlands. They also take a substantive look at the
grounds of appeal against the decision of the competition authority. A unified ap-
proach by the courts would be preferable.
Concerning the position of the leniency applicant in Dutch civil proceedings, the
following can be concluded. As said, public enforcement cartel cases are almost
always uncovered by the leniency applicant(s). The public enforcement case appears
in almost every case as the start of the civil proceedings. Hence, private enforcement
cartel cases are standard so-called ‘follow-on’ cases. It means that the application
for leniency could very well lead to antitrust damages claims in the Netherlands
and these damage claims could be substantial, also for the leniency applicants.
Especially under the regime prior to the implementation of the Antitrust Damages
Directive, all infringers were jointly and severally liable for the cartel damage, in-
cluding the immunity recipient. In fact, the leniency applicant had been a particu-
larly interesting party to sue because of its joint and several liability towards the
victims and because it already confessed its participation in the cartel to the com-
petition authority. Moreover, special other characteristics made the leniency appli-
cant an even more useful first target for claimants. The Masterfoods defense could
have had a negative effect. The leniency applicant often does not appeal the decision
and will therefore have a final and irrevocable decision of the competition
authority prior to the infringers that do appeal the decision. It potentially had the
effect that claimants focus on the leniency applicants from which the decision is
final and irrevocable. They are able to claim for the complete damage and do not
have to await to complete administrative procedure first.
4.4 Comparison and Analysis of Private Enforcement in Germany
and the Netherlands Prior to the Antitrust Damages Directive
German lawmakers anticipated the introduction of the directive of the European
Commission. They modified Article 33 of the ARC, including elements also men-
Braat & Rosenboom 2018, pp. 10-19.1013.
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tioned in the European case law and by the European Commission in the Green
Paper and White Paper already prior to the acceptance of the Antitrust Damages
Directive. The adjusted provision appeared to be pretty successful. After the changes
in 2005, the number of civil claims has increased substantially. If the signs are not
misleading, this is a good portent for other Member States where a rather similar
regime will apply because of the introduction of the Antitrust Damages Directive.
In the amended Article 33 of the ARC (amendments of 2005 and 2013), German
private enforcement provides a framework that assists claimants. In line with the
Green Paper, the White Paper and the Antitrust Damages Directive, German courts
are bound to honor the decisions made by cartel authorities regarding cartel infrin-
gements, claims can be brought to court by private associations, and there is a
special suspension term/limitation period incorporated into Article 33 of the ARC
for filing a claim after the competition authority’s decision becomes final.
In the Netherlands until 2017, there were no special amendments for an upcoming
private enforcement. The Dutch system of private enforcement seemed to be less
developed than the German variant. However, because cartel victims started pro-
ceedings in the Netherlands, court decisions have created a private enforcement
framework.
In Germany, there was a special limitation period for private enforcement claims
already. The provision provided for a term that expires after the decision by the
cartel authority has become final. Such a provision was missing in the Netherlands.
Moreover, although it could be argued that the Dutch civil courts followed the final
decision of the national competition authority, the irreversible decisions of the
national cartel authorities concerning cartel infringements were not considered
irrefutable evidence for the civil courts. In Germany, they already were.
A possible difficulty in Germany was that it remained fairly difficult for cartel
victims to receive documents and information from the cartel infringers or cartel
authorities. Although there appear to be more ways to receive information from
other parties under Dutch law than under German law, it has to be concluded that
even in the Netherlands it remained difficult to receive relevant information unless
at least some information is already available to give the impression that the in-
fringement factually took place, especially where it concerns so-called standalone
cases.
Additionally, the German and Dutch systems did (and still do) not provide sufficient
opportunities to claim damages on behalf of a group. With regard to collective re-
dress, the German system appears not to be completely in line with the thoughts
of the European Commission. There remains little incentive for associations to start
legal proceedings. In the Netherlands there are more possibilities for collective re-
dress and collective settlements. Moreover, Dutch lawmakers are working on
amended collective redress legislation in which it will also be possible to claim
collectively for redress. In 2014, the Dutch Minister of Security and Justice started
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consultations on a draft bill for collective damages actions.1014 For victims with
only limited damage, this may open doors to recover damages. In Germany, such
developments have not yet been encountered.
4.5 AQuick Overview of Private Enforcement in OtherMember States
The fact that Germany and the Netherlands are discussed so extensively does not
mean that no private enforcement actions and developments related to private
enforcement took place in the other Member States. For the sake of completeness,
the situation and developments in other Member States will be described briefly
in this Section.
In 2013, the Commission concluded that the 52 actions for damages were brought
in only seven Member States. In the other Member States, the European Commission
was not aware of any follow-on action for damages based on a European Commission
decision. Among those seven Member States, as described, the vast majority was
brought in the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands.1015
The European Commission noted that the relative preference for a legal system in
order to bring an action, or the relatively higher likelihood of victims of competition
law infringements to claim compensation in the United Kingdom, Germany and
the Netherlands depends merely on more effective procedural rules for antitrust
damages actions.1016 The European Commission concludes that the differences be-
tween the Member States lead to inequalities and uncertainty concerning the
conditions under which injured parties can exercise the right to compensation
deriving from the Treaty and may affect the substantive effectiveness of this right.1017
As injured parties often choose the forum of their Member State to claim damages,
the discrepancies between the rules of the different Member States risk leading to
an uneven playing field as regards actions for damages and may affect competition
on the markets on which these injured parties operate.1018 Similarly, these differ-
ences in applicable rules mean that undertakings established and operating in
different Member States are exposed to significantly different risks of being held
liable for infringements of competition law.1019 According to the European Com-
mission, this uneven enforcement of the EU right to compensation may result in
a competitive advantage for some competition law infringers, and a disincentive
to the exercise of the rights of establishment and provision of goods or services in
those Member States where the right to compensation is more effectively enfor-
ced.1020 As such, the differences in the liability regimes applicable in the Member
States may negatively affect competition and risk to the extent of appreciably dis-
torting the proper functioning of the internal market.1021
Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs 2014 (Public consultation on mass damages).1014.
Stancke 2017, p. 4.1015.
European Commission 2013 (Impact Assessment for Directive proposal), point 52.1016.
Ibid, point 53.1017.
Ibid.1018.
Ibid, point 54.1019.
Ibid.1020.
Ibid.1021.
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One of the aims of the European Commission in introducing the Antitrust Damages
Directive, is that the differences between the regimes in the several Member States
will be reduced so that a level playing field and proper functioning of the internal
market can be achieved. Claimants should be able to claim for damages in all
Member States, as occurs in the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands
to a certain extent already.
In line with the observations of the European Commission, several annual compar-
ative competition guides show that the developments in damages procedures as
part of private enforcement of competition law have been moving slowly in most
other Member States.1022 If private enforcement of competition law takes place at
all, it often relates to actions for nullity of contracts and not to actions for damages.
The amount of antitrust damages cases is limited in the other Member States, even
though some of them introduced special private enforcement legislation to make
it easier to claim for damages. Besides Germany, other Member States such as Ro-
mania and Hungary introduced a special antitrust damages actions regime. The
new rules in Hungary could be considered remarkably progressive.
In 2009, the Hungarian legislator amended its Prohibition and Restrictive Market
Practices (“HCA”) by introducing the rebuttable presumption that a hard-core cartel
causes a ten percent price increase in the market.1023 Such a rule makes it easier
to claim for damages because an overcharge is not to be proven. It is up to the in-
fringers to prove that there is no overcharge or that the overcharge is less than ten
percent. It can also easily result in overcompensation. The second reform aims at
protecting the first leniency applicant. According to Article 88.D of the (former)
HCA, the successful immunity applicant can be sued for damages only if the
plaintiff has not succeeded in obtaining full compensation from the other defen-
dants.1024 It meant that the leniency applicant with immunity was protected against
damages claims to a large extent.1025 Only if compensation could not be received
from the other infringers the leniency applicant with immunity was obliged to
compensate the claimants. Despite these amendments, private actions remained
scarce in Hungary.1026 As the rules deviate from the Antitrust Damages Directive,
and the Hungarian legislation should be in line with the provisions of the Antitrust
Damages Directive, the system had to be adjusted.
The United Kingdom (more specifically England and Wales) is a popular jurisdiction
for bringing private antitrust actions.1027 The reputation of English courts, specia-
lizing judges, innovative funding arrangements and an extensive disclosure regime
See inter alia The Antitrust Law Review 2013, Global Competition Review, Law Business Research Ltd;
Private Enforcement 2012, Global Competition Review, Law Business Research Ltd; The International
Comparative Legal Guide to: Competition Litigation 2012, Global Legal Group Ltd.
1022.
OECD 2015, p. 10.1023.
Ibid.1024.
Buccirossi, Marvão & Spagnolo 2015, pp. 4-5.1025.
OECD 2015, p. 10.1026.
Scott et al. 2017, p. 109.1027.
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make claimants choose this jurisdiction.1028 Moreover, the high legal costs of pro-
ceedings and the special procedure offered in Part 36 as stated in the Civil Procedure
Rules appear interesting for claimants.1029 Both motivate defendants to settle the
dispute. Under the ‘Part 36’ regime in the Civil Procedure Rules, a claimant may
make an offer to settle at any stage in the proceedings. If the offer is not accepted
by the defendant and at trial the claimant obtains a judgment “more advantageous”
than its offer, the court may, on being informed of the offer and at its discretion,
award: (i) interest on damages and on costs at up to 10 percent above base and (ii)
may also award costs to be assessed upon the indemnity basis, which means that
all of the claimant's legal costs and disbursements are recoverable except those the
defendant is able to show were incurred unreasonably. A defendant may also make
a Part 36 offer. If the claimant were to reject it and then win at trial but not obtain
a judgment more advantageous than the defendant's offer, the court can order the
claimant to pay the legal costs of the defendant.
4.6 Private Enforcement in Germany and the Netherlands and the
introduction of the Antitrust Damages Directive
4.6.1 Introduction
By the end of 2016 the Antitrust Damages Directive had to be implemented in the
national legislation of the Member States. Almost none of the Member States im-
plemented the Antitrust Damages Directive in time. By the end of May 2017, 12 of
the Member States had still not yet implemented the Antitrust Damages Directive.
This included Germany. However, from June 2017 the Antitrust Damages Directive
provisions became part of the German competition law.
The most important changes stemming from the Antitrust Damages Directive in
Germany and the Netherlands will be discussed as far as they are related to the
topic of this study. The author does not describe every single change, as most of
the changes are a copy of the provisions as stated in the Antitrust Damages Directive
as described in Section 3.3.2. Regarding certain provisions, for example concerning
the limitation period and the disclosure of information, there is some room left
for the Member States to further elaborate or expand the set of rules of the Antitrust
Damages Directive. In Section 4.6.2 the specific choices in the German system will
be summarized. In Section 4.6.3 the specific choices in the Dutch system will be
summarized.
4.6.2 Changes in Germany
Some drafts of a completely new ARC (ninth GWB) have been produced and pub-
lished since the second half of 2016. Since June 2017, the Antitrust Damages
Directive provisions have been part of German legislation. It includes much more
than only the implementation of the Antitrust Damages Directive. The changes of
Israel, Dimopoulos & Walton 2013, p. 181.1028.
Scott et al. 2017, p. 141.1029.
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the ARC also relate to the adjustments because of digitalization concerns in relation
to competition and provide adjusted rules for concentrations.1030
Regarding the implementation of the Antitrust Damages Directive, the German
federal government changed Section 33 ARC drastically and incorporated the new
sections 33a (duty to pay compensation), 33b (binding effect of competition
authorities), 33c (passing-on), 33d (joint and several liability), 33e (Immunity reci-
pient), 33f (settlement), 33g (means of evidence) and 33h (limitation period).
Not all provisions will be discussed in detail, as most of the provisions mirror what
is stated in the Antitrust Damages Directive. However, there are several provisions
that are in line with the Antitrust Damages Directive, but do include the indepen-
dence choice of the German federal government as well. The ones relevant for this
study will be discussed below.
One of the most important findings is that the Section 33 ARC and further not
only apply if there is an interstate effect, but also if it is a pure domestic competition
law infringement (i.e. even if there is no interstate effect). This is not required by
the Antitrust Damages Directive.1031
Section 33b ARC provides that final decisions of competition authorities and final
decisions of courts after decisions of competition authorities, are binding for the
court in a private damage action. It also implies that decisions coming from other
Member States are binding. Also this is not required by the Antitrust Damages
Directive.
Regarding the means of the disclosure provision, the German Federal Government
did not implement rules that are, although allowed, broader than the minimum
requirement on disclosure as required by the Antitrust Damages Directive.1032 It
should be noted that for Germany, the adjustments are already a huge step.1033 In
Germany, the adaptation of the disclosure regime is even described as the core
point of the ninth ARC Novella.1034 In literature there is quite some criticism about
the German disclosure provision. Legal authors note that there is still a great deal
of uncertainty about this new provision.1035 The exact meaning of a lot of terminol-
ogy is unclear.1036 Moreover, it is questioned whether leniency documents that are
protected under the Antitrust Damages Directive from disclosure, are in each and
every situation protected from disclosure per se. There might be situations in which
the case-by-case analysis – as stated in the Pfleiderer case and the Donau Chemie case
– make it necessary to disclose leniency documents.1037
German Federal Government 2016, p. 1.1030.
See inter alia Antitrust Damages Directive, preamble point 10.1031.
Antitrust Damages Directive, Article 5(8).1032.
Schroeder, Polley, Harms et al. 2017, pp. 2, 3 and 5.1033.
See inter alia Ruster 2017, p. 158.1034.
Ibid.1035.
Ibid.1036.
Ibid, p. 167.1037.
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The German Federal Government did introduce a new limitation period of five
years for antitrust damages claims in Section 33h ARC. The five-year period starts
at the end of the year in which the claim arose, the victim knew or should have
known about the existence of competition law infringement and the identity of
the infringers, and the infringements ended.
The limitation period also ends irrespective of whether the victim knew or should
have known about the existence of competition law infringement 10 years after
the claim arose and the infringement has ended. Furthermore, as a third limitation
period, the limitation period also ends 30 years after the infringement caused
damages. Limitation periods are suspended during the public enforcement pro-
ceedings of the BkartA, European Commission or another competition authority
within the EU. The suspension ends one year after the final decision or other end
of the public proceedings. For the victims who are not considered as direct or indi-
rect purchasers and providers of the immunity recipient, the five-year limitation
period against the immunity recipient starts from the end of the year in which it
becomes clear that full compensation cannot be received from the other infringers.
For those victims, in this circumstance, the 10-year imitation period is not applica-
ble. It implies that there is no need to claim damages from the leniency applicant
in advance to secure the (potential) claim (Section 33h (8) ARC).
In Germany, Section 33e ARC makes clear that the immunity recipient is only
obliged to pay damages to its direct and indirect purchasers or providers. For other
victims of the cartel, the immunity recipient is only obliged to pay the damages as
far as they cannot be claimed from the other infringers. Section 33e ARC makes
clear that the immunity recipient cannot be held liable for claims that are already
prescribed in relation to the other infringers. If a claim for damages against the
other infringers is no longer enforceable because of the expiry of the limitation
period, the liability of the immunity recipient is also excluded from this claim.
Section 33h (8) ARC under 1 makes sure that for victims that cannot be considered
as the direct and indirect purchasers or providers of the immunity recipient, the
limitation period starts by the end of the year in which becomes clear that they
cannot receive compensation from the other infringers. The advantage of this
specific provision is that for this group of victims there is no need to file suit against
the immunity recipient rapidly, without knowing whether other infringers will
compensate the damage just in order to prevent that claims could be time-barred.1038
It also means another advantage for the leniency applicant, as it could be expected
that the immunity recipient will not be one of the most interesting parties to sue
first. The disadvantage is that it is in uncertainty for a long time about whether
claims should still be expected.
4.6.3 Changes in the Netherlands
The Dutch legislator implemented the Antirust Damages Directive at the beginning
of 2017. It is common in the Netherlands that an act implementing a Directive
contains no provisions that go beyond the provisions of a Directive.1039 It implies
Schuler & Stübinger 2017, p. 353.1038.
Netherlands, Parliamentary Papers II 2015/16, p. 2.1039.
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that these adjustments are not applicable for pure domestic competition law infrin-
gements.1040 The Dutch legislator provided a separate new bill in which the pure
domestic infringements are covered by the same regime.1041
The new law contains rules that protect certain categories of information. Other
information may be ordered by the court. Like the German legislature, the Dutch
legislature does not provide a broader system for the disclosure of information,
but limits the provision to what is strictly necessary on the basis of the provisions
of the Antitrust Damages Directive.
The national disclosure provisions had to be adjusted to be in conformity with the
Antitrust Damages Directive. A new Article 844 CCP provides a special disclosure
regime in relation to competition law infringement claims. The provision is similar
to the already existing 843a CCP provision. Under Section 843a CCP, no successful
request can be made to the right of access if it can reasonably be assumed that a
proper administration of justice can also be obtained without the requested for
information. Such a condition is not included in the Antitrust Damages Directive.
Pursuant to Article 845 CCP, this condition is removed for claims based on a com-
petition law infringement as referred to in Article 193k DCC. On the basis of article
846 CCP, leniency statements and settlement statements are protected against dis-
closure. Leniency statements may not be used by the court as evidence. It is questi-
oned whether leniency documents that are protected under the Antitrust Damages
Directive from disclosure, are in each and every situation protected from disclosure
per se. There might be situations in which the case-by-case analysis – as stated in
the Pfleiderer case and the Donau Chemie case – make it necessary to disclose leniency
documents.1042
The Dutch court is bound by the final and irrevocable decision of the ACM (Article
161a Dutch CCP). However, unlike in Germany, the Dutch legislator decided that
the Dutch court is not bound by a final decision of a competition authority or court
of another Member State per se. The decision of the competition authority or court
of another Member State may be used as prima facie evidence, however.1043
The Dutch legislator introduced a new special limitation period regime for cartel
damages claims in article 6:193s and 6:193t of the DCC. The limitation period is
five years. The limitation period does not begin to run until the infringement of
competition law has ceased and the claimant knows, or can reasonably be expected
to know: (a) of the behavior and the fact that it constitutes an infringement of
competition law; (b) of the fact that the infringement of competition law caused
harm to it; and (c) the identity of the infringer. The five-year limitation period will
be prolonged if a competition authority takes action for the purpose of the investi-
gation or its proceedings in respect of an infringement of competition law to which
the action for damages relates. The suspension shall end, at the earliest, one year
after the infringement decision has become final or after the proceedings are
See inter alia Antitrust Damages Directive, preamble point 10.1040.
Netherlands, Parliamentary Papers II 2015/16, p. 2.1041.
Ruster 2017, p. 167.1042.
Netherlands, Parliamentary Papers II 2015/16, p. 8.1043.
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otherwise terminated. Originally the legislator planned to interrupt the limitation
period, which could lead to a longer prescription period. Under the guidance of
Kortmann et al. the legislator changed the extension from an interruption (common
in the Netherlands) during the legislation process into a suspension of the period.1044
The rationale was that the interruption period could create more uncertainty for
cartelists because of an extremely long limitation period, resulting in less willingness
to settle a dispute with the victims because as long as claims are not prescribed,
the risk lingers that other potential claimants instigate claims. The Dutch legislator
also implemented a 20-year absolute limitation period. According to Article 6:193t
DCC, the absolute period starts to run the day after the infringement ends.
4.7 Conclusions
Within Europe, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands are the leading
nations for private enforcement litigation. It appears that for these three countries,
this new Antitrust Damages Directive was not necessary to ensure that victims are
compensated for their harm.
Germany seemed to be a precursor when it came to competition law in Europe.1045
Germany is an interesting forum for a number of reasons. Claim collectors are able
to purchase claims. Germany is known for its effective judiciary and relatively low
cost. In terms of the German legislation, Germany even had quite a unique position
because it had implemented special private enforcement legislation prior to the
introduction of the Antitrust Damages Directive. The specific legislation codified
the European case law; and it was more or less in line with the Green Paper and
the White Paper of the European Commission. The German legislator made it easier
to claim damages and provided certainty for claimants in claiming for damages.
The Netherlands also has an attractive climate to claim damages. In the Netherlands
as well, claim collectors/ funders are able to purchase claims from victims. The
Netherlands is also renowned for its effective judiciary and relatively low legal
costs.
The difference compared to Germany is that – at least until very recently –
claimants in the Netherlands based their claims on standard provisions. Because
of this, specific aspects concerning private enforcement — limitation periods,
standards of proof regarding competition authority’s decisions etc. — were not
subject to specific legislation, and questions in that context had to be dealt with
by the courts. This has created uncertainties for claimants and concurring/dissenting
rulings, certainly in the first few years since private damages actions became more
common.1046
In both national systems, prior to the Antitrust Damages Directive, the immunity
recipient could be held liable and was jointly and severally liable for the entire
Kortmann et al. 2015, pp. 6-8.1044.
See Section 1.3.1045.
For example about applying the limitation period provisions, the Masterfoods defense doctrine and
the passing-on defense.
1046.
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damage. In fact, in both countries, the immunity recipient potentially encountered
several negative effects of applying for leniency in the civil procedure. First of all,
the leniency applicant admitted its role in the cartel to the competition authority.
Moreover, there was uncertainty about information that potentially had to be dis-
closed and could be used in follow-on actions. Moreover, leniency applicants (espe-
cially immunity recipients), were interesting to target for damages claims, as the
decision of the competition authority could have been, and often was, final and
irrevocable at an earlier stage then the decisions of the other defendants that often
appealed the decision of the competition authority.
The adoption of the Antitrust Damages Directive has meant statutory amendments
in German legislation and created statutory amendments in the Dutch legislation
as well. The amendments mainly relate to the disclosure of evidence, burden of
proof, the stronger position of indirect claimants, and the adjustment of the limi-
tation period.
Regarding the relation between the leniency policy and private enforcement, with
the arrival of the Antitrust Damages Directive some important elements changed.
Leniency statements are protected from disclosure and also other information will
be protected during the competition authority’s investigation. Other information,
also from the immunity recipient, could be disclosed. In literature, it is questioned
whether leniency documents that are protected under the Antitrust Damages
Directive, including the corporate statement, are in each and every situation pro-
tected from disclosure per se. There might be situations in which the case-by-case
analysis – as stated in the Pfleiderer case and the Donau Chemie case – make it
necessary to disclose leniency documents.1047 Where clarity and preventing uncer-
tainty was one of the goals, there could be still some uncertainty about the disclo-
sure of leniency documents. Most likely, the CJEU will have to turn to this question
one day.1048
The joint and severally liability is partly removed from the immunity recipient. It
makes the immunity recipient a less interesting target for claimants. In principle
the immunity recipient is relieved from joint and several liability for the entire
harm and any contribution it must make vis-à-vis co-infringers does not exceed
the amount of harm caused to its own direct or indirect purchasers or, in the case
of a buying cartel, its direct or indirect providers. To the extent that a cartel has
caused harm to those other than the customers or providers of the infringers, the
contribution of the immunity recipient should not exceed its relative responsibility
for the harm caused by the cartel. The immunity recipient remains fully liable to
the injured parties other than its direct or indirect purchasers or providers only
where they are unable to obtain full compensation from the other infringers.
The limitation period of the leniency applicant, e.g. the immunity recipient, could
end prior to those of the other infringers, if it does not appeal the decision. It could
have the effect that victims are already claiming from the leniency applicant, pre-
Ruster 2017, p. 167.1047.
Ibid.1048.
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venting claims being time-barred. The German legislator provides some kind of
solution for the indirect purchasers and providers. Section 33h (8) ARC under 1
provides a special limitation period for victims that can not be considered as the
direct and indirect purchasers or providers of the immunity recipient. The limitation
period starts by the end of the year in which becomes clear that they can not receive
compensation from the other infringers. The advantage of this specific provision
is that for this group of victims there is no need to file suit against the immunity
recipient rapidly, without knowing whether other infringers will compensate the
damage just in order to prevent that claims could be time-barred. It also means
another advantage for the leniency applicant, as it could be expected that the im-
munity recipient will not be one of the most interesting parties to sue first. The
disadvantage is that there could exist uncertainty for a long time about whether
claims should still be expected.
For both countries, the remaining obstacles to improving the situation for claimants
relate to difficulties in collecting information, especially in stand-alone cases and
a lack of collective redress possibilities.
Chapter 5 will give an overview of the characteristics of US private enforcement.
In Chapter 6 the amendments to the national legislation as a result of the adoption
of the Antitrust Damages Directive will be further discussed, bottlenecks will be
summarized and additional suggestions for legal system(s) will be made to make
overall competition law enforcement even more effective.
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5.1 Introduction
The United States has a long history when it comes to antitrust legislation. It was
the first country in the world to have antitrust legislation and a leniency pro-
gramme. Furthermore, there is no country in the world with more private enforce-
ment than the United States.
In this chapter, the legal framework of antitrust legislation and the development
of antitrust legislation in the United States are discussed. Subsequently, special
attention is given to both private enforcement and the DOJ’s leniency policy. This
chapter ends with a comparison between the American system and the European
systems already discussed.
5.2 Antitrust in the United States
In the United States in the 19th century, industrialization led to output exceeding
demand, which resulted in intense competition.1049 Seeking greater profits and
security, competitors created cartels.1050 The large and powerful corporate mono-
polies that arose in the United States became the subject of public protest.1051 In
1890, Congress passed the first antitrust legislation. With the passing of the Sherman
Act, Congress banned agreements that restrained interstate or foreign trade, and
they made it illegal for individuals to form or attempt to form monopolies.
The basic structure of the EU provisions, comprised of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU,
finds its counterpart in Sections 1 and 2 of the American Sherman Act.1052 To a
large extent, Article 101 of the TFEU is comparable with Section 1 of the Sherman
LeClair 2011, p. 65 et seq. See also Kwoka & White 2014.1049.
LeClair 2011, p. 65 et seq.1050.
Letwin 1965, p. 15. See also LeClair 2011.1051.
Gifford & Kudrle 2015, p. 2.1052.
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Act. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits every contract, combination, in the
form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States or with foreign nations. To a large extent, Article 102 of the TFEU
is comparable with Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
prohibits persons from monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, or combining or
conspiring with any other person or persons, from monopolizing any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations.
In the beginning, the effectiveness of the antitrust legislation in the United States
appeared to be limited, prompting additional legislation.1053 In 1914, Congress
passed the Clayton Act. The Clayton Act was more specific than the Sherman Act
and made concentrations subject to controls.1054 In this act, Congress banned price
discrimination, corporate mergers, tying and exclusive dealing contracts, and inter-
locking directorates if it could substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly. In 1914, Congress also passed the Federal Trade Commission Act. This
law generally prohibited unfair competition methods and unfair or deceptive acts
affecting commerce. The Federal Trade Commission Act also created a new regula-
tory agency: the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). The FTC has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the enforcement of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The rules estab-
lished by the FTC are considered administrative codes. The FTC is authorized to
enforce and regulate its rules with injunctions, lawsuits and administrative com-
plaints if the FTC decides that an undertaking has violated the Federal Trade
Commission Act. In 1936, Congress passed the Robinson-Patmann Act in order to
protect small undertakings from being excluded from the market by large compet-
itors. With this law, Congress sought to clarify the law on price discrimination as
stated in the Clayton Act. Price discrimination was explicitly prohibited.
In 1978, the United States was the first country in the world to adopt a leniency
policy. In the United States, the leniency applicant was protected from criminal
conviction.1055 Until the reform of 1993, however, the leniency policy appeared
not to be very effective.1056 This was because of the lack of transparency, certainty
and sufficient incentives for infringing companies to apply for leniency.1057 In 1993,
the DOJ revised its leniency policy, making it more transparent, increasing the
opportunities and raising the incentive for an undertaking to report criminal
activity and cooperate with the DOJ.1058 Under the 1978 leniency programme, vio-
lators who came forward and revealed their illegal activity before an investigation
had begun were eligible to receive a complete pass from criminal prosecution.1059
The DOJ held the identity of leniency applicants and the information they provided
in strict confidence, affording them nearly the same treatment as confidential in-
formants.1060 The grant of leniency, however, was not automatic, and the DOJ re-
Letwin 1965, p. 16 et seq.1053.
Appeldoorn & Vedder 2013, p. 29.1054.
Hammond & Barnett 2008, para 5.1055.
J J.R. Borell, Jiménez & Carcía 2012, p. 2.1056.
Hammond 2004.1057.
Ibid.1058.
Ibid, footnote 1. See also: Hammond 2000 (2); Spratling 1999 (1); Spratling 1998.1059.
Hammond & Barnett 2008, para 6.1060.
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tained substantial prosecutorial discretion in the decision-making process.1061 In
1993, the leniency programme was revised in three major aspects.1062 First, the le-
niency policy was changed to ensure that amnesty would be automatic if there was
no pre-existing investigation.1063 If an undertaking came forward prior to an inves-
tigation and met the programmes’ requirements, the grant of leniency would be
certain and would not be subject to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.1064
Second, the DOJ created a leniency alternative whereby amnesty would be available
even if cooperation began after an investigation was underway.1065 Third, if an
undertaking qualified for automatic leniency, then all directors, officers, and em-
ployees who came forward with the undertaking and cooperated would also receive
automatic amnesty.1066 As a result of the 1993 amendments, the antitrust leniency
policy appears to be much more successful. The leniency policy is a great help to
the DOJ in uncovering cartels and prosecuting cartel members. Since 1993, there
has been a nearly twenty-fold increase in the application rate, and the revised
policy has resulted in uncovering large international cartels.1067
One of the most recent and most fundamental changes in antitrust legislation in
the United States came with the 2004 approval of the Antitrust Criminal Penalty
Enhancement and Reform Act (“ACPERA”). On 22 June 2004, President George W.
Bush signed ACPERA into law. The penalties for antitrust violations increased
substantially. For an individual, the maximum fine increased from USD 350,000
to USD 1 million. Additionally, the maximum prison sentence increased from three
to ten years. The maximum fine for an undertaking increased from USD 10 million
to USD 100 million. Another important change resulting from ACPERA is the new
provision that eliminates the trebling of damages for the infringing undertaking
receiving immunity.1068 Prior to 2004, an undertaking had to balance a significant
countervailing factor against the benefits of the Corporate Leniency Policy as there
was a high probability that civil lawsuits for treble damages would be filed against
the undertaking. ACPERA limits damages for the leniency applicant to the damages
suffered. Furthermore, with the introduction of ACPERA, the rule of joint and
several liability on the part of the leniency applicant has been eliminated. The
purpose of these new rules was to remove the possibly adverse consequences of
private litigation (i.e. treble damages and joint and several liability) and, by doing
so, to provide a significant additional incentive to undertakings and individuals to
be the first to cooperate with the competition authority.1069
Hammond 2004.1061.
Ibid.1062.
Ibid.1063.
Ibid.1064.
Ibid.1065.
Ibid.1066.
Borell, Jiménez & Carcía 2012, p. 2.1067.
ABA 2007, p. 758.1068.
See e.g. ABA 2009.1069.
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5.3 Similarities andDifferences Between Europe and theUnited States
Both the United States and the European systems employ safeguards in order to
prevent condemnation of corporate arrangements that benefit the public by guar-
anteeing efficiencies.1070
Although there are similarities, there are also several differences. Article 101 TFEU
has an unique objective to facilitate the integration of the market economies of
the Member States into one single market.1071 According to the CJEU, Article 101
TFEU constitutes a fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment
of the tasks entrusted to the Union and, in particular, for the functioning of the
internal market.1072 Gifford and Kudrle note that, in fact, the competition policy
was launched as an element of Europe’s unification project.1073
In terms of the differences between the United States and European antitrust re-
gimes, the differences can best be described from a historical perspective.1074 Gifford
and Kudrle describe that the relative absence of the residue of feudalism left the
United States largely free of reactionary and revolutionary impulses.1075 A doctrine
of sharply limited government of the kind most Americans espouse, is typically
only championed by minorities in Europe.1076 They note that the history of Europe
since the French revolution has generated a far broader array of basic postures to-
wards government and its role in the economy.1077
As a variant of the liberal approach in the United States there was the ordoliberal
approach in Europe which found its roots mainly in Germany.1078 This approach
holds that the state should ensure that the free market produces results close to
its theoretical potential. According to this theory, the state is to be indispensable
for the constitution and stabilization of the continuously aspired to competitive
order.1079
A key element of the ordoliberal approach to competition law is enforcement by
an independent agency of clearly stated principles. Bigger undertakings in Germany
successfully lobbied for discretionary administrative intervention instead of clear
prohibition.1080 With the introduced system – that was taken over by the other
Member States – there was more room for political intervention.1081 Gifford and
Kudrle state that European enforcement is more vulnerable to political influences.
Gifford & Kudrle 2015, p. 2.1070.
CJEU 1 June 1999 (Eco Swiss China Ltd v Benetton International NV), point 36.1071.
Ibid.1072.
Gifford & Kudrle 2015, pp. 11 and 13. See also Van de Gronden 2017, pp. 24-25; Tierno Cantella
2016.
1073.
Gifford & Kudrle 2015, p. 3.1074.
Ibid, p. 3.1075.
Ibid, p. 10.1076.
Ibid, p. 3.1077.
Ibid, p. 9.1078.
Ptak 2009, p. 125.1079.
Gifford & Kudrle 2015, p. 19.1080.
Ibid.1081.
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They also conclude that consumer welfare standard is embraced less consistently
than in the United States.1082 Other (national) interests, like supporting national
champions for example, appear to play a role according to Gifford and Kudrle.1083
The role of private enforcement within the EU evidently differs from that in the
United States, where punishment and the aim of deterrence are, next to providing
compensation, the main objectives of private enforcement. This is historically de-
termined. In the United States, private damages actions were a substitute for public
enforcement because of a lacking effective public enforcement system.1084 In Europe,
punishment and deterrence remain the province of public authority to a large ex-
tent.1085 The CJEU notes that actions for damages before national courts can make
a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the
European Union.1086 However, the aim of introducing the Antitrust Damages Direc-
tive appears limited to protecting the leniency programme and to ensuring that
victims of competition law infringements are able to receive compensation for
harm caused by competition law infringements.1087
5.4 Private Enforcement in the United States
5.4.1 Introduction
According to Sullivan and Hovenkamp, private enforcement has had a major impact
on the development of antitrust law.1088 Müller showed that, in 2005, of the 818
antitrust actions commenced in US district courts, 796 (i.e. 97 percent) were private
actions.1089 O’Conner et al. state that by including a “private” component, US anti-
trust policy effectively outsources a portion of its enforcement role and gives tax-
payers a massive return on essentially no investment.1090 Lande and David assert
that private enforcement has saved the US taxpayer tremendous enforcement costs
by shifting to the legal counsel of private claimants the enormous burdens and
risks of litigating against sophisticated, well-financed lawbreakers.1091
In the United States, at the start of the 20th century, scholars and politicians were
already of the opinion that public enforcement alone was insufficient to combat
antitrust violations. Victims should also be able to sue for compensation for the
loss suffered because of competition infringements.1092 Moreover, with the addi-
tional threat of being ordered by the civil courts to pay damages to non-government
parties, competition infringers would be deterred even more from violating antitrust
Gifford & Kudrle 2015, p. 20.1082.
Ibid, p. 23. See also Van de Gronden 2017, p. 25.1083.
Wils 2017, para 4.1084.
Gifford & Kudrle 2015, p. 20.1085.
CJEU 14 June 2011 (Pfleiderer AG v BkartA), point 29; CJEU 20 September 2001 (Courage Ltd v Bernard
Crehan), point 27.
1086.
Gifford & Kudrle 2015, p. 20.1087.
Sullivan & Hovenkamp 2003, p. 70. See also Wils 2017.1088.
Müller 2010, p. 31. Cf. Foer & Stutz 2012, p. preface xix; Segal & Whinston 2006, p. 1.1089.
Foer & Stutz 2012, p. 289. See also Müller 2010, p. 40.1090.
Lande & Davis 2008, p. 905.1091.
Foer & Stutz 2012, pp. 4 and 11. See also Davis & Lande 2012, p. 6.1092.
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legislation.1093 A third advantage of more private enforcement is that the work of
the FTC and DOJ would become less demanding. No longer would all the work be
on the shoulders of these public entities with their limited resources.1094 In this
way, private claimants would also function as enforcement agents of antitrust law
in general. The United States Supreme Court stated: “By offering potential litigants
the prospect of a recovery in three times the amount of their damages, Congress
encourages persons to serve as ‘private attorneys general”.1095 Consequently, private
claimants would not only help themselves, but also perform a public service by
doing the enforcement work of government bodies.1096
5.4.2 Private Enforcement System in the United States
The long history of private enforcement in the United States makes it interesting
to compare the American system with the German and Dutch private enforcement
systems and with the additional legislation resulting from the Antitrust Damages
Directive. The following characteristics of United States private enforcement are
discussed: the right to damages and collective redress; disclosure of information;
the passing-on of overcharges; the effect of decisions; and the limitation period.
5.4.2.1 Right to Damages and Collective Redress
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that any person who has been injured in his
“business or property” by reason of an antitrust violation, may sue to recover treble
damages, costs of the suit, and attorney's fees.1097 Once a violation, causation, and
an injury have been found, the award of attorney's fees, costs, and treble damages
is mandatory, except for the leniency applicant.1098 The trial judge or jury has no
discretion to modify it.1099 In the United States, each infringer is liable for all
damages resulting from the entire conspiracy and not just those attributable to its
own conduct.1100 A cartel infringer can be held jointly and severally liable for
damages caused by the conspiracy.1101 The United States Supreme Court has held
that there is no right for contribution, meaning a cartelist has no right to sue the
other cartelists to recover damages from them.1102 According to the Supreme Court,
there is no indication that Congress considered contribution among joint viola-
tors under the antitrust laws of the United States.1103 It means that a cartel partici-
pant held liable must bear the entire amount of the damages for which it is held
Foer & Stutz 2012, p. 7 et seq. See also Davis & Lande 2012, p. 8.1093.
Cf. Davis & Lande 2012, pp. 23 and 30.1094.
See Supreme Court 1 March 1972, Hawaii v Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262. See also Baer
2014.
1095.
Foer & Stutz 2012, p. 289.1096.
Pak & Weick 2017, p. 364.1097.
Sullivan & Hovenkamp 2003, p. 70.1098.
Ibid.1099.
Pak & Weick 2017, p. 379. See for example Supreme Court 26 May 1981, Tex. Indus., Inc. v Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 US 630, 635–36, 101 S. Ct. 2061.
1100.
Pak & Weick 2017, p. 379.1101.
Supreme Court 26 May 1981, Tex. Indus., Inc. v Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 US 630, 635–36, 101 S. Ct.
2061. Cf. Court of Appeal 2nd Circuit 25 July 1991, Chemung Canal Trust Co. v Sovran Bank/Md., 939
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liable. A cartel participant is not able to recoup damages from the other cartel
participants.
The liability for treble damages and attorney’s fees and costs, the inability to recoup
part of the damages from co-infringers means that the exposure to defendants’
claims is much more than just the actual loss or damage it caused to its own victims
of the cartel. This huge exposure appears to be one of the important reasons why
defendants in the United States are often willing to resolve antitrust claims by
settling with claimants at an early stage.1104
Pursuant to Section 4 of the Clayton Act, any person who is injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may file suit in
any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides
or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and re-
covers threefold the damages sustained by him, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
Under Section 4A of the Clayton Act, the United States is also able to claim damages.
Pursuant to Section 4C of the Clayton Act, any attorney general of a State may bring
a civil action in the name of such State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons
residing in such State to secure monetary relief for injury sustained by such natural
persons to their property by reason of any antitrust violation.
Class actions
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 permits private antitrust class actions to be
brought. Class proceedings are not mandatory. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(a), a party that seeks class certification must make a motion to the court and
satisfy several prerequisites: the representative parties must be capable of fairly
and adequately protecting the interests of the class; the members of the class must
share a common question of law or fact; the class must be so numerous that joinder
of all members is impractical; the claims or defenses of the class representatives
must be typical of the claims or defenses of the members of the class.1105
In principle, the individual members of the class must be informed of the class
action.1106 The United States Supreme Court has held that some form of notice is
constitutionally required, for it would be a violation of due process to adjudicate
absent class members’ rights without even letting them know that the case exist-
ed.1107 When individual class members can be identified through reasonable effort,
they must receive individual notice. This is often done by mail, but it could also
be done with other instruments like newspapers, television and radio advertise-
ments, internet web sites, and other methods likely to reach class members.1108
Cf. Müller 2010, p. 102.1104.
ABA 2010, p. 152 et seq. See also Foer & Stutz 2012, p.113 et seq. where not four but six requirements
are mentioned: numerosity; commonality, typically, adequacy of representation, predominance,
and superiority.
1105.
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The notice procedure gives class members the opportunity to opt out of the class.
For example, if individuals wish to proceed with their own litigation, they are en-
titled to do so if they inform the class counsel or the court that they are opting out
of accordingly.1109 If individuals do not want to be part of a class, or would rather
bring their own lawsuit individually, or do not like the terms of the settlement,
they can decline to be part of the class.1110 Individuals opting out will not receive
the benefits of any judgment in favor of the class and will not be bound by an
unfavorable result.1111
It should be noted that the United States’ legislator works on an amendment of
the class action provisions. The Senate and the President still have to approve the
amendments which are already accepted by the House of Representatives. If the
amendments will become part of legislation, it is expected that it is more difficult
for victims of cartel infringers to claim damages in antitrust cases collectively.1112
The aim of the changes is to assure fairer, more efficient outcomes for claimants
and defendants.1113
5.4.2.2 Disclosure of Information
In the United States, claimants enjoy a far-reaching pre-trial discovery process.1114
There are several ways to obtain this information. The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dures provide for initial disclosures, expert disclosures, and pretrial disclosures.1115
Most states have similar rules.1116 Litigants are required to make these disclosures.1117
The rules also allow formal discovery requests, in which a party may request certain
information.1118 The discovery rules, found in Federal Rules of Civil Procedures
Rules 26 – 37, are intended to provide parties with the means to find the location
of relevant information, to narrow the scope of the discussion, and to obtain evi-
dence for the procedure. 1119
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 allows discovery of a reasonable time, geograph-
ical and subject matter in the event the requested information is relevant for a
claim or a defense and outweighs the burden imposed on the party that is requested
to disclose the information.1120
Bronsteen & Fiss 2003, p. 1441 et seq.1109.
Alexander 2000, p. 9.1110.
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There are limits to discovery.1121 The scope of discovery is limited, recognizing that
discovery could be unduly burdensome and could be used to embarrass or harass
the other party.1122 The discovery rules recognize that discovery may be restricted
with regard to the disclosure of trade secret information or other confidential or
commercially sensitive information.1123 Compared to most European jurisdictions,
American disclosure provisions are far more liberal.1124 In the United States, private
parties seeking damages for antitrust infringements can use the far-reaching pre-
trial discovery rights to establish the case against an alleged cartelist.1125 The dis-
covery provisions assure parties equal access to information as long as it is not
privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the action prior to the trial.1126
Several scholars have stated that the broad discovery provisions are often abused
to impose substantial costs on the defendants and to oblige the defendants to
provide confidential information with the aim to settle rather than litigate the
matter.1127
The DOJ holds the identity of leniency applicants and the information they provide
in strict confidence, much like the treatment afforded to confidential informants.1128
Therefore, the DOJ does not publicly disclose the identity of a leniency applicant
or information provided by the applicant, without prior disclosure by, or in
agreement with, the applicant, unless required to do so by court order in connection
with litigation.1129 Information submitted to the DOJ can be subject to discovery
in domestic courts in the United States. For this reason, submissions to the DOJ are
typically oral, and not put in writing. Information submitted to the DOJ during
the leniency process may be discoverable in foreign courts, depending on the ap-
plicable laws of those jurisdictions. Courts in the United States appear to concur /
dissent on whether leniency and other information submitted in foreign jurisdic-
tions can be made subject to discovery in American courts.1130 Miller, Norlander
and Owens conclude that the broad scope of the American civil discovery process
remains a potential threat to the continued viability of the American and EU leni-
ency programmes and to the preservation of the EU’s specific procedures for sharing
evidence with co-defendants during an anti-cartel prosecution under the aegis of
confidentiality.1131
Foer & Stutz 2012, p. 207.1121.
Pak & Weick 2017, p. 370; Foer & Stutz 2012, p. 207.1122.
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As discussed more extensively in Section 5.5, the introduction of ACPERA has re-
sulted in requests for disclosure made to a leniency applicant or the information
provided to the leniency applicant becoming less relevant in the United States in
subsequent litigation. ACPERA provides that a leniency applicant must assist
claimants in their antitrust damages actions against the other cartel infringers by
providing relevant documents and witness testimony. In return, the leniency ap-
plicant’s obligation to compensate victims of the cartel is reduced. In fact, with
ACPERA, the Congress has provided claimants with an additional route to receiving
information.
5.4.2.3 The Passing-on Defense
In the case of Hanover Shoe, United Shoe was found to have illegally monopolized
the market for shoe manufacturing equipment, inter alia by forcing shoe manufac-
turers to lease rather than buy its best equipment.1132 Hanover Shoe, a shoe manu-
facturer and lessee of United Shoe equipment sued for damages under Section 4
of the Clayton Act. United Shoe argued that the overcharge paid by Hannover Shoe
did not lead to any injury under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, as Hanover Shoe had
passed-on the overcharge to its own purchasers by raising prices in the downstream
market. The Supreme Court held that an injury under Section 4 of the Clayton Act
is suffered whenever an illegally higher price is paid, regardless of subsequent
claims.
A defendant’s liability in a Section 4 claim is not limited to the actual harm it
brought to the claimant.1133 The rationale for the Supreme Court’s decision was
the potential risk of limiting deterrence on the one hand, and avoiding complex
litigation procedures on the other. The Supreme Court reasoned that a passing-on
defense would reduce potential recovery by direct purchasers and therefore reduce
the incentive to sue.1134 Furthermore, according to the Supreme Court, it would
fragment potential recovery among numerous indirect purchasers, each of which
would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and hence very little interest in attempting
a class action.1135
Nine years later, in the case of Illinois Brick, indirect purchasers of concrete blocks
sued a manufacturer even though they had purchased the blocks via resellers.1136
The Supreme Court denied standing to these indirect purchasers.1137 In 1968, the
Supreme Court reasoned that although this attempt to allocate the overcharge
might seem reasonable in theory, it would add a whole new dimension of complex-
ity to treble-damages suits and seriously undermine their effectiveness.1138 As in
the case of Hanover Shoe, the Supreme Court concluded that allowing indirect pur-
Supreme Court 17 June 1968, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v United Shoe Machinery Corp. – 392 U.S. 481 (1968).1132.
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chasers to divide the amount recovered amongst them would reduce the incentive
to claim damages, given the relatively small size of the damages awarded to the
individual indirect victim.1139
Nevertheless, in the Illinois Brick case, the Supreme Court made clear that there are
potential exceptional situations in which indirect purchasers may pursue damages
claims under federal antitrust legislation.1140 A claimant may have standing in the
situation of a pre-existing cost-plus contract with the purchaser, in which the indi-
rect buyer commits to buying a fixed quantity.1141 What is important for this po-
tential exception is the requirement of a “cost-plus” arrangement, under which a
product is sold at a specified mark-up above the seller’s own cost.1142 Moreover,
the indirect purchaser should have entered into an obligation to purchase a fixed
amount of the product or service.1143 Besides the exception of indirect purchasers
on the basis of a cost-plus contract, indirect purchasers may also be permitted to
sue in lieu of the direct purchaser if the violator of the infringement owns or con-
trols the direct purchaser.1144 And there are also two other exceptions. The first is
when the direct purchaser is a member of the conspiracy.1145 The second is when
the indirect purchaser “acquires” standing by receiving an express and specific as-
signment from a direct purchaser.1146
The dissenting judges in the Illinois Brick case made clear that this outcome (i.e. in-
direct purchasers not being able to claim damages) abandoned another rationale
for bringing a private claim: the need to compensate the injured parties.1147 They
protested that barring indirect purchasers from bringing a claim would ultimately
bar consumers from claiming damages.1148 The dissenting judges’ opinion is more
in line with the decisions of the CJEU.1149 In Europe, every victim able to prove
damages as a result of a competition law infringement may claim damages,
whereas under federal legislation in the United States, indirect victims of a cartel
are not able to claim for damages, with some exceptions.
In the case of Kansas v UtiliCorp, the Supreme Court denied standing to consumers
who paid overblown natural gas prices to an intermediary (a public entity).1150 Even
though the public utility passed-on the overcharge charged by gas suppliers to
consumers pursuant to a fixed markup set up by regulators, the Supreme Court
refused to apply the cost-plus exception described in the cases of Hanover Shoe and
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Illinois Brick.1151 The Supreme Court has not spoken on this issue since the indirect
purchaser rule was stated.1152 The case of Kansas v UtiliCorp indicates that the viabil-
ity of the cost-plus exception is questionable.1153 Some courts have expressly ques-
tioned whether the cost-plus exception still exists.1154
The indirect purchaser rule has been the subject of much criticism.1155 For example,
according to several commentators, direct purchasers often do not have an incentive
to sue as they have passed-on the overcharge. Besides the fact that they are not
harmed, direct purchasers are often reluctant to disrupt important supplier rela-
tionships. Hence, it is likely that direct purchasers are often less reliable private
enforcers than indirect purchasers.1156
Notwithstanding the failure to reform the passing-on defense on a national basis,
the political backlash against the decision was widespread.1157 Contradicting the
Supreme Court’s indirect purchasers rule and denying the passing-on defense,
several states have adopted statutes giving indirect purchasers a cause of action to
enforce state competition laws.1158 These so-called “Illinois Brick repealer statutes”,
in addition to enabling parallel litigation at state and federal levels (and hence
adding to the complexity of the litigation), introduced an additional dimension to
the debate on the passing-on defense.1159
It has been questioned whether these Illinois Brick repealer statutes were validly
passed by the states. The Supreme Court has upheld indirect purchaser recovery
under these Illinois repealer statutes, stating that they were not preempted by
federal antitrust law:1160
“When viewed properly, Illinois Brick was a decision construing the federal antitrust
laws, not a decision defining the interrelationship between the federal and state an-
titrust laws. The congressional purposes on which Illinois Brick was based provide
no support for a finding that state indirect purchaser statutes are preempted by
federal law. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed.”
With the introduction of the Illinois Brick repealer statutes, however, claimants will
commence their suits in the most suitable forum. There is a possibility of forum
shopping given that there are differences between the federal rules and the rules
of the various states.1161 Indirect purchasers will have to claim damages under state
law, whereas direct claimants can often choose between the federal and state levels.
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A claimant would have to assess whether its choice is defensible or whether there
might be a jurisdiction problem. Mainly because of the differences in the regulations
at the state and federal levels, and between states, private enforcement litigation
has become complex, a situation which has prevented efficient litigation. One of
the Supreme Court’s arguments for denying standing to indirect purchasers was
the avoidance of litigation complexity. It can be concluded, however, that the
outcome of prohibiting indirect purchasers from claiming damages at the federal
level but not on a state level has had the opposite effect.1162
In addition, next to the treble damages, the overcompensation of the direct victims
combined with the compensation of the indirect victims may result in an obligation
to pay more damages than the loss or damage actually suffered by the victims.
Furthermore, facilitating private enforcement of antitrust laws only by direct pur-
chasers may be insufficient. Direct purchasers do not always have an incentive to
sue. They often have an interest in maintaining a good relationship with the sup-
plier. Moreover, direct purchasers are often able (at least partly) to pass-on an
overcharge. The Supreme Court’s prohibition against indirect purchasers claiming
damages even appears to have had an adverse outcome.1163 Although the Supreme
Court feared limiting deterrence, denying indirect purchasers from compensation
could limit the deterrence factor.1164
5.4.2.4 Effect of National Decisions
One of the unique factors of private enforcement is the multiplicity of claimants,
both governmental and private, authorized to challenge allegedly unlawful conduct
under federal and state antitrust laws.1165 The private enforcement system in the
United States has evolved into a system consisting of two federal antitrust agencies,
additional federal agencies that review industry-specific transactions, 50 state at-
torneys general and thousands of private parties.1166
Depending on the case, a final criminal or civil judgment in a government antitrust
action may have either a prima facie effect (i.e. unless rebutted, it is sufficient to
prove the violation) or a conclusive effect in subsequent private litigation (i.e. a
collateral estoppel effect).1167 Under the collateral estoppel doctrine, a judgment
in one case is conclusive on the issues litigated in that case between those parties,
and a party from that earlier case is precluded from re-litigating the issues from
that case in a different, subsequent legal action, provided certain criteria are met.1168
The court has a broad discretion to decide whether collateral estoppel would be
fair in any particular case. Even where the requirements of collateral estoppel are
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not satisfied, Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act still provides an invaluable advantage
to private claimants.1169 If a court ultimately refuses to apply collateral estoppel,
the prior final judgment may nonetheless be offered as prima facie evidence of lia-
bility in private litigation under Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act.1170 Claimants may
use prior government rulings to establish their prima facie case, essentially arriving
at the courthouse steps with a rebuttable presumption of having proved their
case.1171
5.4.2.5 Limitation Period
Section 4(b) of the Clayton Act creates a four-year limitation period for antitrust
damage actions.1172 The limitation period begins when the cause of action accrues,
which generally does not happen until damages are ascertainable. If the violation
has already arisen, but the existence of injury is unknown, or the damage is only
speculative, then the limitation period will not begin. Generally, this implies that
a claimant must file its claim within four years following the defendant’s injurious
act, once the claimant was or should have been aware of the existence and source
of the injury.1173
For example, if a secret cartel is formed in 2006 but is not discovered and broken
up until 2011, the limitation period will not begin to run until 2011. Likewise,
distinctive, repeated actions may serve to re-start the running of the limitation
period.1174
Besides the four-year limitation period, the Clayton Act authorizes the suspension
of the running of a limitation period for a civil action if the DOJ or the FTC pursues
a criminal or civil cause of action against the targeted defendants.1175 The Clayton
Act provides that whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the
United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws,
but not including an action under Section 15a, the running of the limitation period
is suspended during the pendency thereof and one year later.1176 Suspending the
running of a limitation period during governmental litigation seeks to balance the
competing policy objectives of the antitrust laws.1177 On the one hand, the policy
retains private litigation as a tool for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.1178
On the other hand it provides legal certainty in applying the statute’s tolling pro-
vision to avoid overly prolonged antitrust litigation.1179
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5.5 Leniency Policy in the United States
5.5.1 Introduction
The DOJ has a policy of providing leniency to an undertaking that reports its illegal
activity at an early stage.1180 Providing leniency in the United States means not
charging the undertaking criminally for the activity reported.1181
An undertaking can avoid criminal conviction and fines, and an individual can
avoid criminal conviction, prison terms, and fines, by being the first to confess
participation in a criminal antitrust violation, fully cooperating with the DOJ, and
meeting specified conditions set out in the DOJ's leniency programme.
5.5.2 Enforcement by the DOJ
The antitrust division of the DOJ is the sole enforcer of criminal federal antitrust
laws. The leniency programme applies to criminal violations of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, which is the primary criminal statute enforced by the DOJ. The
wording in Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not indicate whether certain violations
are to be addressed criminally or civilly, but the DOJ has a long-standing policy of
seeking criminal indictments only in cases involving “per se” violations of Section
1, such as agreements to fix prices, bid-rigging, or market or purchaser allocation.
5.5.3 Developments in the United States’ Leniency Programme
The DOJ first implemented a leniency programme in 1978. Under this programme,
the DOJ received approximately one leniency application per year.1182 The pro-
gramme did not lead to the detection of a single international cartel.1183
Over the last decades, the cartel enforcement landscape has changed dramatically.
In the early 1990s, the sanctions imposed in criminal cartel cases brought by the
DOJ were considered insufficiently severe, and the original Corporate Leniency
Programme was not providing cases.1184 This has changed substantially. In the last
decades, the world has seen an expansion of effective leniency programmes, ever-
increasing sanctions for cartel offenses, a growing global movement to hold indi-
viduals criminally accountable, and increased international cooperation among
enforcers in cartel investigations.1185 Nowadays, in over 90 percent of the cartel
cases in the United States, leniency applicants assist in the investigations.1186
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The DOJ has spent the last two decades building and implementing a carrot and
stick enforcement strategy.1187 This strategy couples rewards for voluntary disclosure
and timely cooperation pursuant to the DOJ's Corporate Leniency Programme on
the one hand and severe sanctions on the other.1188 The DOJ substantially revised
the programme with the issuance of the Corporate Leniency Policy of 1993 and the
Leniency Policy for Individuals in 1994. Making its leniency policy more transparent,
the DOJ increased the opportunities, and raised the incentives, for companies to
report criminal activity and cooperate with the DOJ.1189 The leniency policy became
more predictable for undertakings. Since then, there has been nearly a twenty-fold
increase in the application rate, and it has resulted in cracking dozens of large in-
ternational cartels, convictions and jail sentences for culpable American and foreign
executives, and considerable corporate fines.1190
Although the leniency programme encouraged violators of antitrust laws to reveal
their conduct to the DOJ, a primary concern was that litigation would likely follow
from a DOJ investigation, which would reduce the incentives for early cooperation
with the antitrust authority.1191 In response to this concern, ACPERA was passed
in 2004.1192 ACPERA encourages self-reporting by substantially limiting civil liabil-
ity for a leniency-qualifying undertaking. ACPERA provides that undertakings that
successfully enter the leniency programme will have to pay only the actual damages
(as opposed to treble damages) plus attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest.1193 ACPERA
immunizes the leniency applicant from joint and several liability for the acts of
their co-conspirators.1194 With ACPERA, the amount of damages to be paid by the
leniency applicant for an antitrust violation litigated under federal or state law is
limited under both federal and state laws, whereas competitors that do not receive
amnesty can be sued, and obliged to pay all the damages awarded multiplied by
three.1195
Congress chose to increase the incentives for illegal-cartel participants to cooperate
with antitrust prosecutors. According to Harrison and Bell, this has been accom-
plished by statutorily limiting cooperating undertakings’ civil liability to actual
damages rather than treble damages in return for the undertaking’s cooperation
in both the resulting criminal case as well as any subsequent civil suit based on
the same conduct.1196
Harrison and Bell argue that the risk of treble damages under the Clayton Act ap-
peared to be the greatest deterrent to applying for amnesty after 1993.1197 According
to them, treble damages actions and the existence of joint and several liability may
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even have served as a deterrent to organizations that have considered reporting
violations to antitrust agencies outside of the United States.1198
Harrison and Bell state that ACPERA “sweetens incentives for antitrust violators to
cooperate under the Antitrust Division’s leniency programme.”1199 They conclude
that with ACPERA, the legislator is attempting to lessen the risks associated with
the decision to apply for amnesty.1200 Harrison and Bell also refer to a statement
made by Senator Hatch:1201
“Though this program has been successful, a major disincentive to self reporting still
exists – the threat of exposure to a possible treble damage lawsuit by the victims of
the conspiracy. . . This provision addresses this disincentive to self-reporting. Specifi-
cally, it amends the antitrust laws to modify the damage recovery from a corporation
and its executives to actual damages. In other words, the total liability of a successful
leniency applicant would be limited to single damages without joint and several lia-
bility. Thus, the applicant would only be liable for the actual damages attributable
to its own conduct, rather than being liable for three times the damages caused by
the entire unlawful conspiracy.”
Hence, in addition to immunity from prosecution by the government, a successful
leniency applicant is exempt from civil treble-damages liability. Besides de-trebling
the damages, another incentive to cooperate is the amnesty from joint and several
liability for the cooperating defendant in subsequent civil litigation.1202 At the same
time, the claimants remain able to recover full and treble damages from each of
the other cartel infringers.
To obtain this relief, the leniency applicant must cooperate with the claimants,
providing witnesses and documents to help them build cases against the other de-
fendants.1203 Hence, the leniency applicant not only has to assist the public author-
ities, but also the private claimants, and in return receives immunity from criminal
punishment and a reduction of the compensation to be paid.
ACPERA requires the leniency applicant to cooperate satisfactorily with claimants
in civil procedures by providing them with documentation and reasonable access
to potential witnesses without unreasonable delay.1204 Several legal practitioners
have criticized the vagueness of the term “satisfactory cooperation”.1205 It is often
the subject of courtroom discussion.1206
In addition to the incentives to apply for leniency, ACPERA also provides an incen-
tive to victims of a cartel to claim damages. Since the leniency applicant will help
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the claimants in filing suit against the other antitrust violators, it will be easier for
claimants to successfully sue the other cartel infringers.
Hausfeld states that, since the advent of ACPERA and the amendment to limit civil
liability, amnesty applications have markedly increased, as have successful inves-
tigations and the collection of fines.1207
The DOJ believes that limiting damages has made its Corporate Leniency Programme
“even more effective” at detecting and prosecuting cartels.1208
In May 2009, in a letter sent by the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association
(ABA) to the Senate and House of Representatives,1209 the ABA drew attention to
the existing debate about whether the actual damages limitation in ACPERA is ef-
fective.1210 The ABA stated that those in favor of the de-trebling provision point
out that by reporting cartel conduct, an amnesty applicant is, in many cases, effec-
tively ending an ongoing crime. Reporting the crime to the DOJ, in many cases,
ultimately has the effect of alerting the victims of the crime.1211 Further, by tying
the damages limitation to cooperation with the civil claimants, ACPERA makes it
more likely for the victims of the crime to ultimately receive compensation for
their losses.1212 Early cooperation of the amnesty applicant with the civil claimants
makes it more likely for claimants to be able to build strong cases against other
members of the conspiracy.1213
According to its proponents, the de-trebling provision removes a barrier to reporting
criminal conduct. Many view the provision as a useful means to encourage firms
to come forward and cooperate with the DOJ, and increase the level of cooperation
available to claimants.1214 The ABA stated that the provision maintains the total
potential recovery available to civil claimants. It improves their chances of obtaining
that recovery by requiring the leniency applicant to cooperate with the civil
claimants.1215 The ABA points out that ACPERA provides that a leniency applicant
is eligible for the damages limitation only after the court has affirmatively deter-
mined that the leniency applicant has provided satisfactory cooperation to the civil
claimants.1216 According to the ABA, this provision ensures that the victims of the
conduct will, in exchange for lower damages from the leniency applicant, receive
meaningful cooperation that will make them better able to obtain recovery from
the other members of the conspiracy.1217
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Others in the field are less convinced of the effectiveness of the ACPERA rules for
de-trebling. Leveridge and Martin hold that in recent years there has been no evi-
dence that de-trebling has incentivized companies to seek amnesty.1218 According
to critics, undertakings seek amnesty today for the same reasons they did before
ACPERA, i.e. to avoid prison sentences for high-level executives, to escape significant
criminal fines, and to win the “prisoner’s dilemma” race to obtain amnesty.1219 In
their view, the real determining factors for seeking corporate amnesty are the same:
(1) high-level executives being able to avoid prison terms; (2) minimizing exposure
on a global scale; and (3) winning the race to the courthouse to obtain amnesty.1220
The ABA states that according to the opponents of de-trebling, de-trebling does not
appear to add anything.1221 In addition, the opponents argue that corporate amnesty
applicants have routinely resolved civil cases in the United States in exchange for
cooperation and relatively small settlement amounts representing single damages
or less based on the volume of sales by the amnesty applicant, rather than total
sales.1222 In other words, according to the critics, the de-trebling measurement does
not have a particularly significant effect.
In 2004, legislators decided that the de-trebling clause would be in force for five
years. After those five years, the recovery limitations would be renewed if the de-
trebling had proved to be an effective incentive for cartel conspirators. If the exper-
iment failed and the de-trebling provision lapsed, the enhanced fines and impris-
onment terms would automatically be reinstated.
According to the ABA, five years turned out to be an insufficient amount of time
to assess the effectiveness of the damages limitation.1223 The ABA made clear that
it was difficult to gauge the effectiveness of the provision based on the limited record
thus far.1224 Nor were there any reported cases discussing the implications of the
leniency applicant’s requirement to cooperate with the civil claimants.1225
In July 2011, the US Government Accountability Office published a report concern-
ing the 2004 antitrust reforms.1226 The US Government Accountability Office found
that ACPERA may have resulted in little change in the number of leniency applica-
tions submitted: 78 had been submitted in the six years before ACPERA versus 81
in the six years after.1227 Furthermore, the US Government Accountability Office
concluded that most defense attorneys representing leniency applicants indicated
that ACPERA’s offer of relief from some civil damages had only a slightly positive
effect on leniency applicants’ decisions to apply for leniency; the threat of jail time
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and corporate fines appeared to be the most motivating factors both before and
after ACPERA’s enactment.1228
The US Government Accountability Office also concluded that after the ACPERA’s
enactment, nearly twice as many successful applicants reported criminal cartel
activity about which the DOJ had no prior knowledge. In addition, higher fines
and jail times were imposed in criminal cartel cases after the ACPERA’s enactment,
although DOJ officials emphasized that neither trend is primarily attributable to
ACPERA.1229 Other factors – such as an increase in leniency programmes in other
countries – may also have affected the number and types of leniency applications
submitted over this time period, making it difficult to isolate ACPERA’s impact.1230
The US Government Accountability Office also paid attention to how the ACPERA
possibly affected claimants and defendants in civil proceedings. Claimants’ attorneys
from most of the civil cases indicated that ACPERA’s cooperation provision –
which provides the leniency applicant with relief from civil damages in exchange
for cooperation with claimants – had strengthened and streamlined their cases.1231
Based on several interviews, the US Government Accountability Office concluded
that the claimants’ cases were strengthened in two ways: it helped to prove the
case and it helped claimants to reach higher settlements with non-leniency defen-
dants.1232
From the above, it can be concluded that although other factors also play a role,
ACPERA appears to have at least some positive influence on the overall effectiveness
of competition law enforcement. De-trebling the damages and removing joint and
several liability have possibly led to more successful applicants reporting criminal
cartel activity to the DOJ. Although it can be argued that other factors played a role
in the total number of leniency applications and the total number of leniency ap-
plications did not significantly increase, the number of cases in which leniency
applications led to knowledge about cartels previously unknown to the DOJ in-
creased once ACPERA was introduced. Furthermore, it is equally interesting that
because of the ACPERA rules on assisting claimants in private proceedings, private
litigation appears to be easier and more beneficial for a claimant, as the assistance
of the leniency applicant is considered useful. This assistance strengthens claimants’
cases by assisting in proving the case and helping claimants to reach higher settle-
ments with non-leniency defendants.
As the de-trebling clause was a five-year sunset provision, lawmakers had to decide
whether to extend the provision. In June 2009, they decided to postpone the expi-
ration of ACPERA by one year. In 2010, the Congress passed a bill extending the
civil leniency provisions of the ACPERA for another ten years. With this extension,
ACPERA's civil leniency provisions will expire on 22 June 2020. Depending inter
alia on surveys regarding the effectiveness of the ACPERA clauses, such as the GAO
report, the Congress will decide in 2020 whether or not to extend the provision.
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As it seems to have positive consequences for the overall legal antitrust system,
and negative consequences are unlikely, the author’s conservative assessment is
that the provision will remain part of the legislation beyond 22 June 2020 as well.
5.5.4 Current Leniency Policy
5.5.4.1 Introduction
As already described, through the DOJ’s leniency policy, undertakings and individu-
als can avoid criminal conviction, prison terms, and fines by being the first to
confess participation in a criminal antitrust violation, fully cooperating with the
DOJ and meeting other specified conditions.1233 As described above, since 1993 the
DOJ has heavily relied on the leniency programme to uncover and prosecute illegal
cartel activity.1234 Leniency is available for undertakings either before or after a
DOJ investigation has begun. The Corporate Leniency Policy includes two types of
leniency: “Type A Leniency” and “Type B Leniency”.
5.5.4.2 Immunity
Type A Leniency is available only before the DOJ has received any information
about the activity being reported from any source. Type B is available even after
the DOJ has received information about the activity.
Leniency Before an Investigation Has Begun (Type A)
Leniency is granted to an undertaking reporting illegal antitrust activity before an
investigation has begun if the following six conditions are met:
i. at the time the undertaking comes forward, the DOJ has not received informa-
tion about the activity from any other source;
ii. upon the undertaking's discovery of the activity, the undertaking took prompt
and effective action to terminate its participation in the activity;
iii. the undertaking reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and
provides full, continuing, and complete cooperation to the DOJ throughout
the investigation;
iv. the confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as opposed to isolated
confessions of individual executives or officials;
v. where possible, the undertaking makes restitution to injured parties; and
vi. the undertaking did not coerce another party to participate in the activity and
clearly was not the leader in, or the originator of, the activity.
If the undertaking does not meet all six conditions of the Type A Leniency, it may
still qualify for leniency if it meets the conditions of Type B Leniency.
Alternative Requirements for Leniency (Type B)
After the DOJ has received information about the illegal antitrust activity, whether
this is before or after an investigation is formally opened, an undertaking qualifies
for leniency if the following conditions are met:
GAO Report 2011, p. 7.1233.
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i. the undertaking is the first to come forward and qualify for leniency with re-
spect to the activity;
ii. at the time the undertaking comes in, the DOJ does not have evidence against
the undertaking that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction;
iii. upon the undertaking's discovery of the activity, the undertaking took prompt
and effective action to terminate its part in the activity;
iv. the undertaking reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and
provides full, continuing, and complete cooperation that advances the DOJ
in its investigation;
v. the confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as opposed to isolated
confessions of individual executives or officials;
vi. where possible, the undertaking makes restitution to injured parties; and
vii. the DOJ determines that granting leniency would not be unfair to others,
considering the nature of the activity, the confessing undertaking's role in
the activity, and when the undertaking comes forward.
In the following, some characteristics of the American leniency programme are
further discussed.
5.5.4.3 Not the Leader or Originator
Part A of the Corporate Leniency Policy requires that “[t]he corporation did not
coerce another party to participate in the illegal activity and clearly was not the
leader in, or originator of, the activity.” Similarly, Part B of the Corporate Leniency
Policy requires that: “The Division determined that granting leniency would not
be unfair to others, considering the nature of the illegal activity, the confessing
corporation's role in it, and when the corporation comes forward.”
The leniency policy refers to “the leader” and “the originator of the activity” rather
than “a” leader or “an” originator. The DOJ makes clear that applicants are disqual-
ified from obtaining leniency only if they were clearly the single organizer or single
ringleader of a conspiracy.1235 If, for example, there are two ringleaders in a five-
firm conspiracy, then all of the firms, including the two leaders, are potentially
eligible for leniency.1236 Or, if in a two-firm conspiracy, each firm played a decisive
role in the operation of the cartel, both firms may qualify for leniency.1237 In addi-
tion, an applicant will not be disqualified under this condition just because it is
the largest undertaking in the industry or has the greatest market share if it was
not clearly the single organizer or single ringleader of the conspiracy.1238 Wherever
possible, the DOJ has construed or interpreted its programme in favor of accepting
an applicant into the leniency programme in order to provide the maximum amount
of incentives and opportunities for companies to come forward and report their
illegal activity.1239
Hammond & Barnett 2008, paras 13 and 14. See also Spratling 1998.1235.
Hammond & Barnett 2008, paras 13 and 14.1236.
Ibid.1237.
Ibid.1238.
Ibid.1239.
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5.5.4.4 The Winner Takes It All
Under both Type A and Type B, only the first qualifying undertaking may be
granted leniency for a particular antitrust conspiracy. Condition (i) of Type A leni-
ency requires that the DOJ has not yet received information about the illegal anti-
trust activity being reported from any other source, and Condition (i) of Type B le-
niency requires that the undertaking be the first to come forward and qualify for
leniency.
Under the policy that only the first qualifying undertaking receives conditional
leniency, there have been severe differences in the disposition of the criminal lia-
bility of undertakings whose respective leniency applications to the DOJ were very
close in time. The winner takes it all. If an undertaking applies for leniency only
one minute after the other undertaking, the second applicant will receive nothing
from its leniency application. Meanwhile, the other undertaking will receive im-
munity from criminal sanctions and could reduce the damages to be paid in private
enforcement actions.
5.5.4.5 Amnesty-Plus and Penalty-Plus
The Amnesty-Plus rule is a part of the American leniency programme and is worth
mentioning. If an undertaking is under investigation for an antitrust conspiracy
but is too late to obtain leniency for that conspiracy, it can still receive benefits in
its plea agreement for that conspiracy by reporting its involvement in another an-
titrust conspiracy. The undertaking will receive immunity from prison terms and
fines in the other cartel, and in addition, the DOJ will recommend to the sentencing
court that the undertaking receive a substantial additional reduction in its fine for
its participation in the first cartel.
A large percentage of the DOJ's investigations have been initiated as a result of
evidence developed during an investigation of a completely separate conspiracy.
This pattern has led the DOJ to take a proactive approach to attracting leniency
applications by encouraging subjects and targets of investigations to consider
whether they may qualify for leniency in other markets where they compete.
An undertaking that decides not to take advantage of the Amnesty Plus opportunity
risks potentially harsh consequences (“Penalty-Plus”).1240 If an undertaking participates
in a second antitrust offense but does not report it, and the conduct is later dis-
covered and successfully prosecuted, where appropriate, the DOJ will urge the
sentencing court to consider the undertaking's and any culpable executive's failure
to report the conduct voluntarily as an aggravating sentencing factor.1241 The DOJ
will request that the court impose a term and conditions of probation for the un-
dertaking pursuant to U.S.S.G. §8D1.1, and the DOJ will pursue a fine or jail sentence
at or above the upper end of the Guidelines range.1242 Moreover, where multiple
Griffin 2003.1240.
Ibid.1241.
Ibid.1242.
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convictions occur, an undertaking's or individual's guidelines calculations may be
increased on the basis of prior criminal history.1243 For an undertaking, the failure
to self-report under the Amnesty Plus programme could mean the difference
between a potential fine as high as 80 percent or more of the volume of affected
commerce versus no fine at all in relation to the other cartel. For the individual,
it could mean the difference between a lengthy jail sentence and avoiding jail alto-
gether.1244
5.5.4.6 Restitution to Injured Parties
Pursuant to the Corporate Leniency Policy, undertakings make restitution to injured
parties. Paragraph 2(g) of the model leniency letter requires that the applicant make
“all reasonable efforts, to the satisfaction of the DOJ, to pay restitution.” Thus, the
applicant must demonstrate to the DOJ that it has satisfied its obligation to pay
restitution before being granted final leniency.1245 Restitution is normally resolved
through civil actions with private claimants.
There is a strong presumption in favor of requiring restitution in leniency situations.
Restitution does not have to take place only where, as a practical matter, it is not
possible.1246 Examples of situations where an applicant might be excused from
making restitution include circumstances where the applicant is bankrupt and
prohibited by court order from undertaking additional obligations, or where there
was only one victim of the conspiracy and it is now defunct.1247 Another example
of a situation where the DOJ will not require the applicant to pay full restitution
is if doing so will substantially jeopardize the organization's continued viability.1248
5.5.4.7 Cooperation with private claimants
As comprehensively discussed in Section 5.5.3, the new ACPERA rules provide that
the immunity recipient does have an incentive to cooperate satisfactorily with
private claimants. The leniency applicant can avoid treble damages and joint and
several liability if it cooperates with private claimants satisfactorily. In other words,
if it helps claimants with their claims against the other cartel infringers.1249
5.5.4.8 Marker Protection
The DOJ has established a marker system to hold an applicant’s place in line for
leniency while the applicant gathers more information to support its leniency ap-
plication. Many foreign authorities, including in Germany and the Netherlands,
as well as the European Commission, have adopted the idea of a marker system.
Griffin 2003.1243.
Hammond & Barnett 2008, para 20.1244.
Ibid.1245.
Ibid.1246.
Ibid.1247.
Ibid.1248.
Hausfeld & Sweeney 2017, p. 11 et seq. GAO Report 2011, p. 26.1249.
CHAPTER 5212
LENIENCY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES5.5
The DOJ states that it understands that when a corporate counsel first obtains indi-
cations of a possible criminal antitrust violation, the undertaking’s managers may
not have sufficient information to know for certain whether the undertaking has
engaged in such a violation. It may be too early to admit to a violation, but an ad-
mission is required to obtain a conditional leniency letter.1250
In this situation, the DOJ frequently gives a leniency applicant a marker for a finite
period of time to hold its place at the front of the line for leniency. The counsel
gathers the additional information through an internal investigation to perfect the
client's leniency application. The marker ensures in effect that no other undertaking
can “leapfrog” the applicant with the marker.1251
To obtain a marker, a counsel must do the following: (1) report that he or she has
uncovered some information or evidence indicating that his or her client has en-
gaged in a criminal antitrust violation (e.g. price fixing, bid rigging, capacity restric-
tion, or allocation of markets, purchasers, or sales or production volumes); (2) dis-
close the general nature of the conduct discovered; (3) identify the industry, product,
or service involved in terms that are specific enough to allow the DOJ to determine
whether leniency is still available and to protect the marker for the applicant; and
(4) identify the client.1252
With respect to the product or service involved in the violation, in some cases,
identification of the industry is sufficient for the DOJ to determine whether leniency
is available.1253 For example, there may be no pending investigations of any products
or services in that particular industry. In other cases, identification of the specific
product or service or other identifying information, such as the geographic location
of affected purchasers or one or more of the subject companies, may be necessary
in order for the DOJ to determine whether leniency is available.1254
Because companies are urged to seek leniency at the first indication of wrongdoing,
the evidentiary standard for obtaining a marker is relatively low, particularly in
situations where the DOJ is not already investigating the wrongdoing. The burden
is higher when the DOJ is already in possession of information about the illegal
activity.1255
A marker is provided for a limited period.1256 The length of time an applicant is
given to perfect its leniency application depends on factors such as the location
and number of undertaking employees that the counsel needs to interview, the
amount and location of documents the counsel needs to review, and whether the
DOJ already has an ongoing investigation at the time the marker is requested.1257
Hammond & Barnett 2008, para 2.1250.
Department of Justice 2012, pp. 99-100. See also Hammond & Barnett 2008, para 2.1251.
Hammond & Barnett 2008, para 2.1252.
Ibid.1253.
Ibid.1254.
Ibid.1255.
See Department of Justice 2012, pp. 99-100.1256.
Hammond & Barnett 2008, para 2.1257.
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A 30-day period for an initial marker is common, particularly in situations where
the DOJ is not yet investigating the wrongdoing.1258 At the DOJ's discretion, if nec-
essary, the marker may be extended for an additional finite period as long as the
applicant demonstrates it is making a good-faith effort to complete its application
in a timely manner.1259
5.6 Evaluation of Competition Law Enforcement in the US and
Comparison with Europe
Concerning private enforcement, the United States is far ahead of Europe in terms
of the number of cases. As discussed in Chapter IV, it has only become a serious
part of the European legal system since the start of the millennium.
The successful history of antitrust regulation and private enforcement in the United
States can be attributed to its policy towards civil claims. In the United States,
private enforcement is in fact seen as a welcome instrument, not only to compensate
victims of the infringement, but also to punish infringers and to function as a de-
terrent instrument. Within Europe, the public role of the governments and compe-
tition authorities, especially regarding deterrence and punishment is most impor-
tant. Private enforcement is clearly in second place.
The successful history of antitrust regulation and private enforcement in the United
States can also be attributed to the legislation, at least partly. The private enforce-
ment system provides special benefits for victims and leniency applicants. In addi-
tion to the fact that a claimant can be awarded three times the damages, the
claimant can focus on litigating against one cartel infringer for the complete
damages, and it can also rather easily receive adequate compensation for the attor-
ney fees. In Germany and the Netherlands it is, except in cases involving IP issues,
common to be awarded only a small portion of the attorney fees.
It also appears that the civil procedural rules are helping claimants in the United
States more so than in Germany and the Netherlands. For example, the United
States is known for the possibility of filing suit as a class. This can make it interesting
to file a suit on behalf of a group even when the damage suffered by each victim
is limited. For victims in Europe, this appears to be more difficult. Some European
countries do have some kind of class action options; others do not. Regarding the
disclosure of information in the United States, it is particularly interesting that le-
niency applicants have to provide information to claimants in antitrust damages
actions in return for a limitation of the damages to be compensated. Since the in-
troduction of ACPERA, apparently more leniency applications have been filed
which the competition authority was not aware of. In addition – and it is even
more obvious – ACPERA appears to assist claimants in receiving compensation.
In Europe, such a system is unknown.
Hammond & Barnett 2008, para 2.1258.
Ibid.1259.
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In the United States, the passing-on defense is not possible at federal level, which
makes litigating more straightforward for direct victims. A direct victim can claim
all the overcharges. At federal level, indirect victims of a cartel are not able to claim
damages because it would jeopardize the effectiveness and ease of claiming for
damages. In Germany and the Netherlands, deterrence and ease of filing a lawsuit
are unknown arguments to justify the prohibition of the passing-on defense. Al-
though the CJEU holds that obtaining compensation should be effective, this is not
limited to claims for direct victims. In Europe, compensating all victims of a com-
petition-law infringement is the highest priority. The disadvantage of the US system
could well be that direct victims do not want to sue their supplier. To them, it may
be more important to maintain a good relationship with the supplier. Furthermore,
a direct purchaser does not always suffer a loss because it is often able to pass-on
the overcharge. Another difficulty in the United States exists because of the Illinois
Brick repealer statutes. They make it possible for indirect claimants also to claim
damages. In fact, the multiplicity of claim options at the federal and state levels,
along with the various regimes, makes the American system complex.
Up until 1991, the United States was the only country in the world that had a leni-
ency policy. It is interesting that in the United States, unlike in Europe, only the
first applicant receives immunity from fines and there is no reduction for any
other applicant. In addition, an important part of American public law enforcement
is the jail sentences for cartel infringers. The US leniency system also prevents
executives from going to jail. As mentioned in the GAO report, avoiding a prison
sentence is one of the main factors in applying for leniency, besides avoiding high
corporate fines. Although jail sentences are possible in some Member States, espe-
cially regarding bid rigging, prison sentences comparable to those ordered in the
United States are unknown in Germany and the Netherlands. Therefore, this extra
incentive that encourages undertakings to apply for leniency in the United States
does not exist in Germany and the Netherlands. In the United States, the aim of
avoiding prison time appears to be an important factor in the decision whether to
apply for leniency. It means that undertakings will make a different cost-benefit
analysis for the United States than for Germany and the Netherlands.1260
Another difference between the European systems discussed in this study and the
US system is that in the Unites States a leniency applicant is required to compensate
its direct victims. In Europe, such an obligation does not exist. In some countries,
there is a possibility of receiving a lower fine from the competition authority if the
cartel infringer compensates the victims of the infringement. If the fine is already
zero because of full immunity, there appears little incentive for a leniency applicant
with immunity to compensate the cartel victims. However, for the other cartel in-
fringers, it could be worthwhile in order to receive a lower fine.
Another benefit for an immunity recipient in the United States is that the damages
are de-trebled and the leniency applicant, if it cooperates with the victims of the
cartel that claim for damages, is only liable for the damages attributable to it. The
leniency applicant is exempted from the standard rule of joint and several liability,
See Section 2.2.3.1.1260.
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which remains applicable for all other cartel infringers. It provides an additional
incentive to apply for leniency in the United States, along with avoiding possible
prison sentences and fines. Although the precise effect of the compensation benefits
is hard to determine, there does appear to be some positive effect on the ef-
fectiveness of the leniency programme.
In Europe, where the negative side effects of private enforcement for the leniency
policy are just partly removed and private enforcement is growing, it is likely that
private enforcement actions will have negative consequences on the effectiveness
of the leniency programme because of the damages that will most likely have to
be paid. It could become less worthwhile to apply for leniency. Chapter 2 makes
clear that damages claims are part of the overall consideration in deciding whether
to apply for leniency or not. And as described, leniency is important. As seen in
Chapter 4, the leniency programme is indirectly the starting point for much of the
private enforcement cases that are pending.
With ACPERA, a leniency applicant in the United States also has an incentive to
help a claimant by providing information in the subsequent litigation. This is a
condition for reducing the compensation to be paid to the victims of the cartel.
Where it is normally difficult to receive the information from cartel infringers,
claimants in the United States receive help from an unexpected corner: one of the
competition infringers. It becomes easier for victims of cartels to collect evidence
and receive compensation.
The American approach is diametrically opposed to how information sharing and
provision are discussed in the European Union. Whereas public and private enforce-
ment are seen in the EU as two different enforcement routes, and information
collected as part of the public enforcement process is seen as something that should
be protected, in the United States the two systems are well intertwined. The public
leniency process in fact helps to stimulate private enforcement.
In Europe, it is quite the opposite. The leniency applicant is protected to some extent
in order to prevent disclosure of leniency information. The result is that it is more
difficult for claimants to successfully claim damages. The case law shows that it is
the leniency applicant who creates the momentum for starting private enforcement
actions. The consequences of the European system are twofold: claimants are
frustrated in their search for evidence and the protection offered to a leniency ap-
plicant is seen as a sham, as the claimants will claim damages regardless.
5.7 Conclusions
In contrast to Europe, the United States private enforcement is dominant in fighting
cartels. The reasons can be found in the US history of lacking effective public en-
forcement and favorable instruments available to claimants in civil procedure: the
ability to claim treble damages, the right to compensation for attorney fees, the
possibility of class actions and the availability of far-reaching disclosure provisions.
Furthermore, the help of an insider – a leniency applicant with immunity – ap-
pears to be a valuable tool for a claimant seeking to claim damages successfully.
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The US system has multiple purposes: compensation, deterrence and punishment,
and also aims at being straightforward for claimants. From that perspective, it is
comprehensible that only direct victims can claim damages. Rather straightfor-
wardly, a direct victim can claim compensation for an overcharge even if the direct
victim passed-on part of the cartel overcharge to others. With the introduction of
the Illinois Brick repealer statutes by many states, however, the intended simplicity
of the direct purchaser rule is largely eliminated. The fact that indirect victims can
still claim damages in state courts creates a complicated situation, which is exactly
what the Supreme Court wanted to avoid. An obvious criticism of the direct pur-
chaser rule is that it precludes indirect victims from being compensated. This seems
inexplicably unjust, for one of the basic legal principles is that any injured party
is entitled to compensation. Moreover, it could lead to overcompensation. In Europe,
although it makes the litigation process more complicated, any injured party is
entitled to damages, including indirect victims. It is the essence of what the litigation
systems in Germany and the Netherlands are all about: ensuring a wrongful act
will not result in a victim being worse off. In these countries, claiming for damages
is not meant to serve as a deterrent, nor are litigants meant to serve as enforcers.
Concerning competition law enforcement, the United States clearly sees competition
law enforcement as a complete system that includes criminal law, administrative
law and civil law. In the United States, the system has a number of checks and
balances, and it is the court that sets the penalization. This is in contrast to what
occurs in Europe.
In Europe, public enforcement remains of utmost importance. It is common practice
to protect a leniency applicant from having its information disclosed to litigants.
Instead of a system where the various elements complement each other, in Europe
the litigation system and the public law enforcement system work in fact against
each other. The protection of a leniency applicant’s information from disclosure
during the litigation process does not help the claimant, nor does it provide safety
for the leniency applicant either. The decision of a competition authority could in
itself already be sufficient grounds for suing a leniency applicant. In fact, in Europe
the leniency applicant has often been one of the first to be sued, as it was considered
a relatively easy victim. It already confessed its involvement in the cartel (which
is made clear in the decision of the competition authority) and often the decision
of the competition authority is final for the leniency applicant with immunity but
not for the other cartel infringers.
Protecting the confidentiality of information and not providing additional incentives
for a leniency applicant in the private enforcement area could undermine effective
competition law enforcement in the following three ways. First, cartel infringers
may be less interested in applying for leniency because they risk several damages
actions. Second, as a result, cartel victims may not become aware of the cartel and
therefore may not be able to claim damages as long as cartel infringers refuse to
apply for leniency. Third, claimants may have difficulties in collecting evidence
for their claims because information is protected.
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Providing incentives in both areas of law, as done in the United States, has the
following advantages. First, there are more incentives for leniency applicants to
apply for leniency. Second, as a result, more actions could follow and more victims
could be compensated. Third, victims would be assisted in claiming damages which
could, as seen in the United States, even lead to more settlements.
In Europe, the benefit of such a system may even be greater because incarceration,
unlike in the United States, is not an incentive for applying for leniency. Whereas
in the United States the main reasons to apply for leniency are the threat of incar-
ceration and fines, and to a lesser extent a likely reduction in the amount awarded
in private litigation, in Germany and the Netherlands the main reason to apply for
leniency is the threat of fines. In Europe, if private claims against a leniency appli-
cant can be prevented or reduced, it is conceivable that this would be an extra in-
centive to apply for leniency. It might even have a greater effect than in the US
because the incarceration does not play the important role. This would possibly
result in more leniency applications, more victims being aware of being victim of
a cartel, and more victims being compensated for the loss suffered by cartel infringe-
ments.
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6.1 Introduction
Chapters 1 to 4 provide a broad overview of the competition law and leniency sys-
tems within Europe and the state of the private enforcement systems in both Ger-
many and the Netherlands. Chapter 5 describes the systems of leniency and private
enforcement in the United States and the main similarities and differences between
these and the previously analyzed European systems.
In this chapter, the most significant potential weaknesses and inefficiencies of the
European systems are set out, highlighting the bottlenecks and those areas where
improvements could be made, as well as the ways in which these improvements
could be achieved. In doing this, the solutions provided by the Antitrust Damages
Directive and by the system in the United States are examined and analyzed. Further
ideas as to how competition law enforcement could be made even more effective
are then discussed.
Chapter 6 starts by summarizing the main findings of the previous chapters and
focuses on the bottlenecks and solutions in order to take a step forward.
6.2 Main Findings
Consumers benefit when prices are set at an equilibrium in the levels of supply
and demand. A cartel results in a surplus to one of the parties, often the supplier,
and is therefore considered harmful to consumer interests.1261
One of the main characteristics of a cartel is that it is concealed from the public.1262
The severe penalties and negative consequences for the undertakings and private
persons involved in a cartel leads to the situation of cartel infringers doing their
utmost to keep the cartel hidden. Therefore, it is often difficult to detect the exis-
tence of a cartel.
See Section 2.2.1261.
See inter alia Section 2.1.1262.
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As seen in Chapter 2, an effective leniency policy is often required to detect a car-
tel.1263 At the European level, nearly 80 percent of cartel investigations result from,
or are assisted by, a leniency application.1264 Even if a cartel has already been de-
tected, a 100 percent fine reduction is still commonly provided. This reflects the
fact that even if a leniency application did not lead to the detection of a cartel, the
leniency applicant’s assistance is still considered important in proving the existence
of the cartel infringement.1265
A consequence of leniency is that at least one of the infringers (i.e. the party reveal-
ing the existence of the cartel and applying for leniency) will not be punished, or
rather will be punished only to a limited extent for the infringement. The general
reasoning behind leniency is that protecting consumer welfare and terminating a
cartel’s infringement with the help of a leniency applicant is more important than
fining the individual infringing offender.1266
Several economists have done extensive research on how to make antitrust enforce-
ment more effective.1267 Economists often start with the objective of antitrust law.
When is the law enforcement effective? The general conclusion is that the main
objective of antitrust law enforcement against cartels is to prevent infringement.1268
The assumption is that deterrence acts generally on a much larger number of po-
tential infringements.1269 Society enjoys larger savings in prosecution costs.1270
Therefore, Spagnolo for example concludes that deterrence is and must be the
primary objective of law enforcement and the foremost criterion for the evaluation
of its optimality and efficiency.1271 Several of these economists have designed ex-
periments and models to analyze the general deterrence and price effects of different
antitrust policies.1272 The overall conclusion is that schemes granting leniency to
the first wrongdoer who informs about the cartel and the other infringers, strongly
increases deterrence and therefore the effectiveness of competition law enforce-
ment.1273 Hence, leniency applicants are really important. Indirectly, the leniency
applicant appears to play a very significant role in antitrust damages cases as well.
In most cases, a damages action against a cartel infringer in the civil courts follows
once public enforcement action has begun.1274 It can be concluded that, in both
public enforcement action commencing with a leniency application and in those
cases where the competition authority is assisted in its investigation by one of the
See Sections 2.1 and 2.8.1263.
See Section 2.3.5.1264.
See Sections 2.2.1.2 and 2.8.1265.
See Sections 2.2.1.1 and 2.3.1.1266.
See inter alia Buccirossi, Marvão & Spagnolo 2015; Bigoni, Fridolfsson, Le Coq & Spagnolo 2015;
Marvão & Spagnolo 2014; Bigoni, Fridolfsson, Le Coq & Spagnolo 2012; Silbye 2011; Harrington
2008; Spagnolo 2008; Spagnolo 2005.
1267.
Spagnolo 2005, p. 7.1268.
See Section 2.2.2.3.1269.
Spagnolo 2008, pp. 264-265.1270.
Ibid, pp. 264-265.1271.
Bigoni, Fridolfsson, Le Coq & Spagnolo 2012, p. 369.1272.
Ibid.1273.
See Sections 4.2.2.1 and 4.3.2.1.1274.
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cartel infringers, the leniency application has an intrinsic value to the effectiveness
of private damages actions.1275
In the normal sequence of events, the leniency applicant informs the competition
authority about the cartel’s existence, after which the competition authority then
begins an investigation and eventually makes a decision whether to fine the under-
takings involved or the competition authority already suspected the cartel and the
leniency applicant then assists it in proving the cartel’s infringement. In both
situations the leniency applicant assists claimants in subsequent private enforce-
ment actions because the public enforcement procedure will then be used in the
private enforcement case. An effective leniency policy leads to effective public en-
forcement and, indirectly, to the possibility of victims being able to claim damages
and receiving compensation.1276
The facts show that in the current system of Germany and the Netherlands, an ef-
fective leniency policy is necessary in practice to obtain damages. Even if there is
a suspicion, it often appears difficult to gather information from offenders and
prove the offence in civil cases.1277 In the United States, more far-reaching instru-
ments are available to collect information from other parties. It is probably for this
reason, next to the historical background and financial benefits of claiming damages
and procedural assistance from the legislator, that private enforcement is not just
the consequence of public enforcement, but also has its own important independent
meaning for competition law enforcement.
As previously seen, a more productive leniency policy can be achieved in two ways.
As discussed in Chapter 2, in order for a leniency policy to function properly, it is
essential for it to be established and executed in a clear, predicable and transparent
way, with all undertakings being treated equally.1278 The leniency policy and
competition authority must be sufficiently “trusted” by the leniency applicant for
them to make a well-considered decision about whether or not to apply for leniency.
Secondly, leniency should be beneficial from a cost-benefit perspective.1279 There
must be sufficient incentive to apply for leniency.
During the last few decades, competition authorities and policymakers in Europe
have put a lot of effort into making leniency policy more effective.1280
Equality, predictability, transparency and certainty
Competition authorities and policymakers have put a great deal of effort into
making leniency policy clearer, more predictable and transparent, and also into
ensuring that all undertakings are treated equally.1281 For example, competition
authorities introduced a marker system for leniency applicants, which has the effect
See Sections 4.2.2.1 and 4.3.2.1.1275.
Ibid.1276.
See Sections 3.3.2.4, 4.2.3.3 and 4.3.3.3.1277.
See Section 2.2.3.2.1278.
See Section 2.2.3.1.1279.
See Sections 2.2.3.1, 2.3.1, 2.3.5, 2.3.6, 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.5.5.1280.
See Section 2.2.3.2.1281.
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of securing their place in the line, thus providing greater certainty in receiving
immunity or a reduction.1282 In addition to this, amendments to the leniency policy
text have made the level of fine reduction clearer, thus providing possible leniency
applicants with greater clarity as to what they can expect from a leniency applica-
tion. Furthermore, the different competition authorities within the EU have tried
to align their leniency policies. By removing discrepancies from individual leniency
programmes and introducing the short form, competition authorities have removed
some of the unpredictability and ambiguity, with the aim of making it easier to
apply for leniency and, as a result of this, making leniency policy more effective.1283
It is virtually impossible to identify exactly which of these changes has made these
leniency policies more effective. However, it is obvious that the number of leniency
applications has substantially increased in the past few decades.1284 These adjust-
ments combined, have resulted in many more leniency applications being submit-
ted, both at the EU level and in Germany and the Netherlands. This has, in turn,
led to both the detection and fining of many more cartels.
Cost-benefit analysis
Policymakers have also increased the penalties for infringers, whilst simultaneously
increasing the benefits for leniency applicants. Hence, policymakers created “bigger
sticks and sweeter carrots”.1285 The fines for infringing undertakings have been
raised, and in both Germany and the Netherlands natural persons involved in a
cartel can be fined now too.1286 Furthermore, the level of reduction in fines has
been increased to up to 100 percent of the fine.1287 This number creates a gap
between the treatment of the leniency applicant, especially the applicant with
immunity, and that of the other infringing undertakings. It makes it even more
advantageous to be the first to apply for leniency.
6.3 Bottlenecks
6.3.1 Introduction
Whilst the effectiveness of the leniency policies of the EU, Germany and the
Netherlands have improved tremendously, there are still elements of the leniency
policy and of overall competition law that could be improved.
6.3.2 The Unpredictability of Policy Rules
Chapter 2 explains how the leniency system is laid down in policy rules. These
guidelines for national authorities are established without direct democratic control
and do not bind authorities directly towards third parties. If a competition
authority does not act in accordance with the policy rules, a party should argue
See Sections 2.3.4.4, 2.4.3.3 and 2.5.3.4.1282.
See Sections 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8.1283.
See inter alia Sections 2.2.3.1 and 2.3.6.1284.
Cf. Harrison & Bell 2006.1285.
See Sections 2.3.1, 2.4.5 and 2.5.5.1286.
See inter alia Sections 2.2.3.1 and 2.3.6.1287.
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that the authority is violating the principles of sound administration. In some
situations, the authorities are allowed, at least to some extent, to deviate from
those policy rules. Moreover, policy rules can be implemented quickly and adjusted
without democratic approval. Additionally, the courts are not bound by them. All
of these circumstances create a degree of uncertainty.1288 This unpredictability is
further exacerbated if policy rules provide competition authorities with broad
discretion in the setting of fines and have a certain amount of freedom to reduce
the fines. It is particularly the latter that makes the exact advantages of applying
for leniency somewhat uncertain.1289
6.3.3 Independent Decision Makers
The European Commission has different roles. It develops legislation and edits
policy rules, investigates infringements and sets fines. There is no complete inde-
pendency for those who have to impose the fines. In the Netherlands, decision
makers are under the direct control of executives who are also responsible for the
investigations. These executives even have fine level targets to meet. The undertak-
ings involved could question whether the fine and the fine reductions are suffi-
ciently predictable, transparent and certain.
6.3.4 Differences Between the Leniency Policies
Another area that creates ambiguity, unpredictability and inequality, as well as
hindering transparency, is the differences between the leniency policies of the
various Member States.1290 The European Commission only provides markers to
the first leniency applicant, whereas in the Netherlands and Germany other leniency
applicants can also receive a marker. Also, fine reductions can differ from Member
State to Member State. Whether the European Commission or a national competition
authority deals with a case could make a huge difference to the fine amount. In
theory, a leniency applicant who is in fourth place could receive a reduction of up
to 50 percent of the fine in Germany, whereas an applicant to the European Com-
mission or the Netherlands could only expect a reduction of 20 percent or less.1291
As discussed in Chapter 2, differences in leniency policies also make it more expen-
sive and time consuming when applying for leniency. A special analysis of every
competition authority’s leniency policy is often required to decide whether or not
to apply for leniency.1292
6.3.5 Multiple Filing
Not only do the rules of different competition authorities differ from one another,
but as was seen in Chapter 2, it could also be uncertain as to which competition
authority will actually handle a specific case. This results in further ambiguity for
See Sections 2.3.5, 2.3.6 and 2.7.1288.
Ibid.1289.
See Sections 2.7.2 and 2.8.1290.
See Section 2.7.2.1291.
Ibid.1292.
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leniency applicants.1293 Leniency applicants do not always know exactly where to
secure their position in the leniency line. To make sure that a cartel infringer applies
for leniency correctly, it must apply for leniency with all the competition authorities
that could potentially handle the case. This is inefficient, particularly when different
authorities can raise questions and require supply of information at the same
time.1294 Such a procedure is also very time-consuming. Moreover, it is inefficient,
as it then remains uncertain as to whether these differing competition authorities
will actually ever act on the requested information.
6.3.6 (An Upcoming) Private Enforcement
Private enforcement of competition law in the civil courts has existed for a relatively
long time in both Germany and the Netherlands, but it has not often been used in
order to claim damages in cartel cases, until recently. The cases of Courage v Crehan
and Manfredi helped to create awareness of the existence of this tool to claim for
damages. The efforts of the European Commission in its Green Paper and White
Paper, the Antitrust Damages Directive and other publications have also broadened
this awareness.1295
In response to European developments, Germany introduced a special private en-
forcement framework relatively early, even prior to the adoption of the Antitrust
Damages Directive. The special provisions assisted parties to claim damages. In the
Netherlands, lawmakers have not provided the same certainty and assistance. This
certainty and clarity had to come, instead, from the case law of the Dutch civil
courts.1296 In the beginning of 2017, the Dutch legislator implemented the provisions
of the Antitrust Damages Directive into Dutch legislation. Since June 2017, the
German legislation was also adjusted.
These days, in Germany and the Netherlands, almost all private enforcement cases
relating to cartel victims claiming damages are so-called “follow-on cases”. These
cases almost always start with a leniency application, after which a public enforce-
ment case is initiated. The publicity surrounding the public enforcement case, often
resulting from the publication of a decision by the competition authority, gives
rise to private enforcement actions.
US lawmakers have correctly pointed out that the connection between public and
private enforcement is close.1297 As discussed in Sections 2.2.3.1 and 3.3.2.2, public
and private enforcement are closely intertwined, inter alia due to the existence of
the leniency programme. In most cases, leniency is needed for the detection of
cartels. Therefore, a leniency applicant plays a vital role regarding private enforce-
See Sections 2.6.5 and 2.8.1293.
Ibid.1294.
See Sections 4.2.1, 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.4.1295.
See Section 4.3.2.2.1296.
See Section 5.5.3.1297.
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ment.1298 The applicant makes people aware of the existence of the cartel and fac-
tually forms the basis for starting a private damages action.1299
Stand-alone cases regarding cartel infringements are uncommon in Germany and
the Netherlands. In these countries, the resistance to fishing expeditions and puni-
tive damages is gargantuan.1300 However, without the possibility of starting fishing
expeditions with extensive discovery rights and attractive financial provisions for
claimants (as is the case in the United States), stand-alone damages actions remain
scarce, and public and private enforcement cannot be considered equal to one an-
other. As long as such far-reaching discovery rights remain unknown and the An-
titrust Damages Directive does not steer Europe in that direction, then public en-
forcement, with its leniency policy, will remain the driving force in competition
law enforcement. Private enforcement in cartel cases is, and will remain, the last
enforcement step to undo the illegality by compensating the victims of the cartel
infringement.
The CJEU has noted that an upcoming private enforcement system, with damages
to be paid by leniency applicants, including paid by the immunity recipient, could
influence the effectiveness of the leniency programme.1301 This is what several
scholars also conclude. Several economists, based on economic research including
experiments and economic models, conclude that an upcoming private action may
indeed jeopardize the effectiveness of leniency policies, resulting in less effective
overall competition law enforcement.1302
This conclusion is congruent with the observations about the cost benefit analysis
as discussed in Sections 2.2.3.1 and 3.3.2.2. Because the effectiveness of a leniency
programme largely depends on its benefits to the leniency applicant, all the relevant
disadvantages that come from applying for leniency must be considered. If elements
exist, or develop, that could make leniency less interesting, then a solution could
help to prevent the effectiveness of the leniency policy from being jeopardized.1303
Applying for leniency would most likely lead to future private actions, which
though not a punitive fine, would certainly hurt the undertaking, as they would
have a negative influence on its financial performance. The same is true for other
additional costs, such as for legal assistance and advice, as well as those for the cost
of lawsuits and possible use of experts. With an upcoming private enforcement, it
is more likely that damages will have to be paid, at least in part, to the victims of
the competition law infringement. These damages could be very substantial if the
private enforcement system works properly and could be even more substantial
than the fine of the competition authorities, even in Europe where the fines are
astronomical.1304
See Sections 4.2.2.1 and 4.3.2.1.1298.
See Section 6.3.1299.
See inter alia Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs 2006, pp. 2 and 4.1300.
CJEU 6 June 2013 (Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie et al.), point 42; CJEU 14 June 2011 (Pflei-
derer AG v BkartA), points 26-32.
1301.
Buccirossi, Marvão & Spagnolo 2015, p. 2; Silbye 2011, p. 692.1302.
See Section 2.2.3.1.1303.
See Section 3.3.2.2.1304.
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The negative aspect of more private enforcement is even stronger, if the leniency
applicant appears to be an extra worthwhile party to sue. Prior to the Antitrust
Damages Directive, in Germany, as well as in the Netherlands, all cartel infringers
were jointly and severally liable.1305 The victim(s) could have decided to sue only
one party — for example, the leniency applicant for the overall damage. The main
advantage of suing the leniency applicant is that it will have already confessed to
the existence of, and its participation in, the cartel. In such circumstances, the
burden of proof can more easily be met for the claimants. This can therefore be
considered a drawback of applying for leniency.
In European cases, a related negative consequence relates to the “Masterfoods”
defense. A leniency applicant granted immunity is no longer obliged to pay a fine,
meaning that the applicant then has no reason to apply for judicial review of the
competition authorities’ decision. However, the other cartel infringers will almost
always do so. This implies that the decision for the leniency applicant with im-
munity could be final and irrevocable, whilst the decision for the other cartel in-
fringers is not. Because the decision for the other cartel infringers remains revocable,
national courts are prevented from taking decisions that could possibly oppose
that of the European Commission.1306 This could lead to a situation where proceed-
ings for the leniency applicant could go on, but remain on hold for the other in-
fringers. Because the cartel infringers are jointly and severally liable, claimants
could then focus solely on the leniency applicant and go on with the procedure.
For claimants, this could be an additional argument to focus on the leniency appli-
cant.
Potential claimants can delay starting a procedure and create all kind of costs until
the decision of the competition authority has become final and irrevocable and
certainty about the infringement exists. However, if the decision against the leniency
applicant is final and irrevocable, but for the others it is not, it could imply that if
a claimant decides to sue a leniency applicant, that claimant must sue the leniency
applicant prior to the other infringing parties to prevent claims being time barred.
It can be assumed that victims would like to secure their claim against the leniency
applicant and prevent the claim from being time-barred.
6.4 Steps Forward and Solutions
6.4.1 Introduction
This Section discusses possibilities to improve the effectiveness of leniency in order
to improve the effectiveness of overall competition law. Firstly, the provisions of
the Antitrust Damages Directive that influence leniency policy are summarized
below. Then the European, German and Dutch leniency systems are compared with
that in the United States, including by examining the characteristics of the Amer-
See Sections 4.2.3.2 and 4.3.3.2.1305.
See Sections 4.2.3.7 and 4.3.3.7.1306.
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ican leniency programme. Finally, additional alternative solutions that could make
leniency policy more effective are discussed.
6.4.2 The Antitrust Damages Directive and Leniency
6.4.2.1 Introduction
As discussed in Section 6.4.2, the Antitrust Damages Directive includes several
provisions that make leniency policy more effective. However, the Antitrust Dam-
ages Directive pays no attention to enhancing the leniency policy’s effectiveness
by improving its clarity and predictability or by securing the principles of equality
and transparency in the policy itself.
The Enforcement Directive Proposal could, if it would be accepted, provide more
guidance.1307 Although it is likely that the Member States will keep their policy
rules, the policy rules can no longer be adjusted that easily. They have to remain
in accordance with the Enforcement Directive. It provides more clarity and predict-
ability and secures the principles of equality and transparency. Unfortunately, the
other mentioned shortcomings are not resolved with the Proposal. The leniency
provisions of the proposed Enforcement Directive are in fact merely a copy of the
ECN Model Leniency Programme, which leaves much freedom to the Member States.
Although the Antitrust Damages Directive does not provide clarity, predictability
or secures the principles of equality and transparency of the leniency policy itself,
one of the main aims of the Antitrust Damages Directive is to maintain effective
public enforcement by securing an attractive and a productive leniency policy.1308
It does this by protecting the leniency applicant against private claims to some
extent.1309 It protects specific information, and partly removes joint and several li-
ability. This then makes the immunity recipient only jointly and severally liable
towards its own direct or indirect purchasers and providers and towards others if
no full compensation could be received from the other infringers.
6.4.2.2 Protection of Information of the Leniency Applicant
The Antitrust Damages Directive protects the leniency applicant by protecting the
leniency statement and some additional documents from disclosure until after the
competition authority has closed its investigation.1310
As discussed in Section 6.3, the Antitrust Damages Directive provides some protec-
tion but ignores the fact that the investigation and decision by the competition
authorities, as well as other information provided to the public, could already
provide an incentive for claimants to claim damages. It can, therefore, be assumed
that the provisions in the Antitrust Damages Directive do not protect the leniency
applicant from the adverse effects of applying for leniency. In fact, by applying for
See Section 2.6.5.1307.
See Section 3.3.2.2.1308.
See Sections 3.3.2.4 and 3.3.2.7.1309.
See Section 3.3.2.4.1310.
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leniency, more claims can be expected because the cartel becomes known to the
outside world, including to the victims that will possibly claim damages. The main
effects of the provisions regarding the protection of information are the protection
of the leniency statement and the protection of the investigation.
6.4.2.2.1 Protection of Investigation
Point 4.2 of the preamble of the Antitrust Damages Directive states that whilst an
investigation is going on, disclosure could hinder public enforcement proceedings.
Disclosure could reveal what information is in the file of a competition authority
and could therefore be used to unravel the authority’s investigation strategy. The
aim is not to hamper the public enforcement procedure.
6.4.2.2.2 Protection of Leniency Statement
The Antitrust Damages Directive makes clear that the leniency statement that is
specially prepared by the leniency applicant for the purposes of the application
and that describes the undertaking’s or natural person’s knowledge of, and role
in, the cartel cannot be used as extra evidence against the leniency applicant once
protected by immunity.
The aim of the Antitrust Damages Directive is to protect the leniency applicant
from being in a worse position than its cartel co-infringers. It assumes that a leni-
ency applicant assesses only whether it is in a worse position than its co-infringers.
For the effectiveness of the leniency policy however, it is relevant for the leniency
applicant whether applying for leniency implies that private actions are to be ex-
pected.1311 The protection of the leniency statement does not change that. In actual
fact, the provisions intended to protect a leniency applicant’s information do not
save the applicant completely from the negative consequences of applying for leni-
ency.
From the leniency application and the competition authority’s public enforcement
actions, the cartel will become public knowledge. Dozens of recent cases have
shown that this then appears to be sufficient reason for claimants to commence
litigation for damages.1312
Moreover, this provision protecting the leniency applicant from disclosure of the
information does not protect the applicant from disclosure of the information that
already existed prior to the leniency application. It is even uncertain whether the
corporate statement can be protected per se, or whether a case-by-case analysis is
necessary, as explained by the CJEU. In addition, after the investigation of the
competition authority, protected information from the grey list could still be
claimed and used in civil proceedings.1313 It could be argued that even more infor-
mation may have to be provided by the leniency applicant after the implementation
See Section 2.2.3.1.1311.
See Sections 4.2.2.1 and 4.3.2.1.1312.
See Section 3.3.2.4.1313.
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of the new Antitrust Damages Directive. This would make it less attractive to apply
for leniency as it could lead to more successful claims.
At the same time, it is questionable whether the new provisions will assist claimants
in collecting information and claiming for damages successfully. Information
asymmetry between cartel infringers and claimants continues to exist. This is espe-
cially the case where the cartel is undetected by public enforcement officials.
Claimants still have the obligation to present a reasoned justification containing
reasonably available facts and evidence sufficient to support the plausibility of its
claim for damages.
Sections 4.2.2.1 and 4.3.2.1 have shown that in practice in Germany and the
Netherlands, unlike in the United States, antitrust claims for damages are almost
always follow-on cases based on public enforcement investigations, information
and decisions. Inter alia because no far-reaching discovery rights have been intro-
duced, the Antitrust Damages Directive will most likely not change much regarding
the importance of public enforcement and information stemming away from that
procedure, in relation to successful private enforcement.
6.4.2.3 Partial Removal of Joint and Several Liability
A second instrument created by European lawmakers to protect the leniency appli-
cant, is limiting the liability of the immunity recipient.1314 In principle the immunity
recipient is relieved from joint and several liability for the entire harm and any
contribution it must make vis-à-vis co-infringers does not exceed the amount of
harm caused to its own direct or indirect purchasers or, in the case of a buying
cartel, its direct or indirect providers. To the extent that a cartel has caused harm
to those other than the customers or providers of the infringers, the contribution
of the immunity recipient should not exceed its relative responsibility for the harm
caused by the cartel. The immunity recipient remains fully liable to the injured
parties other than its direct or indirect purchasers or providers only where they
are unable to obtain full compensation from the other infringers.1315
At first sight, this sounds like it makes a huge financial difference in comparison
to the existing situation where all parties are jointly and severally liable. However,
in Germany and the Netherlands jointly and severally liable parties under normal
circumstances ultimately contribute the amount that they are responsible for. That
is to say that they do contribute for their relative part of the damage. In most cases,
it is therefore not immediately likely that a lot will change regarding the contribu-
tion. Moreover, it should be noted that in practice the group of direct or indirect
purchasers or providers of the immunity recipient as mentioned in Article 11 (4)
of the Antitrust Damages Directive could be a substantial group still. Only selling
See Sections 3.3.2.7 and 3.4.3.1314.
See Section 3.3.2.7.1315.
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one product once to a purchaser appears sufficient for the purchaser to claim full
compensation, including from the immunity recipient.
This new provision however does provide a few important benefits for the immunity
recipient. First of all, the immunity recipient can be sued by its direct or indirect
purchasers and providers. For other direct and indirect purchasers and providers
it is only liable if compensation cannot be received from the other infringers. With
regard to third parties, the immunity recipient has a contribution obligation to
other infringers to pay damages for its relative share of the damage. It means that
its potential exposure is, especially in first instance, more limited. Secondly, it
makes the leniency applicant less attractive to cartel victims as the target of the
litigation, as only a relative share of the damages can be recovered from the im-
munity recipient.1316 This could certainly be considered an advantage for the im-
munity recipient. As discussed above, the immunity recipient was often an attractive
party to sue, as it was jointly and severally liable and it had confessed to the cartel
and the decision was often already final because it had not appealed. This provision
could prevent a leniency applicant from being required to litigate first, and from
first bearing the risk that damages cannot be recovered from the other infringers.
It also prevents the situation in which the immunity recipient needs to pre-finance
all the damages and sue or implead the other infringers. In addition to the cost-
benefit advantages for the immunity recipient of both advantages described above,
the limitation of liability will also provide more certainty and clarity about the
amount of damages that could be expected if applying for leniency.
It should be noted that the immunity recipient could still be an attractive party to
sue because of other considerations. In international cartels claimants often first
analyze in which country they would like to start the legal proceeding and then
look at the parties they would like to sue. If the immunity recipient is incorporated
in the Member State where the claimants want to start their proceedings, the im-
munity recipient probably remains an attractive party as an anchor defendant.
One of the aims of the Antitrust Damages Directive, however, is to limit the differ-
ences between the Member States when it comes to antitrust damages actions. If
this goal is achieved, it could be argued that this – potential negative – forum-
shopping consequence for the immunity recipient will become less important.
6.4.3 United States Solutions
In the United States, an immunity recipient receives all the benefits, whereas the
other cartel infringers are left empty-handed and severely punished, often with
prison sentences. In Europe, subsequent leniency applicants receive reductions in
different “bands”. As there is no similar reduction for subsequent leniency appli-
cants, the competition authority also has a more limited discretion.1317 This makes
the system more straightforward and less susceptible to discussions on clarity,
predictability, transparency and equal treatment.
Antitrust Damages Directive, preamble point 38.1316.
See Section 5.5.4.1317.
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In the United States, leniency policy and private enforcement are attuned, as leni-
ency is also attractive in relation to private enforcement cases. In Europe, the system
functions such that private enforcement is seen as a risk inherent in an effective
leniency policy, whereas in the United States this risk is abated. In the United States,
a leniency applicant receives an additional bonus in the private litigation if it co-
operates with the victims of the cartel infringement. The immunity recipient, col-
laborating with claimants, is not jointly and severally liable for all damages and
does not risk the payment of treble damages, as its risk is limited to single damages
only.1318 Instead of seeing private enforcement as a negative, risky consequence of
applying for leniency, in the United States the leniency programme brings advan-
tages with regard to the effectiveness of private damages claims. The leniency ap-
plicant has the certainty that its damages will be limited to single damages. This
provides an extra incentive in applying for leniency and is a considerable advantage.
It is an advantage that can also be taken into account in the cost-benefit analysis.
Therefore, it could be expected to make leniency policy and overall competition
law enforcement more effective.1319 In addition to this, the difficulties regarding
information that has to be collected are less evident for claimants. The leniency
applicant is obliged to provide all the necessary information, which in turn makes
the whole information process for claimants significantly easier.
6.4.4 Thoughts on Further Improvements of the Effectiveness of
Competition Law Enforcement
6.4.4.1 Introduction
Based on the observations above, how can competition law enforcement be made
even more effective? In this Section possible improvements are discussed.
6.4.4.2 Binding Legislation
At the moment, the rules for receiving leniency are set out in soft-law policy rules.
Incorporating the leniency policy into legislation would be preferable in helping
to make it even more effective, although this would likely be less practical for the
competition authorities and policymakers. In general, it is more difficult to diverge
from hard law than it is from policy rules. Moreover, hard law cannot be so easily
changed and would also be subject to democratic approval.
It makes sense to implement leniency policy in hard law if leniency also starts to
play a role in other binding legislation. Where, under certain circumstances, the
positive consequences of applying for leniency are already provided for in binding
law, why is the cause of these positive consequences – i.e. applying for leniency
and receiving immunity – also not implemented in these provisions? For example,
with the new Antitrust Damages Directive, the applicant with immunity has special
privileges, including limitation of liability. As another example, in the Dutch Pro-
curement Act, the immunity recipient has other advantages, such as still being
See Section 5.5.3.1318.
Ibid.1319.
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able to join tenders, which will be more difficult for the other cartel infringers for
at least several years.
It appears that the European Commission shares this view, at least to some extent.
As described in Chapter 2, the European Commission recently spread a proposal
for a new directive inter alia meant to adopt the leniency rules of the ECN Model
Leniency Programme as the standard.1320 Although it is likely that the Member
States will keep their policy rules, the policy rules should be – if the Enforcement
Directive will be accepted – in accordance with the Enforcement Directive and
cannot be changed anymore that easily. They have to remain in accordance with
the Enforcement Directive.
6.4.4.3 Independent Decision Makers
As it is already the case in the German system, it would be preferable if the decision
makers setting the fine were completely independent from the investigating officials,
executives and policymakers. For undertakings, this could provide additional trust
regarding the competition authorities’ activities and the exact fines (including any
reductions) set by the competition authority.1321
The German solution, which is to protect decision-making officials with a “judge”
status appointed for life, contributes to this independent status. The decision makers
are not, or are only to a limited extent, dependent on others like executives of the
competition authority and policymakers. This creates certainty for undertakings
that are willing to apply for leniency. They will sooner assume that the decision is
taken solely on the merits of the legislation, policy rules and the case, and not
under pressure from policymakers, executives or investigating officials.
6.4.4.4 Fixed Reductions
We have seen in both the United States and Europe that the certainty of full im-
munity and the removal of discretion from competition authorities leads to more
leniency applications.1322 However, competition authorities within Europe still
have a wide margin to reduce fines for the second leniency applicant and other
later leniency applicants. This results in uncertainty, which could negatively affect
the effectiveness of the leniency programme and hence the competition authorities’
public enforcement task.
A competition authority should be prevented from misusing, or being expected to
misuse, its discretionary power by providing a lower reduction. By making these
elements crystal clear, the leniency policy would be considered more predictable
and transparent and would provide more safeguards for the equal treatment of
undertakings. All of these ingredients could help to create an even more effective
leniency policy.1323
See Enforcement Directive, chapter VI. See also Section 2.6.5.1320.
See Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.5.1321.
See inter alia Sections 2.3.1, 2.4.5, 2.5.1, 2.5.5 and 5.2.1322.
See Section 2.2.3.2.1323.
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To prevent ambiguity about the actual reduction, the reduction should be a binary
consideration. If the place in the line is clear, then the following questions remain:
is the additional information of value and did the undertaking fulfill all its obliga-
tions concerning leniency? If the answer to these questions is yes, then a fixed re-
duction should be provided.
6.4.4.5 Fully Harmonized Policy
Differences between Member States should also be removed. Until now, it has only
been possible to harmonize the leniency policies of different Member States to a
limited extent, using the recommendations and considerations of the ECN Model
Leniency Programme.
By using exactly the same reductions and conditions, a fully harmonized policy
would likely provide more clarity, predictability and certainty about whether the
principles of equality and transparency have been taken into account. This would
also be more cost-effective, as both the legal costs and the effort for leniency appli-
cants would be reduced. Cartel infringers would no longer need to be advised on
the policy in each Member State, as well as that of the European Commission.
Rather, they could receive simplified, general advice.
Unfortunately, the proposed Enforcement Directive of the European Commission
does not provide much more clarity, predictability and certainty. The leniency
provisions of the proposed Enforcement Directive are in fact merely a copy of the
ECN Model Leniency Programme which leaves much freedom to the Member States.
The freedom implies that important differences still exist between the programmes
of the different Member States, for example the exact reduction of the fine and
parties who can receive a marker (only the immunity applicant or all applicants).
6.4.4.6 One-stop Leniency Shop
The current ECN Model Leniency Policy does not provide a “one-stop leniency
shop”.1324 Predictability could be further enhanced by creating a system in which
cross-border cartels could be dealt with by applying to a single authority.
The European Commission holds that leniency policies are a key tool for detecting
cartels, and also holds that companies considering leniency need a sufficient degree
of legal certainty to be incentivized to cooperate with authorities.1325 Unfortunately
however, the proposed Enforcement Directive does not provide a one-stop shop as
instrument to provide an improved degree of legal certainty and being more
straightforward and more cost-effective.
See Section 2.6.5. See also CJEU 20 January 2016 (DHL v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato),
with opinion of Advocat General Wathelet of 10 September 2015.
1324.
European Commission 2017 (Proposal Enforcement Directive), pp. 3 and 5.1325.
233SYNOPSIS
6.4STEPS FORWARD AND SOLUTIONS
Currently, the cartel infringer has to apply for leniency in all Member States where
there has been a possible cartel infringement, as well as with the European Com-
mission. Furthermore, the leniency applicant could then receive questions from,
and be obliged to provide information to, several different competition authorities
at the same time. By dealing with the application for the whole of the EU in one
place, there would be more certainty for the undertakings involved. With a one-
stop shop, it would be up to the competition authorities to decide which would be
the best authority or authorities to handle the case. A one-stop shop would make
it easier, more straightforward and more cost-effective to apply for leniency.
If the Commission were to provide a marker (and not only for the immunity recip-
ient but for all (successful) leniency applicants) that would also be applicable towards
national competition authorities, then a one-stop shop would in fact be created.
The leniency applicant would then have to apply for leniency only once and the
competition authorities would decide which authority or authorities would handle
the case. The undertaking’s place in the queue would be secured in front of all
competition authorities.
6.4.4.7 Balancing the Leniency Policy and Private enforcement
Disclosure of leniency information
It is often argued that a disadvantage for leniency applicants exists when informa-
tion is disclosed from the competition authority's record. Protecting the corporate
statement is considered a panacea. However, it should be reminded that the
knowledge of a cartel decision of a competition authority often appears to be suf-
ficient to bring about damages claims, even without special information from a
leniency applicant. It means that the effectiveness of the leniency policy could
already be jeopardized when the knowledge of the cartel becomes public. This
happens when a competition authority makes a decision to start an investigation,
sets a fine and publishes (information about) the decision. At the same time, in
practice, claimants still face difficulties in collecting evidence. Although this does
not appear to stop them from claiming damages in follow-on cases per se, it makes
the procedure more complex, more time consuming, and more expensive.
Limiting liability immunity recipient
Under the Antitrust Damages Directive, a successful immunity recipient is in
principle no longer jointly and severally liable to all victims but only towards its
direct or indirect purchasers or providers and to other purchasers and providers to
the extent they cannot receive the compensation from the other infringers. This
could be considered an extra incentive to apply for leniency. However, in relation
to the damages that have to be paid in the end the effect of this provision appears
limited. The leniency applicant may assume that it still has to compensate for its
share of the damage and maybe even more if the other infringers are not able to
compensate the damage. The situation does only differ from what has been the
situation prior to the introduction of the Antitrust Damages Directive to a limited
extent. The main effect of the provision is that the immunity recipient is less ap-
pealing to sue at first instance.
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Public Enforcement v Private Enforcement
It becomes clear that in Europe, public enforcement and private enforcement
policies remain separate areas, whereas in the United States, policymakers have
established a regime where the two are closely intertwined and cooperate. Unlike
in the United States, a leniency applicant with immunity has no obligation to co-
operate with victims in their pursuit of compensation from the other cartel in-
fringers.
A system similar to that used in the United States, where the advantage in damages
actions is incorporated into the system, would give immunity recipients an extra
incentive to apply for leniency and would most likely make the leniency policy
more effective. In addition to this, as has been shown in the United States, it would
also make it easier for claimants to receive compensation and settle cases, as they
are then assisted by one of the cartel infringers.1326
In this context, a reference could be made to conclusions of economic research. To
optimize the attractiveness of the leniency programme and the antitrust aim of
deterrence, Buccirossi, Marvão and Spagnolo allege that for a leniency programme
to be optimal, the amount of damages the leniency applicant is liable for should
be minimized and the share of information collected by the competition authority
and made accessible to claimants should be maximized.1327 Based on their economic
models and experiments, it is clear that when liability risks for the immunity re-
cipient decreases, cartel deterrence increases.1328 They state that reducing the
amount of information victims of cartels can access and use in private damages
suits – as done in the EU solution as mentioned in the Antitrust Damages Directive
– will never lead to maximal deterrence.1329 In fact, the Antitrust Damages Directive
creates difficulties for claimants to receive information, preventing claimants from
successfully claiming full compensation. Buccirossi, Marvão and Spagnolo even
conclude that claimants are worse off under the new Antitrust Damages Direc-
tive.1330
It is interesting that the antitrust regime in Hungary already contained the idea of
providing protection for the immunity recipient in civil proceedings prior to the
introduction of the Antitrust Damages Directive. The immunity recipient only had
to compensate victims for the harm suffered as a result of the infringement if the
other infringers were not able to compensate the victims.1331 The Hungarian system
could be considered a variant to the United States ACPERA rules. The Hungarian
system has also removed a lot of the uncertainty for the whistle-blower. The im-
munity recipient had an extra incentive for blowing the whistle, and the protection
granted to the immunity recipient did not prevent the access to the information
See Section 5.5.3.1326.
Buccirossi, Marvão & Spagnolo 2015, p. 5. Cf. Renda et al. 2007, para 6.2.1327.
Buccirossi, Marvão & Spagnolo 2015, p. 14.1328.
Ibid.1329.
Ibid, p. 5.1330.
Ibid, p. 4.1331.
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and evidence to the competition authority.1332 The aim was to protect the leniency
programme, without preventing claimants from claiming for damages.
With the “Hungarian model”, the claimants could be compensated fully, and are
protected against payment problems if other cartelists (besides the immunity recip-
ient) are not able to compensate for the harm caused by the cartel infringement.
In such – almost theoretical – event, the immunity recipient could still be liable.
Of course, this brings some uncertainty for the immunity recipient but ensures
compensation for the harm caused by the infringement. In fact, it provides an extra
guarantee that everyone who suffers from a competition law infringement should
be indemnified.1333
It is worth noting that in the Green Paper of December 2005, the European Com-
mission mentioned the idea of reducing the damages paid by the leniency applicant
with immunity already, in order to make the leniency policy more effective.1334 In
the consultation round that followed, many parties gave their opinion about this
suggested solution. Some parties, among almost all – if not all – Member States,
were very much against this idea on the grounds that the public “immunity” should
be separate from the civil law system. Moreover, a limitation of liability for a leni-
ency applicant is undesirable as it could be considered as an undesirable extra bonus
for a cartel offender.1335 Others appeared less skeptical about this solution, including
the Max Planck Institute.1336 For whatever reason, most likely also because of the
critical notes from the Member States, the Member States that still had to approve
the Antitrust Damages Directive, the European Commission decided not to include
this possible solution in the subsequent White Paper or in the Antitrust Damages
Directive.
If, however, the intention of the Antitrust Damages Directive is, on one hand, to
prevent a leniency policy from being jeopardized by more private enforcement
and, on the other hand, to encourage victims of competition law infringements to
claim for damages, the obvious solution is then to provide leniency applicants with
an incentive to assist claimants with their antitrust damages actions with financial
benefits in return.
The immunity recipient should not have to compensate for damage, or only a
limited extent of the damage it normally has to compensate if it duly assists in the
civil proceeding. This would be akin to the United States model. The final calculation
of damages could be, for example, 50% of the damages it normally has to pay,
based on its own sales or market share. The obligation to assist claimants should,
like in the United States, be part of the conditions to apply for immunity success-
Buccirossi, Marvão & Spagnolo 2015, p. 4.1332.
Cf. CJEU 20 September 2001 (Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan), point 26; CJEU 13 July 2006 (Manfredi v
Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others), point 60 et seq; CJEU 5 June 2014 (Kone AG and Others v
ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG), point 21.
1333.
See Section 3.2.9.3.1334.
Ibid.1335.
Max Planck Institute 2006.1336.
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fully. The other infringers should remain jointly and severally liable for the complete
harm and would have to compensate for the overall damage.
Like in the Hungarian variant, in the – rather theoretical – event that the other
infringers are not able to compensate the victims, the immunity recipient should
still be obliged to compensate the victims. This will often only be a theoretical op-
tion, as most of the time the other infringers are individually or collectively able
to compensate for the complete harm. Such a clause provides more certainty that
every victim can successfully claim for compensation. Moreover, this – theoretical
– risk prevents immunity recipients from exaggerating the infringement and harm
caused in order to hinder their competitors in the civil proceedings, as the risk of
paying damages itself still lingers.
According to the mentioned economists, a complete deletion of the obligation to
compensate would make the leniency programme most effective. Even if that would
not be achievable, a reduction of the obligation to compensate also appears helpful,
certainly for the claimants, as can be concluded from the experiences in the United
States. Although some damages would still have to be paid, by providing a reduction
in these damages there would be two extra incentives to apply for leniency first:
firstly, as an “extra carrot”, the damages that have to be paid would be reduced for
the immunity recipient, and secondly, as an “extra stick”, the extra damages would
have to be paid by the other cartel infringers.
With a balanced system between leniency and private enforcement as described
above, every victim would still be able to receive full compensation. Moreover,
such a system creates an extra incentive for cartel infringers to apply for leniency.
Both solutions (hence the complete waiver or a reduction of the compensation
obligation) would not be in violation of the case law of the CJEU, which has made
clear that every victim of a competition law infringement should receive compen-
sation and that an effective leniency policy should be secured to safeguard the
public interest of effective competition. In fact, both of these goals will be achieved
to the maximum extent.
This suggested system does not introduce punitive damages, nor does it result in
overcompensation for claimants, which would be in conflict with Article 3(3) of
the Antitrust Damages Directive. In the suggested system, only the real damage
(cost, lost profit and interest) would actually be compensated. Moreover, it should
be noted that the obligation to pay more than the relative share of the overall harm
as individual infringer (what would be a consequence of the suggested system for
the other infringers), is not new. It is already possible for an infringer to be required
to compensate more than the share attributed to it. If one of the infringers is unable
to compensate its part of the damages, other infringers are required to bear that
part of the compensation as well, even if more than its relative part of the damages.
Granting a limitation of liability is, although uncommon, definitely defensible, as
the leniency applicant would not only reveal the cartel, and stop further harm for
the victims, but also provide support to the claimants in civil proceedings. In actual
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fact, the leniency applicant with immunity is the one who makes it possible for
claimants to receive compensation for the damage suffered. As a reminder, without
the leniency application, victims would most likely have been unaware of the
damage and would even have continued to bear this loss and damage for as long
as the cartel existed.1337 The suggested system could be compared with the rationale
of the administrative system of fine reductions in relation to the leniency policy.
In the Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines, the
European Commission alleges that detecting secret cartels is in the interests of both
consumers and citizens. Detection outweighs the interest of fining those undertak-
ings because otherwise there would be no enforcement activity at all. The same is
true when it comes to compensation. The overall interest of stopping further harm
and receiving full compensation outweighs the interest of claiming damages from
the immunity recipient.
If a system is introduced where private and public enforcement go hand in hand,
the United States system demonstrates that it is important for the policy to state
clearly what cooperation is expected from the leniency applicant. Several US legal
practitioners have noted that one of the weaknesses of the American system is that
the exact nature of the cooperation obligation of the leniency applicant with im-
munity is too vague and results in uncertainty.1338 The exact kind of cooperation
should be framed and demarcated. For example, the leniency applicant should be
obliged to provide its record as provided to the competition authority, to give its
input on the causality between the unlawful act and the harm and give its input
on the calculation of damages.
Masterfoods
Another identified hurdle for leniency applicants relates to the Masterfoods defense,
where the decision for the leniency applicant has become irrevocable but the de-
cision for the other cartel infringers has not. As stated in the preamble of the Anti-
trust Damages Directive the decision of the competition authority finding the in-
fringement may become final for the immunity recipient before it becomes final
for other undertakings, making the immunity recipient potentially the preferential
target of litigation.1339
A positive (side-)effect of (partly) removing joint and several liability for the im-
munity recipient, as stated in the Antitrust Damages Directive, is that the immunity
recipient is less appealing to claimants. Under the alternative system just presented,
the immunity recipient would become even less popular to sue, as the amount of
compensation that could be claimed from the immunity recipient would be even
more limited, and perhaps nil.
Limitation period
Furthermore, the special limitation period to assist claimants could be stipulated
more in favor of the leniency applicants and the claimants. The Antitrust Damages
See Sections 4.2.2.1 and 4.3.2.1.1337.
Hausfeld & Sweeney 2017, p. 9 et seq.1338.
Antitrust Damages Directive, Preamble point 38.1339.
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Directive does provide a solution for the limitation period for follow-on cases, but
it is rather complex and can differ per infringer. For example, if a leniency applicant
does not apply for judicial review, and other infringers do, then claimants will be
able to, and may be obliged to (based on the limitation period), claim damages
against leniency applicant earlier than the other cartel infringers that have applied
for judicial review.
In Germany, Section 33h (8) ARC under 1 provides a particular rule for victims that
cannot be considered as the direct and indirect purchasers or providers of the im-
munity recipient. It ensures that for such victims, the limitation period starts from
the end of the year when it becomes clear that they cannot receive compensation
from the other infringers. The advantage of this specific provision is that for such
victims, there is no need to file suit against the immunity recipient rapidly, without
knowing whether other infringers will compensate the damage just in order to
prevent claims from being time-barred. It also means an advantage for the leniency
applicant, as it could be expected that the immunity recipient will not be one of
the most appealing parties to sue first. The disadvantage is that immunity recipients
could entertain uncertainty for a long time about whether claims should still be
expected. Consequently, the file cannot be closed for a long time.
It would probably be more straightforward if, for example, the limitation period
was to end one year after the last decision regarding the cartel had become final
and irrevocable, irrespective of how long the public procedure(s) took. That is to
say, regardless of interruptions of the limitation period. This would give claimants
sufficient time to claim damages after the decisions has become final and irrevoc-
able. It would also provide defendants with the certainty that one year after the
(last) public procedure closes, the cartel infringers are known with the possible
antitrust damages claims. This could make it easier to settle to case.
6.5 Conclusions
One of the main difficulties with competition law is that so many aspects can in-
fluence its overall effectiveness. The introduction of criminal law sanctions or a
rise in private enforcement could influence the leniency policy and, hence, the
effectiveness of public enforcement. Protecting the information of the leniency
applicant could also influence the effectiveness of antitrust damages actions.
It is important to find the right balance. That is, a balance between claimants being
able to effectively claim damages and cartel infringers still having enough benefits
to continue to apply for leniency, and public enforcement policy, therefore, remain-
ing effective. This is imperative, because as this study shows, without leniency
applicants there would be hardly any private enforcement in Germany and the
Netherlands at all.
Even with the Antitrust Damages Directive, there is still ambiguity regarding the
liability of entities, the fact that decisions of foreign competition authorities are
not binding per se and how to calculate the relative share of the damage to be paid
by each and every infringer and the fact that it remains difficult for claimants with
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small claims to claim for damages collectively. However, the Antitrust Damages
Directive is a serious step in the right direction, as it provides better instruments
for the victims of competition law infringements to claim damages and a unified
approach for the EU. There are several elements that could lead to more effective
private enforcement: the presumption of damages in a cartel infringement, a pro-
vision for a special limitation period, the valuation of public enforcement decisions
and verdicts, the strengthening of indirect victims’ position and some unified rules
on disclosure of information. The leniency applicant with immunity also has a
better position towards claimants. This makes the leniency applicant less of an at-
tractive litigation target.
However, the introduction of the Antitrust Damages Directive may also have a
negative consequence for leniency applicants, because more claims could be expec-
ted and information, even relating to the leniency application, may have to be
disclosed and more claims in general could be expected. This could make applying
for leniency less attractive after a cost-benefit analysis, resulting in less effective
public enforcement and having the side effect of victims remaining unaware of
the infringement and, therefore, not being able to claim damages. At the same
time, protecting the leniency statement and other information may make it more
difficult to collect information about the cartel infringement for claimants. The
provisions should lead to more disclosure on the one hand, and on the other hand
prevent disclosure (whereby, it should be noted the prevention does not have the
effect that the leniency applicant will be protected against claims). The disclosure
system has something schizophrenic and in fact, it could be assumed that it helps
neither the leniency applicant nor the claimant.
By aligning the leniency policy, to a larger extent, with private enforcement and
providing a waiver or reduction in the damages to be paid by the immunity recip-
ient in return for requiring them to provide information to claimants about the
infringement, the effectiveness of the leniency policy and overall competition law
enforcement could be improved even further. In addition, more victims would
become aware of cartel infringements because of the more effective leniency policy.
When it comes to civil proceedings, the immunity recipient, who has a considerable
amount of the relevant information in most cases, would assist claimants.
As leniency appears to be the crucial fundament for effective public enforcement
and private enforcement, other measurements to improve the leniency policy could
also be considered or further developed. As discussed, a number of elements could
be used to make the leniency policy and hence ultimately competition law enforce-
ment more effective overall. With even more certainty, transparency, predictability
and better safeguards for undertakings to be treated equally, it could be possible
to make the policy even more effective. Fortunately, the European Commission
recently spread its proposed Enforcement Directive. Preferably, however, a new
enforcement directive should not only set out binding leniency rules, but also clear
self-explanatory reductions in fines, the same rules across the whole of the EU and,
preferably, the introduction of a one-stop leniency shop system for cross-border
cartels.
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7.1 Introduction
One of the main questions raised at the start of this study was whether a leniency
policy would be jeopardized by the emergence of private enforcement as an enforce-
ment tool. The answer is that if the cost-benefit analysis conducted by a leniency
applicant before applying for leniency is negatively affected, for example, because
of an increase in private damages actions against the leniency applicant, then this
will indeed jeopardize the leniency policy and, in turn, the overall effectiveness of
competition law enforcement. This is congruent with the observations of several
economists, who came to the same conclusion based on their economic models
and research. It also confirms what the CJEU and several legal scholars already
thought about the relation between leniency and (an upcoming) private enforce-
ment.
This study also investigates possible measures to prevent a leniency policy from
being jeopardized by the emergence of private enforcement as an enforcement tool
and to make the leniency policy even more effective.
7.2 Findings
As discussed in Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5, over the last ten to twenty years, both
competition authorities and policymakers in Europe have put a great deal of effort
into improving their leniency programmes. These improvements include the fol-
lowing: making leniency more financially attractive (cost-benefit analysis); improv-
ing clarity; increasing predictability; and securing the principles of equality and
transparency. This has resulted in many more leniency applications being submitted,
both at the EU level and at the national level in Germany and the Netherlands. In
turn, this has led to many more cartels being detected.
The leniency policy has proved to be successful. The European Commission has
stated that the detection of up to 70 – 80 percent of cartels is because of the exis-
tence of its leniency programme. Leniency is of the utmost importance in the fight
against cartels. In Germany and the Netherlands, these figures, according to the
national competition authorities, are not as high, but even in these countries the
importance of an effective leniency programme is acknowledged by the competition
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authorities. Even though the leniency policies of the EU, Germany and the Nether-
lands have improved tremendously, there are still elements that negatively influence
the cost-benefit analysis. Also, the lack of clarity and predictability in leniency
programmes and the sub-optimal guarantees to secure the principles of equality
and transparency are considerably hindering the development of a more effective
leniency policy. Five bottlenecks have been recognized.
The unpredictability of policy rules
Non-binding policy rules often provide competition authorities with broad discretion
in setting fines. In particular, competition authorities have a certain amount of
freedom to reduce fines. In turn, this makes the exact level of fine uncertain. This
unpredictability is further exacerbated if policy rules can be quickly implemented
or amended without democratic oversight and if courts are not bound by policy
rules. As a consequence, policy rules are less reliable than statutory provisions.
Independent decision-makers
The decision-makers of the European Commission and the ACM are under the direct
control of those who are also responsible for investigations into competition law
infringements. In the Netherlands, the government has even set targets for the
fines that should be issued each year. Undertakings could conclude that setting
and reducing fines also depends on elements lacking procedural fairness. If the
process of reducing the fine generates doubt and fear in undertakings, even if this
doubt and fear are unjustified, they consider the leniency policy to be less predict-
able, less transparent and less certain — problems that influence their decision-
making and the effectiveness of the leniency programme.
Differences between the leniency policies of different competition authorities
The differences between Member States, for example in de reduction of fines, also
create a lack of clarity, lack of transparency, unpredictability and inequality. Al-
though the leniency policies have been brought more in line through the ECN co-
operation process, practice has shown that differences still exist.
Multiple filing
Not only do the rules of different competition authorities differ from one another,
but it could also be uncertain which competition authority will actually handle a
specific case. This results in further ambiguity for leniency applicants. Leniency
applicants do not always know exactly where to secure their place in the leniency
queue. To ensure a correct leniency application, a cartel infringer must apply for
leniency with all the competition authorities that could potentially handle the
case. This brings uncertainty. Furthermore, it is inefficient and a huge burden for
applicants. This is particularly true if different authorities ask questions and require
information simultaneously from the same applicant and about the same cartel.
Balancing Leniency and (an upcoming) Private Enforcement
As shown in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, private enforcement has been an integral part
of competition law for a relatively long time in both Germany and the Netherlands.
However, it was rarely employed by the victims of cartel infringements before 2001.
The CJEU decisions Courage v Crehan and Manfredi, as well as papers and (draft) pro-
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posals for legislation produced by the European Commission, have all helped raise
awareness amongst the various parties of the existence of this area of law.
Within the European Union, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands
are the countries with the most private damages claims pending in the courts.
This study has shown that private enforcement cases for cartel infringements are
usually “follow-on cases”, i.e. litigation by private-sector parties commenced after
the public enforcement process of the competition authorities. Even more interest-
ingly, a leniency application assisted in uncovering or proving most of these cases
of enforcement by the competition authorities. The publicity surrounding public
enforcement cases and the information disclosed in them, often as a result of the
publication of a decision by the competition authority, appears to have given rise
to private enforcement actions.
Since the effectiveness of a leniency programme largely depends on its benefits to
the leniency applicant, all the relevant disadvantages that come from applying for
leniency must be taken into account. As shown in this study, the risk of damages
to be paid by the immunity recipient, could – certainly if private enforcement
evolves and does provide compensation for all victims resulting in an enormous
exposure for infringers – negatively influence the effectiveness of the leniency
programme.
This study also shows that claimants are heavily dependent on the information
provided by an insider. One of the difficulties for the victims of a cartel infringement
is that, without a whistleblower, the existence of a cartel is and often remains un-
known. Even if a cartel has been identified, there are many hurdles to prove that
it was responsible for the occurrence alleged by the claimant to have caused the
harm. With only a suspicion and without solid information, a claimant has no
option but to go to court if a suspected cartel infringer does not voluntarily provide
the claimant with the relevant information. Because of the uncertainty about the
outcome for information requests, possible compensation, the costs and efforts
involved in an application for disclosure, and the calculation and estimate of the
damage, victims are often hesitant about starting proceedings at all. In practice, it
appears that almost all damages claims are preceded by public enforcement pro-
ceedings. The public enforcement case provides the necessary information to make
it both possible and appealing for cartel victims to claim damages.
The information asymmetry, which puts claimants at a disadvantage, is partly re-
moved by the Antitrust Damages Directive. This is done firstly by presuming that
a cartel is harmful. It is then up to the defendant to refute this presumption. This
changes the legal positions of the claimant and the defendant and makes it easier
for victims to successfully claim damages. Secondly, the inclusion of special provi-
sions for indirect purchasers and providers also shifts the legal positions of defen-
dants and indirect claimants. This makes it easier for indirect victims to successfully
claim damages. Thirdly, the Antitrust Damages Directive makes clear what infor-
mation needs to be provided and states that almost all information, except for le-
niency statements and the settlement submission, can be disclosed.
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With the introduction of these new provisions, the amount of stand-alone cases
could possibly increase because of the special disclosure provision. However, the
new provisions do not provide many more disclosure opportunities than already
familiar to the Netherlands. From the victims, it is still expected to provide reason-
ably available facts and evidence sufficient to support the plausibility of the claim
for damages. Furthermore, it should be noted that with the new Antitrust Damages
Directive, there are no incentives to actively search for (new) infringements. As
long as the process does not have far reaching pre-trial discovery rights, compensa-
tion for the actual legal fees and costs, and treble damages, as there are in the
United States, a large increase in stand-alone cartel cases should not be expected.
Similar to the German and American systems, the Antitrust Damages Directive
contains a special limitation period provision that makes it possible to await the
outcome of a public enforcement case without risking the expiry of the limitation
period. This could be an advantage for claimants, who would then be able to await
the outcome of the public enforcement case without fearing that the limitation
period would expire. The new directive’s limitation period provision, however, is
not completely clear and could lead to a really long limitation period. This means
that for a long time, defendants will not be certain who will claim damages from
them. Moreover, the limitation period is still not the same in each and every
Member State. In practice, a long limitation period also prevents defendants from
being willing to settle because the fear exists that other claimants will stand up
afterwards. Furthermore, the limitation period could differ from infringer to in-
fringer because a decision could be final for one infringer, but not for the others.
The Masterfoods case was meant to provide clarity, to prevent difficulties and differ-
ences from occurring as a result of the various decisions of the European Commis-
sion and those of national courts. However, in private enforcement damages actions,
the Masterfoods defense often cause delays in civil proceedings. National courts
delay making their own final decisions in antitrust damages actions for as long as
the European Commission’s decision is not yet final. As public enforcement proce-
dures can take many years, claimants would then have to wait a long time for
compensation. The leniency applicant can also be disadvantaged in civil proceedings
because of its participation in the leniency process, because the enforcement de-
cision about it could be final before that of the other cartel infringers (if it has
chosen not to appeal). This has the unintentional outcome of making the leniency
applicant an appealing party for claimants to sue. That is the case even more so if
the limitation period for the leniency applicant ends earlier in time. The Antitrust
Damages Directive does not provide clarity on how national courts should deal
with the Masterfoods defense and the possible delays that can be caused in antitrust
damages actions when the court allows the proceedings to be delayed pending the
outcome of the public enforcement process. Indirectly, the Antitrust Damages Di-
rective does provide a solution for the first leniency applicant by partly removing
the applicant’s joint and several liability. This means that (in most cases) not all
claimants will be able to receive complete compensation from the leniency appli-
cant, thereby making the leniency applicant a less attractive party to sue.
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7.3 Recommendations
The Antitrust Damages Directive seeks to ensure the effective enforcement of EU
competition rules, firstly, by optimizing the interaction between public and private
enforcement and, secondly, by ensuring that the victims of EU competition rules
infringements can obtain full compensation for the harm they have suffered. With
these aims in mind, this study discusses several proposals to optimize the ef-
fectiveness of competition law enforcement.
To make the leniency policy even more predictable, it should not be incorporated
into the legal system in the form of ECN recommendations and policy rules, but
laid down in binding legislation. This would mean that competition authorities
would have to obey the rules, that both they and the policymakers would not be
able to change the rules so easily, and that it would be subject to democratic over-
sight. It would also mean that the courts would have to abide by the rules. For
cartel infringers, this would provide more clarity, more predictability and more
certainty that the rules are being applied in accordance with the principles of
equality and transparency.
Clarity, predictability and certainty would be further enhanced if the leniency
policy was based on binary tests for a reduction in fines in exact amounts, without
the competition authority having the discretion to decide the level of reduction.
The first undertaking to provide significant added information would, for example,
receive a set 50 percent fine reduction, the second a set 30 percent reduction, and
subsequent undertakings a set 20 percent reduction.
As is the case in the German system, it would be preferable if the decision-makers
setting the fine were completely independent from investigating officials, executives
and policymakers. For undertakings, this could increase trust in the actions of the
competition authority and in the exact fines (including eventual reductions) set by
the competition authority.
Differences in the systems of the individual Member States should be eliminated.
Until now, it has been virtually impossible to fully harmonize the leniency policies
of various Member States. A fully harmonized policy would more likely provide
clarity, predictability and certainty that the principles of equality and transparency
were being taken into account. This would also be more cost-effective, as both the
legal costs and effort would be reduced. Cartel infringers would no longer require
advice on the policies of each Member State, as well as that of the European Com-
mission, but could just rely on a single, simplified, general letter of advice.
Predictability could be further enhanced by introducing a “one-stop leniency shop”
for cases involving cross-border cartels.
In this study, it has become clear that the current ECN Model Leniency Policy does
not provide a one-stop leniency shop. The cartel infringer has to currently apply
for leniency in all Member States where the possibility of a cartel infringement
exists, as well as with the European Commission. Moreover, in the existing system
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an applicant may receive questions from, and have to provide information to, all
those various competition authorities at the same time.
With a one-stop shop, it would be up to the competition authorities to discuss and
decide which would be the best authority or authorities to handle a case. A one-
stop shop would make it easier, more straightforward and more cost-effective to
apply for leniency. A system dealing with the application for the whole of the EU
in one place would provide more certainty for undertakings, particularly with regard
to whether they would receive immunity or a fine reduction. A one-stop shop could
be achieved making it clear that the European Commission’s marker would have
effect in all Member States.
Regarding private enforcement, to receive compensation, it is first necessary to
have knowledge of the infringement that has caused the victims harm. Because
cartel participants operate under the radar and often do their utmost to keep the
cartel secret, it is difficult to become aware of these infringements.
The Antitrust Damages Directive provides a disclosure provision, making it easier
to receive information from cartel infringers. However, some kind of clear suspicion,
with facts, must first exist and so it remains questionable whether this will trigger
potential victims into starting stand-alone case proceedings.
With regard to the disclosure of information, it is sometimes argued that the dis-
closure of leniency information from the competition authority's record creates a
disadvantage for the leniency applicant. However, as this study shows, the attrac-
tiveness of applying for leniency could be jeopardized if the cartel becomes known
to the public, even without specific leniency information. This could transpire, for
example, through a competition authority’s decision to set a fine.
The risk of claims, especially if claiming becomes widely adopted and substantial,
may dissuade cartel infringers from submitting a leniency application and could
therefore undermine their willingness to apply for leniency. The risk of claims is
what matters for analyzing the risk of private enforcement, not the risk of being
in a worse position than the co-infringers. It highlights the link between public
and private enforcement. It also shows that protecting leniency information is of
limited relevance, as this information often appears unnecessary for claimants to
start proceedings per se. Moreover, the protection for the leniency applicant is
quite minimal. The leniency documents, with the exception of the corporate
statement, can be subject to disclosure, once the authority has closed its investiga-
tion or made a decision. Hence, in the end, most of the documents could be subject
to disclosure.
The solution brought in by the Antitrust Damages Directive is the partial removal
of joint and several liability for the immunity recipient. In principle the immunity
recipient is relieved from joint and several liability for the entire harm and any
contribution it must make vis-à-vis co-infringers does not exceed the amount of
harm caused to its own direct or indirect purchasers or, in the case of a buying
cartel, its direct or indirect providers. To the extent that a cartel has caused harm
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to those other than the customers or providers of the infringers, the contribution
of the immunity recipient should not exceed its relative responsibility for the harm
caused by the cartel. The immunity recipient remains fully liable to the injured
parties other than its direct or indirect purchasers or providers only where they
are unable to obtain full compensation from the other infringers.
In fact, the scope of the damages to be paid by the leniency applicant does not
differ much from the compensation it had to pay prior to the implementation of
the Antitrust Damages Directive provision. In the end, all cartel infringers should
pay their share of the damages. Even without the special provision on joint and
several liability, the contribution payable by the cartel infringers appears in many
cases not to be that different from the previous situation. This could be different
if one or more of the other infringers is/are not able to pay for compensation. In
such event, the immunity recipient could have a financial advantage in the new
situation.
Probably a more important benefit for the immunity recipient is that the immunity
recipient becomes far less appealing for claimants as a (full) litigation target because
it can only be obliged to pay a specific part of the compensation.
It remains questionable whether in applying for leniency these advantages would
outweigh the downside of having to pay – at least in theory – the damages caused
to their direct and indirect purchasers and providers and their relative share of the
damages to others than direct and indirect purchasers and providers. The contribu-
tion obligation could very well overshadow the potential fines of the European
competition authority(ies) in the future.
If the Antitrust Damages Directive were intended to prevent leniency policy from
being jeopardized, whilst at the same time to encourage the victims of competition
law infringements to claim for damages, the obvious solution would have been to
impose an obligation on a leniency applicant to assist claimants in their antitrust
damages actions. In return, the leniency applicant should receive an additional
bonus as an incentive to apply for leniency, such as a waiver or reduction of the
compensation that it would otherwise have had to pay.
Such a system similar to that used in the United States and the previous system in
Hungary would give leniency applicants an extra incentive to apply for leniency
and would most likely make the leniency policy even more effective. In addition,
it would also make it easier for claimants to receive compensation, as it happens
in the United States.
A special limitation period for antitrust damages claims is justified, because the
judgment in a private enforcement case can often not be treated separately from
the public enforcement case. The Antitrust Damages Directive does provide a
solution, but this solution has drawbacks: it requires a complex calculation; the
limitation period can be extremely long and the limitation period is not necessarily
the same for all cartel infringers and could differ per Member State. The long
period especially does not facilitate case settlement. It would have been more
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straightforward if the limitation period had been set to expire, for example, half
a year or one year after the last competition decision in relation to the infringement
has become final and irrevocable. Such a provision would be clear. For defendants,
it would become clear who might possibly claim damages half a year or one year
after the decision of the competition authority. After this period, the defendant
can settle disputes with claimants without fearing the emergence of new unknown
claimants.
The Masterfoods defense appears to be an extra hurdle for leniency applicants be-
cause it could potentially result in a situation where the decision for the leniency
applicant becomes final and irrevocable but the decisions for the other cartel in-
fringers are not. Claimants would then be able to claim from the leniency applicant
with immunity, but not yet from the other cartel infringers, as their decisions
would still be outstanding. To minimize the risk of being the first party sued civilly
for damages, the immunity recipient could appeal the decision of the competition
authority to prevent it from being placed in this adverse position. A positive side
effect of partly removing joint and several liability from the immunity recipient,
as stated in the Antitrust Damages Directive, would be to make the immune leniency
applicants a less appealing target for claimants, as only part of the overall damages
could be recovered from them.
7.4 Final Conclusions
The difficulty with competition law is that so many aspects can influence its overall
effectiveness. Sanctions in criminal law or the emergence of private enforcement,
for example, may influence leniency policy. In turn, public enforcement, whilst
protecting information, could also influence the effectiveness of antitrust damages
actions.
A comparison can be made with the board game “Pisa”. In this game, small figures
have to be placed at different levels of the Leaning Tower of Pisa, with the aim of
keeping the tower stable. When there are too many dolls on one side and not
enough on the other, the balance is lost and the figures topple off the tower.
Competition law enforcement is a leaning tower of Pisa. If the structure of an ef-
fective competition law policy is not sufficiently balanced between public and
private enforcement, then it will function less effectively than it could.
It is important to strike the right balance so that claimants are able to effectively
claim damages on the one hand, but cartel infringers remain interested in applying
for leniency on the other. The public enforcement system is effective only if in-
fringers apply for leniency and the same is true for private enforcement.
This study has demonstrated the absolute importance of leniency applications for
successful public enforcement, and indeed for successful private enforcement. It
can be assumed that without leniency applications there would be almost no private
enforcement in relation to cartels in Germany and the Netherlands. This means
that the primary focus of policymakers has to be on an effective leniency pro-
gramme.
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The Antitrust Damages Directive includes several provisions that make leniency
policy more effective. However, the Antitrust Damages Directive pays no attention
to improving clarity or predictability or to securing the principles of equality and
transparency in the leniency policy itself. Competition authorities continue to have
large amounts of discretion in how they apply the leniency programme. Significant
differences remain between the leniency programmes of the various competition
authorities. The Antitrust Damages Directive does not provide a solution for diffi-
culties relating to multiple leniency filings, or to the hurdles that multiple filings
can bring for cartel infringers who want to apply for leniency. The removal of these
hurdles would help create clarity and predictability and, in turn, could make leni-
ency policy even more effective. Unfortunately, also the Enforcement Directive as
proposed by the European Commission does not provide a solution for these differ-
ences and uncertainties.
It has been shown that the Antitrust Damages Directive does provide certain ele-
ments to protect the balance between public and private enforcement. On one
hand, it provides greater guidance and assistance to claimants, whilst on the other
hand it makes some attempt to protect the leniency applicant by safeguarding
certain documents and by removing joint and several liability to a certain extent.
This study has established that, in a cost-benefit analysis, the benefits for the leni-
ency applicant will be reduced as a result of the emergence of private enforcement.
The measures suggested by European lawmakers regarding the protection of docu-
ments from disclosure do not protect the leniency applicant. In fact, the suggested
system could be considered a lose-lose situation. The solution that would assist the
leniency applicant is the partial elimination of joint and several liability. However,
this provision does not, to a large extent, provide a financial benefit. The main
advantage would come from preventing the leniency applicant from being the
most appealing defendant to sue in the first place. Even if the new liability provision
provided a financial benefit for an immunity recipient that is sufficiently interesting,
it would be a win-lose solution. Cartel victims do not directly profit from the finan-
cial and other advantages received by the immunity. They are not assisted by the
immunity recipient.
One solution is that the first leniency applicant (i.e. the immunity recipient) provides
information and assistance to claimants in exchange for additional benefits, such
as a waiver or (further) reduction in the damages to be paid. Such a provision,
which appears to work in the American system and is supported by several econo-
mists in economic models and economic research, would help to balance the
overall competition law enforcement system.
Cartel infringers would then have an additional reason to apply for leniency, as
their liability for antitrust damages actions would be reduced. With such a provision,
the damages to be paid by the other cartel infringers will be higher (bigger sticks),
which means that being the first to apply for leniency is even more attractive
(sweeter carrots). If the immunity recipient assists in antitrust damages claims, it
would also become easier for claimants to effectively claim damages. This could
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lead to even more out-of-court settlements. Such a system could be considered a
win-win situation.
In this study, it is clear that an integrated approach of both public and private en-
forcement is needed. The two fields of law should not function against each other,
e.g. by protecting the leniency policy against civil proceedings, but work effectively
together by providing additional benefits for the immunity recipient and assisting
private claimants in antitrust damages claims. By doing so, an effective chain of
competition law enforcement could be created, starting with as many leniency
applications as possible, followed by clear and effective fines from the competition
authorities, and finished by compensating as many cartel victims as possible.
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Samenvatting en conclusies
De meeste beleidsmakers en wetenschappers zijn het erover eens dat kartels de
belangen van consumenten en de welvaart schaden en daarom hoge boetes vereisen.
Het blijkt echter nog niet zo eenvoudig kartels op te sporen. Deelnemers aan een
kartel worden daarom aangemoedigd bij de mededingingsautoriteiten het kartel
te onthullen. Zo hebben zij de mogelijkheid om bestuurlijke boetes te voorkomen
of te verminderen. Voor mededingingsautoriteiten is dit clementiebeleid een be-
langrijk instrument om kartels te bestrijden. Het overgrote deel van de Europese
kartels wordt zelfs via het clementiebeleid ontdekt.
Vooral aan het begin van dit millennium begon de Europese Commissie ook met
het aanmoedigen van de civiele handhaving van het mededingingsrecht, om in-
breuken op de mededingingsregels aan te pakken en consumenten te beschermen.
Volgens de Europese Commissie moesten slachtoffers van kartels worden geholpen
om civiele procedures tegen kartelovertreders te starten en om de schade op hen
te verhalen. De afgelopen jaren heeft de civiele handhaving een meer prominente
rol gekregen binnen het mededingingsrecht en de verwachting is dat de civiele
handhaving van het mededingingsrecht een nog prominentere rol zal krijgen.
Een probleem dat zich kan voordoen, is dat de civiele handhaving en het clemen-
tiebeleid elkaar tegenwerken. Een bedrijf dat clementie aanvraagt, is niet gevrij-
waard van civiele rechtszaken, aansprakelijkheid en schadeclaims. Een verschei-
denheid aan juristen en (andere) wetenschappers verwacht dat door meer civiele
claims het clementiebeleid minder aantrekkelijk wordt. Zelfs bij een 100% boete-
vermindering kan clementie minder interessant zijn, indien de civiele claims als
een zwaard van Damocles boven het hoofd van de clementieverzoeker blijft hangen.
Daarmee staat de Europese Commissie voor het volgende dilemma. Aan de ene
kant moedigt de Europese Commissie als beleidsmaker de civiele handhaving van
het mededingingsrecht aan. Aan de andere kant beschermt de Europese Commissie,
als ‘openbare handhaver’ van het mededingingsrecht, de functionaliteit van de
publieke handhavingsinstrumenten, en met name de aantrekkelijkheid van het
clementieprogramma, als middel om kartels te ontdekken.
In deze studie wordt onderzocht wat de relatie is tussen het clementiebeleid en de
civiele handhaving van het mededingingsrecht. Daarbij wordt ook gekeken wat
noodzakelijk is voor een zo effectief mogelijke algehele handhaving van het mede-
dingingsrecht en worden de regels voor publieke handhaving en private handhaving
in de EU, Nederland, Duitsland en de Verenigde Staten geanalyseerd en vergeleken.
Het Amerikaanse systeem voor clementie en civiele handhaving is daarbij als inspi-
ratiebron gebruikt en de systemen in de EU, Duitsland en Nederland zijn het pri-
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maire onderwerp van dit onderzoek, waarbij ook de recente Richtlijn schadever-
goedingsacties wegens inbreuken op het mededingingsrecht besproken wordt. De
auteur koos naast het Nederlandse systeem voor Duitsland en de Verenigde Staten
vanwege de geschiedenis en de ontwikkeling van het mededingingsrecht in beide
landen.
Binnen Europa is Duitsland een van de grondleggers van het Europese mededin-
gingsrecht. Volgens verschillende Duitse wetenschappers was het Europese mede-
dingingsbeleid aanvankelijk gemodelleerd naar het Duitse mededingingsbeleid.
Ook nu nog houden Duitse economen en juristen levendige discussies over het
mededingingsrecht. Ze hebben grondig onderzoek gedaan naar de effecten van het
clementiebeleid en de private handhaving en er in Duitsland veel kartelschadeclaims
in behandeling zijn. Bovendien is Duitsland interessant omdat het als een van de
eerste landen in Europa speciale bepalingen invoerde in de wetgeving ten behoeve
van een effectievere civiele handhaving. Duitsland is ook om andere redenen inte-
ressant. De Duitse mededingingsautoriteit bestaat al meer dan vijftig jaar, veel
langer dan de Nederlandse autoriteit. Bovendien keek de Nederlandse wetgever bij
het creëren van de Nederlandse Mededingingswet ook nauwlettend naar het Duitse
systeem.
Amerikaanse mededingingswetgeving, oftewel ‘antitrustwetgeving’ waarnaar in
de Verenigde Staten wordt verwezen, evolueerde al aan het einde van de negentien-
de eeuw vanwege de gevoelde noodzaak om de consument te beschermen tegen
de ongebreidelde uitbreiding, samenwerking en consolidatie van bedrijven als gevolg
van de industrialisatie. Sindsdien is de Amerikaanse antitrustwetgeving een voor-
beeld voor de rest van de wereld geworden om een concurrerende markt te hand-
haven en consumenten te beschermen tegen concurrentieverstorend gedrag. De
Verenigde Staten zijn onder meer interessant vanwege de ervaring met kartelscha-
declaims, collectieve acties, het systeem van punitieve schade, de hulp van claimen-
de partijen door clementieverzoekers en het verregaande disclosure regime. De
Amerikaanse antitrustwetgeving wordt bestudeerd om lessen te trekken met het
oog op de civiele handhaving in de EU.
In deze studie wordt het absolute belang van een goed werkend clementiebeleid
voor de succesvolle publieke handhaving en zelfs voor de succesvolle private
handhaving van het mededingingsrecht duidelijk. Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat er
zonder clementieverzoeken nauwelijks civiele handhaving in Duitsland en
Nederland zou plaatsvinden. De auteur komt dan ook tot de conclusie dat – om
de effectiviteit van het mededingingsrecht te beschermen of te verbeteren – de
focus van beleidsmakers op een effectief clementieprogramma zal moeten (blijven)
liggen.
Het onderzoek laat zien dat een clementiebeleid effectiever wordt naarmate de
volgende twee voorwaarden beter worden ingevuld. (i) Op basis van een kosten-
batenanalyse moet het doen van clementie zo aantrekkelijk mogelijk zijn en (ii) het
beleid moet de beginselen van gelijkheid, transparantie, voorspelbaarheid en
rechtszekerheid in acht nemen. Hoe beter deze voorwaarden worden ingevuld,
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hoe effectiever het clementiebeleid en daarmee ook de handhaving van het mede-
dingingsrecht zal zijn.
Er lijkt nog ruimte te zijn om deze voorwaarden beter in te vullen. De auteur
concludeert onder meer dat mededingingsautoriteiten in Europa nog altijd een
grote discretionaire bevoegdheid hebben bij de manier waarop zij het clementie-
programma toepassen. Het gaat dan bijvoorbeeld over de relatieve vrijheid bij de
toe te passen boeteverminderingen. Dit komt de transparantie, voorspelbaarheid
en rechtszekerheid niet per se ten goede. Er blijven bovendien aanzienlijke verschil-
len te bestaan tussen de clementieprogramma's van de verschillende mededingings-
autoriteiten. Het wegnemen van de onduidelijkheden en onvoorspelbaarheden
zou het clementiebeleid effectiever kunnen maken.
Helaas biedt ook de door de Europese Commissie voorgestelde Richtlijn schadever-
goedingsacties wegens overtredingen op de mededingingsregels geen oplossing
voor deze verschillen en onzekerheden.
Deze studie laat zien dat de voordelen voor de clementieverzoeker zullen afnemen
als gevolg van meer private handhaving. Dat heeft een negatief effect op de tweede
voorwaarde: de kosten-batenanalyse, en daarmee tevens op de effectiviteit van het
clementiebeleid.
In het kader van de kosten-batenanalyse is met de Richtlijn schadevergoedingsacties
wegens overtredingen op de mededingingsregels getracht het clementiebeleid zo
aantrekkelijk mogelijk te houden en de nadelen van de civiele handhaving te mi-
nimaliseren. Het onderzoek laat echter zien dat de door de Europese wetgever ge-
nomen maatregelen met betrekking tot de bescherming van documenten tegen
openbaarmaking de clementieverzoeker maar zeer beperkt beschermen. In feite
zou het voorgestelde systeem als een verlies-verliesoplossing kunnen worden be-
schouwd. Immers, de oplossing die de clementieverzoeker kan helpen, is de gedeel-
telijke afschaffing van hoofdelijke aansprakelijkheid en de bescherming van de
clementieverklaring. Hiermee is niet gegeven dat de clementieverzoeker met im-
muniteit minder schadevergoeding moet betalen. Bovendien betekent de bescher-
ming van de verklaring niet dat geen civiele procedures zullen volgen. Het grote
voordeel zou zijn dat de clementieverzoeker niet de meest aantrekkelijke gedaagde
is om in de eerste plaats tegen te procederen. Zelfs als de nieuwe aansprakelijk-
heidsbepaling een (financieel) voordeel biedt voor een ontvanger van immuniteit,
zou de gekozen oplossing hoogstens als een win-verliesoplossing kunnen worden
bestempeld. De slachtoffers van kartels profiteren niet rechtstreeks van de financiële
en andere voordelen die de immuniteit biedt. Anders dan in de Verenigde Staten
worden de slachtoffers door de ontvanger van de immuniteit niet geassisteerd bij
civiele procedures jegens andere kartelovertreders, blijft informatieasymmetrie
waarschijnlijk een belangrijke hobbel voor slachtoffers van kartels en blijft het
complex schade te verhalen.
Met deze studie wordt duidelijk dat een geïntegreerde aanpak van zowel publieke
als private handhaving nodig is. De twee rechtsgebieden mogen elkaar niet tegen-
werken, bijvoorbeeld door het clementiebeleid te beschermen tegen civiele proce-
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dures, maar dienen effectief samen te werken door extra voordelen te bieden aan
de ontvanger van de immuniteit en door slachtoffers bij te staan in schadevergoe-
dingsclaims met betrekking tot kartelschadezaken. Op die manier kan een effectieve
keten van handhaving van de mededingingswetgeving worden gecreëerd, te begin-
nen met zo veel mogelijk clementieverzoeken, gevolgd door duidelijke en effectieve
boetes van de mededingingsautoriteiten, en eindigend met zo veel mogelijk kartel-
slachtoffers die worden gecompenseerd.
Voorgesteld wordt in de studie dat de eerste clementieverzoeker (d.w.z. de ontvanger
van de immuniteit) aan eisers informatie en hulp verstrekt in ruil voor aanvullende
voordelen, zoals de uitsluiting van civiele aansprakelijkheid, althans een (verdere)
vermindering van de te betalen schadevergoeding. Een dergelijke bepaling, die
werkbaar lijkt in het Amerikaanse systeem en wordt ondersteund door verschillende
economen in economische modellen en economisch onderzoek, helpt om het alge-
hele handhavingssysteem voor mededingingswetgeving in evenwicht te houden.
Kartelovertreders zouden zo een extra reden hebben om clementie aan te vragen,
aangezien hun aansprakelijkheid voor schadevergoedingsacties met betrekking tot
antitrustmaatregelen verminderd wordt. Met een dergelijke bepaling zal de door
de andere overtreders van het kartel te betalen schadevergoeding hoger zijn (bigger
sticks), uitgaande van volledige compensatie voor alle slachtoffers. Dat betekent
tevens dat de eerste die om clementie verzoekt in een nog aantrekkelijker positie
geraakt (sweeter carrots). Als de immuniteitsontvanger assisteert in schadevergoe-
dingsclaims op het gebied van antitrustzaken, wordt het bovendien makkelijker
voor eisers om effectief schadevergoeding te eisen. De thans bestaande asymmetrie
wordt dan namelijk (in ieder geval grotendeels) opgeheven. Dit zou net als in de
Verenigde Staten kunnen leiden tot meer buitengerechtelijke schikkingen. Een
dergelijk systeem zou dus als een win-winoplossing kunnen worden beschouwd.
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